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This thesis explores why ethnicity was introduced as the basis for the reconstitution 
of the Ethiopian state in 1991, examining the politicisation of ethnic identity before 
and after the federation of the country’s ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ was 
instituted. The establishment of the modern Ethiopian empire state in the nineteenth 
century, and the processes of centralisation and bureaucratisation which consolidated 
it in the mid twentieth, provide a backdrop to an emerging concern with 
‘regionalism’ amongst political circles in the 1960s and 1970s. Ethnicity operated as 
both resource and product of the mobilisation by which the major movements of 
armed opposition to the military regime of the 1970s and 1980s, later the architects 
of ethnic federalism, sought control of the state. Under federalism through the 1990s, 
political representation and territorial administration were reorganised in terms of 
ethnicity. A stratum of the local elite of each ethnic group was encouraged to form an 
ethnic organisation as a platform for executive office. Meanwhile ethnic groups and 
their elites responded to these new circumstances in unanticipated but calculative 
ways, often radically reviewing and reconstructing not only their sense of collective 
interest, but also the very ethnic collectives that would best serve those newly-
perceived interests.  
 
The architects of ethnic federalism are influenced by a Marxist formulation of the 
‘National Question’ which incorporates contradictory elements inherent in the notion 
of ‘granting self-determination’: the conviction that self-selected communities 
respond better to mobilisation ‘from within’, in their own language, by their own 
people; and the notion that ethnic groups are susceptible to identification, definition, 
and prescription ‘from above’, by a vanguard party applying a checklist of externally 
verifiable criteria. These two sets of assumptions correlate with tenets of 
instrumentalism and primordialism respectively, which are, as they stand, equally 
irreconcilable.  
 
An investigation of theoretical approaches to ethnicity and collective action suggests 
that many conflate the ‘real world’ and ‘socially constructed’ referents of the ethnic 
profile of an individual (the constituents of the individual state of being an ethnic x), 
with the fully constructed collective accomplishment which creates members of an 
ethnic group (conferring the social status of being an ethnic x, of which those 
referents are markers). Differentiating the two, and exploring the recursive 
relationship between them, by means of a consideration of calculative action within 
the framework of actors’ categories (emerging from emic knowledge systems) and 
shared social institutions (premised, whether their referents are ‘natural’ ‘social’ or 
‘artificial’, on collective processes of ‘knowledge construction’), may improve 
analysis of the causes and operation of collective action associated with ethnicity and 
ethno-nationalism.  
 
Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia offered the prospect of a shift away from the ‘high 
modernism’ of that state’s past projects to ‘develop’ its people, apparently in favour 
of the collective perspectives of groups of its citizens. The coercive and 
developmental imperatives of the state that guided its implementation, however, have 
militated against the substantive incorporation of locally determined social 
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Acronyms, Glossary and notes on usage and orthography 
 
Acronyms  
AAU Addis Ababa University 
ALF Afar Liberation Front 
ANDM Amhara National Democratic Movement (EPRDF) 
ANLM Afar National Liberation Movement 
APDO Afar People’s Democratic Organisation 
BPLM Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement 
CC Central Committee 
COPWE Commission for the Organisation of the Party of the Workers of 
Ethiopia 
CSA Central Statistics Authority 
EC Ethiopian (Gregorian) Calendar 
EDAG Ethiopian Democratic Action Group 
EDC Ethiopian Democratic Congress 
EDORM Ethiopian Democratic Officers’ Revolutionary Movement 
EDU Ethiopian Democratic Union 
EHRCO Ethiopian Human Rights Council  
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front 
ENDP/O Ethiopian National Democratic Party/Organisation 
EOC Ethiopian Orthodox Church 
EPDM Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (now ANDM) 
EPLF Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (now Popular Front for Democracy 
and Justice, PFDJ) 
EPRP Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party  
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front  
ESLC Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate 
ESM Ethiopian Student Movement 
ESUNA Ethiopian Student Union in North America 
EUS Ethiopian University Service 
EUSE Union of Ethiopian Students in Europe 
FCSC Federal Civil Service Commission 
FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1995-present) 
GPDF Gurage People’s Democratic Front 
GPDUP Gurage People’s Revolutionary Democratic Movement 
HNA Harari National Assembly (constituent part of HPC) 
HNL Harari National League 
HNDO Hadiya National Democratic Organisation 
HoF House of the Federation 
HPC Harari Peoples’ Council 
HPR House of People’s Representatives 
HSIU Haile Selassie I University 
ICRC International Corp of the Red Cross 
IFLO Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia 
IGAD Inter-governmental Authority on Development 




KPDO Kambatta People’s Democratic Organisation 
MP Member of Parliament 
NEB National Election Board  
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NRS National Regional State: official title for the federated units of the 
FDRE, also referred to as ‘State’ or ‘Region’, or in Amharic kilil 
NUEUS National Union of Ethiopian University Students 
OALF Oromo Abo Liberation Front  
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
OLF Oromo Liberation Front  
ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front 
OPDO Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (EPRDF) 
PDOs People’s Democratic Organisations 
PDRE People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1987-91) 
POW Prisoner of War 
PMAC Provisional Military Administrative Committee (of the Dergue regime) 
PRA Peoples’ Representative Assembly (in Harar NRS, constituent of HPC) 
SALF Somali Abo Liberation Front 
SEPDC Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Coalition (or hibret)  
SEPDF Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
SLM Sidama Liberation Movement 
SNNPNRS Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ NRS 
SMDUP Sheko-Majangir Democratic Unity Party 
SPDP Somali People’s Democratic Party (former Ethiopian Somali 
Democratic League, ESDL) 
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
SPO Special Prosecutor’s Office 
TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-1995) 
TLF Tigray Liberation Front 
TNO Tigray National Organisation 
TPLF Tigray People’s Liberation Front (EPRDF) 
UCAA University College of Addis Ababa 
UOPLF United Oromo People’s Liberation Front 
USUAA University Students’ Union of Addis Ababa 
WIC Walta Information Centre 
WPE Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (of the Dergue) 
WSLF Western Somali Liberation Front 
 
 
Ethiopian terms *   
Afaan (Oromiffa) Lit. ‘tongue’; language 
Awraja Imperial sub-provincial district made up of several weredas  
Awrajawinet political/sentimental attachment to awraja, sub-ethnic 
nationalism 
Baito (Tigrigna) Kebele 
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Ethiopian terms *   
Barissa (Oromiffa) Dawn 
Blatta Title signifying learning, given in the twentieth century to 
senior government officials 
Debub South 
Dejazmatch ‘Commander of the gate’; imperial politico-military title 
Dergue Lit. ‘committee’; from ‘Provisional Military Administrative 
Committee’, used of the regime of 1974-1991 
Enset False banana; staple food in southern areas 
Gabbar/gebbar Tribute paying farmer, peasant, sometimes translated ‘serf’ 
Gada (Oromiffa) Age-grade socio-political system of the Oromo 
Gemgem[a]  Evaluation (Amharic/[Tigrigna]) 
Gragn ‘left handed’, used of Ahmed ibn Ibrahim-al-Ghazi (1506-43) 
Gunbot  Ethiopian month, approximately June 
Habesha Abyssinian 
Hamle  Ethiopian month, approximately July 
Hanfishfish (Tig.) Lit. ‘confusion’, used of 1976 period of division in TPLF 
Hibret Lit. ‘coalition’, used to refer to the SEPDC 
Hidar  Ethiopian month, approximately November 
Iddir Mutual savings association for funeral expenses 
Itihad (Arabic) Al Itihad Al Islamiya 
Jogol  Area enclosed within the walls at Harar 
Kebele Orig. small geographical unit; widely used after 
nationalisation of land to denote area of a peasant/urban 
dweller’s association during Dergue; also used of 
administrative council/committee of area unit. 
Keyi Lit ‘red’; ‘bright’ or ‘pale’ of skin colour 
Kifle hager Province (Dergue-era) 
Kilil National Regional State, NRS, federated units since 1995. 
Malkagna  Representative, patron, ‘lord’ (imperial-era) 
Me’isone All Amhara Socialist Movement  
Mereb Mellash ‘Beyond the Mereb River’, area roughly equivalent to Eritrea 
Misrak East 
Naft/neft  Gun, rifle 
Neftegna/naftagna Lit. ‘gun-carrier’; coloniser, settler, used of ruling class 
established in the wake of Menelik’s conquest in the south 
Negadras Head of merchants 
Negus/negusa negast King / king of kings, i.e. emperor 
Ras Lit. ‘head’; prince, lord 
Rest/rist Land owning system providing usufruct rights, and based 
around lineage; came to mean [inherited/inheritable] private 
property. 
Sabat/sebat bet Lit. Seven houses, used of Gurage clans 
Shanqala Lit. slave, used esp. of black populations of the western 
periphery 
Simien North 
Tehadso Renewal  
 
 12 
Ethiopian terms *   
Tekempt Ethiopian month, approximately December 
Teklai gezat Province (imperial era) 
Tikur Black 
Waagshum Aristocratic hereditary ruler of Waag province; below Ras in 
status; entitled to honours because of royal Zagwe descent  
Wegagoda Welaiyta, Gamo, Goffa, Daro (language or political party) 
Wereda  District 
Weyane  Revolt, rebellion, revolution; used initially of the 1943 
uprising in Tigray, and subsequently of the TPLF and its 
struggle. 
Yeqign ager Conquered land 
Yekatit Ethiopian month, approximately February 
Zemana Mesafent ‘Era of the Princes’, Mikhael Suhul to Tewodros, roughly 
1769-1855 
Zuria Environs 
* terms listed are Amharic unless otherwise specified 
 
No attempt has been made to adhere to a systematic orthography of transliteration in 
the English presentation of terms originating in Ethiopic script. Amharic and other 
Ethiopian language terms and names are rendered in commonly used and recognised 
English forms. This includes the less than desirable practice of adding English plural 
suffixes to Amharic words (weredas rather than weredawoch).  
 
This system has occasionally resulted in the Amharicisation of non-originally 
Amharic terms, notably, but not consistently, of the names of Ethiopian languages: 
Kaffaigna instead of the little known, but more ‘authentic’ Keffinoono, for instance, 
whilst the widely known Oromiffa is used in preference to Oromigna. The 
transliteration into English of Ethiopian ethnonyms enjoys a political life of its own, 
something not unrelated to the themes of this thesis: it is perhaps necessary therefore, 
to state at the outset that the choice of usage has been made here in an attempt to 
achieve clarity through familiarity, and not for any other reason. 
 
Amharic syllabic acronyms (such as Me’isone and Wegagoda) have been retained 
only where they are known in English, and no obvious English alternative exists.  
 
Ethiopian (Julian) calendar dates have been kept to a minimum. Where given they 
are marked EC. The Ethiopian calendar differs from the Gregorian calendar as 
follows: the year begins on 11 September, and is eight years (January 1 – September 
10) or seven years (September 11 – December 31) behind the Gregorian year. 
 
Ethiopian names are not based on family or surnames. For Ethiopian authors, 
therefore, bibliographical listings and references in the text do not invert first and 
second names, but provide both: author’s name followed by author’s father’s name. 
Other authors are listed by surname, with first names also included in references in 






In the early hours of 21 May 1991, Lt Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, President of the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, took off from Addis Ababa with his 
normal security entourage to visit a military camp in the southwest of the country. En 
route, the light plane was diverted to Nairobi, from where the President went into 
exile in Zimbabwe, ending seventeen years of military Marxist rule, and the so-called 
Dergue1 regime. A few hours later that day, a press release of the armed opposition 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF2) claimed that the 
forces amassed to defend the capital, remnants of the largest army in black Africa, 
had ‘evaporated like dew under a hot sun’ (Statement by the Supreme Council of 
EPRDF, 21 May 1991). 
 
Within days then-Prime Minister Tesfaye Dinka had left for London for US-brokered 
talks with the EPRDF, their Eritrean counterparts, and with the Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF). The talks were scheduled for 27 May. By then, however, the 
movements’ forces had captured the Eritrean capital Asmara, and stood encircling 
Addis Ababa’s Bole and Lidetta airports. No conference took place. Instead on 28 
May EPRDF troops and tanks rolled virtually unopposed into the city: along the 
meandering roads from the plains in the south and west, and down the twin routes 
over Mount Entoto from the north, converging, through the wide avenues of the 
sprawling city, on the old palace of Menelik II, where finally they met some limited 
resistance.  
 
Six weeks later, on 1 July, observed by envoys from 15 countries and a range of 
international bodies, representatives of 27 Ethiopian political organisations and 
groupings gathered beneath the imposing marble of the OAU’s Africa Hall, with its 
modernist echoes of Haile Selassie’s 30-year-old bid to preside over the resurrection 
of a newly emancipated continent. They met to agree upon a ‘charter’, a compact for 
government, which, given the de facto separation of Eritrea, would steer the 
                                                 
1 Amharic, meaning literally ‘committee’. For this and all other Ethiopian terms see the Glossary 
above. 
2 For this and all other acronyms see the list, above. 
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remainder of this large country through two further dramatic transformations over the 
forthcoming ‘transitional period’. The first was the reconstitution of the Ethiopian 
political and economic systems, now to be governed under a series of liberal 
institutions ostensibly designed to create an elected, representative, and plural 
legislature, independent judiciary, and accountable executive, alongside an 
extensively liberalised and privatised economy.  
 
The motivation behind the proposals for political and economic transformation in 
terms of liberal democratisation is readily apparent. Given Ethiopia’s recent past, all 
were aware of the one-party-state as the spectre at the feast. In view of the early 
1990s’ climate of political conditionality on aid, the demise of the Soviet donor bloc, 
and the parlous state of the Ethiopian economy, some form of ‘liberal democracy’ 
was pretty much the only option. In the event, the form of government approved by 
the conference enormously calmed the fears of the international community: all were 
conscious that its approval and support were requisites according to which the new 
government might stand or fall. The question then remained not so much why a 
strategy that looked liberal democratic was adopted, but quite what form of such 
‘democratisation’ would be implemented. 
 
The second radical initiative enshrined in the Transitional Charter of July 1991 was 
more surprising. This proposed to carve up the rump empire state into a series of 
federated units, each drawn up along the lines of the major language – or ethnic – 
groups living within its borders. According to its authors, the adoption of the 
Transitional Charter in July 1991 would 
 
start a new chapter in Ethiopian history in which freedom, equal rights 
and self-determination of all the peoples shall be the governing principles 
of political, economic, and social life […] thereby contributing to the 
welfare of the Ethiopian Peoples and rescuing them from centuries of 
subjugation and backwardness. (Transitional Conference 1991:preamble) 
 
The text continued with the affirmation of the ‘right of nations nationalities and 
peoples to self-determination’: 
 
To this end, each nation, nationality and people is guaranteed the right: 
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a) to preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and 
history, and use and develop its language; 
b) to administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and 
effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, 
and fair and proper representation; 
c) to exercise its right to self-determination of independence, when the 
concerned nation/nationality and people is convinced that the above 
rights are denied, abridged, or abrogated. (ibid.:Part One, Article Two)  
 
These moves to a system of federalism, which would base both constitutional 
provision and legal, political, economic, and administrative order essentially upon 
ethnicity, upon Ethiopia’s ‘nations, nationalities, and peoples’ (who were at the same 
time explicitly offered rights of secession from the arrangement), proved both 
controversial and – to many - unintelligible. Internationally and domestically it was 
seen as an eristic initiative, which set its face squarely against the integrationist 
nation-building currents then reaching a peak in other parts of Africa – most notably 
in Eritrea and South Africa, both of whose governments publicly expressed concern 
about the Ethiopian experiment. Given the ongoing disintegration of the former 
Yugoslavia, and the collapse and fragmentation, but persisting irredentism, of 
neighbouring Somalia, such an act of ‘ethnicising’ politics in Ethiopia - surely 
thereby of inflaming ethnic passions – appeared to many to be inexplicable, 
irresponsible and dangerous. 
 
* * * 
 
This thesis investigates how, why, and with what effect ethnicity entered the formal 
political arena in Ethiopia providing cornerstone and rationale for the reconstitution 
of the centralised empire state in 1991.  
 
The research considers this question in relation to the periods before and after the 
introduction of ‘ethnic federalism’ in 1991, and Sections Two and Three of the thesis 
are structured accordingly. Section Two (Chapters IV and V) looks back from 1991 
to consider the origins of the innovation; Section Three (Chapters VI and VII), 
meanwhile, looks forward over some of the developments of the subsequent decade, 




The history of the politicisation of ethnic identity before the federation of the 
country’s ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ was instituted, is considered in two 
parts. Chapter IV discusses the period of expansive conquest over the later part of the 
nineteenth century, which established the modern Ethiopian state as a multi-ethnic 
empire. The account briefly considers the controversial issue of continuities between 
the modern Ethiopian state and a series of ancient Abyssinian and Axumite polities. 
It considers the processes of centralisation and bureaucratisation by which the empire 
state was consolidated in the mid twentieth century, and a number of instances of 
local resistance to them. These factors provide a backdrop to an emerging concern, 
initially with ‘regionalism’, amongst the expanded political circles of the 1960s, 
which blossomed into full-blown divisions within the ‘Ethiopian student movement’ 
of the 1970s as to the appropriate application to Ethiopia of the Marxist-Leninist 
‘National Question’. Chapter V traces and discusses the evolution of the two 
significant proponents of ethnic federalism in 1991, both of which have important 
roots going back through the Ethiopian student movement: the EPRDF and the OLF. 
Ethnicity operated as both resource and product of the ethno-nationalist mobilisation 
by which these two major movements of armed opposition to the military régime of 
the 1970s and 1980s sought to win control of the state. The chapter considers the 
attempts to establish what Anderson (1991[1983]) has famously called ‘imagined 
communities’ in Tigray and Oromia, and the factors which may have influenced the 
differential patterns of success achieved. 
 
Section Three (Chapters VI and VII) considers how, under federalism through the 
1990s, political representation and territorial administration were reorganised in 
terms of ethnicity. Chapter VI looks at the various kinds of ‘ethnic mobilisation’ 
which EPRDF attempted to carry out in a range of contexts: in the multi-ethnic south 
of the country, amongst pastoralists, in the competitive context of Oromia, and in 
mixed urban areas. It considers the processes by which a stratum of the local élite of 
each ethnic group was encouraged to form an ethnic EPRDF member organisation as 
a platform for electoral competition and executive office. The account suggests that 
there is evidence that the degree to which the ruling party has been able successfully 
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to renegotiate political representation on its own terms correlates with the extent to 
which its processes of mobilisation got ‘under the skin’ of the collective culture and 
understanding of the groups in question. In doing so it draws both on interviews and 
existing ethnographic data on the areas under study. 
 
The thesis thus explores the implications of the juxtaposition of a range of 
understandings and discourses about collective identity. The architects of ethnic 
federalism are, it is suggested in Section Two, influenced by a Marxist formulation 
of the ‘National Question’ which incorporates contradictory elements inherent in the 
notion of ‘granting self-determination’. The first is the conviction that self-selected 
communities respond better to mobilisation ‘from within’, in their own language, by 
their own people; that this provides a morally superior, and practically more 
effective, basis for political recruitment, and mobilisation for collective 
advancement. The second is the notion that ethnic groups are susceptible to 
identification, definition, and prescription ‘from above’, by a vanguard party 
applying a checklist of externally verifiable criteria; that Ethiopia’s 'national' or 
'ethnic' groups can be externally identified and demarcated, and granted both the 
status of legal entity, and rights of self-determination. It is the combination of the 
two which suggests that grants of self-determination to Ethiopia’s groups provides a 
superior basis for state administration, whilst blurring the key question of how the 
boundaries and definition of the self-determining units are determined.  
 
The third section of the thesis, then investigates the operation of key premises of the 
currently dominant political elite, and those who are elsewhere often referred to as 
‘ethnic entrepreneurs’. The thesis considers their assumptions, and the resultant 
strategies of ethnic mobilisation and now federalism they have employed, against 
popular responses to them. It demonstrates that the political effectiveness of appeals 
to ethnicity lies, not least, in their capacity to invest politicians with the semblance of 
‘internal’ or ‘members’’ knowledge3, of speaking from within the collective system 
of belief of the population group they seek to mobilise, and documents a range of 
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cases in contemporary Ethiopia where this has, or has not, turned out to be the case. 
Where, as often, the primary dynamic of ruling party mobilisation has been ‘from 
above’, with its implementation formulaic and taking little account of the collective 
beliefs and perceived material interests of the ethnic group in question (the crude 
‘deployment’ of language group member cadres notwithstanding), its success can be 
shown to have been limited.  
 
Meanwhile ethnic groups and their élites have responded to the new circumstances 
presented by ethnic federalism in unanticipated but calculative ways, many of which 
have challenged the roughly-drawn map of self-determining ethnic territories set out 
in 1991. These processes are explored in Chapter VII. The chapter considers two 
exceptional instances where groups were, early on, successful in having historical 
factors taken into account in the demarcation process. It then reviews a range of 
territorial challenges and conflicts from the SNNPNRS, tracing the various factors 
which seem to have influenced the responses of ethnic elites, their co-ethnic group 
members, and the ruling and opposition parties. The account suggests that in 
response to the new opportunities and constraints offered by a form of federalism 
which renders a certain formulation of ethnicity both politically salient, and often 
apparently materially advantageous, Ethiopia’s ethnic groups have reviewed and 
reconstructed not only their sense of collective interest, but also, occasionally, the 
very ethnic collective ‘selves’ that would best serve those newly-perceived interests.  
 
* * * 
 
Another way of looking at the approach of the thesis is as follows. Section Two 
(Chapters IV and V) considers the circumstances and influences which inspired the 
introduction of nationality-based mobilisation (alternatively ‘politicised ethnicity’, or 
‘ethno-nationalism’) as the basis for opposition to the regime which held power up to 
1991, and as the cornerstone for the constitution of a new one since that date. Many 
accounts which, projecting chronologically backwards, seek to locate and explain 
                                                                                                                                          
3 As will emerge in Chapter II, below, I adopt throughout ‘the standard conception of knowledge as 
accepted or acceptable belief’ and not one in which the belief is ‘justified and true in some absolute 
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nationalist projects with reference to their inherited historical, ideological, and socio-
economic contexts, demonstrate a tendency to focus on ‘structural’ contextual 
factors, in the process divesting the analysis of an adequate account of the ‘agency’ 
of those involved.  
 
This tendency itself mirrors (and may to some extent be explained by) the natural 
inclination of the nationalist protagonists, or ‘entrepreneurs’, themselves. In seeking 
to justify their projects as ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’ and therefore ‘legitimate’, they 
often project the motivation for their adoption away from themselves and their fellow 
protagonists back onto the desirably ‘inherent’ or ‘natural’ constituent features of 
whatever context they operate in. Here the historian’s desire to explain that ‘it was 
so’ melds with the politician’s keenness to demonstrate that ‘it could not have been 
otherwise’ and was thus ‘rightly so’. In the Ethiopian case, scholarly - like official - 
responses to the question ‘why ethnicity?’ repeatedly offer such answers as the 
following: ‘national struggle was essential because of the suffering of our people at 
the hands of an ethnocratic state’; or ‘because the national contradiction had reached 
the pitch in Ethiopia where there was no getting around it’; or ‘given the 
circumstances, it was the right thing to do in the interests of social transformation 
and justice’. Dispute then hinges on the validity or otherwise of such claims, 
effectively reiterating battle lines which have become entrenched amongst Ethiopia’s 
radicals since Walleligne Mekonen’s famous 1969 student paper ‘On Nationalities’ 
ignited the debate: is it class or nationality (ethnicity) which rightly ‘comes first’ in 
Ethiopian politics in the late twentieth century? Or (in Marxist parlance), which is 
the ‘primary contradiction’?  
 
Whilst it is perhaps unremarkable that the leaders of nationalist enterprises (or indeed 
any other enterprise) present their activities in terms suggestive of their 
appropriateness, even necessity, the approach becomes a social scientific explanation 
of the operation of ethnicity less well. Nationalist accounts, in drawing a single 
causal arrow sharply and simply from pre-existing ‘nation’ or ‘national context’ to 
‘nationalism’, commonly rely on some form of ‘primordialist’ theorising. They posit 
                                                                                                                                          
sense’ (Barnes 1988:181n7).  
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the very entity many academic accounts now seek to problematise. Various of the 
problems associated with this kind of ‘true’ primordialism are discussed in Chapter 
II. A central one is that in considering the actions of a group of people, it loads what 
it imputes to be their ‘primordial inheritance’ with a weight of explanation it simply 
cannot bear. Most commentators now agree that the fact that ‘x is from this 
nation/ethnic group and as such bears the (apparently) inherited (and primordial) 
characteristics of her nationality/ethnicity’ is not likely ever to be a sufficient 
explanation of ‘x’s ethno-nationalist action’.  
 
Not only would recourse to this kind of explanation constitute a lapse into 
determinism, but (more seriously) it would be a lapse into a form of determinism 
which arbitrarily privileges one – and one particularly doubtful – category of causal 
antecedent (apparent biological inheritance) above, and to the exclusion of, all or 
many others. Much more insidious, however, has been the idea that although such an 
account is clearly not a sufficient explanation, it must somehow remain a necessary 
part of any explanation. Why else could politicised ethnicity, ethno-nationalism, be 
so powerful, if not at some level because of this link with ethnic ‘reality’? This is a 
notion that has persisted even in the face of repeated examples of perfectly good 
nationalist utterances and actions performed by non-nationals. If, however, social 
science is about the explanation of events and action, about tracing and situating the 
origins, emergence, interaction and significance, of their multiple causal antecedents 
to the greatest extent that this is possible, this kind of account will be uninteresting, 
presenting a set of pitfalls best avoided in looking into the antecedents of the change 
of power in Ethiopia in 1991. 
 
A symmetrical set of pitfalls seems to confront the second part of the investigation, 
set out in Section Three (Chapters VI and VII), into some of the consequences of the 
introduction of ethnic federalism in 1991. Here the research question looks forward 
from 1991, attempting to identify and account for the impact and results of the 
explicit introduction of ethnicity into political life, as well as what its architects 
intended by it. Here the obvious tendencies – shared by proponents and opponents of 
the regime alike - are all in the opposite direction: to stress the ‘agency’ of the new 
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political elite at the expense of ‘structure’ or context; to present all the consequences 
of their policy initiatives as caused and intended, as unconstrained by the 
circumstances within which they came about; and therefore to attribute blanket 
responsibility for all eventualities to that elite and its party of government, now cast 
as a fearsomely Machiavellian protagonist. So far from relying upon the resources of 
the primordialist, such an account likely clothes itself in a strong, and probably 
strongly teleological, brand of instrumentalism – and in doing so risks a lapse not 
into determinism but into voluntarism: all agency and no structure. 
 
There is no shortage of recent literature on Ethiopia under ethnic federalism which 
takes this kind of approach, deploying whatever problems have emerged during the 
period of ethnic federalism as evidence of the malevolence of the government and 
ruling party which introduced it (or – occasionally – claiming its successes as 
evidence of corresponding virtue). One of the core problems associated with 
instrumental analysis is in play here: the tendency automatically to ‘read off’ 
motivation for a particular action, the actor’s perceived interest in pursuing it, and its 
consequences, merely from observable circumstances – often also considered to be 
‘objective’ circumstances. As such it does nothing to take into account the 
knowledge base, or belief system, within which (groups of) actors operate. Ayele 
Gebre Mariam & Getachew Kassa (2001) is only one recent example of a genre 
which classifies contemporary ‘ethnic conflicts’ into those which can be understood 
as ‘arising out of federalism’, and those which have ‘other’ causes (land, water, 
language, or regional relations) (2001:9)4. Much of this literature is as politically 
‘engaged’ and motivated as are the propagandist accounts of the origins of ethno-
nationalism described above. 
 
The attempt to shift outside the terms of the oversimplifying dichotomy between 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’ thus provides the theme of another narrative: that of the 
move from activist to social scientific interest in Ethiopia’s politics. It has recently 
been suggested that continuing social scientific enthusiasm for ‘individual agency’, 
                                                 
4 In fact Ayele & Getachew’s account is an example of relative dispassion: others are less circumspect 
in blaming federalism for all of Ethiopia’s ills.  
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and its associated voluntarist discourse, serve a range of political and practical 
purposes, not the least of which are the retention of ‘morally or politically expedient’ 
ontological commitments (Barnes 2000:30), or the societal need to be able to 
identify, blame, and ultimately punish responsible individuals (ibid.:20). In what 
follows, I hope to show that perhaps the most influential feature of the context within 
which the calculative activities of ‘agents’ are embedded is the body (or system, or 
distribution) of ‘knowledge’ of the world collectively constructed, constituted and 
shared by the members of the group to which they belong, and that a research focus 
here can implicitly transcend the structure/agency dichotomy, rendering it redundant 
in terms of explanatory potential. 
 
In Sections Two and Three (Chapters IV-VII) which follow, I attempt to trace a more 
complex recursive pattern of influence as different social groups interact internally, 
with one another, and with their ‘real world’ surroundings. Methodologically, the 
development of this kind of focus becomes easier in the later chapters, which deal 
with the more recent period, and are based on research undertaken virtually 
simultaneously with the events documented, amongst participants in them. These 
methods are more likely to illuminate the emic perspectives in play than is the case 
with much of Chapters IV and (less so) V, where sources are either secondary, or 
primary interviews subject to significant and relevant re-interpretation with 
hindsight. In Section Three, the account of the mobilisation which EPRDF carried 
out in the southern and other parts of the country is interwoven with the responses of 
the communities in question, both based largely on primary data. As the account 
proceeds, it seems clear that the collective categories employed (government, ruling 
party, elite, ethnic group, etc.) are themselves overlapping, permeable, and – because 
continually self-(re)constructing – intrinsically shifting and soluble. As they tend 
periodically to soften and reform, with many members of ethnic groups interacting in 
new ways, joining the parties of government or opposition, and indeed other ethnic 
groups, it can be shown that the perspectives and interests of each ‘collective 
category’ themselves are thereby shifted in different ways.  
 




Here, one runs simultaneously into the limitations of both instrumentalism and 
primordialism: the activities of all parties are neither unconstrained, and explicable 
with reference to ‘objective material interest’, nor constrained, and explicable with 
reference to primordial inheritance. Less interesting than the operation of agents’ 
‘free will’, I suggest, is the recursive relationship between interacting collectives, and 
the circumstances they perceive - of which the actions, or pronouncements, of other 
collectives often constitute a primary part. Chapter II offers a discussion of theories 
of ethnicity, which proposes precisely the interaction that underpins and constitutes 
the collective, as a useful focus for its study. The chapter traces the influence of three 
dichotomies between the poles of which the theoretical literature on ethnicity has 
oscillated: the individual versus the group; the salience versus the content of 
ethnicity; and the primordial attachment versus the instrumental utility which 
ethnicity is thought to reflect. It seeks to reconsider these polar oppositions in the 
light of an approach focused on the social production of knowledge. 
 
The theoretical investigation in Chapter II suggests that many conflate the ‘real 
world’ and ‘socially constructed’ referents of the ethnic profile of an individual (the 
constituents of the individual state of being an ethnic x), with the fully constructed 
collective accomplishment which creates members of an ethnic group (conferring the 
social status of being an ethnic x, of which those referents are markers). 
Differentiating the two, and exploring the recursive relationship between them, by 
means of a consideration of calculative action within the framework of actors’ 
categories (emerging from emic knowledge systems) and shared social institutions 
(premised, whether their referents are ‘natural’ ‘social’ or ‘artificial’, on collective 
processes of ‘knowledge construction’), may improve analysis of the causes and 
operation of collective action associated with ethnicity and ethno-nationalism. 
 
In sum, then, the empirical account which this thesis offers points to an 
understanding of the policy of ethnic federalism, and of its architect, the EPRDF, 
whilst illuminating how little we yet know of the impact of either. The empirical 
work is informed by ethnographic literature on the interface between the modernist 
 
 24 
projects of state-orientated agents and those of rural peasant and pastoralist 
populations (cf. Donham 1999, Abbink 2000). Scott has suggested that the gulf 
between these two perspectives – ‘high modernist ideology’ and ‘mtis’ or ‘practical 
local knowledge’ – is at the root of the way in which ‘schemes to improve the human 
condition have failed’ (1998). This account provides some suggestion of the 
‘incongruent and incommensurate’ terms in which groups commonly perceive 
identity difference as a matter of kind or conceptual classification and not simply of 
degree (Anthony Cohen 2000), and of the difficulties this raises for policy makers, 
themselves incapable of adopting either the emic perspective of their citizens, or the 
(relatively) etic position of the analyst (Schlee 1994).  
 
The thesis explores the various means by which communities have sought to prime 
the inductive processes which performatively build the ‘social institution’ which is 
the collective, and define and delimit its identity. It therefore explores the great 
variety of initiatives and sources involved in the invocation of markers and 
precedents of the collectivity. In this context, the markers of the collective identity 
about which both group members and outsiders have beliefs/knowledge become 
important: the more ‘natural’ (rather than ‘socially constructed’) or historically 
compelling they look, the stronger the temptation to impute this ‘naturalness’ or 
historicity to the group identified: to impute to ethnic ‘status’ our intuitions about 
individual ethnic ‘state’ or ‘nature’.  
 
The account of the introduction of the ‘ethnic group’ as the basic unit of 
administration in Ethiopia, and of the ‘granting’ of self-determination to groups 
which may or may not have called for it, demonstrates the effects of juxtaposition of 
various different kinds of understandings about identity. Much depends on the 
relationship – and perceived relationship – between the identity existing (i.e. 
believed) within the group, and the identity proferred by the outside world. The 
thesis thus explores the significance of the nature of the overlap or hiatus between 
the 'knowledge systems' of ethnic group insiders, and relevant outsiders – in this case 
the state and dominant political party – regarding the range of identities and 
collectivities in question. Whilst the former can be seen to be largely incrementally 
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self-generated in continual response to perceptions of immediate circumstances, the 
latter is externally, often consciously, manufactured, proferred and prescribed. Once 
‘imposed’, however (and to the extent that this fact is ‘visible’ to the group) it may 
become simply another part of ‘what the group knows’, on the basis of which it 
forms its sense of interest. This may, in turn, involve modification of how the group 
defines itself, as part of the reconstruction of a strategy of collective navigation of a 
changed world. The evidence of such shifts of collective identity after the 
introduction of a policy of ethnic federalism in 1991 (Section Three), can perhaps be 
seen to contrast with the apparently more organic development documented in 
relation to the earlier period (Section Two), although the same responsive and 
recursive processes are in play.  
 
It is ironic that a policy – ethnic federalism - which embodies a strongly normative 
premise as to what constitute the ‘natural’ criteria of a ‘nation, nationality, or people’ 
(what is thought to ‘constitute’ that group as a nation, nationality, or people) can be 
seen to have elicited striking innovation in group internal self-definition and external 
self-presentation, the better to conform with (and operate within) these expectations. 
In other words it is the very ‘performativity’ of social construction involved in group 
formation that enables a policy based on the reification of ‘natural’ groups to look as 
through it is bringing about what it posits – a process which should in turn lead us to 
discount the validity of much of what it posits. The thesis suggests that ethnic 
federalism in Ethiopia has ‘ethnified’ Ethiopian politics, in the obvious sense that, 
amongst those who are aware of its provisions, federalism has made the ethnic group 
(‘nation, nationality or people’) a salient category – a ‘prominent solution’ – for the 
mediation of access to state resources and decision-making. Quite what then results 
from this fact, however, is far from automatic or clear, and depends on the local 
details of the interface between government pronouncement, policy, and activity, and 
local group dynamics, circumstances, interests, and responses: essentially on the 
recursive interplay of overlapping systems of knowledge. 
 
The thesis opens with an account of the events by which ethnic federalism was 
introduced in 1991 – of the innovation that bears investigation. Given a focus on 
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‘systems of knowledge’ however, it seems important, also to open with some account 
of the range of perspectives, analyses, and conclusions about these recent events of 
Ethiopian political history. Chapter I, therefore, also incorporates a brief review of 
some of the common perspectives on ethnicity in Ethiopia. This is intended as a 
further justificatory preface to the rejection of various of the theoretical positions 
reviewed in Chapter II, and further to contextualise the selection of this research 
question.  
 
There is no other single issue in Ethiopian politics as inflammatory and controversial 
as the ‘empowerment of ethnicity’, and the ‘self-determination of nations, 
nationalities and peoples’, unless it is perhaps the related question of the self-
determination of Eritrea. As far as Ethiopian domestic politics is concerned, 
however, the establishment of ethnic federalism is ‘the main event’, and its 
architects, the EPRDF elite, its clear protagonists. The system has now been in place 
for more than a decade, and has had a significant impact on the interface between 
state and citizenry. Without an understanding of this story, it is perhaps unlikely that 
much else about today’s Ethiopia can be adequately interpreted. 
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Section One: Setting the scene 
 
Chapter I. 1991: Redrawing the empire state 
 
This brief chapter focuses on the key events and themes of the change of power in 
1991 as the pivotal moment of convergence for the stories of politicised ethnicity in 
Ethiopia: the ‘neck of the hourglass’ into which prior histories fed, and from – or at 
least through - which subsequent evolutions flowed. It documents the extent of the 
consensus forged in favour of ethnic federalism, and traces elements of its 
implementation over the transitional period. The chapter is intended to provide a 
basic account of the events that need to be explained, of the emergence of politicised 
ethnicity onto the formal political arena as a basis for the reconstitution of the 
Ethiopian state.  
 
The account is couched in terms of representation and territory, the twin axes of 
government which formed the major parameters of transformation. They are referred 
to again in chapters IV and V, where the dynamics according to which they operated 
prior to 1991 are explored. Chapters VI and VII are then structured to provide an 
analysis of the results and implications of restructuring along these two axes. This 
chapter concludes with a note of the depth of controversy which currently attaches to 
ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.  
 
What happened in 1991 and after 
 
Co-opting the participants: reconstituting representation? 
 
A conference of political and ethnic groupings, convened within weeks of the 
collapse of the Dergue in July 1991, approved a ‘Transitional Charter’, committing 
the new government to a raft of principles outlining the directions in which it would 
move, and resigned itself to the de facto separation of Eritrea (Vaughan 1994). Most 
important of the new policy directions was, as already set out in the introduction, the 
recognition of the self-determination of ethnic groups, of ‘nations, nationalities and 
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peoples’, and legislating along these lines was one of the first tasks of the new 
parliament. 
 
Seats allocated in the new legislature, the so-called Transitional Government (TGE) 
Council of Representatives, reflected the political balance of power at the time, along 
with an attempt at comprehensive ethnic representation. EPRDF parties retained a 
substantial majority, alongside representatives of other ethnically based liberation 
movements to have opposed the previous regime5, a raft of newly-established parties 
representing the smaller ethnic groups6, and a number of new and older pan-
Ethiopianist groups7. The parliament elected the EPRDF chairman TGE President, 
and ratified a selection of ministers reflecting the hierarchy of influence across the 
spectrum of political organisations represented. Whilst EPRDF retained key 
portfolios (PM, Defence, Security, Foreign Affairs, etc.), the OLF were offered 
significant positions including Information and Agriculture, and remaining cabinet 
jobs were distributed amongst representatives of other ethnic groups.  
 
A Boundary Commission was appointed to draw up an ‘ethnic map’ delineating the 
borders of the new political units. On the basis of this new map, proclamation 7/1992 
establishing the new ‘National Self-Governments’ followed in January 19928. A 
National Election Board was set up, legislation drafted for the conduct of federal, 
regional (kilil), and district (wereda) elections, and the first regional and wereda 
elections were held in June 1992. A Constitution Commission was appointed to draft 
a range of constitutional proposals and questions for popular discussion, and 
subsequent debate and ratification by a Constituent Assembly, which was finally 
elected in 1994.  
 
                                                 
5 They included the ALF, BPLM, IFLO), Issa & Gurgura Liberation Movement, Ogaden Liberation 
Front (Horiale), OALF, OLF, SLM, UOPLF, and WSLF. See Vaughan (1994). 
6 Hadiya, Harari, Kambatta, Gurage, Omotic group, Welaiyta; those later granted TGE Council seats 
were Agew, Burji, Gedeo, Kaffa, and Yem. 
7 EDAG, EDC, EDU, ENDO. 
8 The original 14 units were reduced to 9 plus Addis Ababa when regions 7-11 (roughly 
Gurage/Kambatta/Hadiya, Sidama/Gedeo, Welaiyta/Simien Omo, Debub Omo/Konso, 
Kaffa/Sheka/Bench) were amalgamated to form the SNNPNRS, in 1992. See Chapter VII. 
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The constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, ratified in 
December 1994, came into effect following federal elections in mid-1995. It 
formalised the division of the country into 9 federated states (kilils or NRSs) 
‘delimited on the basis of settlement patterns, identity, language and the consent of 
the people concerned’ (FDRE Constitution 1994: Art.46, 47). It provides for the 
 
unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession 




group[s] of people who have or share a large measure of a common 
culture, or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a 
common or related identities, and who predominantly inhabit an 
identifiable contiguous territory. (FDRE 1994:Art.39) 
 
Meanwhile commissions had been established to negotiate the division of resources 
and responsibilities with the newly established Provisional Government of Eritrea; to 
manage the demobilisation of the army of the former regime, along with volunteers 
and disabled veterans from the EPRDF; and to organise the repatriation and 
resettlement of returnees (and refugees) from conflict in Sudan and a steadily 
disintegrating Somalia9. Food security policies and strategies were revised, with a 
new in-country network of emergency reserve stores established, and transportation 
privatised. Programmes designed to consolidate the independence and capacity of the 
judiciary, to train the police in methods appropriate to the new ‘democratic’ context, 
and to prosecute members of the previous regime alleged to have committed crimes 
against humanity, all billed as attempts to reverse a culture of impunity, were also 
enthusiastically supported by the international community.  
 
At the beginning of the transitional period, the diplomatic corps was pleased both 
with the liberal democratic nature of the political reforms undertaken by the TGE, 
and with the surprisingly inclusive manner in which they were being implemented by 
the coalition government. Those middle-class and ‘intellectual’ members of ethnic 
groups, particularly from the south, whom EPRDF had encouraged to form parties, 
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and join the TGE in senior positions, spoke of the ‘magnanimity of the EPRDF’ who, 
despite their decisive military victory, had apparently committed themselves to share 
power (interviews, TGE members and conference delegates, Addis Ababa, June-
August 1994)10. Many took the coalition at face value, and assumed that they were 
being offered a permanent ‘place at the table’ representing rural constituents amongst 
whom they had done little to mobilise political support or establish a party 
organisational infrastructure (Vaughan 1994). They thought of EPRDF as a northern 
party, and saw themselves as taking over a complementary role in the south, and on 
the peripheries.  
 
EPRDF moves south… 
 
It was only in the run-up to the first kilil (regional) and wereda (district) elections in 
mid-1992 that the extent of their miscalculation became apparent at national level. 
Despite considerable opposition from the OLF, It had been agreed in July 1991 that 
the EPRDF forces would operate as the national ‘army’ for the duration of the TGE. 
During the summer months of 1991 they fanned out across the south of the country 
into areas where they had not previously operated, often spearheaded by small 
numbers of specially-trained fighters originally from each local area in the south, 
who as Dergue soldiers in the 1980s had been taken prisoner in Tigray, and joined 
the EPRDF. They quickly established myriad local ‘peace and stability committees’ 
from amongst educated local people recruited on the basis of the acceptance and 
respect they seemed to enjoy amongst their communities. Those who had been 
members of the workers’ party of the former government (WPE) were excluded from 
government office, and a campaign to track down and arrest senior cadres suspected 
of involvement in Red Terror and War Crimes galvanised communities and detained 
several thousand.  
 
With the immediate task of securing the south of the country accomplished by 
August 1991, in a process further described in Chapter VI, EPRDF continued and 
                                                                                                                                          
9 President Mohammed Siad Barre had fled Mogadisho in January 1991, precipitating the collapse of 
central government in Somalia. 
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extended its mobilisation, encouraging those it had identified, and recruiting others to 
join the party, and establish local chapters of the front in each ethnic area. These 
parties, commonly referred to as PDOs, from the formulaic acronym which tagged 
each ethnonym, would mobilise, represent, and – after election – eventually 
administer their own ethnic communities under federalism. Thousands of young 
recruits went through EPRDF’s Tatek political training centre in 1991 and 1992, 
mostly drawn from Oromia and (what would become) the SNNPNRS, although also 
from the pastoralist peripheries. Elementary school teachers were targeted for 
recruitment as enjoying that ideal combination of close proximity and contact with 
rural populations, a degree of local respect because of their relatively educated status, 
and the uniform ambition to move on to positions enjoying better remuneration and 
conditions.  
 
… and the TGE disintegrates  
 
As these EPRDF activities began to run up against rival campaigns, tension mounted. 
The first instances of this were in Oromia, where the OLF, and also the IFLO and 
OALF, constituted seasoned and determined competitors (Chapter VI). The OLF 
nursed bitter memories of military and political collaboration with the TPLF in the 
early 1980s, and had been infuriated by the EPRDF’s establishment of the competitor 
OPDO in 1989/90 (Chapter V). Violent clashes between the armed forces of the two 
movements escalated as the elections approached. Finally on the eve of the elections 
the OLF withdrew from the government, announcing its inability to work with 
EPRDF, and decision to return to armed opposition. The civil war, which for several 
days threatened to engulf the country, failed to materialise. After three weeks the 
military threat posed by the OLF had been effectively defeated, and 30,000 of its 
fighters taken prisoner in re-education camps.  
 
As other non-EPRDF members of the government began to consider their positions, 
elections were held, the new PDOs were swept to power, and EPRDF was left in full 
control of local government throughout the four core regions of Amhara, Oromia, 
                                                                                                                                          
10 Interview methods and referencing are discussed in Chapter III. 
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SNNPNRS, and Tigray. Realising that, with federal elections, their influence and 
positions in government would vanish, other non-ERPDF members of the TGE 
began to protest the non-level playing field, and several withdrew. Some joined 
forces with a diaspora-based opposition bloc, which had been excluded from the 
beginning. They began calling for a process of ‘national reconciliation’ which would 
start the process of state constitution anew, incorporating those increasing numbers 
of actors who now operated outside the legal framework. Such attempts to undermine 
the legitimacy of the energetic process they had undertaken so far were anathema to 
EPRDF, and the rump TGE moved harshly to expel from parliament and detain 
members of those parties which had been involved in ‘illegal’ negotiations with 
armed opponents. Positions polarised. The remaining opposition parties were torn 
between risking all by withdrawing from the process and elections of 1994 and 1995, 
or lending a veneer of multi-party legitimacy to a process they now saw as vitiated, 
by continuing to participate in it.  
 
As TGE pluralism dissolved, observers questioned the capacity of EPRDF to work in 
coalition with other political parties. By the end of the transitional period, the TGE 
no longer looked like the magnanimous mechanism for power-sharing some had 
envisaged. It had, however, served a number of EPRDF purposes well. Firstly it had 
secured the support of representatives from communities all over the country, 
including all the major armed liberation movements, for the controversial new state 
structure of ethnic federalism. This consensus represented an important bulwark 
against the virulent hostility of sections of the nationalist urban middle class, who – 
unable to digest Eritrean secession - saw federalism as a further step in the 
dismemberment of the motherland. Secondly, the TGE won EPRDF a period of 
grace during which the new arrangement could be viewed by almost all sides (and 
especially the international community) as marking a distinct ideological break with 
the past, introducing pluralism, multi-partyism, inclusivity, and apparently ‘liberal’ 
democracy. Finally, it won for the EPRDF an essential breathing space within which 
it was able to establish and activate an infrastructure for political mobilisation in 
those core areas of the country where it had not previously operated. Thus the 
transitional period, with the involvement and even, initially, approval of many 
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outside the party, and with relatively limited visible recourse to violence, achieved 
the formula which has now become entrenched: a core administered by EPRDF 
parties, with a periphery administered by EPRDF affiliates or associates.  
 
The trajectory of the transitional period from 1991-1995 illustrates the difficulties of 
contemporary assessment of who gains what from changes to Ethiopia’s political 
arrangements. At the outset of the TGE the answer seemed to many observers and 
participants to be that the many small ethnic parties and liberation movements who 
became partners in government had gained very considerably. By the end of the 
period, however, it emerged starkly that it was the ruling party, the EPRDF, which 
had gained greatly from the legitimating collaboration of these other groups in its 
reconstitution of the state. 
 
Drafting the new ethnic map: reconstituting territory 
 
The visible involvement of non-EPRDF parties was most important in the drafting of 
the new ethnic map, since both the project itself, and the content of the decisions 
reached, were highly controversial. The Boundary Commission, which was 
established in August 1991, was composed of 10 members, and represented six 
political groups in addition to EPRDF: three from EPRDF, two from OLF, one 
Gurage, one Hadiya, one Harari, one Somali, and one Afar. The fact that there was 
'all-party' involvement in the negotiations was an enormously important coup for the 
EPRDF: whatever the subsequent complaints of the opposition, there were few from 
the TGE who remained external to the process of ‘founding’ the Federal Democratic 
Republic. In addition to its importance in implicating other players, the spectrum of 
participants provided useful dynamics in forcing compromise and getting decisions 
made quickly. 
 
All expected that the OLF would forward strong claims that a large disputed area be 
incorporated into Oromia, and it was politically important that these were countered 
not only by EPRDF, but also by a range of representatives from other ethnic and/or 
political blocs. The balance of actors from different ethnic constituencies (each of 
whom was encouraged to imagine they were fighting to maximise territory which 
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would then form their own ‘fiefdom’) effectively reined in the more ambitious 
claims of powerful players, whilst diffusing conflict within the group, and deflecting 
it away from the EPRDF. When the OLF representatives, for instance, claimed much 
of Amharic-speaking Wollo as ‘really’ (i.e. historically) Oromoland, the Hadiya 
commission member is reported to have countered that much of Arsi and Bale should 
then be regarded as ‘really Hadiya or Sidama’ (interview, TGE Boundary 
Commission member, Addis Ababa, 9 November 1999), and both suggestions were 
consequently dropped. The balance also lent a sense of transparency and legitimacy 
to the outcome, which could be said to have been ‘thrashed out around the table’. 
And finally, the involvement of a range of actors representing most parts of the 
country disguised the logical absurdity of ‘granting self-determination’ to groups in 
parts of the country which had neither demanded nor fought for it11.  
 
The Commission drew only the outlines of the regions, and left it to the regional 
governments to sort out their own internal boundaries. Problems arising along the 
borders between regions were to be settled at some future date by canvassing the 
relevant kebeles (local council units) and registering the preference of the majority in 
each. A draft map of 14 regions appeared in the Election Commission Bulletin, 
Issues 1, 2 and 3, towards the end of the year (Map 8). Bulletin Issue No. 4-5 (June 
1992), declared it to be an error and withdrew it, replacing it with a list of the 
numbered regions and the names of the nationalities included in each. No official 
map exists to date12. Difficult issues were postponed (as Dire Dawa), sidestepped (as 
Simien Omo), or siphoned off for separate negotiation by interested parties (as 
Harar). Some of these cases appear in Section Three. 
 
Whilst the states are constitutionally ‘delimited on the basis of settlement patterns, 
identity, language and consent of the people concerned’, it was current language use 
which became the single effective criterion applied by the commission, considered a 
more visible and conclusive marker than, for instance, history. The TGE 
Commission was dismissive of claims based on history, fearing their open-ended 
                                                 
11 Cf. Andreas Esheté (1992). 
12 The appended maps numbered 9 and 10 have no official status. 
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potential for dispute13, and preferring to deal in ‘currently verifiable demographics’ 
(interview, then-prospective EPRDF member of the TGE Boundary Commission, 
Addis Ababa, August 1991). Even this was not straightforward. The commission 
drew heavily on the work of the Dergue’s Institute for the Study of Ethiopian 
Nationalities (Chapter V), even including amongst its number one of its former 
research members. ISEN, in a much more leisurely study of the ethnic profiles of the 
country during the 1980s, had ‘found out that of the 580 weredas in the country, only 
around 30 odd were actually monolingual’. As a result it was concluded that 
‘language was not a good criterion on which to base an administrative division’ 
(interview, ISEN and TGE Boundary Commission member, Addis Ababa, 9 
November 1999). In 1991, however, there was not much argument about adopting 
this policy, only about certain of the boundaries, notably between Oromo NRS and 
Gurage, Sidama, Kefficho and Somali areas. The commission did some preparatory 
work to clear up these disagreements, and other issues were reported back to the 
council. Meanwhile, Bender’s 1976 language map was there for reference, ISEN’s 
copious research used to double-check its accuracy, and the work finished within a 
few months. 
 
There was a clear political rationale for such haste. All parties sought stability, the 
reduction of controversy, and the rapid and peaceful demarcation of the areas of local 
government, which each could then seek to colonise. By contrast, the subsequent 
periods of dispute, debate, violent conflict and adjustment associated with these 
boundaries continue to be protracted and painful. If ethnic groups select amongst 
historical precedents for markers and materials with which to categorise and label 
their identities and stake out their territories, the hasty administrative revisions of 





                                                 
13 Thus, for instance, the 1991 conference avoided historical discussion of the Eritrean issue (Vaughan 
1994:52) as likely to become mired in multiple competing narratives (Sorensen 1993:38ff.). 
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There is a torrent of conjectures on the motives and consequences of 
recognizing the right to self-determination. (Andreas Esheté 1992:8) 
 
I have already referred in the Introduction, above, to the deep-seated nature of 
disputes over the primacy or otherwise of the ‘national contradiction’ in defining the 
‘objective situation’ in Marxist analysis of Ethiopia. In Chapter II, below, I explore 
the notion of ‘performativity’ in categorisation: the idea that in classifying a set of 
events in a certain way we ‘make’ them as we have categorised them. This notion, 
however obscurely recognised, undoubtedly accounts for some of the vigour with 
which EPRDF and the TGE’s policy of ethnic federalism are debated, disputed, and 
attacked. The establishment of ethnic federalism explicitly institutionalises the 
politically salient classification of Ethiopia’s populations according to their ethnic 
profiles. How this is interpreted depends upon one’s political point of view. 
 
The official version: ethnicity as ‘conflict resolution’ 
 
The proponents of ethnic federalism, for instance, aver that ethnicity already 
provided the basis for political classification of Ethiopia’s populations before 1991: a 
discriminatory categorisation under an ‘ethnocratic’ empire state, intolerant and 
contemptuous of divergence from its core culture, and intent upon ‘nation-building’ 
centralisation. Ethnic federalism, according to its advocates, represents an 
improvement on this discriminatory situation, since the ethnic classification is now 
overt and egalitarian, backed by justiciable rights, and effective constitutional 
safeguards. As such the introduction of ethnic federalism is to be understood 
primarily as a mechanism of conflict resolution.  
 
This position – advanced by the government and taken up by many in the 
international community unwilling to contemplate the collapse of the lynchpin state 
of the Horn – is perhaps best set out in the words of the Ethiopian Prime Minister. 
 
From a purely legal point of view, what we were trying to do was to stop 
the war, and start the process of peaceful competition […]. The key cause 
of the war all over the country was the issue of nationalities. Any 
solution that did not address them did not address the issue of peace and 
war […] People were fighting for the right to use their language, to use 
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their culture, to administer themselves. So without guaranteeing these 
rights it was not possible to stop the war, or prevent another one. […] 
People were already expressing themselves even at that early stage 
before the conference in terms of nationalities: that is manifested in the 
way they organised themselves. (Interview, then-President of the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, August 1994) 
 
It is important to note that the critical issue, which divided the Transitional 
Government (then including the OLF and a number of other pan-Ethiopian and 
nationality-based organisations who subsequently left) from its opponents, was its 
assessment of the situation in Ethiopia at the time of the change of power.  Most of 
the government’s critics14 claimed that it was creating a problem where there had 
been none – that it was ethnicising Ethiopian politics where previously this had not 
been an issue. The government, pointing to the nature of opposition against the 
Dergue as evidence of the vehemence of the sense of ethnic oppression in many parts 
of the country, counter claimed that the only way of ‘lancing the pain’ was to address 
its roots directly, and meet demands for ethnic emancipation by means of a robust 
form of self-determination. Whatever the merits of ethnic federalism, there is no 
doubt that ethnicity had by 1991 long become a significant factor in shaping many if 
not most of the various power struggles waged by armed ‘liberation movements’ in 
different parts of Ethiopia, and was understood as such, at least by their active and 
elite participants. 
 
Counter views: the inevitability of ethnic conflict  
 
The opponents of ethnic federalism dispute the position of the government on one or 
both of two grounds. Most, including ethno-nationalist proponents of the federal 
principles, claim that the new arrangement is not egalitarian and inclusive as alleged, 
but in practice institutionalises a new and highly discriminatory constellation 
favouring a new EPRDF, primarily Tigrayan, elite. Others are opposed in 
fundamental terms: the additionally aver that there was nothing ‘ethnocratic’ about 
the old arrangement and that a centralised system is, in principle, much to be 




the belief that talking about ethnicity creates or reinforces ethnic 
divisions even when the talk is directed at how to prevent such divisions 
from overwhelming a future democratic state. (Horowitz 1991:29) 
 
Such profound ideological lack of consensus on how to deal with ethnic issues 
generates a ‘metaconflict’, which ‘relates directly and exclusively to the ascriptive 
conflict, and compounds it’ (Horowitz 1991:2)15. Thus the argument is not only that 
an ethnic classification will in itself reinforce ethnic division; but, in addition, that 
the fact of a lack of consensus on the desirability of an ethnic classification is likely 
(in itself) to exacerbate the conflict in which it can be expected to result. 
 
These are views shared by opponents and critics of the government. They have 
mounted a range of attacks on the ethnic federal policy and its implementation. 
Ethnicity has been denounced as a ‘red herring’, some alleging that there is no such 
thing as Amhara ethnicity, let alone a tradition of Amhara ethnocracy. Others have 
suggested that the introduction of ethnicity into political life can only result in 
disaster, along the lines experienced in the Former Yugoslavia (Walle Engedayehu 
1993, 1994). Another set of commentators has questioned the viability of federalism 
additionally on grounds of expense (Aaron Tesfay 1992 and, more sympathetically, 
Henze 1994). 
 
Self-determination: an alternative to ‘authoritarian high modernism’?16 
 
The introduction of ethnic federalism can be seen as closely associated with many of 
the issues raised in Scott’s study of state ‘myopia’ (1998), which considers possible 
reasons underlying the frequent failure of large-scale state-sponsored development 
schemes. Scott’s recipe for social and developmental disaster involves four factors. 
They are: the administrative ordering of nature and society, viewed by means of 
myopic state ‘simplifications’, or abridged ‘maps of legibility’ (ibid.:3); a state 
commitment to high modernist ideology; an authoritarian state willing and able to 
                                                                                                                                          
14 Including some members of the TGE, notably the pan-Ethiopianist ENDO and EDU. 
15 Horowitz concludes that the metaconflict exacerbated the problems of developing democracy in 
South Africa in three ways: by placing constraints on political discourse; by contracting the range of 
acceptable political innovation; and by increasing the difficult of finding ways for the parties to the 
conflict to reach accommodation (ibid.:27). Each has relevance in Ethiopia. 
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use coercion in the achievement of its high modernist designs; and, finally, a 
prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these schemes (ibid.:4-5). Each 
of these factors had long been evident in the Ethiopia inherited by the EPRDF in 
199117. A core problem is the ‘hegemonic planning mentality that excludes the 
necessary role of local knowledge and know-how’ (ibid.:6). Much more successful 
would be the elaboration of developmental initiatives based on a form of practical 
local knowledge, for which Scott coins the term mtis (ibid.:ch.9). 
 
In what follows I discuss ethnicity as a social status conventionally constructed on 
the basis of the body of beliefs – the ‘system of knowledge’ – in play amongst the 
group in question and those with whom they interact. There is, further, much in the 
Marxist literature on the national question, so influential in Ethiopia and within 
EPRDF, suggestive of the value of using ethnicity to get within the ‘mindset’ of a 
population, the better to mobilise it to ends defined by the class struggle. Chapter V 
discusses the perspectives on ethnic mobilisation EPRDF had acquired from 
ideological sources and from its experience in opposition in the north. Chapter VI 
investigates the processes of ethnic mobilisation which it carried out in areas of the 
south of the country after 1991. An interest in systems of knowledge/belief, and in 
the extent to which external mobilisation can make use of internal patterns of 
conventional knowledge (and what happens as a result) is a theme of each of these 
chapters. Following Scott, the interface between local and state ‘knowledge’ might 
be expected to be a useful locus for the investigation of the likely political and 
developmental impact of ethnic federalism and self-determination. Specifically, the 
extent to which Ethiopian government structures under, and perhaps because of 
ethnic federalism, are able to take account of ‘practical local knowledge’, or mtis, in 
formulating their ‘schemes for improving the human condition’ becomes a matter of 
considerable practical importance. 
                                                                                                                                          
16 Scott (1998:ch.3). 
17 Scott discusses Dergue-era policy, conflating villagisation and resettlement schemes (ibid.:247-52). 
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Chapter II. Frameworks, perspectives, and constraints 
 
This Chapter considers the theoretical resources available to a study of ethnicity. It 
has three sections. The first sets out the co-ordinates of the ‘terrain’ of the theoretical 
literature on ethnicity, introducing four pairs of polar opposites between which it has 
oscillated. The second summarily reviews theoretical trends and resources, drawing 
on anthropological, sociological, and political approaches to the study of ethnicity. 
The third section revisits some basic debates about social construction and collective 
action in search of tools to build on insights in the literature. Questions of the 
application of these tools, and methodological issues, are treated in the following 
chapter. 
 
Introducing the ‘terrain’ of ‘ethnicity’ 
 
Collective identity – the nature of community – continues to be problematic. We are 
constantly reminded that we live in an age of supreme individualism, and yet our 
problems are those of collectives: how they are forged, how it is that we belong to 
them, and how they relate to one another. Issues of identity seem at once intrinsically 
relational, and intensely personal. The most idiosyncratic of individual identity 
profiles seems somehow to be significant (some would argue ‘extant’) only in so far 
as it is communicable, and intelligible, to others. Questions about affect and 
belonging – what Hearn (2001) calls ‘thinking about feeling’ – continue to exercise 
us. How should we account for the extension of affective ties beyond (for example) 
relations of kinship and shared language or territory? Do we, in fact, really 
understand the operation of affect, community, and identity even within such 
relations, whether they are ‘actual’ or ‘metaphorical’ (Eriksen 2002[1991])? These 
are questions the overt political implications of which have been raised by the 
introduction of a system of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, a country long associated 
in the literature with a dominant social structure characterised by individualism and 
vertical stratification (Levine (1965), Allan Hoben (1970)). 
 
They are problems with which contemporary theorising about identity – specifically 
that about nationalism and ethnicity – have wrestled. The notion that theories of 
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ethnicity have ‘oscillated between a number of polar extremes’ maps a useful set of 
co-ordinates for this theoretical terrain: 
 
the individual versus the group; the contents of an ethnic identity versus 
the boundary; the primordial gut feeling of an identity versus its 
instrumental expression; ethnicity as an all-inclusive general theory 
versus ethnicity as a limited approach to particular problems. (Banks 
1996:47) 
 
Discussions of the operation of ethnicity have wrestled for some time with the 
concern to move beyond the instrumentalist/primordialist dichotomy (Fardon 1995), 
a division alternately cast around the modernist/perennialist debate which separates 
Gellner (1964, 1983, 1996) and Breuilly (1993), from Anthony Smith (1986, 1992)18. 
Primordialism has long been charged (most trenchantly by Eller & Coughlan (1993)) 
with assuming the fixed nature and explanatory power of the very ethnic ‘givens’, 
which much research now problematises. Instrumental or materialist approaches, on 
the other hand, are often criticised because they lack an adequate account of the 
emotive strength, and often apparently irrational ‘power’ or ‘pull’ associated with 
ethnic identities (Hutchinson & Smith (1996), Grosby (1994), Robin Cohen (1999)). 
Common to both approaches has been the placement of ethnicity – reified and 
defying deconstruction – at one end or other of a causal vector, situating it as either 
primordial instigator or instrumental consequence of action and interest, and 
preserving unscathed the essentialism which has dogged the concept (Tonkin, 
MacDonald & Chapman (1989)). Some accounts purport to clear the ground of the 
instrumental/primordial dichotomy, whilst sliding towards one or other of its poles 
(Bayart 1993). Many others seek a synthesis of elements of both schools (Crawford 
Young 1986). This discussion concludes that they often founder amidst the 
contradictory currents of causality inherent in the two positions which are, as they 
stand, irreconcilable. 
   
The debate between those who stress the cultural content of ethnicity, and those who 
emphasise the salience (or otherwise) of ethnic boundaries and divisions, has seen a 
number of incarnations, and continues to exercise anthropologists. It was sparked by 
                                                 
18 See Mortimer 1999, and Volume 2, Issue 3 of Nations and Nationalism (1996).  
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Fredrik Barth (1970), whose introduction to his edited collection Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries set out a preference for a focus not on the cultural ‘contents’ of ethnic 
identity, but on the boundaries that ‘contain’ the group. This position drew the fire of 
Abner Cohen (1974:vii-xv) and Epstein (1978), and has been challenged or criticised 
in the more recent period by Eriksen (2002[1993]:79), Anthony Cohen (1996:120), 
and Banks (1996:14-16), the latter noting that Barth relies heavily on the 
enumeration of the very cultural features he claims he is rejecting. This discussion 
stresses the recursive nature of the relationship between ethnic boundaries and 
salience, and the ‘content’ of ethnic identity, suggesting that boundary, form and 
substance are more intimately interwoven than is sometimes suggested.  
 
The two poles of community group and individual have also caused problems for 
discussion of ethnicity. Eriksen claims that ‘when we talk of identity in social 
anthropology we refer to social identity’ (2002:60)19. Nevertheless much of the 
literature, including anthropological discussion, tends to treat the collective as an 
individual writ large, or as an aggregate of individuals. Associated with this, 
particularly in literature with an instrumental slant, is a failure to problematise the 
emergence of shared perspectives on, for instance, categorisation, or group interests. 
In so far as the collective is treated simply as some kind of a rational individual unit, 
there is a tendency for its interests – and indeed the reified ‘interest group’ which 
shares them – to be ‘read off’ from observation of a set of ‘objective’ circumstances. 
This discussion suggests that a focus on the interaction which underpins the 
collective, and through which it establishes shared knowledge, categories, and social 
‘institutions’, may prompt a different understanding of the relation between the 
ethnic identity of an individual, and her or his membership of an ethnic group.  
 
The following discussion traces some of the most important strands of theorising on 
ethnicity. It concludes that recent literature has struggled to reconcile elements of the 
two established schools of instrumentalism and primordialism. My concern is that, as 
it stands, this approach is unlikely to succeed given the incompatibility of the 
premises on which these two schools draw: in short, ethnicity causes action for 
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primordialists, and does not cause action for instrumentalists. I therefore propose a 
return to a number of the fundamental debates about collectives in an attempt not to 
bridge but to transcend the instrumental/primordial dichotomy. These debates relate 
to the achievement of collective action, the emergence and maintenance of stability 
in social life, and the achievement and recognition by a social group of shared 
meaning, knowledge, and interests.  
 
Theorising ethnicity and ethno-nationalism 
 
African political leaders, experiencing it as destructive to their ideals of 
national unity, denounce it passionately. Commentators on the Left, 
recognizing it as a block to the growth of appropriate class awareness 
inveigh against it as a case of ‘false consciousness’. Apologists for South 
African apartheid, welcoming it as an ally of continued white dominance, 
encourage it. Development theorists, perceiving it as a check to economic 
growth, deplore it. Journalists, judging it an adequate explanation for a 
myriad of otherwise puzzling events deploy it mercilessly. Political 
scientists, intrigued by its continuing power, probe at it endlessly. If one 
disapproves of the phenomenon ‘it’ is ‘tribalism’; if one is less 
judgemental, ‘it’ is ethnicity. (Vail 1989:1) 
 
The study of ethnicity confronts interrelated terminological, political and conceptual 
problems. ‘Ethnicity’ remains a mobile term (Glazer & Moynihan 1975), meaning 
different things to different people. ‘Ethnic’ or ‘ethnic group’ has been used to mean: 
race; specific major races; socio-cultural groups; sub-groups living among others in a 
foreign country; or, a group of people who ‘contrast themselves or are contrasted by 
others, on the basis primarily of sharing certain cultural criteria such as language, 
beliefs and values, religion or history’ who may or may not share ‘geographical 
contiguity’ and ‘racial characteristics’ (du Toit 1978:1-4). Recent theorising has 
stressed the importance of ‘contrast’ betweem groups.  
 
For ethnicity to come about, [two distinctive] groups must have a 
minimum of contact with each other, and they must entertain ideas of 
each other as being culturally different from themselves. If these 
conditions are not fulfilled, there is no ethnicity, for ethnicity is 
essentially an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a group. (Eriksen 
2002:12) 
                                                                                                                                          




The fact that ‘ethnicity’ is commonly understood both as a ‘neutral unemotional 
referent to those characteristics and qualities that mark an ethnic group’ (du Toit 
1978), and as an instance of a social relation or status, is an ambiguity which renders 
it conceptually problematic. It is a problem to which I return below. Lack of clarity 
has probably been exacerbated by the inter-disciplinary pedigree of ‘ethnic studies’, 
which has left it a ‘conundrum’ (Fukui & Markakis (1994), de la Gorgendière 
(1996)), ‘subject to parochial analysis’ (Enloe 1986:xi). Its ‘chameleon-like capacity’ 
to ‘merge with other elements of social identity and solidarity’ leave it ‘hard to see 
what would remain of ethnicity if all [these] were peeled off’ (Fukui & Markakis 
1994:3).  
 
Conceptual and terminological confusion is further compounded by assumptions 
arising from political antipathy: ‘if nationalism was a progressive and worthy topic, 
ethnicity was a retrogressive and shameful one’ (Crawford Young 1986:443). It is 
only after ‘ethnicity has fought and bled and burned its way into public and scholarly 
consciousness’ (Horowitz 1985:xi) that it has been appropriated from its 
ethnographic niche for study by political scientists and sociologists. 
 
Primordial attachment, and ‘assumed’ attachment 
 
The conclusion of the ‘primordialists’ [...] taking their cue from the work 
of Edward Shils [1957] on the importance of primordial ties based on 
language, religion, race, ethnicity and territory, [is the] claim that nations 
and ethnic communities are the natural units of history and integral 
elements of the human experience. […] Even more important, 
‘primordial ties’ have always divided the human species, as naturally as 
have sex or geography, and will always do so. (Anthony Smith 1986:12) 
 
Geertz builds on Shils to describe how ‘considered as societies, the new states [of 
Asia and Africa] are abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on 
primordial attachments’ (1967:109). ‘Economic or class or intellectual disaffection 
threatens revolution, but disaffection based on race, language, or culture threatens 
partition, irredentism, or merger, a redrawing of the very limits of the state, a new 
definition of its domain’ (1967:111). The ‘foci of discontent’ are enumerated by 
Smith (1986:12): blood ties, race, language, region, religion, and custom, which 
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operate as causes of conflict, albeit with the important caveat that Geertz is explicitly 
talking about ‘assumed givens’, i.e. what the group thinks of as its ‘given’ 
inheritance, rather than what actually is given20.  
 
In conjunction with the set of ideas that takes either ethnic attachment itself, or the 
process of essentialising it to be somehow ancient, natural and innate, is the idea that 
something about this irreducibility renders it more virulent and powerful than other 
factors. For Geertz, the nature of the new state means that it comes automatically into 
conflict with the old societies within which ethnic or primordial sentiment is (taken 
as) natural. Both notions – the idea that ethnicity is a cogent force, and that it is 
opposed to modernising social and political development – recur in parts of the 
literature which do not retain the view of ethnicity as a primordial attachment.  
 
The debate between ‘primordialists’ and ‘instrumentalists’ then, is at the heart of the 
conceptual problem with ethnicity, touching on the direction of the causal vector 
between ethnicity and action. Centrally, for primordialists, the primordial 
attachments inherent in ethnicity cause and explain action; for instrumentalists, 
actions have other (often material) causes, and ethnicity can be either a by-product, 
or resource in the achievement of these other events and factors, but does not cause 
them. 
 
In a useful discussion Hearn ‘disaggregates the concept of primordialism and 
questions the linkages between its constituent parts’, distinguishing actors’ and 
analysts’ primordialism (2001:10)21. He demonstrates that ‘what primordialists tend 
to do is to highlight (and less often analyse) systems of symbols, and then assert the 
                                                 
20 This is a point stressed by Hearn (2001), often overlooked in readings of Geertz. 
21 ‘The ‘primordialism of the theorists’ […] does not take ethnic essentialism at face value, but rather 
takes the process of essentialising identities through symbols seriously, seeing it as an important part 
of what causes national identity (cf Penrose 1995). The pejorative use of the term primordialism in 
theoretical debates sometimes elides this distinction’. (Hearn 2001:2) One might however want to 
note that the elision is also fairly strong in many theorists’ accounts, that quoted above: for Smith, the 
divisions based on sex and geography, with which sociological primordialists compare ‘primordial 
ties’, are not assumed but ‘natural’. I return to this issue below. 
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emotive power of the same’ (ibid.:4), and concludes that in fact ‘the causal 
connections are not as tight as they tend to assume’ (ibid.:10).22  
 
Whilst full-blown primordialism, which takes essential identity as self-evident, is not 
now common amongst theorists23, there remains a strong consensus that there is 
something innate, irreducible (something associated with our understandings – 
perhaps our constructions - of racial or biological ascription) about ethnicity: that at 
some level it is ‘natural’, made up if not of ‘givens’, at least of ‘assumed givens’. 
The strength of this view has seemed to some to be linked to the manner in which 
ethnicity has been studied, in the ethnological tradition of structural-functional 
anthropology, under Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown24. Early ethnographic studies 
– which still constitute a majority – tended to document the nature, the cultural 
content, of the ethnic identity of the group studied contemporary with the visit of the 
researcher: interest focused upon the persona rather than the salience of ethnicity 
(Horowitz 1975). A move towards a more circumstantial or instrumental view of 
ethnicity, then, required a change not just in the view of what ethnicity is, but also in 
how it should be studied.  
 
Towards a materialist interpretation: locating ‘non-traditional wolves 
under the tribal sheepskin’25 
 
A number of significant steps towards the evolution of a more instrumental view of 
ethnicity were taken by members of the Manchester School of anthropology (Eriksen 
2002:22ff): Abner Cohen, Epstein, Mayer, and Mitchell (Banks 1996:25ff), drew in 
turn on insights of the Chicago School of urban sociology26 whose work showed that  
                                                 
22 Hearn illuminates a neglected parallel by which Geertz (1973) lies ‘in the Gellnerian mode of 
nationalism as an ideology of transition to modernity (Gellner 1983)’ (2001:4). 
23 Soviet ethnos theorists led by Bromley have been ‘the most strongly primordialist […] Bromley’s 
theory of ethnicity proposes that a stable core of ethnicity persists through all social formations’ 
(Banks 1996:17ff). Thus, for instance, ‘Soviet Africanists have developed a theory of foci or centres 
of peoples’ ethnic (national) integration and consolidation, drawing on a large corpus of data. Foci are 
distinctly discernible in modern Africa in the biggest peoples, around whom various ethnoi are 
grouping’ (Andrianov 1979:307). 
24 Primordialism is sometimes also attributed to Barth (see below), who broke with this tradition. 
25 Sklar (1967:6), as well as Hussein Adam (1992:13) and Bayart (1993:56). 
26 Park (1955), and associates. Limitations of the School’s work are discussed by Anthony Cohen 




ethnic relations are fluid and negotiable; that their importance varies 
situationally; and that, for all their claims to primordiality and cultural 
roots, ethnic identities can be consciously manipulated (Eriksen 
2002:21). 
 
Mitchell’s 1956 study of The Kalela Dance in the copperbelt of what is now Zambia, 
demonstrated that ‘far from being an expression of tribalism, the dance was an 
expression of social differentiation, and that ‘tribalism’ in town was merely a 
‘category of interaction’’ (Mafeje 1971:225). As a result of such studies27, ‘a sharp 
contrast was drawn between ethnicity in the urban areas and rural ‘tribe’, with 
lingering implications that the latter represented the genuine unit, and that the former 
was somehow artificial’ (Crawford Young 1986:444). I return below to this 
distinction between ‘real’ ethnicity, and ‘mere categories of interaction’. 
 
These studies suggested that ethnicity was  
 
an artefact, created by individuals or groups to bring together a group of 
people for some common purpose. […] Primordialist ethnicity simply is, 
it has no purpose (beyond a psychological one of giving individuals a 
sense of identity as members of a group), […] instrumentalist ethnicity is 
motivated, it comes into being for a purpose and its continued existence 
is tied to that purpose. (Banks 1996:39) 
 
Focusing on boundaries  
 
Burgeoning concern with ethnicity in the urban context of ethnic pluralism, inspired 
interest in the boundaries between ethnic groups, and their interaction. The emphasis 
placed, seminally by Barth, upon boundaries between ethnic groups represented a 
significant shift of interest towards the salience rather than the personae of ethnicity 
in inter-group relations, and Barth is ‘nearly always described as an instrumentalist’ 
(Eriksen 2002:54). He broke with ‘the simplistic view that geographical and social 
isolation have been the critical factors in sustaining cultural diversity’. Rather 
 
Boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them, […. and] 
secondly, stable, persisting, and often vitally important social relations 
                                                 
27 Including Abner Cohen (1969) (1974). 
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are maintained across boundaries, and are frequently based precisely on 
the dichotomised ethnic statuses’ (1970:9-10).  
 
Treating ethnic groups as ‘a form of social organisation’ Barth drew two important 
conclusions. Firstly it is the maintenance of the boundary between groups, the 
‘continuing dichotomisation of members and outsiders’ which allows specification of 
the continuity of ethnic groups. Secondly, ‘socially relevant factors alone become 
diagnostic for membership, not the overt, ‘objective’ differences which are generated 
by other factors’28 (Barth 1970:14-15). Barth’s emphasis on social processes, 
including processes of social construction, is a resource to which I return below. 
Primarily because of the value of much of his approach, it is worth detailing some of 
the criticism it has drawn.  
 
Firstly, Barth, has been charged with primordialism by Abner Cohen (1974:xii-xv), a 
charge which seems to focus on a widely quoted passage in which Barth concludes 
that: 
 
ethnic identity implies a series of constraints on the kinds of roles an 
individual is allowed to play […] regarded as a status, [it] is 
superordinate to most other statuses, [...] it constrains the incumbent in 
all his activities, not only in some defined social situation. [Ethnic 
identity] is imperative, in that it cannot be disregarded and temporarily 
set aside by other definitions of the situation. The constraints on a 
person’s behaviour which spring from his ethnic identity thus tend to be 
absolute and, in complex poly-ethnic societies, quite comprehensive. 
[emphasis in original] (Barth 1970:17) 
 
This passage is open to (and has been given) a range of different interpretations. 
Barth states explicitly that ethnic identity influences (constrains) behaviour. He 
comes close to saying that this must be the case: constraints ‘tend to be absolute’. 
Importantly, however, by stressing ‘socially relevant factors’ he stops short of saying 
that the identities that influence action – are themselves ‘natural’, or that they could 
not have been otherwise. Perhaps the most problematic part of his account, however, 
is its assumption of the durability of the boundaries – the divisions between 
                                                 




categories – around which cultural ‘packages’ shift and sift according to processes of 
‘social construction’, which thereby remain constrained. Since these boundaries are 
themselves the result of processes of collective construction, this problem is perhaps 
less one of principle than of emphasis in the 1970 account, which, in illuminating the 
‘underdetermined’ nature of cultural content, relies overly on the reification of the 
boundaries which demarcate groups whether sharing or separated by culture29. 
Barth’s later problematisation of the concept of the boundary (2000) serves to correct 
this difficulty30. 
 
Secondly, as already mentioned above, Barth produces a ‘catalogue of features, the 
very approach to ethnicity that [he] claims to be rejecting’. In so doing, ‘Barth reifies 
a correlation between the physical boundaries of a population and the conceptual 
boundary of its ethnic identity’ (Banks 1996:14). This tendency to reify categories 
and units of analysis, as well as the correlation between culture ‘areas’, identity 
areas, and physical populations, is one it is difficult to eradicate from research which 
requires categories for description and analysis. Whilst there may be ways to 
overcome the problem, they seem to pose substantial methodological problems. I 
return to these questions below and in the conclusion. 
 
Finally Barth’s account of ethnicity has been criticised as neglecting individual ‘self-
consciousness, making people members of ethnic groups almost ‘by default’, or ‘by 
extension’:  
 
[Barth’s] view […] rests on the assumption that ethnicity is simply 
generalised to the members of a group […]. In treating ethnicity only as a 
tactical posture, it ignored both self-consciousness and the symbolic 
expression of ethnic identity. When we consult ourselves about who we 
are, that entails something more than […] reflection on ‘who we are not’. 
(Anthony Cohen 1994:120)31 
                                                 
29 Barth demonstrated that ethnic units do not necessarily coincide with culture units.  
30 Barth’s approach is also criticised as overly coloured by a ‘transactionalist stress on free will and 
choice’ (Banks 1996:15, citing Asad 1972). As a result of an inadequate stress on ‘very real factors of 
power and domination’, stratification and hierarchy emerge as ‘consensual processes in which even 
those who appear to lose out by such processes collude’ (Banks 1996:16). Similar objections are often 
levelled at social constructivist approaches explored below. The issue, discussed by Barnes (1988) 
(1993), lies beyond the scope of this discussion. 




Barth’s recent assertion that ‘people are not merely playing out a structure, they are 
each a locus of reason and construction, using complex embodied imagery that they 
are trying to fit to what they perceive and experience’ (2000:33) should be 
understood as an attempt to take account of this last set of criticisms. The discussion 
raises the problems inherent in assuming that analysts’ concepts (including that of 
the boundary itself) are shared by the groups under study, an issue which must 
confront any subjectivist approach.  
 
Barth’s introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries remains one of the most cited, 
influential, and fruitful texts in the study of ethnicity. Since it was published a 
significant thread of the literature on ethnicity has dealt with ethnic boundaries and 
their persistence (Enloe 1986:19) or transformation. Schema of the ‘assimilation’ (by 
‘amalgamation’ or ‘incorporation’) and ‘differentiation’ (by ‘division’ or 
‘proliferation’) of ethnic groups have been evolved (Horowitz 1975). Analysis of 
changes of boundaries of ethnic identity suggests that  
 
cultural change may follow or accompany rather than precede identity 
change. If so, the significance of a certain cultural mix as a determinant 
of identity has probably been vastly overemphasised. (ibid.:124) 
 
Adjusting to modernity 
 
This view was put forward much earlier in Gellner’s account of ‘the contingency of 
nationalism’ (1964 ch.7)32. His was one of the first unequivocal statements of the 
view that ‘there is nothing natural or universal about possessing a ‘nationality’. […] 
The theoretical problem is to separate the quite spurious ‘national’ and ‘natural’ 
justifications and explanations of nationalism, from the genuine, time- and context-
bound roots of it’ (ibid.:150-151). Gellner invokes the anthropologists’ distinction 
between structure and culture, and suggests the increased instrumental importance of 
the latter in a modern world where structure has ceased to be the determinant of 
                                                 
32 Whilst Gellner is writing about nationalism he also makes reference to ‘ethnic loyalty’, and refers to 
different nationalities as one might refer to different ethnic groups: ‘the dividing line between ethnic 
unit and nation is a very blurred one’ (Saul 1979:354). 
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location and identity. In the context of a modern educational requirement usually 
greater than that which can be met within the village, but which must still create a 
framework within which village-educated children can retain access to employment 
and otherwise participate, the instrumental significance of cultural features such as 
language, becomes clear. Gellner concludes that  
 
men become nationalists through genuine, objective, practical necessity, 
however obscurely recognised (ibid.:160). The self-image of nationalism 
involves the stress of folk, folklore, popular culture, etc.. In fact, 
nationalism becomes important precisely when these things become 
artificial. Genuine peasants or tribesmen, however proficient at folk-
dancing, do not generally make good nationalists. (ibid.:162) 
 
Gellner has explained the significance of sub-state loyalty-engendering units in 
transitional societies, but not why there should also now be ‘a new divisive 
nationalism’ (ibid.:165). Ethnicity is significant but why does it induce conflict? In 
answer to this, Gellner cites the impact of uneven development. This kind of 
economic iniquity brings about a new form of social stratification which ‘has little 
cause to be accepted as in the nature of things […], is not well protected by social 
mechanisms […], and which is seen to be remediable by secession’ (ibid.:166). This 
issue of uneven development recurs throughout more recent Marxist literature on 
ethnicity, and has been highly influential in Ethiopia. 
 
The ‘dialectic of class and tribe’33 
 
There is a real difference between the man who, on behalf of his tribe, 
strives to maintain its traditional integrity and autonomy, and the man 
who invokes tribal ideology in order to maintain a power position, not in 
the tribal area, but in the modern capital city, and whose ultimate aim is 
to undermine and exploit the supposed tribesmen. The fact that it works, 
[…] is not proof that ‘tribes’ or ‘tribalism’ exist in the objective sense. If 
anything, it is a mark of ‘false consciousness’ on the part of the supposed 
tribesmen, who subscribe to an ideology that is inconsistent with the 
material base and therefore unwittingly respond to the call for their own 
exploitation. (Mafeje 1971:259) 
 
                                                 
33 Saul (1979). 
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Mafeje’s recognition that ethnicity ‘is an ideology in the original Marxist sense’ 
provides the opening for Saul’s attempt to move Marxist discussion beyond ‘an 
analytical framework which crudely polarizes ethnic analysis and class analysis’. 
 
Marxists have long argued that ‘tribalism’, the active political expression 
of ethnicity in Africa, has been situationally evoked and defined, the 
‘transitional’ reality which enlivens it being the class-structured society 
of African peripheral capitalism. (Saul 1979:349) 
 
In order to integrate ethnicity into a class analysis, Saul suggests ‘tak[ing] more 
serious the reality of imperialism […] as an explanation for the politicisation of 
ethnicity’ (ibid.:353), concluding that  
 
on the specific terrain of the centre-periphery contradiction, an ethnic 
interpellation is at least as likely a possibility as a ‘new nation’ 
interpellation. For ethnicity can often draw upon much more proximate 
and recognizable ingredients – language, symbols, ties of kin both real 
and imagined – in defining itself and recruiting ‘subjects’. (ibid.:356) 
 
Secondly, ‘the articulation of modes of production has a clear tendency to strengthen 
ethnicity’ (ibid.:358), since ‘capitalism does not spring into the Third World full-
blown’ (ibid.:357). Normally the ‘combat between the two modes of production, 
with the confrontations and alliances which such a combat implies’ would be 
‘between the classes which these modes of production define. Yet African realities 
complicate this process’. Finally, Saul explores the possibility that ethnicity has a 
positive role to play in the ideological class struggle, noting the link Fanon 
(1967:164) makes between ‘fierce demands for social justice’ and ‘tribalism’, in 
transitional social circumstances, and adding a number of cautionary points about the 
specificity and exclusiveness of ethnic identity which might be expected to hinder 
the development of a radical movement.  
 
Conclusion: the need to transcend the instrumental/primordial 
dichotomy 
 
Most commentators have sought to situate themselves somewhere on the spectrum 
between ‘the primordialist and the circumstantialist’ (Glazer & Moynihan 1975:19). 
Many attempts continue to seek a synthesis of the two positions, which retains a non-
instrumental element to identity, without resorting to the ‘murky notions’ of innate or 
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racial difference: most end up sliding to one or other of them. The invocation of 
socio-psychological conflict-producing factors (Rothchild 1991) offers a more 
sophisticated spin on earlier controversial attempts to ‘relate culture to psychological 
properties, an exercise burdened with ethnocentric dangers’ (Crawford Young 
1986:446). It is unclear that appeals to psychological complexity succeed: remove 
emotive references to ‘fears’ and feelings, and one is left pretty much claiming the 
‘essentially political determination of contemporary ethnicity’: not a synthesis, but 
instrumentalism again. 
 
For both Fardon (1995)34 and Bayart (1993), ‘the existence, even the irreducibility of 
ethnic consciousness cannot be denied’ (Bayart 1993:42). Yet ‘throughout Africa as 
a whole ethnic discourse seems unavoidable’ (ibid.:43); it ‘offers a democratisation 
of differences’ which as a result seem to ‘belong to a single register of difference’ 
(Fardon 1995:2). For both authors this homogenising omnipresence is problematic. 
Bayart’s response is to dismiss ethnicity as analytically useful in terms of 
contemporary politics (1993:59, ch.1), although in the end  
 
his attack is on the straw man of primordialism; revealing that as an 
impostor does not permit the conclusions that ethnicity is therefore mere 
‘shadow theatre’ of ‘consciousness without structure’. (Fardon 1995:9n9) 
 
Once again, the argument merely ‘reverses the causal arrow normally running from 
ethnicity to political conflict’ (Crawford Young 1986:447), and  
 
fails to convey the intense passions and peculiarly coercive powers of 
activated ethnicity. […] The necessity to weave together the 
instrumentalist and the primordialist dimensions of ethnicity is self-
evident. Instrumentalism alone fails to capture the intensity, the passion, 
the availability of ethnicity for political mobilization. (ibid.:450) 
 
To reiterate, the problem that I see with Young’s approach is that it is not at all clear 
how such a ‘weaving’ process can be undertaken, given two schools of thought 
which operate less as ‘dimensions’ of a single whole than as mutually incompatible 




One needs to explain why so many ethnic groups co-exist harmoniously without 
becoming prey to ‘atavistic passions’; and also to allow for the way in which the 
continuation of ‘ethnic salience in advanced societies subverts traditional 
development theory’ (Enloe 1986:268). In sum, then, there is a need to locate 
ethnicity other than as a coercive causal factor which is powerful because it is 
suffused with subjectivity, or, at the other extreme, as caused by other factors. It is 
difficult to disagree with Fardon’s convincing conclusion: 
 
African ethnicity deserves to be treated as a phenomenon more complex 
than either primordial identity or the flamboyant garb of self-interest. Put 
like that no-one is going to disagree with me; but I have also tried to 
demonstrate how writers generalizing on the subject of ethnicity 
recurrently fall back on some variant of these simple positions. (Fardon 
1995:17) 
 
Looking again at collectives… 
 
Thus far, much of this discussion of the literature on ethnicity has focused on the 
division between primordialism and instrumentalism, between those for whom ethnic 
identity causes action, and those for whom it is caused by other factors. The other 
polar oppositions between individual and society, and between the boundary and 
content of ethnicity, have remained further in the background. I have tried to show 
how much of the literature falls back onto one or other of the poles of 
instrumentalism or primordialism, and that attempts to reconcile elements of the two 
positions fail because of the contradictory approaches to causation they embody. In 
an attempt to transcend this division I now propose to focus on the nature of the 
collective, returning to a range of fundamental debates regarding social stability, 
order, and collective action. This will, in turn, bring the relation between individual 
and social group centre stage. 
 
The virtues of social construction, and two shortcomings 
 
                                                                                                                                          
34 Fardon’s account employs the entanglements described in Calvino’s Castle of Crossed Destinies to 
illuminate ‘the propensity of ethnicities to be defined contrapuntally in terms of their ostensible 
cultural contents’ (1995:17). 
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all of the approaches [of anthropology] agree that ethnicity has 
something to do with the classification of people and group 
relationships. (Eriksen 2002:4)  
 
My starting point is the immensely fruitful social constructivist position elaborated 
by Barth (1970)35, and extended subsequently by a range of anthropologists. As 
already observed, Barth treats ethnicity as a ‘form of social organisation’ (1970:13) 
and stresses ‘socially relevant’ over ‘objective’ factors (ibid.:15), emphasising that  
 
[n]either of the kinds of cultural ‘contents’ [of ethnicity]36 follows from a 
descriptive list of cultural features or cultural differences; one cannot 
predict from first principles which features will be emphasized and made 
organizationally relevant by the actors. (ibid.:14) 
 
Ethnicity emerges when there is ‘self- and other-categorisation’ of populations, 
coupled with acceptance that different standards apply to one than to another. 
Drawing on Goffman’s ideas of interaction and sanction (1967) (1969[1959]), Barth 
(and Eriksen) seem to locate ethnic groups amongst what Kusch calls 
 
[o]bvious cases of social institutions. Some social entities […] are clearly 
social institutions in the common understanding […] like being a 
member of a group; you are a member if you are taken to be a member. 
(Kusch 1998:236) 
 
In what follows, my starting point is that membership of an ethnic group – like 
membership of any other kind of group – is premised on the group’s agreement to 
treat a member as a member: membership is fully socially constructed.  
 
In so arguing, however, I wish also to move away from the implications of what I 
suggest is a limitation common to many nominally ‘social constructionist’ 
approaches. The problem lies in the application of notions of construction only to 
‘social’ matters, and not to those which have to do with the ‘real world’. Thus for 
instance, many agree that what we know about norms, conventions, culture, ritual, 
etc. is a reflection of what we know about the collective construction, invention, and 
                                                 
35 as well as the range of criticisms which Barth’s work has elicited, summarised above. 
36 ‘(i) overt signals or signs – the diacritical features that people look for and exhibit to show identity, 
often such features as dress, language, house-form, or general style of life, and (ii) basic value 
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beliefs of the group under study (or in the case of our own culture, conventions and 
norms, what we have learned from our social group in the process of our 
socialisation); meanwhile, however, many also continue to assume that what we 
know about objects such as trees, mountains, genes, and daylight is a reflection of 
what we know about trees, mountains, genes, and daylight – i.e. that it can somehow 
be ‘read off’ from the real physical world. Social construction, on this understanding, 
only happens in the social realm. It plays no role in the ‘real’ or ‘natura’ world 
where, according to this view, one can rely on some form of correspondence theory 
of truth37 to explain why it is true, for instance, that this tree is a tree.  
 
I think that this approach is wrong, and that some form of what is wrong here lies 
behind much that is mistaken in our intuitions and understanding about ethnicity. For 
instance, the foregoing discussion of various kinds of primordialism has shown how 
many theorists are not sure that ethnic group membership is a ‘social institution’ in 
the common understanding of the term. Much of the primordialist literature38 
qualifies the idea that ‘one is a member of an ethnic group if one is taken to be a 
member of an ethnic group’ (i.e. ethnicity is a social status) with a rider along the 
lines of ‘and also if one is a member of that ethnic group – or at least looks like one’ 
(i.e. ethnicity is a ‘real world’ state). The idea underpinning this is that – at some 
level – ethnicity is to be deduced not only from ‘what the collective thinks’ but also 
from ‘the facts of the matter’ – what, as well as who the members of the collective 
‘are’. This is what is behind much of the thinking that suggests that instrumentalism, 
for instance, can’t really explain ethnicity, because it is more vivid, ‘real’, and 
indissoluble than could be true merely of ‘what the group happens to think’.  
 
At this point it is important to set out (and reject) a second common misconception 
associated with much social constructionism, namely the idea that what is 
constructed is malleable, changeable, and shifting (that its ‘validity’ is relative to the 
                                                                                                                                          
orientations: the standards of morality and excellence by which performance is judged.’ (Barth 
1970:14) 
37 Russell (1912) is the best known. Kusch argues correspondence theories have been in retreat 
(2002:226-31). 
38 and I suggest that much of what Hearn refers to as the ‘primordialism of the theorists’, as well as 
‘true’ primordialism has tendencies in this direction. 
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moving currents of culture, i.e. that it is valid in so far as it is credible); whereas what 
is ‘real’ is real: stable, durable, and demonstrably true or false – valid or invalid – 
according to objective correspondences, irrespective of who knows what about it. On 
this stereotype, what is socially constructed is obviously a dubious and transient basis 
for ‘knowledge’, as compared with the ‘scientific’ bedrock of the ‘real facts’. Thus, 
for instance, the distinction mentioned above between ‘mere categories of 
interaction’ in urban ethnicity (shifting, likely to change and fade with 
circumstances), and ‘real ethnicity’ in its original uncontaminated (read non-
constructed) form in rural areas (durable, perennial, and, no surprise this, fiercely 
motivating).  
 
The view that beliefs which are socially constructed are thereby more ‘arbitrary’ than 
beliefs based on ‘reality’ is itself based on a fundamentally mistaken understanding 
of the role and locus of social construction in epistemology. In conjunction with 
mistaken intuitions about our knowledge of ‘reality’, the error is also premised on a 
misleadingly individualistic understanding of the process of construction. In 
particular, the view has a tendency to juxtapose the open-endedness and fluidity of 
the processes of social construction, features which we are able to perceive at the 
collective level, with our individual experiences and impressions that whatever 
situation we find ourselves in is not nearly as fluid and open to influence (to 
construction) as this might suggest. It mistakenly concludes that social construction 
cannot therefore explain what is going on.  
 
From an individual perspective a well-developed (that is, widely known) 
conventional social status will undoubtedly be experienced as ‘tend[ing] to be 
absolute’ (Barth 1970:17). What constitutes social construction is that each 
individual member of the collective brings her or his own contribution to the on-
going collective creation and recreation of the social status in question, in the very 
process of knowing about it, and operating in its terms. It is, however, more than 
likely that this fact of self-involvement will be obscured at the individual level where 
the self-contribution will appear either so infinitesimally small as to seem irrelevant 
or – more likely – altogether invisible, subsumed by the collective ‘imperative’. 
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From an individual’s perspective, then, collectively constructed convention, always 
partly caused and constituted by her or his own behaviour, usually seems far from 
‘chosen’ or ‘open’, far from ‘self-constructed’.  
 
A more radical and thoroughgoing approach to social constructionism is required to 
overcome these two related errors. The errors are (i) an understanding of processes of 
collective construction as restricted only to the social realm, and (ii) the assumption 
that they provide a less stable basis for knowledge than empirical evidence offered 
by the natural realm39. A more radical and comprehensive approach to 
constructionism will deliver a better understanding of how empirical factors relate to 
the construction of the social status of ethnicity, and of why such a conventional 
status can appear to be compelling. It will insist upon the instrinsically social nature 
of ‘knowing’ which draws on (but does not boil down to) individual acts of 
observation and experience40. By extending a coherent approach to the social aspects 
of concept application throughout our cognitive experiences – to so-called ‘real 
world’ or ‘natural kinds’ as well as ‘social kinds’41 – the approach will clarify the 
basis for our beliefs, and of the conventional ‘socially constructed’ nature of all 
categorisation – whether of social or natural kind ‘objects’. On this view collective 
construction, based on interaction, provides the basis for mutual intelligibility, social 
cohesion and stability, and collective action itself.  
 
                                                 
39 My suggestion is not an original one. The approach I propose employs ideas worked out in the 
Edinburgh School of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (also known as the ‘Strong Programme’ 
in the SSK) by Barry Barnes, and David Bloor, and elaborated by Martin Kusch. The position 
incorporates ideas about meaning finitism and classification (Barnes et al. 1996, Bloor 1997, Kusch 
2002:ch.15); on natural and social kinds and self- and alter-reference (Barnes 1983, Kusch 1998); on 
the role of interaction – rather than ‘norms’ – in achieving social order (Barnes 1988, 1995); on causal 
explanation and voluntaristic notions of agency (Barnes 2000); on the nature of power as a fully self-
referential social kind, a function of the distribution of knowledge in a collective (Barnes 1988, 1993). 
These various areas of work result in what has been called the ‘performative theory of social 
institutions’ (Kusch 1998:255). This position is premised upon an important statement of commitment 
to investigative symmetry and cognitive relativism (Barnes & Bloor 1982:20-47). It states that the 
features of social institutions, as developed in the performative theory are conventionality; self-
reference; self-validation; finitism and performative character; collective good and predictability; 
rights duties and obligations; interconnectedness; change and contest (Kusch 1998). The position has 
recently been developed into a theory of communitarian epistemology (Kusch 2002), according to 
which knowledge itself is a ‘social institution’. 
40 And reject as false the epistemological stereotype of ‘pattern recognition’ from reality (Kusch 
(1998:256ff), an elaboration of Barnes (1983:525-6)). 
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Realist intuitions about ethnicity and ethnic ‘features’ 
 
It is useful to spell out the mistaken stereotype of classification because of the vigour 
with which it pervades our assumptions about how actors recognise ‘real’ members 
of their – or another - ethnic group. The stereotype runs as follows. 
 
When individuals encounter worldly entities that fit [learned and 
remembered] patterns they attach the respective labels. The empirical 
properties of the encountered entities determine whether or not they fit 
the pattern; the empirical properties thus determine how the entities will 
be labelled or classified. (Kusch 1998:256) 
 
This stereotype of concept formulation and application applies widely, if not 
uniformly, in terms of the way we think we see and describe the ‘real world’. It is 
exceptionally pervasive, and at a number of different levels, in terms of the ways we 
think about ethnicity, or at least suggest that actors do. Ethnic actors think they 
define the ethnic group (establish the concept of the ethnic group), and identify its 
members (apply the concept) by reading off from ‘the facts’, or at least the 
‘observable facts’, about the nature of group members, namely ethnic ‘features’. I 
argue that group members (and indeed any ‘full-blown primordialist’ theorists, or 
government policy makers who remain wedded to the idea of an intrinsic ‘real world’ 
‘naturalness’ of ethnic status) are wrong in thinking that this is what is happening. 
Secondly, I argue that the fact that, albeit mistaken, this remains the pervasive 
stereotype of what is happening in ethnic identification is in itself relevant in terms of 
the formulation, operation and application of any particular conception of ethnic 
group. In particular, I suggest, it may help account for much-discussed ideas about 
the ‘virulence’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘durability’, or ‘vigour’ of ethnic formations.  
 
The point can be made by setting out the alternative understanding of concept 
application we apply to those concepts we can and do commonly think of as ‘socially 
constructed’. Here 
 
neither pattern recognition nor empirical properties play any role in 
concept application. There cannot be patterns of empirical properties in 
                                                                                                                                          
41 The distinction, coined by Barnes (1983) and developed by Kusch (1998) is elaborated  below. 
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this case because social kinds cannot be discriminated by means of our 
senses: a husband need look no different from a bachelor, and a prisoner 
no different from a free man or woman. (Kusch 1998:256) 
 
This formulation, close to that of Barth above, may demonstrate the resilience of our 
intuition that, in fact there is something ‘real’ and ‘observable’ about ethnicity, 
provoking the response that that ethnic group members are different from prisoners 
or husbands, that they are in some sense empirically identified, and natural. This 
conviction seem hard to eradicate, given that we generally do believe that even . 
‘metaphorical kinship’ or ‘assumed givens’ will somehow ‘show up’. The very 
vigour of this intuition itself feeds the performative processes which create, build, 
and sustain the fully constructed conventional social reality of ethnic group 
membership.  
 
Partly because of conceptual and terminological ambiguity, there is more than one 
level at which the pattern recognition stereotype tends to creep back into our 
thinking about ethnicity. A first level is the assumption that ethnic members are 
members because of something intrinsic about their nature. Those who have stepped 
away from ‘ethnic givens’ in favour of ‘assumed ethnic givens’ (from ‘full-blown’ to 
‘theorists’’ primordialism) have avoided this application of the stereotype. Ethnic 
group members cannot be read off from their empirical properties. Nevertheless the 
stereotype of classification by pattern recognition does not evaporate at this point. 
The notion frequently persists that the categorisation ‘member of an ethnic group’ is 
based not on collective consensus, but still somehow on ‘the nature of the thing 
categorised’: if we rule out ‘the group members’ as ‘the thing categorised’, 
dismissing the idea that they can be identified empirically or ‘from their nature’, 
something else has to be identified as ‘the thing categorised’. What often happens is 
that the categorisation ‘member of an ethnic group’ is judged to be made on the basis 
of the nature of ‘the ethnic group’s ethnicity’, again understood in empirical rather 
than conventional terms (i.e. in terms of observable ‘real’ markers of ethnicity rather 
than beliefs about it).  
 
This is a notion which persists even in analyses which recognise that the ‘empirical 
features’ of ethnic nature include only ‘assumed givens’ and ‘constructed features’ 
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(language, culture, religion, etc.). In substituting ‘the group’s ethnicity’ for ‘the 
group’s members’ we tend to conflate the emblems conventionally selected to label, 
or provide a shorthand ‘marker’ of the social status ‘member of an ethnic group’, 
with the empirical features which we consider constitute the individual state of 
ethnic identity. One of the reasons why we slip particularly easily into this conflation 
is that we tend to think that ‘markers’ of ethnic status, unlike markers of other social 
statuses, are somehow ‘ineradicable’, part of the core of identity of each individual: 
unlike wedding rings, or badges of office, for instance, we do not tend to think of 
ethnic ‘givens’ – even ‘assumed givens’ - as so easily slipped off. This is a confusion 
fostered by the persistence of multiple meanings and referents for the term 
‘ethnicity’. It has close links to the problem of the dual perception of the nature of 
social construction, seen at the collective level as invented, individually as 
imperative. It is primarily, however, a function of our intuitive difficulty in 
recognising that the categorisation of real world referents is conventional and 
constructed, and not ‘pattern matched’. 
 
attributions [of status] classify things not by anything internal to them but 
by what lies outside them – what is directed toward them, or attached to 
them, or associated with them. […] That something counts as having a 
status is what constitutes it having a status. […] Our dominant form of 
naming and classification refers to context and confers status. Our 
dominant paradigm of naming and classification imagines that reference 
is made to the nature of the thing classified. Why this curious incongruity 
exists it is hard to be sure. But there is no doubt that it does exist, and that 
there is a continuing inclination to understand the dominant form in terms 
of the dominant paradigm. The consequence is that what is due to status 
is attributed to nature instead. (Barnes 2000:148) 
 
This ‘curious incongruity’, I have suggested, is particularly hard at work in the 
widespread conflation of ethnic ‘status’ with ethnic ‘state’. 
 
To reiterate, ethnic group membership is – like any other group membership – the 
result of being taken as a member by the collective. The selection of the factors 
which cause one to be taken as a member – the ‘markers’ of membership, of the 
social status – as well as their application, are matters of convention, something 
which is unaffected whether or not the list of selected factors includes some ‘natural’ 
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or ‘real world’ distinguishing ‘features’. The fact that members of one group are 
‘recognised’ by one means, and those of another by another, is pure convention42, as 
is the degree of rigour with which such conventions are or are not enforced. Whilst 
the nature of the markers of recognition does seem to have some bearing upon the 
likelihood of the category being maintained and reinforced or not43, the essential 
point is that categories are in the eyes of the beholders, the collective and its 
members, and not in the nature of the objects or features categorised, and that this 
applies to real world objects (‘natural kinds’) as well as to social conventional 
‘objects’ (‘social kinds’).  
 
I now consider in turn the following questions: how should we extrapolate a coherent 
constructivist epistemology to encompass the ‘real’ world as well as the ‘social’ 
realm? What kind of understanding of ‘the collective’ and of the role of interaction is 
required to underpin such a perspective? What does this then mean about the basis 
for collective beliefs, in general, and collective and individual beliefs about ethnicity, 
in particular? How do beliefs about ethnicity relate to beliefs about interests?  
 
Situating the ‘real world’ amidst social construction 
 
[I]t is not the empirical characteristics or describable properties of a 
human being that make her an individual of a specific name, but 
nonetheless her physical manifestation is relevant to how she is 
identified. […] what actually allows identification of ‘the same’ human 
being in a changing body is not the essence of an individual within but 
continuing references to that essence from without. It is the ring of 
speech and action around the body, no particular part or component of 
the ring but merely the persistence of such a ring over time, that 
constitutes the human being qua individual. (Barnes 2000:146-7) 
 
                                                 
42 Thus, for instance, race has ‘a dubious descriptive value’ but ‘exists as a cultural construct whether 
it has a ‘biological’ reality or not’: ‘if influential people had developed a similar theory about the 
hereditary personality traits of red-haired people, and if that theory gained social and cultural 
significance, ‘redhead studies’ would for similar reasons have become a field of academic research 
[…]’ (Eriksen 2002:5). See also McCrone (1998:25ff). 
43 This is to say that here is some feedback mechanism between the persona and the salience, between 
the cultural contents and the boundaries of ethnicity, that the two do not function fully-independently 
of one another. I return to this below. 
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This section explores an approach to knowledge of the real world which incorporates 
a coherent approach to social construction, whilst retaining an important difference 
between beliefs which have a ‘real world’-referent, and those which are fully 




There are constraints on the observation of reality. It is not collectives or omniscient 
individuals that carry out empirical observation, but individuals each with a finite, 
separate, and contingent series of empirical experiences. Individuals have neither 
‘bird’s eye’ nor ‘universal’ access to the real world, and are thereby denied the 
possibility of distinguishing what is ‘really true’ from what is ‘really false’ about that 
world (Barnes & Bloor 1982:31)44. Individuals do not share the experience of 
empirical observation of others, but they do regularly receive ‘testimony’ from others 
regarding their observations, and this provides a large proportion of what individuals 
consider that they ‘know’. Barnes (1995:99ff), and Kusch (2002:201ff) provide 
accounts of how children and social outsiders become ‘competent’ members of a 
community by means of processes of ‘ostensive learning’ according to which they 
are taught to categorise their observations ‘correctly’ or ‘incorrectly’, according to 
categories and concepts which are the product of social construction and collective 
convention. Thus whilst the (say) five instances of a child’s observation of cats are 
triggered by the ‘real world’, the knowledge the child has that these five experienced 
objects are (i.e. that they should be categorised as) cats, whilst the objects of another 
three observatory experiences are not (i.e. that they should not be so categorised), is 
learned conventional knowledge. It cannot be ‘read off’ from the objects, or the facts 
of what the child observed, but draws on a wealth of ‘background knowledge’ 
provided by the child’s teachers45. 
                                                 
44 Without something equivalent to a rationalist ‘bridgehead’ (Hollis 1967), the distinction between 
validity and credibility is inaccessible to the observer. It is ‘not an absolute distinction, but one whose 
employment depends upon a taken-for-granted background. […] Without [background knowledge], 
the distinction itself could never be put to use, or its contrast be given an application.’ (Barnes & 
Bloor 1982:30) 
45 It is this which allows the child to begin to formulate a distinction between validity and credibility. 
‘Materials for cognitive models […] do not take their meaning from their correspondence with objects 






It seems quite straightforward to claim that the concepts and categories which the 
member of a collective learns are learned partly from the collective’s reports. But 
why does that make them conventionally, rather than empirically based? Why can 
they not just be an aggregate ‘reading off’ all of the community members’ empirical 
observations of the world – effectively ‘pattern recognition’ from reality, as our 
intuitions suggest, and by an aggregate community which has greater observatory 
access to the ‘real world’ than an individual would? An answer is offered by the 
theory of ‘meaning finitism’46, which contends precisely that ‘meanings are social 
institutions’, that is, they are conventional (Kusch 2002:206). An important premise 
of meaning finitism is that each and every judgement about the application of a 
particular category to a newly encountered entity ‘involves, or can be reconstructed 
as, a judgement concerning similarity’ (ibid.:203). The set of known examples (the 
‘learning set’) of things that can be categorised as, say, ‘cat’ is finite (and almost 
certainly different) for each individual considering the next application of the 
classification. Because of this, each individual’s judgement as to whether or not a 
new instance is or is not also a cat is never a judgement of identity, but always of the 
form of the ‘extension of an analogy’, an extrapolation on the basis of the finite 
knowledge of ‘catness’ at her or his disposal.  
 
Logically, therefore, since it is not a judgement of identity, the judgement could 
always go either way – it is ‘open-ended’. In this sense the meaning of the 
classification ‘cat’ is ‘under-determined’, and can always be significantly shifted by 
the next application made of it – say, for instance, to a cat-like dog. The meaning of a 
categorisation which has a real-world referent, then, is ‘under-determined’ by the real 
world: correct application of a ‘real world’ concept is not a matter of correlation with 
some ‘essential catness’: it could not be, because any given observer has no means of 
                                                                                                                                          
whereby they reason and try to comprehend what happens to them, and in their world.’ (Barth 
2000:31). 
46 The most important accounts of this central, but profoundly counter-intuitive position are Barnes et 
al. (1996:ch.3), Bloor (1997), and Kusch (2002:ch.15). 
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observing such ‘essence’. What, then, gives stability to this underdetermined 
identification? What prevents the application of the category ‘cat’, for instance to 
that cat-sized dog?  
 
The answer lies in the social nature of learning. The appellation ‘cat’ is used 
correctly in so far as the community will let the user ‘get away with’ her or his usage 
(Kusch 2002:204). What gives stability to the meanings of ‘real-world’ or ‘alter-
referential’ concepts and categories is collective consensus, not the fleeting, 
contingent, and partisan observations of individuals. In many instances individuals’ 
views will be in tune with those of the collective within which they have learned to 
use the category ‘cat’. In others they may vary. 
 
Active intervention will be necessary to modify routines and automatic 
responses, at the individual psychological level, in order to keep tradition 
constituted and allow the routine implications of traditional knowledge to 
unfold at the collective level. It may be that minority deviance has to be 
overruled here, or that majority opinion defers to expertise and/or to 
power, or some other route to consensus may be negotiated. [H]owever 
consensus is established, whether easily or with difficulty, the outcome 
will be a revisable judgement. (Barnes 1995:113) 
 
At this point it is perhaps useful to return briefly to Smith’s summary of the 
primordial view, cited above, that ‘primordial ties have always divided the human 
species, as naturally as have sex or geography, and will always do so’ (Anthony 
Smith 1986:12). This passage needs further investigation when considered from the 
perspective of meaning finitism. For whilst all manner of sexual or geographical 
features may undoubtedly be ‘out there’ in the real world, the classificatory system 
according to which we may or may not recognise them, and may or may not consider 
that ‘they divide us’ are matters of constructed convention: there is nothing ‘natural’ 
about the way in which sex and geography divide us (i.e. nothing that can be ‘read 
off’ from the real world), any more than there is anything ‘natural’ about the way in 
which ethnicity, even if it happens to be premised on actual biological difference, 




‘The effect on belief of ‘the facts’’48 
 
Once again, it is important to reiterate that the constructivists’ view of our 
knowledge of the real world does not posit that all belief/knowledge is ‘fully’ 
‘completely’ and ‘only’ conventional – and never anything else49. Barnes & Bloor do 
not deny the impact of the real world, even though the causal role they attribute to it 
– necessarily given their relativist account – might seem a step down from that which 
empiricist/realist intuitions would suggest. They advocate an  
 
open and matter-of-fact stance towards the role of sensory stimulation 
[and] any other of the physical, genetic or psychological and non-social 
causes that must eventually find a place in an overall account of 
knowledge. The stimulation caused by material objects when the eye is 
turned in a given direction is indeed a causal factor in knowledge and its 
role is to be understood by seeing how this cause interacts with other 




the effect of ‘the facts’ on a believer plays the same general role whether 
the belief that results is a true one or a false one. […] reality is a common 
factor in all the vastly different cognitive responses that men produce to 
it. Being a common factor it is not a promising candidate to field as an 
explanation of that variation.50 (Barnes & Bloor 1982:33-4) 
 
Sahlins provides an account which is evocative of the appropriate balance to be 
struck between social and natural factors in explanation:  
 
material forces in production contain no cultural order, but merely a set 
of physical possibilities and constraints selectively organized by the 
cultural system and integrated as to their effects by the same logic that 
                                                                                                                                          
47 I am grateful to Irene Rafanell, for her determination and clarity on this point. 
48 (Barnes & Bloor 1982:33) 
49 Many critiques of radical social constructivism mistakenly charge it with idealism, or suggest that 
reality serves it only as a series of tokens to bear socially constructed meanings and institutions 
(Latour 1999, 1992). See Bloor (1992) (1999).  
50 The ‘equivalence postulate’ in the sociology of knowledge is specifically not that it is completely 
irrelevant whether a belief is false or true (or indeed that beliefs are equally true or equally false – 
both of which positions they reject as faulty), but rather that (a) no meaningful sense can be given to 
the distinction between the truth and the falsity of beliefs because we don’t have any independent 
vantage point from which to assess this, and (b) the truth or falsity of beliefs does not alter the manner 
of their explanation or the nature of the combination of causes (social, psychological, ‘real world’, 
etc.) which together bring them into being. 
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gave them cause. The material forces taken by themselves are lifeless. 
Their specific motions and determinate consequences can be stipulated 
only by progressively compounding them with the co—ordinates of the 




Natural and social kinds: self and alter-reference 
 
We now have two different categories of ‘objects of belief’: social kinds, which are 
fully constructed or conventional, and natural kinds whose categorisation is 
constructed or conventional, but which also have a ‘real world’ ‘alter-referent’ ‘out 
there’, to which cognitive response is made. Conventional belief, meanwhile, is 
‘belief about belief’ – that is, it is ‘self-referential’.  
 
Take away talk, and whatever is referred to as a social kind [money, 
marriage] ceases to exist. That should occasion no surprise: in the case of 
social kinds, the talk, ultimately is the referent itself. The case of natural 
kinds is not equally straightforward: take away all talk, and the category 
‘elephant’ disappears. What so disappears is our communally instituted 
and maintained taxonomy of animals and our exemplars and prototypes 
for what elephants look like. But whatever it was that we formerly 
referred to as ‘elephants’ will still be there. (Kusch 2002:68-69) 
 
Thus, for instance, if we take ethnicity to be a social kind,  
 
if persons A, B and C believe that C is a member of their ethnic group, 
then C’s ethnicity is constituted by the mutual belief of A, B and C. If 
they all change their minds, then C’s ethnic membership evaporates into 
thin air. C’s ethnicity is nothing but this mutual belief in C’s ethnic 
membership. The mutual belief is thus a belief about this mutual belief; 
that is, it is self-referring. By the same token, it is also self-validating: the 
mutual belief of A, B, and C, that C is a co-ethnic is what makes this very 
same belief true. (adapted from Kusch (1998:236)) 
 
The fact that beliefs about social kinds, and the conventional component of beliefs 
about natural kinds, are self-referring and self-validating constitutes a fundamentally 
important feature of this kind of belief: belief in such beliefs brings them into being; 
the more they are believed, the more they are true; they are ‘performative’. Notice 
here that the paragraph cited reads more easily when one inserts the phrase ‘ethnic 
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membership’ than the term ‘ethnicity’. This is, I suggest, symptomatic of the sort of 
conflated ‘double referent’ which the term ‘ethnicity’ has acquired, referring in much 
usage both to social status (member of an ethnic group), and to individual state 
(‘instrinsic’ individual ethnic nature). Whereas the notion that a person’s ‘group 
membership’ disappears once all talk about it is removed is quite readily intelligible, 
we are intuitively extremely resistant to the notion that a person’s ‘ethnicity’ 
evaporates in quite this way. We tend to think of an individual’s ethnicity as being 
made up of what constitutes the individual qua individual, rather than (or as well as) 
what constitutes the individual qua member of a group.  
 
People as artificial kinds? 
 
Kusch adds to natural and social kinds a further category of ‘artificial kinds’: 
 
Finally, turning to the case of typewriters, once we withdraw the talk and 
the performatives, typewriters qua typewriters will cease to exist. But we 
shall leave behind a changed physical world. (Kusch 2002:68-69) 
 
Some of the complications and confusions associated with ethnicity can perhaps be 
suggested by relating different aspects of the concept to these three kinds of kinds. 
The social status ‘member of an ethnic group’ seems a relatively straightforward 
social kind: take away all talk of ethnicity and ethnic membership and the social 
status conferred cease to exist. What about the people so categorised? Take away all 
talk of ethnicity and the people we formerly referred to as ‘members of the ethnic 
group’ remain, whilst the category has disappeared. On the other hand, can we really 
say that ‘the people remain’, independent of their categorisation as ‘members of an 
ethnic group’, in quite this straightforward way? Is there not, perhaps a sense in 
which various of the social conventions they adopt, including that of ethnicity, have a 
hand in ‘creating’ them, in many different ways, of which perhaps the clearest is the 
influence such conventions have in shaping processes of human reproduction. 
 




‘typewriter’ has alter-reference, and there are models, paradigms, and 
prototypes of what a typewriter ought to look like and how it ought to 
work. Yet ‘typewriter’ differs from [elephant or rose] in that the 
individuals classified as typewriters do not exist wholly independently of 
the classifying activity. Instead, the classifying activitiy is part and parcel 
of a social process that essentially involves physical actions bringing the 
classified individuals into existence. In the case of artificial kinds, human 
action makes it so that the individuals referred to fit the prototypes, rather 
than vice versa. (Kusch 1998:246) 
 
One might wish to argue, along these lines, that (at least second generation) members 
of an ethnic group might, depending on the norms of endogamy or exogamy 
associated with the group, be better regarded as artificial than natural kinds. In so far 
as ethnicity (in common with a whole range of other social statuses) is a social 
institution potentially associated with human reproduction (and this is clearly a 
contingent matter), would one not perhaps wish to argue that human beings 
constitute an artificial kind, ‘brought into existence’ by a (range of different kinds of) 
social process? 
 
Social institutions as the basis for beliefs 
 
For something to be a social institution it is sufficient that some 
collective has a self-referential belief about it. It is not necessary that this 
collective be extensive. […] It is important to recognise the performative 
or finitist aspect of social institutions. Social institutions are performed, 
and their path is not predetermined by rules and norms. (Kusch 
1998:237) 
 
A basis for all of our beliefs, then, is the self-referential, self-validating 
(performative) conventional knowledge that we learn from the collective, 
supplemented in the case of alter-referential objects by such empirical observations 
as we may make. Far from the shifting, arbitrary ‘optional extra’ of popular 
conception, social ‘construction’ turns out to form the basis for knowledge. I turn 
now to consider what sort of understanding of the collective is required to underpin 
the notion that individuals’ 
 
acts and comprehensions are tested against the acts of others, and the 
resistance of the environment. There is a constant creativity in this; and 
people may use multiple images and perform a multiplicity of operations 
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as they grope for an understanding of the world, fallibly exchanging, 
adjusting and reconstructing their models as they harvest the experiences 
that ensue. (Barth 2000:31) 
 
Human sociability and susceptibility: the ‘proto-normative system’ 
 
[H]uman sociability is deep seated and pervasive. [… O]ur sociability 
should be conceived of as a continuing profound, mutual susceptibility, 
which finds expression in aligned cognition, shared language and 
knowledge, and indeed in the existence of all manner of powers, skills 
and capacities that can be readily combined and co-ordinated with those 
of other people. [… R]ather than restricting us to, or confining us within, 
a given social order, our sociability is what facilitates its production and 
allows its continuing reconstitution and recreation. (Barnes 1995:3-4) 
 
Individual knowledge is premised on interaction with the wider collective, and is 
only stable in its terms: ‘normativity can only exist for interacting individuals’ 
(Kusch 2002:196)51. The approach discussed so far requires a focus on inter-
subjectivity and interaction, on the collective or interacting social group; it rejects 
methodological individualism. Rather, it sets out a model in which the very nature of 
ongoing social interaction (characterised by a continual process of mutual sanction 
and susceptibility to sanction)52, itself offers the key to co-ordinated action53, and to 
the achievement of normativity.  
 
Members will be differentially susceptible to those particular forms of 
communication originating from fellow members. But the form of the 
system will be much the same everywhere. It will be constituted of 
agents who, of their nature as it were, are both susceptible to the 
evaluations of others and disposed to offer such evaluations to others. 
These will be agents to whom verbal and symbolic communication is 
normal and natural, and on whom the evaluations implicit in such 
communication will have effects. (Barnes 2000:68) 
 
This has a number of important implications for how we might want to go about 
studying the social status of ethnicity, and its relationship with collective action. First 
and foremost, both are underpinned by interaction, and the collective discourses, 
                                                 
51 See Kusch (2002:ch.14) and Bloor (1997).  
52 Cf. Goffman on face (1967), Scheff on shame (1988), both references made by Barnes (2000:67-8).  
53 See Barnes (1995). ‘Collective action will not be accounted for by any theory that deals in 
independent individuals.’  
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beliefs, and body of knowledge generated thereby. Interaction (incorporating 
imitation, sanctioning, and self-correction (Kusch 1998:267-8)) is a continual 
process, generating knowledge (of the social status of ethnicity, for instance) which, 
albeit potentially experienced as stable, constraining, or ‘imperative’ at the individual 
level (or not, according to the conventions in play), is so, but is also subject to 
reinforcement, undermining, development, or transformation, as a result of ongoing 
collective iteration. In the case of social statuses, such iteration of itself 
performatively creates (knowledge about) those statuses: hearing, knowing about 
ethnic group membership constitutes ethnic group membership. Ethnicity as social 
status, then, is always a contemporary project, of an actual existing and interacting 
community, continually renewed, continually new, and the function of ongoing 
interaction, consensus and sanction: 
 
the collective consensus and the process of sanctioning constantly shape 
and determine one another. The consensus sets the standard for the 
sanctioning, and the sanctioning protects and creates the consensus. 
(Kusch 1998:270) 
 
The system admits of change and variation. ‘Consensus’ is achieved by means of 
myriad encounters between individuals or groups of members of the collective54. The 
sanctioning and consensus-forming processes, then, are local to these encounters, and 
reflect individual variation of experience and interpretation amongst the parties to 
them55. If there is a lot of interaction between two groups, all other things being 
equal, the sanctioning and consensus-forming (and interpretation) processes will be 
vigorous and dynamic. If interaction – as it always must be - is restricted or 
interrupted, or newly influenced by interaction with third and additional parties, 
‘drift’ or ‘change’ will set in.  
 
                                                 
54 This account, suggestive both of the active role of the individual, and of the fact that this active role 
is that of an individual-in-a-setting, not of an individual per se, satisfies Anthony Cohen’s concerns 
with symbolic communication and self-consciousness, above. 
55 Kusch’s ‘model of local consensus’ posits an array of mobile clocks which, in order to ‘keep time’, 
each time they encounter another clock in the array, adjust their settings, as a pair, to the average of 
the times they show, before departing for the next such collision: ‘in this scenario, all consensus is 
local and temporary, and none of the clocks can ‘know’ what the ‘collective consensus’ – that is, the 
bandwidth of all times – of all clocks would be’ (Kusch 2002:206). 
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An ethnic status is the persistent accomplishment of a group of individuals as 
members of a collective, inhering in what they know about that status; and what they 
know is a function of their interaction and agreement, repeated or shifting. 
 
Initial Implications for an understanding of ethnicity as a social status 
 
The implications of the approach I have suggested for an understanding of ethnicity 
are profound.  
 
One is that the level and extent of conventionality associated with ethnicity goes 
much deeper than is usually recognised. At a first level, the issue of whether or not 
group members or group outsiders recognise someone as a member of an ethnic 
group is a matter of convention, arising out of the ongoing interaction of the 
collective. The conventions according to which an ethnic group is identified and 
categorised from within, and from without, may well differ, since interaction patterns 
within the group, and with non-group members, may be different. Interaction patterns 
and experiences across the group are also not likely to produce uniform 
understandings of the conventional basis of the group. Given that ethnic groups are 
often regarded as extending across thousands of members – in Ethiopia, some as 
running into millions – we seem to be in the realm of Anderson’s ‘imagined 
community’, and the extent and nature of any constructions of the ethnic self which 
are shared will be contingent upon the considerable vagaries of the extent and nature 
of interaction and distribution of testimony and empirical experience on this wide 
scale. 
 
Whether or not the distribution of this convention coincides with the borders of the 
ethnic group demarcated by it is just as much a contingent matter as is the 
coincidence of cultural and ethnic boundaries; as Barth noted, an ethnic boundary 
may be characterised as well by interaction which crosses it as by an interruption in 
interaction between those on either side of it. Since consensus is local, each 
individual member of the interacting collective which ‘shares knowledge’ of the 
conventional status will have a slightly different perspective on precisely what that 
convention amounts to. Similarly, any piece of new information relevant to the 
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categorisation and marking of groups will, in so far as it is disseminated, and belief 
in it locally ‘constructed’, form part of the knowledge from which consensus about 
groups and group membership is locally constructed. If, as a result of widespread 
government propaganda and mobilisation campaigns the categories ‘nation, 
nationality, and people’ become widely known and widely, if variously, incorporated 
into the basis for conventional attributions of status, it can be expected that the 
attributions of status will shift in similar but not identical ways over this same broad 
canvas. Whether and how they do shift, however, will nevertheless remain 
contingent upon myriad processes of local consensus formation, based upon the 
specifics of interaction amongst group members, and between group members and 
the source of these new categorisations – cadres, government officers, and whatever 
news or political media may be in operation. 
 
Also conventional will be the selection of ‘markers’ which label or identify the group 
membership in question, and the means, regularity, and rigour with which members 
of the community recognise them as markers: they may have everything or nothing 
in common with what outsiders, including constitution makers, regard as ethnic 
markers. Again, since consensus is local, a ‘single’ ethnic identity status will be 
identified by means of innumerable slightly different (even significantly different) 
processes. Questions about whether ethnic group membership is to be regarded as 
natural, stable, durable, exclusive, or inescapable, are also all contingent matters of 
local convention. Answers to them need to be investigated rather than assumed in 
each case; they may well depend on the kinds of features which are considered to 
mark the status: if physical features are regarded as unchangeable, and have been 
selected to constitute an important marker, the status may be regarded as 
‘inescapable’ or ‘natural’ – more so, perhaps, than if linguistic competence is a more 
important factor, and individuals are seen to acquire members’ status by learning it56. 
 
                                                 
56 although particular features might be likely to correlate with certain kinds of interpretation, there is 
nothing to say that they always will do – this is also a matter of convention: communities which do 
not share western beliefs about the relative malleability of language competence versus biology, might 
well reach different conclusions. As ever, whilst the effect of the facts may be to prompt certain social 
responses, it will not dictate them. 
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The means of investigating how ethnicity operates in any given situation, then, is to 
consider what people know about ethnicity – about salient group membership; what 
they genuinely believe it to constitute. For if they believe it divides them from their 
neighbours, it will do so; if they do not, it will not. Of investigative interest then, are 
questions of what they believe, how and why they have come to believe it, and what 
action such beliefs may influence. An assessment of the impact of ethnic federalism, 
for instance, should enquire primarily into what people know about it. Whether or 
not ethnic federalism has ‘ethnified’ Ethiopian politics, becomes a question of 
whether and how it has shifted patterns of knowledge, and modified popular 
conventions allocating social statuses of group membership. Answering it would 
encompass an investigation of the beliefs of all those germane to the situation, inside 
and outside the group; one difficulty would be to know quite how to delimit the 
research community, the distribution of whose knowledge is to be investigated. 
 
A second set of implications of this approach is that the nature of ethnic group 
membership is contemporary: temporary, local, and transient. In fact, we should 
probably be talking, with Fardon (1995) about ethnicities rather than ethnicity. There 
is nothing ancient, atavistic, or immutable about any particular social status of 
ethnicity: it is, quite literally, continuously and locally re-constructed (or dissolved) 
in the course of social interaction. Views which stress the primordial or perennial 
nature of ethnicity are, I suggest, conflating the thing marked (the social ethnic 
status) with common intuitions that those features which mark it are ancient and 
immutable, and that they not only mark it, but also constitute it (the individual ethnic 
nature). In societies where there has been little mobility, and little interaction with 
the outside world, it may well be that what we might wish to call ‘ethnic’ social 
statuses have remained apparently little changed over long periods, based on similar 
patterns of interaction. This does not make the status in any way immutable: it 
simply means that the way in which it is daily reconstructed is closely reconstitutive 
of an existing situation: there is little ‘drift’ in the array.  
 
This is an entirely contingent matter. Shifts in the system or pattern of beliefs of the 
community could be introduced in all sorts of ways, and because the reconstruction 
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of the ethnic status is continuous, such changes could be expected to change its 
course. Because of the performativity associated with the self-referential nature of 
such beliefs (beliefs about statuses constitute beliefs about statuses and make them 
true), the introduction of outsiders’ views about the nature of the ethnicity (the basis 
for ethnic group membership) operating within the group, will, ipso facto, shift the 
nature of ethnicity in so far as they are believed by members of the group. 
 
At this point, most of the tenets of primordialism look as though they have to be 
discarded. Ethnicity is not natural, perennial, fixed, or immutable: it cannot be ‘read 
off’ from empirical features of the real world, but is continuously and continually 
recreated by the collective. One of the key features of primordialism, however, seems 
in this approach to have been reinstated in a surprising way: understood as a social 
status as suggested, clearly ethnicity does cause or influence action. In so far as an 
ethnic status forms part of what individuals or a population know at any given 
moment (part of their contemporary system of beliefs), and in so far as it is regarded 
as salient, it will influence the calculative processes underpinning action. Now it 
seems appropriate to investigate those calculative processes further, considering how 
much can be drawn from the resources of instrumentalism.  
 
Barnes argues that the social group, and its interaction, predates any form of 
collective action – including the formulation of collective interests and consensus 
regarding them.  
 
[S]tatus groups emerge from individuals who are already together, 
whether interacting in a distinct context of social intercourse or in a 
condition easily transformed in that direction. It is not that independent 
individuals have prior interests that induce them to combine in particular 
ways and act together. Rather it is that individuals living and interacting 
together are able, on the basis of their knowledge of their situation, to 
evoke conceptions of shared interests and to enjoin action to further 
them. (1995:144) 
 




Several points of relevance for the investigation of ethnicity result from this view57. 
If interaction, not interests, is the first step towards collective action, it seems only 
sensible that our interest in explanation should focus upon those relations which may 
be most likely to constitute the first bases of human interaction – namely those, based 
on proximity, with family and neighbours. Thus the components from which 
ethnicity is commonly constructed may be reconfirmed as a commonly likely focus 
of interest – at least in those relatively many situations where these do constitute the 
first bases of interaction58. As Calhoun puts it: 
 
The reproduction of cultural tradition is supported by social practices that 
discourage or limit experimentation with alternatives, and inhibit 
searches for other ways of seeing things. Ethnicity embeds us in a web of 
such practices and in a social group which constantly reproduces them 
and may view any challenge to them as disloyalty. (Calhoun 1997:130n7) 
 
We need to exercise caution about ‘reading off’ the salience of ethnic group 
membership from circumstances that seem to us as analysts to prompt it: if ethnic 
group membership is a social status, the salience or otherwise of ethnic group 
membership is also a social status, and so is the ‘interest’ of the ethnic group. That is, 
ethnicity is salient if the ethnic group takes it to be and refers to it as salient, and the 
group has an ‘interest’ if it believes it has an interest. Whilst real world factors may 
be taken into account in the collective calculations that arrive at these conclusions, 
the conclusions remain ‘talk about talk’. 
 
In the empirical account which follows in Sections Two and Three I try to suggest 
that, although the actions of groups can be explained as constituted by the actions of 
calculative agents (and that these calculations can be investigated), the relationship 
between these calculations and what, as analysts, we might want to think of as their 
‘real’ collective interests is complicated by the social nature of the processes 
involved. The point is brought out by Calhoun: 
                                                 
57 I do not reproduce the details of Barnes’ arguments that his schema (interaction-organisation-
interests-action) accounts better for collective action than that offered by Marx and Weber (situation-
interests-organisation-action). See Barnes (1995:188ff). 
58 This, for instance, might go some way to answering the question which Banks suggests Epstein 
(1978) fails to answer: ‘why an ethnic identity rather than a class identity or a gender identity or some 




An understanding of identity that goes beyond the notion of interest is 
[…] important. […] many of the new social movement examples […] do 
not seem intrinsically close to a rational choice explanation but involve 
unconventional sorts of interests and especially processes of continual 
redefinition of interests because of reconstitution of identity. (1991:53) 
[…] the rational choice to take extraordinary risk may depend on the 
social construction, in the midst of unusual collective action, of a 
personal identity that makes not taking a given risk more certain to 
imperil the self of the actor than taking it. This sort of calculation cannot 
be understood in terms of an approach to rational action that takes actor’s 
identities as fixed attributes of individuals or one that analyses individual 
action solely in terms of interests derived from various external sources – 
such as class position. But it can be understood. (ibid.:69)59  
 
Caveats regarding the straightforward understanding and elaboration of collective 
interests and identities as directly based on observable ‘real’ circumstances, remain 
to the fore in the following exploration of collective identity construction as a 
calculative and continual response to what is known (believed) by the collective in 
question. Much of the foregoing discussion has had the function of distancing this 
analysis from much of primordialism. At this point, symmetrically, a range of 
caveats regarding the kind of instrumentalism which ‘reads off’ interests from 
‘objective circumstances’ should be clear. The account given in what follows seeks 
to distinguish between the ‘effect on belief of “the facts”’ (Barnes & Bloor 1982:33) 
and the constructed conceptualisation carried out by the collective in fastening on a 
response60. It therefore pays particular attention to the ‘markers’61 of ‘reality’, and 
the empirical causes62 which seem to assume importance in the process of 
construction of ethnicity (see below), whilst also assessing the nature of that 
significance, and that of the relative systems of knowledge of the various actors and 
commentators, as they influence the emergent motivation of the collective.  
 
                                                 
59 One of the most striking instances of just such an apparently ‘inexplicable’ construction of 
collective interest is explained in Turton’s account of Mursi - Nyangatom relations (1989) 
60 Albeit with Bloor’s caveats about setting up a tug-of-war between ‘reality’ and ‘society’ (1997:3).  
61 I mean emic ‘markers’ as opposed to the ‘features’ observable from a social scientific perspective 
‘etic’ to the group in question (Schlee 1994) (see below). I would tend, for instance, to agree with 
Schlee’s critique of Levine (1974) that he effectively neglects ‘emic markers’ in focusing on common 
‘form’ (‘etic features’) in his identification of Ethiopia as a ‘culture area’ (1994:140).  
62 ‘which must eventually find a place in an overall account of knowledge’ (Barnes & Bloor 1982:33) 
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Barnes, as I have mentioned, insists that the collective must pre-date collective 
interest, and that collectivities are not ‘naturally’ brought into existence by pre-
existing shared interests, which somehow inhere in ‘reality’ (Barnes 1995:174-192). 
Once established, however, it is clear that perceptions of interest – individual and 
collective – will have a feedback effect on processes of categorisation. In his account 
of meaning finitism, Kusch notes that whilst there is often little difficulty in reaching 
agreement on the classification, for instance of a series of cats as cats (not least, he 
suggests, because of our similar physiology and linguistic training), there is always 
room for difference: 
 
Our judgements of similarity do not always coincide. And they tend to 
diverge in particular when we have different interests (goals and aims). 
[…] Whether or not a child judges a newly encountered entity – say a 
stuffed toy – to be relevantly similar to her exemplars (of real cats) might 
depend on whether the child is interested in watching an animal chase 
after a ball, or whether the child is eager to caress the furry body of a cat-
size creature. If the latter interest looms large, then the perceived 
similarity between the stuffed toy and live cats will be higher than if the 
former goal is more salient. To that extent, similarity is in the eye of the 
beholder. (Kusch 2002:203-4) 
 
All of this suggests a recursive relationship between categories or statuses and 
interests, perhaps tantamount to nothing more than the observation that a population 
grouped and interacting in one way will see their interests differently from the same 
population categorised and categorising differently. What is problematic is that the 
groups that emerge, the statuses by which they are defined as groups, and the 
perceptions of their interests they generate are all contingent – and shifting.  
 
What appears throughout is the continuous existence of individual judgements of 
similarity: the contemporaneity of construction and reconstruction of collective 
identity, and of the collective sense of self-interest. This prompts a reconsideration of 
the significance of ‘historical legacy’ (along the lines discussed in Section Two), 
suggesting that all and any known precedents can be effective as ingredients or 
markers of identity – precisely in so far as they are known. On this view, the priority 
often accorded to those markers which may appear to have historical longevity, is 
interpreted as a function of the performative power of what is known of their 
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pedigree, and their subsequent respected contemporary status, and not somehow 
intrinsic to their atavism per se.  
 
The ‘real’, material conflicts, problems, and dynamics which the identity politics of 
contemporary Ethiopia reflect and seek to address clearly do have ‘deep historical 
dimensions’ (Schröder 1998:28). It seems important, however, not to assume that 
such ‘history’ and ‘reality’ have much, or exclusive, explanatory power, but to stress 
the selective contemporary exploitation of available resources and precedents – be 
they of yesterday or several centuries past, ‘truly’ or ‘falsely’ perceived. Whilst the 
events of a group’s history remain a ‘heavy inheritance’ in the sense that they cannot 
be undone, their selection and categorisation as elements of the narrative of its 
history, remain – like all such processes - ‘underdetermined’: at the collective level, 
in so far as they are known, they form an endlessly malleable and selectable treasure-
trove of resources. What makes ‘history’ or ‘identity’ look like an inheritance which 
is impossible to escape is our individualised perspective: as individuals, we are not 
often visibly at liberty to manipulate the resources of history (or identity) at will – 
but only as a tiny part of the larger collective, whose pre-existing views, culture, 
consensus, and conventions we do indeed very much ‘inherit’ in a continuous 
process of mutual learning, informing and sanctioning. At the individual level the 
‘real’ events of history become the narrative of history, as the ‘real’ elements 
marking separate identity constitute the narrative of identity. The two are not fully 
separable. It is the juxtaposition of the individual with the collective level that makes 
identity look at once fixed and unchanging, and endlessly malleable. 
 
What is true of histories is true of futures: ethnic groups, like all other groups, are 
motivated by what they calculate to be their interests. As analysts we may or may not 
feel we have an understanding of a group’s ‘real’ or ‘objective’ interests. The extent 
to which we do, and whether the group shares our view, are contingent matters. How 
they construct their collective sense of interest will be a function of what they know. 
Whilst the ‘objective circumstances’ are undoubtedly ‘out there’, their selection and 
categorisation as elements of the narrative of the group’s interest, remain – like all 
such processes – ‘underdetermined’. Rather than interest arising out of (an 
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understanding of) real circumstances, collective interest, I have argued, emerges 
from collective interaction, prompted, but not determined, by empirical 
circumstance. Once a sense of interest has emerged in this way, the performativity it 
enjoys is likely to shape the perception and categorisation of these circumstances, 
and, by processes of ‘bootstrapped induction’ (Barnes 1983) to influence the future 
pattern of interaction which will generate it. This is the recursive and mutually 
constitutive relationship which ethnicity and interest enjoy. 
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Chapter III. Scope and Ambition of the Thesis 
 
This brief chapter aims to do two sets of things, each of which relate closely to 
methodological concerns. The first is to provide an account of the methods by which 
the study was carried out, giving some impression of the scope and nature of the 
research undertaken, as well as the perceived advantages and constraints of the 
approach adopted. Included in this discussion is a note on terminology adopted. 
Building on the theoretical discussion in Chapter II, above, the second purpose of 
this chapter is to consider the kinds of lines and focus of investigation likely to prove 
appropriate to a constructivist approach, given the scope of the research outlined. 
This is intended to link the empirical discussion of Sections Two and Three which 







A study of the politicisation of ethnicity in Ethiopia is a study of how ethnicity is 
involved in the way the Ethiopian state and groups of its citizens view and approach 
one another, and of the consequences this has had. In trying to untangle 
developments in the views, beliefs, and understandings of different populations, I 
have drawn on evidence of their experiences and responses provided by both 




I draw on the English language literature on Ethiopia primarily from three 
disciplines: history, politics, and anthropology. Since the focus of my interest is the 
relation between the modern Ethiopian state and its citizens, politics is clearly my 
‘home discipline’. However, for a number of reasons, many of which relate to the 
nature of the research environment for political scientists in Ethiopia over the period 
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in question, the literature in politics proved the least rewarding of the three 
interrelated disciplinary categories.  
 
In the last decade of the imperial regime, Perham’s seminal study of The Government 
of Ethiopia (1969[1948]) was re-issued, and her groundwork extended in two 
important but divergent ways. Whilst Clapham (1969) illuminated the workings and 
institutions of the imperial government over the critical period of centralisation and 
modernisation of the middle twentieth century, Markakis (1974) explored the 
patterns of socio-economic forces for change in the wider society over the same 
period. This exemplary series of imperial-era studies of the Ethiopian state was 
overtaken, in the wake of its overthrow, by a much larger, and often considerably 
less satisfactory range of studies of the bloody events of the change of government, 
and the new revolutionary regime63. Much was written too soon afterwards for 
satisfactory evaluation of either. The ruthlessness with which the military 
government silenced its critics through the Red Terror of the late 1970s, and the 
escalation of the civil wars in the north through the 1980s, offered a domestic 
research environment inimical to political science. After two decades, it did prove 
possible to update analysis of the new institutions, structures, dynamics and policies 
of the central government (Clapham 1988), whilst work on the socio-economic 
forces, which raged around it with increasing violence, had to be carried on outside 
the country’s borders (Markakis 1987)64. Meanwhile, a lot of other ink had been 
spilled to polemical rather than analytical effect. 
 
English language history on Ethiopia, too, has had its limitations. As Donham and 
James note, for a long time 
 
Ethiopian history […] had been focused on the metanarratives of the 
nation – in the case of Ethiopia, the preservation of its independence 
against colonial odds. Emperors’ lives, their battles and foreign intrigues 
[…] furnished a seemingly natural way to shape stories and to distinguish 
periods. (Donham & James 2002[1986]:xviii) 
                                                 
63 Including, for instance, Ottaway M & D (1978), Halliday & Molyneux (1981), Lefort (1983), 
Schwab (1985) 
64 Interestingly neither approach devoted particularly extensive analysis to the political force, the 




Although many historians of Ethiopia have been criticised for overt bias in favour of 
the exploits and culture of its ruling class (and for corresponding neglect of the 
experiences and perspectives of their subjects)65, there is much to be gleaned about 
social development from the scholarship which characterises the historical 
literature66. Its resources provide the bulk of the material from which much of 
Section Two of this thesis is fashioned. 
 
The publication in 1986 of Donham & James’ edited collection, marked a shift away 
from widespread Abyssinia-centricity in Ethiopian history. It also marked the 
beginning of a very fruitful collaboration between history and anthropology, which 
allowed for the elaboration of popular experiences of processes of social, economic, 
and political development from all over the country, as an alternative way to ‘shape 
stories and distinguish periods’67. The late 1980s also saw the emergence of another 
set of voices seeking to articulate stories at variance with the ‘official’ perspective of 
the Ethiopian state, namely those which grew from the nationalist movements in 
Eritrea and Oromia. Whilst many nationalist accounts  - particularly in politics – 
intended primarily to contribute to the polemics of the period, Oromo studies in 
particular also produced history and anthropology of lasting value68. 
 
In the last four decades, then, a contested research environment throughout the Horn 
of Africa, and one often hostile to an overt focus on state power and its operation, 
has resulted in a situation where much of the most informative work on political 
relations (particularly from the points of view of citizens) is to be found in social 
anthropology and ‘historical ethnography’. Thus, for instance, Section Three of this 
thesis, dealing with developments since 1991, draws on such authors as Abbink 
(1991) (2000), Donham (1999), Hogg (1993) (1997), Schlee (1989) (1994), and the 
                                                 
65 See Chapter IV below. 
66 Of outstanding importance are, for instance, Bahru Zewde (1991) (2002), Crummey (2000), Gebru 
Tareke (1996[1991]), McCann (1987), Mohammed Hassan (1990), Richard Pankhurst (1961) (1966) 
(1968) (1990), Rubenson (1966) (1976) and Trimingham (1965[1952]) 
67 The recent publication of a successor volume (James et al. 2002), demonstrates the continuing 
vitality of this interface, irrespective of the uneven quality of its contributions. 
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various contributors to Donham & James (1986[2002]), Fukui & Markakis (1994), 
and James et al. (2000). It is in the nature of much of this work that, in the traditions 
of ethnographic scholarship, it is often tightly focused on one or a number of specific 
research communities and locations. Whilst many of the authors cited offer analysis 
which transcends their temporal, geographic, or ethnographic focus69, one of the 
drawbacks of this literature is that its rich resources have not always been utilised, 
and are not always easily usable, to inform political analysis at the level of the state.  
 
Unpublished graduate and undergraduate theses constitute an increasingly important 
body of secondary literature on Ethiopia and its various ethnic groups. In the course 
of this research, I have been able to gain access to sources at libraries at the Institute 
of Ethiopian Studies of Addis Ababa University, and the Ethiopian Civil Service 
College. Both offer rich resources produced by their students who, as the years have 
passed under ethnic federalism, seem increasingly keen to study and write about their 
home regions. Amidst much which has been of use to this study, the bibliography 
lists only those works cited in the text.  
 
Documents and primary literature 
 
Whilst the early sections of Chapter IV are drawn entirely from secondary sources, 
the study of the evolution of the student movement in the late 1960s, as well as much 
of the discussion of the TPLF and OLF in Chapter V also draws on documentation 
produced by participants in these circles. The line between secondary analysis and 
primary documentation becomes particularly blurred in the case of the student and 
ethno-nationalist movements, since many of the protagonists of each have authored 
their own contemporary analyses and commentaries which now also constitute a 
subject of research70. These are perhaps only the most visible instances of the way in 
                                                                                                                                          
68 Baxter (1986) reviews the field of Oromo studies at that time. See notably, Bartels (1989), Bassi 
(1996) (1997), Baxter, Hultin & Triulzi (1996), Gemetchu Megerssa (1993), Mohammed Hassen 
(1990), Mekuria Bulcha (1988). 
69 Donham (1999) is notable. 
70 Articles by Walleligne Mekonen (1969), Andreas Eshete et al. (Challenge 1970), Tilahun Takele 
(1970), are notable examples. See Chapter IV below. 
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which all analysis and commentary feeds, categorises and creates our subsequent 
understanding of events.  
 
Relevant documentation related to the Ethiopian student movement, EPRP, and 
Me’isone, is listed under ‘publications of Ethiopian Political Organisations’, even 
where these are not specifically cited in the text of the thesis. The same is true of 
relevant documentation produced by the TPLF/EPRDF and OLF in the period up to 
the withdrawal of the OLF from government in 1992. These documents were 
obtained from a number of library and archive sources, including those of the 
movements themselves. Since my survey of this literature was restricted to the 
literature in English, it focuses on what was originally explicitly intended  and 
produced for external consumption and propaganda. Literature produced by the 
Fronts consists primarily of Bulletins, Magazines, and Press Releases, published by 
their foreign relations bureaux; that published by the student bodies was intended 
both for student debate in the diaspora, and to be shared with solidarity organisations 
internationally. Although much of it is not specifically cited or quoted, its study has 





Notes and transcripts of a wide range of interviews of different kinds, conducted 
between late 1988 and mid-2002, constitute a primary resource of this research. My 
interest in the issue of politicised ethnicity dates from interviews and conversations 
during a first visit to Ethiopia in October-December 1988, several of which are cited 
in the text. My academic work began in 1994 with a pilot study of the Charter 
conference in July 1991 which launched the TGE (Vaughan 1994). This project drew 
on 22 formal interviews conducted with delegates to the conference between June 
and August 199471. It established that semi-structured interviews in English, with 
Ethiopia’s political elite, recorded at the time either electronically or in note form, 
                                                 
71 21 conducted in Addis Ababa and one by telephone internationally. It also drew on analysis of the 
18 hour ETV videotape and translated transcript of the proceedings. 
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produced useful and illuminating transcript material; and that formal interviews were 
frequently usefully supplemented by informal and unrecorded conversations.  
 
Fieldwork specifically for the purpose of this thesis was conducted during the period 
I was resident in Ethiopia between January 1998 and March 2000, and again during 
April-July 2002. Formal notes and/or transcripts of around 80 structured and semi-
structured interviews conducted over the period in Addis Ababa are on file. Further 
fieldwork was carried out outside Addis Ababa as opportunities arose: significant 
visits included: October-November 1998, Mekelle, Tigray NRS (12 interviews); May 
1999, Amhara NRS (25 interviews); September-November 1999, SNNPNRS (39 
interviews) and Western Oromia NRS (36 interviews); January 2000, Harar, Dire 
Dawa, Jigjiga (15 interviews); June-July 2002, SNNPNRS (76 interviews), Amhara 
NRS (10 interviews), Tigray NRS (16 interviews). The overwhelming majority of 
these interviews were recorded by simultaneous notetaking, by hand; a very few 
were tape recorded. In both cases, recordings or notes were then transcribed; in a 
small number of cases, transcripts were returned to interviewees to be verified. 
 
Interviews in Addis Ababa and Mekelle, and outside Ethiopia, concentrated on the 
political elite: veterans of various of the political movements discussed in the study, 
particularly the student movement, the TPLF, and the OLF. They also included 
academics and prominent individuals, many of them contemporaries of the 
protagonists in the previous categories. 
 
The majority of those interviewed outside Addis Ababa, meanwhile, were state-
sector executive officers or civil servants, including teachers, at kilil, zone, wereda, 
or kebele level. Interviewees in the regions also included members of ruling and 
opposition political parties; officers of private sector NGOs, religious bodies, and 
commercial organisations; peasant farmers, and elder and ‘respected’ members of 
communities, often singled out by local respondents for their reputation for historical 
or cultural knowledge; and a small number of expatriates living and working in the 
areas in question. Interviewees were selected as those participating in local politics, 
in the widest sense of the term. Interviews were designed to elicit information and 
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views on the following topics: the organisation and activities of the state at each 
level; the activities by which state and political party structures had been established, 
and the processes of mobilisation which had brought respondents (or others) to 
participate in them; local understandings (amongst state/party and non-state/party 
actors) of ‘nationality issues’ as they had been experienced under EPRDF; the 
development of local politics over the period from 1991, and local perceptions of the 
impact of ‘ethnic federalism’ locally and nationally. Interviews conducted in 
Ethiopia’s regions were attempting both to elicit data specific to events and 
developments in different locations, and also to trace patterns of experiences and 
perceptions common to different categories of interlocutors. In order to build up a 
picture along both of these lines, a relatively large number of interviews were 
conducted over an extended period, and attempts were made to revisit locations (and, 
where possible, interviewees) on more than one occasion.  
 
Interviews are cited in the thesis text as follows: (interview, category or description 
of interviewee, location of interview, date of interview). Although all interlocutors 
gave permission for their comments to be recorded and used, and many expressed 
their willingness for quotations to be attributed, willingness to be named was not 
uniform. In view of the political sensitivity of many of the issues under discussion, 
this came as no surprise. I have therefore adopted a policy throughout of not naming 
interviewees, attempting instead to contextualise their remarks by providing some 
relevant indication of the status of the person quoted, without compromising their 
anonymity where necessary. 
 
The majority of interviews were conducted in English. A large minority were 
conducted in a mixture of my limited Amharic and English, or involved translation 
from Amharic or another Ethiopian language. In most cases translators were found 
‘on the spot’, which often ‘softened’ the atmosphere of the interview, turning it into a 
more relaxed discussion to which several people who knew one another were party. 
Attempts were made, of course, to ensure that translators were close or acceptable to, 




This approach had a number of advantages. It allowed me to build up a number of 
relatively detailed pictures of the situation in a range of different locations in 
Ethiopia72, sufficient to sustain individual analysis and comparative assessment. It 
allowed me to gain a sense of trends and developments over the second half of the 
decade of the 1990s. Finally it allowed me to gain a sense of the patterns of interface 
and juxtaposition of the views a range of interlocutors, differently located vis-à-vis 
the state. It had, of course, a number of constraints. 
 
Constraints of the approach and methods used  
 
The most significant of the constraints of the research methods adopted, and of the 
combination of methods and theoretical approach, can be set out as a series of 
interrelated problems. Fieldwork based on several series of relatively short visits 
tended to draw on the views of those ‘easily accessible’ to interview, such that the 
resulting ‘interview set’ is representative of certain sectors of communities, and not 
of the society as a whole. Secondly, an approach designed partly to generate 
comparative data regarding patterns of processes in different locations, does not offer 
the depth of understanding of a more traditionally ethnographic approach. 
Additionally, the competing imperatives of breadth and depth proved equally 
difficult to satisfy on an approach investigating patterns and systems of knowledge 
and belief in and around a large number of different interacting groups.   
 
A further factor, which I do not discuss in further detail below, has been the outbreak 
and prosecution of the Ethio-Eritrean War between May 1998 and mid 2000, and the 
standoff between the two countries in the period since. These developments had the 
prompt effect of curtailing the extent of fieldwork undertaken in the north of the 
country, particularly in Tigray NRS, and amongst the upper echelons of the ruling 
party. A more insidious effect of the outbreak of the war, however, was a perceptible 
shift in the public perspectives of many associated with government, away from 
emphasis on the virtues of self-determination under federalism, in favour of a new 
                                                 
72 It is worth noting that a number of areas were excluded from first hand research of this kind. They 
include eastern areas of Oromia NRS, Benishangul Gumuz and Gambella NRSs, and Afar and Somali 
NRSs (beyond visits to Assaiyta and Jigjiga). 
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stress on the advantages in wartime of unity and strength in diversity. The fact that 
the Eritrean Head of State had, in mid-1998, publicly identified ethnic federalism a 
weakness of the Ethiopian state and ruling party, lent an edge to many of the 
interviews conducted over the period. 
 
Categories and prominent solutions: ‘interviewing ethnic groups’  
 
It is easy, in studying Ethiopian politics, to continue to give an account which 
perpetuates elite narratives, for the simple reason that Ethiopia’s English-speaking 
elites are more accessible than the rural peasant majority. It took a long time before 
historians of Ethiopia were able to get away from the heroic metanarratives of the 
nation, to look at the preoccupations of Ethiopia’s Southern Marches. So too has the 
reach of this research undoubtedly been constrained by the existence of a ‘prominent 
solution’ for establishing the views of rural and remote ethnic groups: namely, the 
availability for interview of their English- and/or Amharic-speaking elite 
representatives. 
 
I have made comparative use of existing ethnography, in combination with a large 
body of diachronic interview data, which seeks commonalities and difference in 
order to draw wider conclusions about the impact and operation of politicised 
ethnicity. Interviews were primarily with elites and those who are able to speak 
English: they tended to focus on the classes able and interested to influence the 
political life of the community, at least at the level of local government. This seems 
appropriate since the subject of research was the operation of ethnicity in the overtly 
political sphere. It does however, have a number of negative consequences.  
 
One is that when the thesis, as in Chapter VII below, discusses the ‘responses of 
ethnic communities’ it is actually often setting out the responses of urban-based 
ethnic elites that could be documented by this kind of research. I have been interested 
in the views of those who are interested in the Ethiopian state and in interacting with 
it.  This means that the thesis has tended to document the views of the relatively 
powerful over those of the powerless, whose views remain under-investigated. 
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Absent here are the perspectives of the so-called ‘rural masses’, and, particularly, of 
women. The attitude of an elderly peasant farmer, asked his opinion of the three 
regimes under which he had lived, is sobering: 
 
However you turn the pot on the fire the food still tastes the same 
(Interview, farmer, near Weldiya, Simien Wello, May 1999). 
 
Problematising the unit of analysis: non ethnographic deconstruction 
of the ‘ethnic group’ 
 
The constraint set out above is particularly problematic when dealing with ethnic 
groups, constituted, as I have suggested in Chapter II above, of a myriad of local 
consensus-forming interactions. Vansina has commented that 
 
it is not possible to make generalizations about ethnic consciousness, 
because every case is the product of its own history. […] The ethnic unit 
cannot be used as a valid unit of observation […] It is necessary to 
pinpoint the actual places where the observations have been made 
(Vansina 1990:20). 
 
I have stressed the importance of emphasising collective values as a prism through 
which material resources and circumstances are filtered. Similarly Hallpike 
emphasises ‘the study of values and belief systems as integral elements of society’, 
and asserts that ‘interaction of the organs of the body occurs on the level of physical 
cause and effect. But societies, while they are indeed systems of action, are also 
systems of meaning’ (1972:14). He continues however, that ‘social solidarity is 
[itself] culturally relative and cannot be appealed to as an ‘end’ to which institutions 
contribute’ (1972:16). This theme - the problematisation of social solidarity itself - is 
taken up by Turton in his discussion of the relations between Mursi and their 
neighbours: ‘the materialist explanation [is] that warfare is a means of establishing 
and maintaining the separate political identities of neighbouring groups. Warfare is a 
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cause, not a consequence of political identity’ (1989:80). Thus the nature of the 
‘groupness’ or solidarity associated with any groups is itself a problematic73.  
 
This thesis does not purport to reap what Barth calls ‘the full harvest of a serious 
practice of ‘participant observation’’ (2000:25)74. Rather than a prolonged 
ethnographic study of one or several of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups, it is based on a 
series of systematic investigations into the developments of a forty year period across 
the country, which most seemed to have a bearing on the story of politicised ethnicity 
in Ethiopia as it related to the establishment of ethnic federalism in 1991. As a result 
it does not attempt a full depiction of how ‘social institutions [such as ethnicity] are 
given coherence by [a system of beliefs and] values’ (cf. Hallpike 1972:15). This 
kind of account would require immersion in ethnographic participant observation.  
 
The theoretical position elaborated in Chapter II prompts a focus on interaction, and 
systems of knowledge. Seeking to illuminate the operation of knowledge and 
convention within or around an ethnic collective, I have investigated the interaction 
between collectives, focusing in particular on that category of ethnic elites who have 
engaged with the ethnic narratives of the state, and with each other. This interaction 
is better explained, I argue, by a more rigorous account of social constructivism than 
instrumentalists, primordialists or so-called constructivists usually provide. The 
thesis suggests the explanatory superiority of radical social constructivist approach to 
recent events in the political history of Ethiopia.  
 
A note on terminology 
 
This research does not include an investigation of the relevant terminology in the 
Ethiopian languages now used for instruction, administration, or for official purposes 
in different parts of the country. Clearly, the clusters of meaning and context which 
                                                 
73 Secondly, there is a recursive relation between the factors which mark ethnicity and those which 
constitute it. 
74 ‘[the anthropologist’s] immersion in joint action during fieldwork surely builds a growing 
community of experience with his companions which establishes not only that foundational level of 
sociality to which he refers, but also some of the preconceptual, experiential bases […] that his 
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attach to the terms by which the constitutional phrase ‘nations, nationalities, and 
peoples’ (the Amharic behieroch, behieresewoch, ena hezboch) have been translated 
in different zones and regions, could be expected to shed light on the (range of) local 
understandings of these categories.  
 
Even in English, however, the decision to adopt the terms ethnicity and ethnic 
(group, federalism, etc.), in preference to ‘nation’, ‘nationality’ (and the cognate 
‘nationalism’) generally preferred in Ethiopian discourse (about the ‘national 
question’ or ‘nationality issue’) is already controversial. In a classic article of the 
Ethiopian student movement period, Hagos Gebre Yesus (1970:22) objected to the 
‘fatuous preoccupation with ethnicity’75, just as the previous chapter touched on 
much that is terminologically and conceptually unsatisfactory about the term.  
 
The Ethiopian constitutional triplet of ‘nation, nationality, and people’, however, also 
has ideological and descriptive shortcomings, primarily because it is so strongly 
associated with the writings of Stalin and Lenin as to be immediately evocative of 
Soviet perspectives.  
 
Nationality in the Marxist-Leninist lexicon, can have one of two 
meanings: a people in a prenation state of development, that is to say a 
people who, for whatever reason, have not yet achieved (and may never 
achieve) the more august station of nationhood; or a segment of a nation 
living outside the state where the major body of the nation resides. Being 
classified as a nationality rather than as a nation can have political 
implications. (Walker Connor 1994:xv)  
                                                                                                                                          
companions use to construct their cognitive categories and pathways of thought and reason’ (Barth 
2000:25) 
75 Which he describes as the basis for a ‘narrow and reactionary outlook’ itself a ‘typical petty 
bourgeois characteristic’. One alternative term popular in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the 
Ethiopian student movement began to wrestle with the ‘National Question’ was ‘regionalism’. This 
has not been adopted here because of two sets of limitations, descriptive and ideological. Firstly, the 
collectives discussed here often do not occupy, and are often not usefully defined by, ‘regions’ either 
because they are scattered and mixed amongst others, or because the territories they regard as theirs 
are smaller than that term usually indicates. Secondly, and perhaps more problematically, as the 
student movement debates wore on into the 1970s, ‘regionalism’ became associated with the 
ideological position and dominant faction that rejected ‘nationality-based mobilisation’ as invariably 
subordinate to the class struggle (see Chapters IV and V below). ‘Tribe’ and ‘tribalism’ are not a set 
of terms which need much rejecting in the Ethiopian case, as they have only relatively rarely been 
used in or about Ethiopia. This perhaps reflects the relatively large size of some of the groups 
involved, and the absence of a European colonial categorisation process, with which the term – indeed 




‘Nation’ and its cognates seem, in common English usage, normally to have 
something to do with the state. Those who adopted these terms in Ethiopia did intend 
to effect a transformation of the relations between Ethiopia’s ethnic groups and the 
Ethiopian state. The terminology they have used therefore serves precise, if often not 
precisely articulated, ideological and political purposes76. For all these reasons, it is 
terminology best avoided here.  
 
A series of more recent cautionary comments about ethnicity has included the idea 
that 
 
The choice of an analytical perspective or ‘research hypothesis’ is not an 
innocent act. If one goes out to look for ethnicity, one will ‘find’ it and 
thereby contribute to constructing it. (Eriksen 2002:177) 
 
One response could be that in contemporary Ethiopia one doesn’t need to go looking 
for ethnicity – it is already being deployed perfectly effectively by collectives and 
government servants.  
 
Much of the argument of this thesis, however, is that the categories and 
understandings of Ethiopian planners and Soviet ethnos theorists alike are based on 
fundamental misconceptions about the nature of the collectives so categorised. It is 
perhaps therefore best to make use of a concept (ethnicity) 
 
locate[d] in the observer’s head [as] an analytical tool devised and 
utilised […] to make sense of or explain the actions and feelings of the 
people studied. There are a number of advantages to this perspective. 
First, it shifts the ‘responsibility’ for ethnicity from the ethnographic 
subjects on to the analyst. This is not to say that the ethnographic 
subjects are not responsible for their ‘ethnic’ actions: they are fully 
responsible for their actions but it is for the analyst to decide whether – if 
at all – ethnicity is a useful tool to make sense of those actions. (Banks 
1996:186) 
 
                                                 
76 The hierarchical classification of nations (possessing all of those features identified by Stalin), 
nationalities (lacking perhaps one) and peoples (lacking several or most, but still resisting 
agglomerative classification) leads directly to prescriptive judgements of which collectivity should 
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Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia on a constructivist approach  
 
The empirical Sections Two and Three of this thesis seek to explore the recursive 
relationship between collective identities and collective ‘interests’. They seek to root 
both in collective conceptions (social constructions) of reality and of other beliefs 
(i.e. in collective belief systems) rather than merely upon the individual, intuitively 
‘pattern matching’, experiences of ‘the facts’ (Kusch 1998:258). In this manner, the 
underdetermined nature of collective ‘knowledge’, and the power of performativity 
in establishing shared constructs, can emerge. A sense of the difficulties likely to 
confront Ethiopia’s policy-makers (and instrumentalist theorists of ethnicity), who I 
argue are working with a more straightforwardly instrumental schema, may perhaps 
also become apparent.  
 
Criteria vs indicia: emblems and features: ethnic markers 
 
One way of investigating the operation of ethnicity as a social status, and to compare 
it with the operation of other social statuses is to consider the way in which we 
regard it as marked, and the beliefs we have about those markers. Marking social 
statuses is a widespread phenomenon. Husbands and wives, for instance, are 
commonly distinguished from others by wedding rings, or distinctive styles of dress 
or hair; leaders and those others whose office confers a particular social status, by 
various badges or insignia of office. Such empirical markers provide a useful 
shortcut means of relaying information about the statuses in question. It is relatively 
straightforward in these cases for us to distinguish between the status in question, the 
person to whom that status is attributed, and the marker. This is so because we 
consider each of the statuses in question to be attachable and detachable by 
agreement. Divorced partners can remove their wedding rings and can be regarded as 
no longer married77; retired policemen, or those off duty, no longer have the status of 
law enforcers when they have removed their uniforms. These are social statuses 
where the idea that they are ‘natural’ does not form part of the convention which 
                                                                                                                                          
aspire to, and gain its own state. The Ethiopian state, like the Soviet Union before it, has been at pains 
not to categorise its extant constituents according to these types. 
77 Providing the relevant norm of marriage permits divorce. 
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constitutes them. In instances of ethnicity where this is not the case, where ethnic 
markers are seen as something natural, it has proved more difficult to separate out the 
status, the individual who bears it, and the factors which mark it78. The common 
conflation of status and nature in categorisation is discussed in Chapter II above.  
 
The likely importance of a focus on ethnic boundaries has long been understood 
(Barth 1970). This discussion further emphasises the importance of markers of 
identity and of its boundaries, in establishing what kind of identity is at stake, and 
how it is constituted. I suggest that there is an underdetermined feedback influence 
between the kind of boundary/identity markers selected as significant, and the nature 
of the identity marked: some will be more rigid and exclusive than others, and to 
some extent this will be prompted by the factors chosen to bound it. The empirical 
account further suggests that although there is considerable scope for innovation and 
flexibility in the responsive development of collective identities, it is unusual for 
groups to innovate ‘from scratch’. In most of these instances it can be shown that 
some previously known entity, era, or characteristic is being invoked to serve, and 
confer legitimacy upon, the (often entirely new) purposes of the group, or its more 
politically articulate members. 
 
The discussion suggests that the collective definition of identity is a daily, 
contemporary process of re-creation and innovation, comprised of calculative action 
by the group on the basis of the information and system of beliefs available to it. 
Collective action is enhanced, underpinned, and rendered possible within the context 
of the shared knowledge of the community, and this means that the co-ordination of 
decisions is supported, and deviance sanctioned, by drawing upon elements of 
collective knowledge. I argue that it is for this reason that appeals to traditional, 
historical, and pre-existing experiences (in so far as they are collectively known), as 
well as to known or shared identity ‘markers’, are effective: they form part of an 
already familiar knowledge system, and represent elements of what is most likely to 
be a shared ‘prominent solution’ in terms of group formation.  
                                                 
78 There are other instances in which the ‘thing marked’ is commonly conflated with its marker. The 




This is another way of saying that, on the one hand, the process of developing and 
sustaining a sense of collective identity, group cohesion, or shift, is a fully self-
referential social act of permanent construction and reconstruction, using the material 
of shared beliefs which are themselves secured by normativity in interaction rather 
than by the ‘reality’ supposedly represented by these markers:  
 
Talking about the meaning of a concept is just another way of talking 
about whatever it is which constitutes the normative standards of its right 
and wrong application. We cannot presuppose meaning in order to 
explain normativity; we must explain normativity in order to cast light on 
the nature of meaning. (Bloor 1997:7) 
 
On the other hand, however, what makes this process of construction particularly 
suasive and effective is the convincing illusion that it is somehow ‘natural’ or ‘true’, 
that it is valid as well as credible, and that it corresponds with a pre-existing 
empirical reality suggested by the selected markers, which include beliefs about 
‘natural kind’, or ‘alter-referential’ indicators like phenotype (or any element of 
biology, or ecology), as well as beliefs about ‘social kind’, or ‘self-referential’ ones, 
such as culture and language. The priority of credibility over validity in influencing 
group formation and action is persuasively indicated by the perfectly effective 
manner in which ‘false’ beliefs about non-existent ‘natural kind’ ‘alter-referential’ 
indicators bound and define group relations79. Perhaps the most dramatic instance of 
this in the literature on the Horn of Africa region is Schlee’s account of Rendille 
beliefs that biological differences distinguish them from their neighbours, as 
evidenced by ‘knowledge’ about the different lengths of their pregnancies (believed 
to be seven months in the case of some adjacent groups, up to eleven in the case of 
others) (Schlee 1994:133). 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Barnes (1988:15-20, 82-84) 
79 Schlee puts the point succinctly: ‘”Being aware” is a precondition for the use of a cultural element 
as an “identity marker”. But one can “be aware” of something that is factually wrong, and this does 
not affect its usability as an identity marker in the slightest way’ (1994:139). I would suggest, 
however, that his wider discussion is vitiated by his faith in the possibility of a ‘fully etic’ perspective 
which he associates with ‘scientific’ anthropology. 
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Language as vehicle and marker of identity 
 
Language and specifically words carry an imprint from the past in the 
present. (Vansina 1990:8-9) 
 
As explained in Chapter I, language was adopted as the primary indicator of 
difference between Ethiopia’s populations for the process of ethnic federal boundary 
demarcation in 1991-2. As a result, language is a salient factor in all of the studies of 
cases from 1991 explored in Section Three, be they challenges to ethnic federal 
boundaries based on claims to separate language group ‘status’, or attempts to push 
towards the assimilation of different language groups or dialects. A few words about 
the operation of language as a means of underpinning or marking collective identity 
are therefore in order. It is, for instance, ironic, that the factor which has been singled 
out in Ethiopia since 1991 to distinguish different ethnic groups, because it is 
observable, is usually regarded as one of the least reliable, given its relative fluidity, 
and the fact that many individuals are speakers of more than one language. 
 
Three points need to be emphasised here. They are, the essential fluidity of language 
development, particularly oral language development; the importance of events 
which categorise and fix a particular oral form of a language as ‘different’ from 
others; and thirdly the differential conventions attaching to the perceived status and 
value of different languages, amongst those who do or do not speak them. 
Characteristics of oral language traditions are that they tend to exaggerate differences 
between different ‘language groups’. This contrasts with written linguistic forms, in 
response to which convergence and divergence is more easily visible as, either, other 
written forms remain differentiated despite apparent similarities, or oral forms start 
to coalesce around the new written ‘prominent solution’, regardless of existing 
differences. Chapter VII illuminates the significance of moments when languages 
and language families are ‘classified’ (as for instance in academic studies of which 
Bender et al. (1976) is the most important), and when oral languages are written 
down (as often, for instance, in the preparation of Wycliffe Bible Society 
translations). In both cases, linguistic classifications which had been fluid become 





Chapter V notes the importance of mother tongue in marking off the protagonists of 
nationalist struggle in Tigray and Oromia. Chapter VI goes on to note the differential 
values placed by different social strata on their different mother tongues, and the 
impact this has in complicating approaches to ethnically based ‘self-determination’, 
and the educational and administrative use of local languages. In the decision to 
adopt a particular language two sets of interests are commonly in place: the 
advantages of the state reaching out towards the rural population in a language which 
allows them to access state services and narratives; and the advantages of the rural 
population reaching up to the state in a language which will alow them to negotiate a 
relatively broad range of the services and opportunities offered by the state, 
accessing, for instance, jobs and education at national level. Where mother tongue 
languages have a relatively high status and utility, perspectives can be expected to 
converge on the adoption of the local language; where a national language is widely 
spoken, and local languages confined to a relatively small group, the opposite is 
often true. The difficulty of predicting such correlations and consequences (of 
reading off actions from objective interests in this way) is, however, sharply 





Legacies, resources, causes, inventions: historical roots and 
routes80 to ‘ethnic federalism’ 
 
There are few countries in Africa that are as enriched and burdened by 
the past as Ethiopia (Gebru Tareke 1996[1991]:xii) 
 
History often does not have a future; it can be ‘over’. (McCrone 1998:59) 
 
Selectivity occurs mainly for social reasons. Some topics are worthwhile, 
others are not. Certain individuals or groups of people are interesting, 
others are not. The effects are loss of information and the creation of a 
profile of past history which is the historical consciousness of the present 
(Vansina 1985:190) 
 
This section considers the historical background to the establishment of ethnic 
federalism in 1991. Historians, like natural scientists, are commonly conceived as 
unearthing data in accordance with which the details of a picture of ‘what really 
happened’ (or, for natural scientists, of ‘the real world’) is gradually generated with 
increasing accuracy. In the popular imagination they operate, like neo-Livingstones, 
gradually filling in the blank spaces on the map of Africa with the locations of rivers, 
mountains, and dangerous tribes – locations whose accuracy can be checked by 
means of subsequent comparison with ‘the real thing’ – or at least other sources of 
information about it. The difficulties of the kind of empiricism on which such a view 
is based are set out in Barnes & Bloor (1982) and raised in Chapter II, above.  
 
In the explication of politicised ethnicity, or nationalism, it seems clear that a 
historical account is required to play two roles, which, whilst distinguishable, cannot 
be fully separated. These are both in play in this account. The first is that of 
explanatory ‘cause’ of subsequent events: because a certain historical sequence of 
events documented had previously taken place, it can be seen that the sequence then 
observed to have followed on was natural, likely, and intelligible; it can perhaps even 
be demonstrated that the precedents outlined contribute to a causal explanation of 
subsequent events. Of course our knowledge that this is the case is contingent, and, 
since the events in question involve the actions of groups of people, it is also 
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intrinsically connected with the second role played by history, that of ‘resource’ in 
the hands of its protagonists. Here the edges of ‘valid’ history are – rightly, and as 
they always must be – blurred with the constructivist notion of ‘the invention of 
tradition’ and its ‘credibility’. 
 
For all that human beings often appear as the recipients or even the 
receptacles of tradition, it is none the less they who have created 
(constructed, invented) it. How then can they be regarded as controlled 
by it or subservient to it? […] If constructivism is accepted, the 
presumption must surely be that tradition is the continuing collective 
accomplishment of human beings, that it is lacking in any power of its 
own and that it exists through the continually exercised powers of human 
beings themselves. (Barnes 1995:112)  
 
What may seem, at the individual level as the ‘inexorable weight’ of tradition, can, at 
the collective level, be understood as the creation of the social group, as the sum of 
what it knows81. Introducing arguments from meaning finitism in classification, to 
develop a finitist account of knowledge, culture, and tradition, I have suggested how 
it is possible to demonstrate that the application of a particular classification remains 
formally underdetermined. Far from arbitrary, a classification effectively becomes 
‘determined’ in so far as it has been constructed and sustained by the collective. 
 
What is true of the collective identification of an ethnic group is much more self-
evidently true of any instance of the collective understanding of history, the ‘facts of 
the case’ notwithstanding. What is particularly difficult to establish, however, in 
reconstructing this historical narrative from the current vantage point, is quite which 
elements of it would have been familiar to which groups of its protagonists at which 
points. This is to point up again the contingency of our understanding of history not 
only as ‘cause’ but also as ‘resource’, as well as the limited sociological validity of 
direct extrapolation from ‘events’ to ‘collective knowledge of events’ to ‘collective 
action’82. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
80 Cf. McCrone (1998:34), paraphrasing Hall (1996:4), amongst others. 
81 As suggested above, this approach seems to offer a way of overcoming Anthony Cohen’s objections 
(1994:120) to Barth’s account (1970). 
82 This issue has been touched upon in the discussion of ‘interests’ in Chapter II above. 
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This preamble is intended partly as a reiteration of the warning (already suggested in 
the Introduction to the thesis) against the separation of the two Chapters, IV and V, 
which follow, and against the separate ‘reification’ of the processes described in 
each. To understand Chapter IV as ‘setting out the reality’ and Chapter V as simply 
explaining ‘what was done with it’ (structure and agency, again) would be to 
underestimate the complexity of the feedback loops, indeed the continual interaction, 
between ‘the effect of the facts’ and the social construction of them. It would also 
serve to obscure the extent of ‘unknowability’ inherent in both. 
 
In sum, then, it is worth reiterating the caveat that the relationship between ‘facts’ 
and ‘construction’ remains underdetermined, and that this has profound 
consequences. Calhoun points this up nicely, with respect to the relationship between 
nationalism and history. 
 
Some nationalist self-understandings may be historically dubious, yet 
very real as aspects of live experience and bases for action. […] Other 
claims, by contrast, may fail to persuade because they are too manifestly 
manipulated, or because the myth that is being proffered does not speak 
to the circumstances and practical commitments of the people in 
question. In between are claims that are accepted as part of orthodox 
ideology but which people are aware may be questioned. People may 
even join in public rituals that affirm narratives they know to be 
problematic, but gain an identification with these as ‘our stories’, a sense 
of collusion in the production of these fictions […]. (Calhoun 1997:34) 
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Chapter IV. Building and dismantling the traditions of the 
empire state 
 
Modern Ethiopia dates from the reign of the Emperor Menelik II (E. 
Sylvia Pankhurst (1955) quoted by Greenfield (1967[1965]:96) 
 
Ethiopia’s history contain[s] an analytic truth […]: from time to time, the 
nation disintegrated into component parts, but it never disappeared as an 
idea and always reappeared in fact. (Marcus 1994:xiii) 
 
Ethiopian nationalism under the imperial regime was Abyssinian 
nationalism writ large. The state was named the Ethiopian Empire, a 
designation that broadened its identity without altering its essence. The 
essence derived undiluted from the Abyssinian core, and the process of 
national integration was tantamount to assimilation into the culture of the 
empire builders. (Markakis 1987:73) 
 
This chapter considers the historical context to the emergence in the mid-1970s of 
the protagonists of ethnic federalism, the ethnically-based opposition movements, 
TPLF and OLF, discussed in the following Chapter V. The account is presented in 
three sections. The first briefly considers the process of nineteenth century imperial 
expansion and conquest from areas commonly referred to as Abyssinia83, which 
constituted the formation of modern Ethiopia. It looks briefly at the controversies 
attached to the question of historical continuity of ancient Abyssinia with the modern 
Ethiopian empire state; it considers various of the traditions of the pre-existing 
Abyssinian/Ethiopian polities on which the dominant culture and ‘myth of origin’ of 
the empire state subsequently drew, and which entrenched a situation in which 
divisions of ethnicity and class were widely seen to coincide. Most importantly, 
however, it examines the two primary consequences of this expansion as regards the 
subsequent constellation of ethnicity and power: the incorporation of a multi-ethnic 
southern area, and the bifurcation of a large and historically influential mono-ethnic 
bloc to the north. The second section of the chapter looks at the processes by which 
                                                 
83 The distinction between ‘Ethiopia’ and ‘Abyssinia’ is discussed by Ullendorff (1955:4). Here I use 
Abyssinia (probably from the semitic regional name ‘Habashat’, cf. Levine (1965)) to refer to the 
northern highland areas predominantly inhabited by Orthodox Christian, Amharic- and Tigrigna-
speaking populations; and Ethiopia (from the Greek, probably  , ‘burnt face’) to refer to the 
area encompassed by the modern state, itself roughly coincident with the area of the empire state 
established under Menelik II. Significantly for this thesis, of course, ‘while Abyssinia has been a 
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the consolidation, centralisation, and bureaucratisation of the imperial state over the 
mid-twentieth century served to promote potential sources of opposition to it, and 
activate the conflictual potential inherent in what has been called an ‘ethnocratic’ 
arrangement. Finally the chapter reviews the course of events by which sections of 
the Ethiopian student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s came to apply to 
Ethiopia a Marxist analysis of the ‘National Question’. It gives a brief review of the 
emergence and radicalisation of the student movement; and of the role of external 
ideology, and the Eritrean movements, in inspiring discussion of self-determination 
and providing examples of political struggle through armed opposition. These 
developments laid the groundwork for the shift from student-based protest to the 
establishment of a series of political organisations and armed movements which, 
after the coup of 1974, went on to challenge the military regime which succeeded the 
Emperor.  
 
The chapter seeks to provide sufficient background to suggest an explanation of the 
emergence, amongst intellectual circles in the late 1960s, of the idea that the 
contemporary constellation of ethnicity and state power in Ethiopia was problematic, 
and in need of explicit restructuring. In this sense, then, the chapter is unashamedly 
teleological. It does not provide a general review of Ethiopian history of this period. 
It does not seek either to justify the emergence of a concern with ethnicity as 
appropriate, or vilify it as inappropriate; merely to explain how and why the view 
seems to have emerged, and how and why it is not shared by all, but remains 
contested. Nevertheless, the discussion is restricted to some of the issues which, with 
hindsight, seem to have a bearing on the activation and operation of ethnicity vis-à-
vis political power, in the process attempting to draw attention to various of the many 
controversies associated with these issues. This process of selection, like those it 
studies, itself results from (and forms a tiny future constituent part of) Vansina’s 
‘historical consciousness of the present’.  
 
                                                                                                                                          




Forging the nexus of ethnicity and access to power 
 
The nexus between ethnicity, state power and access to resources was 
forged in the aftermath of the expansion, when land, the prime resource 
in the conquered areas, was expropriated and distributed to the 
Abyssinian nobility, clergy, soldiery and state officials. (Markakis 
2000:8) 
 
On ‘not being an indifferent spectator’: the creation of the empire state 
 
‘If Powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I 
do not intend to be an indifferent spectator’ was Menelik’s message to 
the European colonials powers in 1891 [Rodd to Salisbury, 4 May 1897 
(F.O. 1/32)] (Markakis 1974:24) 
 
The road south was […] paved with dreams of wealth and success for 
many of Menilek’s subjects. (Marcus 1994:79)  
 
Between 1855 and 1898, under the successive rule of the three Emperors Tewodros 
II of Gondar (r.1855-1868)84, the Tigrayan Yohannes IV (r.1872-1889)85, and 
Menelik II of Amhara Shoa (r.1889-1913)86, the heritors of a shifting pattern of 
Abyssinian kingdoms were unified into something approaching a single polity, which 
from 1875, from a base consolidated by Menelik II in Shoa, pursued a dramatic 
policy of expansionary conquest east, west, and south. Within two years of the battle 
of Adua, which put an end to Italian encroachments from Eritrea in the north in 1896, 
the ‘process of territorial expansion and the creation of the modern empire-state had 
been completed’ (Bahru Zewde 1991:111): the empire had swollen to a point 
approaching the boundaries of today’s Ethiopian state87; by 1908 these had been 
delimited (if not always demarcated) in a series of international agreements88.  
 
                                                 
84 For the career of Kasa Haylu (or Kasa Maru from his place of origin) from Qwara, to Gaffat, and 
finally to defeat and suicide at Maqdala see Rubenson (1966) (1976), Crummey (1969) (1971) and 
contributors to Taddese Beyene et al. (eds) (1990). He was crowned negusa negast in 1855 in Gondar. 
85 See Zewde Gabre-Sellassie (1975), Taddese Beyene et al. (eds) (1990), and Rubenson (1976). 
86 See Marcus (1975), Darkwah (1975). 
87 Cf. Rubenson’s Map 5 of the extent of Menelik’s territorial claims in 1891 (1976:316), and 
Holcomb & Ibssa’s sketch map of Abyssinian conquests in 1897 (1990:73-4 Map 15).  
88 With French Somaliland (Djibouti) in March 1897; British Somaliland (June 1897); Italian Eritrea 
(1900); Anglo Sudan (1902); British East Africa (Kenya) 1907; and Italian Somaliland (1908). The 
series of maps in appendix incorporate international boundaries essentially based on these agreements 
(except for the annexation of Eritrea from 1960 to 1991).  
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At the outset of this short period, the overwhelming majority of the polity’s 
populations had been, like their rulers, Orthodox Christian speakers of the two major 
languages descended from a common semitic linguistic ancestor89, Amharic and 
Tigrigna. A little over forty years later, the old Abyssinian populations of Orthodox 
believers, whilst still providing the majority of its rulers, and the cultural type to 
which those rulers uniformly conformed, constituted only a minority of the Ethiopian 
Empire’s subjects. With the expansion, modern Ethiopia was constituted as a 
‘mosaic’ of multi-ethnicity, no more a ‘nation-state’ than any of the other products of 
colonial conquest which pressed around it to fill the African continent90. The 
diversity of the new state’s populations encompassed culture, economy, and 
language, with ‘about a dozen Semitic languages, 22 Cushitic, 18 Omotic, and 18 
Nilo-Saharan’ (Bender et al. 1976:13)91. It extended to religion, with each of the four 
major categories of animism/Paganism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity well 
represented in this ‘region of religious confusion’ (Trimingham 1965:15). 
Trimingham further observes, as many have done, that this was a diversity ‘in 
keeping with [Ethiopia’s] morphological and climatic conditions’ (ibid.:5)92. 
 
After the drive towards a unitary centralised state under Tewodros II, which brought 
to a close the fragmented ‘Era of the Princes’ (or Zemana Mesafent, 1769-1855, see 
Abir 1968), Yohannes IV’s approach to centralisation was different, envisaging a 
‘loosely united Ethiopia, with autonomous regional rulers under an emperor 
exercising benevolent political suzerainty’ (Bahru Zewde 1991:60). Competition 
between two of these rulers, Menelik of Shoa, and Tekle Haimanot of Gojjam, 
particularly over the control of lucrative long-distance trade routes to the south, was 
an important factor precipitating subsequent southward expansion and conquest. The 
battle of Embabo in mid-1882 at which Menelik defeated his rival (Caulk 1975), 
                                                 
89 See Donham Map 2 (2002[1986]:19). Hetzron & Bender (1976:25) discuss whether Ge’ez and the 
modern languages ‘had a common ancestor shared by all of them’, suggesting links between the whole 
range of modern Ethio-semitic languages. See also Ullendorff (1955) and Leslau (1957).  
90 The several mono-ethnic colonial possessions carved from Somali areas also fell short of the nation-
state model, becoming subject to irredentist rather than secessionist pressures (Touval 1963). 
91 Bender’s figures include the languages of Eritrea.  
92 Trimingham identifies four principal regions: the Ethiopian-Kaffa plateau, the Eastern Rift valley, 
the Somali-Oromo plateau, and the central massif between these two last. Donham (2002[1986]:17-8) 
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opened up the south-west to his troops, at the same time securing his eventual 
succession of the Tigrayan emperor. Menelik’s victory at Chalenquo in early 1887, a 
year before Yohannes IV’s death in 1889, had the same effect in the east, paving the 
way for his conquest of Harar and the Hararghe highlands (Caulk 1971a, 1971b). His 
defeat of the Italians at Adua in 1896, which forestalled the colonial counter-threat 
from the north, completed the triangle of military victories, which ‘were crucial in 
establishing Shewan hegemony over the Abyssinian north and in conquering the 
south’ (Donham 2002[1986]:23). 
 
Coming to power in Shoa, Menelik inherited a prosperous region with traditions of 
autocratic leadership (Bahru Zewde 1991:45), which had already expanded to control 
neighbouring Shoan Oromo populations under his grandfather Sahle Selassie 
(r.1813-1847) (Marcus 1994:65, Bahru Zewde 1991:61). Menelik’s suzerainty had 
extended to encompass Gurage areas even before his defeat of Tekle Haimanot at 
Embabo. Between 1882 and 1886 his forces moved west to conquer Nekempte, 
Qellam (Gambella), Jimma and the other Gibe river states, and Illubabor, as well as 
south-east into Arsi, where they met greater resistance but eventually prevailed. After 
the defeat of Harar in 1887, the kingdom of Welaiyta finally fell to Menelik with 
great bloodshed in 1894, providing foot-soldiers for further brutal pushes west into 
Kaffa (defeated 1897), Konso, Benishangul, and Asosa, and east into Bale and the 
Ogaden. Maji in the southwest, Borana in the far south, and the Afar sultanate in the 
northeast were added over the course of the subsequent decade (Map 1 shows the 
situation at the time of Menelik’s death in 1913) 93. 
 
This process had two consequences of long-term significance for subsequent patterns 
of ethnicity and power in Ethiopia. Firstly, the new empire’s rulers were, whether by 
assimilation or inheritance, Abyssinians (habesha), and specifically Amharic-
speaking Christians: they forged a system under which, in many parts of its newly 
expanded territories to the south, class and ethnic divisions coincided, establishing a 
                                                                                                                                          
notes that ‘the territory […] was not a haphazard collection of ecological zones created only by the 
fiat of colonial powers’, but to largely skirts the edges of the highland plateau. 
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nexus or coincidence of potentially conflictual dynamics. Secondly, power shifted 
south, reflecting the new economic interests of Ethiopia’s Shoan Amhara rulers now 
based out of Addis Ababa. Up to this point Tigrigna-speakers had regularly wielded 
power over large areas of the Abyssinian core, dominating them as recently as 
Yohannes IV’s period. The bifurcation of the northern highlands with the cession of 
Mereb Mellash94 to the Italians, a deal initially ‘signed’ at Wichale, and sealed in the 
wake of the battle of Adua95, seemed to render Tigrayan loss of power to the Shoan 
Amhara dynasties irreversible.  
 
The empire in the north: ‘identity jilted’96 
 
Welamo sil abiet abiet 
Sidamo sil abiet abiet 
Gamo sil abiet abiet 
Tigre gorebetegn yetalian gorebiet 
(Welamo answers yes, Sidamo answers yes, Gamo answers yes, 
But Tigray, the Italians’ neighbour, gives me grief.) 
(attributed to Menelik II, cited by Bureau (1993:iv) drawing on Baeteman 
(1929:1063)) 
 
Ethiopians have long speculated about three possible explanations for Menelik II’s 
failure to capitalise upon his victory over the Italians at Adua, drive the Italians out 
of Mereb Mellash, and reunite the Tigrigna-speaking part of the Abyssinian core97. 
They are, firstly, a fear that his absence during a potentially extended campaign in 
the north would encourage rebellion in the (much more lucrative) south; secondly, 
his dim view of the prospects of success; and finally the Machiavellian determination 
often attributed to him permanently to weaken his northern rivals (Gebru Tareke 
(1996[1991]:232n25); see also Marcus (1975:176). In the north, Menelik II’s 
                                                                                                                                          
93 Different authors give different dates. Although Holcomb & Ibssa (1990:73-4) provide a visually 
impressive chronological series of maps of the ‘invention’ of the empire state, dates given here follow 
Bahru Zewde’s unsurpassed synopsis (1991:ch.2).  
94 the territory ‘beyond the Mereb River’ – meaning Eritrea. 
95 ‘paradoxically Adwa was both a negation and an affirmation of Wichale’ (Gebru Tareke 
1996[1991]:41). Post-Adua a new treaty was signed clarifying Italy’s recognition of Ethiopian 
independence. For the debate between Rubenson and Giglio on the question of Italian intentions at 
Wichale and discrepancies between the Amharic and Italian texts, see Rubenson (1976:385n415). 
96 The title of Alemseged Abbay’s study of ‘the divergent paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan 
nationalist struggles’ (1998), an invaluable resource, couched in less convincing theoretical terms. 
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decision has long been a thorn in the side of Tigrayan nationalists: the seminal 
instance of Shoan perfidy, which only served to entrench the resentment that had 
already grown up at his ouster of Yohannes IV’s son Mengesha from the imperial 
succession (cf. Rubenson 1976:368). A key figure in shaping northern Ethiopian 
perspectives of this period has been that of Ras Alula and his ‘struggle to maintain 
Tigrean hegemony under Yohannes IV and then to preserve its autonomy under 
Shoan dominance’ (Erlich 1996[1982]:xi). His rise to become Yohannes IV’s 
governor in Eritrea (1877-1887), his failure to preserve Tigrayan hegemony, or 
create a common Eritrean-Tigrayan alliance against Menelik on Yohannes’ death 
(1889-92), and finally his acceptance of Shoan hegemony under Menelik (1894-
1897), continue to resonate in the north, albeit with different effect on either side of 
the Mereb River. 
 
Whatever Menelik II’s intentions in the period after Adua, the bifurcation of the 
Tigrigna-speaking highlands had a profound and immediate impact, converting  
 
a region which might (once in a while, anyhow) provide an emperor, into 
one in which local notables squabbled for local prizes, and in the process 
rendered themselves increasingly dependent on either the colonial 
authorities in Asmara, or the Shoan emperor in Addis Ababa. (Clapham 
(1988:205-6), also cited by Alemseged Abbay (1998:21-1)) 
 
As if to add injury to imperial insult, much of Tigray was devastated between 1888 
and 1892 by an exceptionally severe rinderpest epidemic and famine (Richard 
Pankhurst 1966), which affected a large part of Sudan and East Africa. Its impact 
may have strengthened Menelik’s southward impetus (healthy cattle from newly-
incorporated Harar and Bale were distributed to those affected), and curbed his 
resolve to pursue Ethiopian interests in Eritrea post-Adua (food supplies in the north 
being at a premium) (Bahru Zewde 1991:71). In Tigray however, the much-
‘remembered’ dark days of the famine, have become conjoined in the popular 
imagination with the advent of rule from Amhara Shoa (interviews, Tigrayan 
farmers, Sheraro area, November 1988).  
                                                                                                                                          
97 Bahru Zewde singles out Gebre Egziabher Gila Mariam as particularly ‘unsparing in his criticism of 




There is considerable debate as to the historicity of such an ‘ethnic’ interpretation of 
these events in Tigrayan and Amhara areas at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Whilst Adhana Haile Adhana asserts that ‘Amhara’ and ‘Tigrayan’ were political 
rather than ethnic categories at the time (1998)98, Alemseged Abbay adduces 
evidence from the following two decades strongly suggestive of the ‘ethnic’ flavour 
that these categories had, as ‘the political power of the Amhara was accompanied by 
their cultural hegemony’ (1998:45). This may be an instance where the set of 
conventions attaching to what we now think of as ethnonyms was either shifting or 
multiple. 
 
Whatever the conventions which were attached at the time by various sections of the 
two populations to the two categories, the writings of Tigrayan Gebre Hewet 
Baykedagne (1912) and Amhara Afewerk Gebre Yesus (1901), indicate that they 
were well established in common use - unsurprisingly given the clear juxtaposition 
of the two written language blocs – and often involving a degree of animosity or 
competition.  The ‘virulently anti-Tegréan sentiments’ and ‘unjustified vituperation’ 
with which Afewerk wrote, elicited a ‘sober criticism’ from Gebre-Hewet, 
commenting on the ‘impoverishment of [Tigray], the migration of its people, and the 
rampancy of banditry, largely a result of the political disarray that had ensued in 
Tegray after the death of Yohannes at Mätämma’ (Bahru Zewde 2002:133).  
 
The division often resonated powerfully in the period since the two wrote. Gebre 
Hewet’s correlation of the impoverishment of Tigray region with the advent of 
Amhara rule, has become a central precept of the nationalist movement in Tigray, as 
discussed in Chapter V. Meanwhile, the title of the first Amharic novel, Tobia, 
written by Afewerk, has, during the 1990s, become better known as the name of a 
leading anti-government private newspaper. The complicated period between the 
battle of Adua, and Mussolini’s occupation of Ethiopia in the run up to the Second 
                                                 
98 Cf. Teshale Tibebu’s comparable contention that ‘Amhara and Galla were not ethnic terms. Amhara 
was a metaphor for power (and the person identified as such could as well be an Oromo from Shawa, 
a Gurage, a Tigrayan), and Galla for the relative lack of it, (a shorthand for the conquered ‘others’). 
For Muslims, Amhara meant a Christian with a gun’ (1995:45). 
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World War, provided numerous instances of patriotism and treachery on the part of 
Amharas and Tigrayans, as elites from either side of the border switched sides, often 
more than once. This history has provided an abundance of accusatory material 
sufficient to show that each of the two ethnic communities was more or less loyal to 
the Ethiopian state than the other99.   
 
During the period after the Battle of Adua, then, the Amharic language became 
entrenched as the language of administration of the Ethiopian empire state, under its 
new Shoan rulers100. The main impact of the cession to Italy of Mereb Mellash was 
politically to divide and to weaken the Tigrigina-speaking highlanders vis-à-vis their 
Amharic-speaking neighbours to the south, removing them from the centre to the 
edge of the polity. For the time being, little otherwise changed in what was now a 
relatively peripheral and impoverished part of the empire: Tigrayan elites retained 
local powers under Menelik, and traditional arrangements governing land and 
taxation were barely modified.  
 
The empire in the south: neftegna, gebbar, and slave 
 
The expansion that established the present borders of Ethiopia also 
sowed the seeds of future conflict. While Abyssinia had been a relatively 
homogenous state with deep Christian roots, the newly acquired 
territories were inhabited by a large number of ethnic groups among 
whom Islam predominated. (Markakis 2000:8) 
 
New sources of conflict were also created. By alienating lands of the 
annexed societies and thereby reducing them to servitude, and by 
imposing on them Abyssinian culture, the conquerors planted the seeds 
for national and class antagonism. (Gebru Tareke 1996[1991]:40-1) 
 
The northerners who moved south with Menelik II as the conquered country’s new 
rulers, came from a situation in which the overwhelmingly dominant majority (of a 
relatively homogenous population) were adherents of Orthodox Christianity, and 
                                                 
99 Thus, for instance, those who resent Afewerk’s anti-Tigrayan sentiments are keen to stress his 
‘fulsome espousal of the Fascist cause’ (Bahru Zewde 2002:57), whilst the ranks of Tigrayan elites of 
the period provide numerous examples of similar perfidy. Consciousness of such issues, of course 
returned with a vengeance during the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war. 
100 Yohannes IV had already tried ‘to avoid becoming a parochial Tigrean monarch. Amharic, not 
Tigrinya, was made the official language at his court’ (Erlich 1996:2). 
 
 111 
semitic language speakers (of Amharic or Tigrigna); they were members of a 
highland socio-economic system in which Muslim minorities, Falasha adherents of 
an early form of Judaism, and pockets of speakers of the indigenous Cushitic Agaw 
language Himtanga, were all marginalized politically, socially, and economically. 
Non Orthodox Christians were barred from holding political office, and Muslims 
denied land rights. Many of these norms were now imported south, as Menelik II’s 
Shoan Amhara and Amharicised Oromo followers were installed in positions of 
authority over the newly-subjugated territories, settling on land they were granted, 
and as local elites were encouraged to join the ranks of the new ruling group.  
 
Bahru Zewde (2002:132) documents how Tedla Haile, writing in 1930, suggested 
there remained three alternatives for dealing with the southern peoples101: 
enslavement and expropriation, assimilation, and indirect rule. Whilst Tedla’s 
recommendations focus on assimilation, elements of all three strategies were 
vigorously pursued. Areas which succumbed to Menelik without resistance retained a 
degree of autonomy based on a form of indirect rule through existing elites, who paid 
an annual fixed tribute to the Emperor. These included kingdoms and sultanates at 
Jimma, Nekempte, Qellam (Gambella), Asosa and Benishangul, Awsa in Afar, and 
parts of Gojjam (Bahru Zewde 1991:86).  
 
Those areas, meanwhile, which had put up a fight against incorporation, saw the 
imposition of so-called gabbar-malkagna102 relations transferred from the north. The 
heavily extractive Abyssinian system of multiple appropriation of labour and 
‘surpluses’ was extended south, divested of the complex arrangement of hereditary 
land tenure safeguards which had underpinned it in the north. The conquered lands 
now ‘came under the jurisdiction of Menelik’s generals, providing them with the 
                                                 
101 He also details the ‘cursory and unscientific ethnographic survey of the country’ on which Tedla’s 
views are based, which is a salutary reminder of the knowledge base of the time.  
102 There is an enormous literature on the operation of this system, its relation with traditional land 
tenure patterns in the north, and the extent to which both should be understood as a ‘feudal 
arrangement’. See Crummey (2000), Cohen & Weintraub (1975), Allan Hoben (1973), McCann 
(1987), and Ellis (1976), whilst Fullerton-Joireman (2000), Markakis & Ayele Nega (1978) and Stahl 
(1974) deal more explicitly with the period after the Second World War. Bahru Zewde (1991:87) 
gives, I think, one of the most succinct and best summaries of the system which the Abyssinians 
exported and adapted to the south at the end of the nineteenth century. 
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source for both their wealth and their military strength. […] officials and retainers of 
the governors were then assigned a number of gabbar commensurate with their rank 
[…] rang[ing] from 5 to 100’ (Bahru Zewde 1991:88). This system encompassed 
most of the newly conquered territory, and included Kafa, Illubabor, Borana, parts of 
Shewa, and Harar(ghe). In the south, then, the traditional northern role of malkagna 
(representative, patron) was played by military settlers from the north, who came to 
be known as naftagna. 
 
Not content with the expropriation of labour, surplus produce, and (gradually) land 
from the newly created southern gabbars, the new ruling class also took labour in the 
form of slaves. A long-standing endemic slave trade was given new impetus by the 
extension of Ethiopia’s borders: ‘in the absence of effective and responsible 
administration, Menelik’s incorporation of new areas only tended to accentuate the 
predatory tendencies of the ruling class and the soldiery’ (Bahru Zewde 1991:92-93). 
 
Each of these strategies had implications for the constellation of ethnic groups vis-à-
vis the state and state power. Whilst some groups were targeted for slave-raiding103, 
others were reduced to a tenant- or serf-like status, the full implications of which 
only emerged later in the twentieth century, when land began to be appropriated in 
large volume (the effects of the changes in the system of land rights were initially 
obscured and mitigated because those who took land needed peasant labour, so that 
the process did not immediately result in widespread alienation). The elites of some 
other groups, meanwhile, emerged as a minority whose status, livelihood, and culture 
became increasingly and entwined with the emergent cultural, religious, military, and 
political dominance of the Shoan Amhara Christian aristocracy. 
 
By absorbing the traditional polities Menelik was able to construct a 
broader social base to the imperial state. […] A new dominant class that 
was trans-ethnic and transregional was definitely emerging parallel to the 
evolving state society. […] As subordinated ruling groups in the 
occupied territories accepted Christianity and became fully dependent on 
                                                 
103 These were often identified on the basis of phenotypic features. The Amharic term shanqala, 
commonly translated as ‘slave’, was long used to refer to the people of the periphery, distinguished by 
their black skin and height, features of which Abyssinian culture continues to be acutely conscious. 
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the imperial state for the conditions of their reproduction, they lost their 
organic ties to indigenous communities. (Gebru Tareke 1996[1991]:40-1) 
 
Those who wished to join the ranks of the powerful were absolutely required to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the empire by means of a specific set of cultural 
credentials. Although many members of the new ruling class were not Amharas from 
Shoa, they were increasingly required to behave as if they were, conforming closely 
to a set of stereotypical cultural features and markers. These included fluency in the 
Amharic language, adherence to Orthodox Christianity (often involving the change 
of Muslim or other personal names to Amharic ones with a Christian meaning), and 
the adoption of a set of norms of Abyssinian codes and styles. Assimilation was not a 
matter of choice: it was sanctioned in ways which made it essential. 
 
The religious conversion of ambitious local leaders was encouraged by 
means of incentives for adherents of Orthodox Christianity (public office, 
the economic benefits of the state, land and property rights) all denied to 
non-believers. (Markakis 1987:73-4)  
 
Baptism into Orthodox Christianity, then, provided an effective and 
vigorous focal criterion for testing, securing, and marking the loyalty of 
southern elites, providing in one go the ‘religious foundation, which 
blended together faith, state, and nation’ (ibid.:73). Whereas in the north, 
religion had proved a ‘unifying ideology, [it] now became a divisive 
factor in the multicultural state’ (Gebru Tareke 1996[1991]:41).  
 
Woven around this hegemonic cultural core, a reinvigorated series of myths of origin 
and legitimacy of the state was now fashioned from the ‘ancient’ fabric of the 
conquering polity’s long ancestral lines on the highlands. Where its resources proved 
threadbare, traditional warp was supplemented with elaborately manufactured new 
strands of weft. It was around this time, for instance, that the narrative of the 
Solomonic origins of the imperial dynasty in the Kebra Negast (‘Glory of Kings’) 
was revivified, and reworked to stress the primacy of Shoa. All manner of imperial 
paraphernalia was introduced in the period in question, including much now 
commonly regarded as ancient in origin, including for instance, the adoption of ‘the 
the lion of Judah […] as part of the Imperial styles, [which] is of no great antiquity’ 
(Ullendorff (1968:11), drawing on Rubenson (1965)). Such refashioning and 
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fabrication has, of course, complicated contemporary perceptions of historical 
continuity. 
 
‘Talking to butterflies’104: ancient Abyssinia in the present? 
 
The processes of unification and expansion described above undoubtedly reflect a 
combination of internal and external dynamics, in the context of the European 
scramble for Africa. The dynamics and interpretation of imperial expansion remain 
controversial, and two central controversies are as follows. Did Menelik II’s 
conquests reunite territories which had previously (and, by implication, properly) 
formed a part of, or at least rendered tribute to, historical Abyssinia, or should they 
be considered as acts of colonial aggression no more justified than the adjacent 
projects of aggrandizement undertaken by Europeans? Secondly, and relatedly, 
should these conquests be lauded as key to the survival and consolidation of an 
independent African giant, a beacon for nationalist aspiration across the continent, or 
decried as evidence of African complicity in an extractive form of ‘dependent 
colonialism’ (Asafa Jalata 1993) whose iniquities have yet to be reversed, leaving us 
today with the few disgraceful remnants of unfinished, albeit ‘internal’, colonial 
business?  
 
These questions – less queries of historical fact than calls for normative judgements 
about legitimacy, justice, and ‘proper’ reparation of damage – have been debated for 
well over a generation in Ethiopia. Answers to them often serve as shorthand means 
of marking out the respondents’ positions on a host of political issues, including their 
views of ethnic federalism, and rely on the accumulation of supporting historical 
evidence either way. Given the complexity of the historical processes involved, there 
is, of course, no shortage of material to bolster any number of interpretations 
associated with the two views. The current account is concerned less with weighing 
up the facts, or assessing the antiquity of each claim, than with tracing the processes 
by which the questions, and the views which prompt them, emerged.  
                                                 
104 ‘There was never a Queen like Balkis, From here to the wide world’s end; But Balkis talked to a 




Regarding Eritrea, Calhoun has remarked that ‘arguments over antiquity matter 
rather more in appeals to external audiences’ (Calhoun 1997:132n8), presumably 
because less proximate audiences work with more schematic categories of 
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ claims105. This fact undoubtedly goes some way to 
explain the vigour these arguments have enjoyed in the Horn of Africa. If those 
fighting for or against self-determination from the Ethiopian empire state in the 
recent period had an important external audience, so too did Tewodros II, Yohannes 
IV, and Menelik II before them, surrounded by European colonial ambitions. 
Performative statements about Ethiopia’s antiquity and extent –claims which attempt 
to bring into being what they assert – have a long history in the region.  Performative 
success was – as ever – greatly enhanced by the perceptible exaggeration of the right 
and proper ‘natural’ truth of what was claimed. Thus 
 
Ethiopian emperors often made extravagant claims, […] Menelik himself 
surpassed them all by declaring to the European powers his intention ‘to 
re-establish the ancient frontiers of Ethiopia up to Khartoum, and as far 
as Lake Nyanza with all the Gallas’. (Markakis 1974:23, quoting Rodd to 
Salisbury, 4 May 1897 (F.O.1/32)) 
 
Menelik II’s ‘more modest’ 1891 claims were widely published in a circular: not 
content that their written assertion would fix colonial beliefs about Ethiopia, ‘the 
wily ruler dispatched his soldiers […] to establish proof of control and pre-empt 
rights of possession’ (Markakis 1974:24-5). In the event, it was nevertheless the 
written agreements (inherently more easily ‘documented’ and better ‘known’ 
amongst decision makers than the situation on the ground) that formed the basis for 
demarcation. 
 
Fuelled by Menelik’s rhetoric and the enthusiasm of the Church, the tradition took 
root that imperial expansion sought only the rightful return to highland populations 
of areas from which they had only been expelled during the period of Ahmed Gragn 
                                                 
105 Sorenson (1993) contrasts the ‘narrative constructions of history and identity’ of Eritrean 
nationalists (relying on ‘more recent historical emphasis’ (:49) and appeals to international law (:186)) 
with those of Ethiopian unionists (the historicity of Greater Ethiopia in antiquity (:40ff)). His useful 
discussion succumbs to the temptation to judge relative ‘authenticity’. 
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(r. c.1526-1542) and the subsequent Oromo incursions (usually dated from 
movements into Bale beginning in the 1520s). That is seems clear that Menelik II 
pushed the frontiers of the Ethiopian state to areas beyond the reach even of the 
renowned medieval empire-builder Amda Tseyon (r. 1314-1344), or the maximal 
limits ruled by Zera Yacob (r. 1434-68), did nothing to shake this belief. 
 
Polemical emphasis on modern Ethiopia’s continuity with the ancient polity 
correlates with what is often a perennialist focus on the continuity of Abyssinian 
cultural norms and socio-economic circumstances. Not surprisingly, therefore, it also 
draws on academic assertion of such continuities, particularly where these assertions 
are incautious enough to lend themselves to the interpretation that both the particular 
set of continuities selected for analysis, and their cultural contents, are in some sense 
‘right’ in virtue of their ‘truth’: ‘valid’ in its widest sense.  
 
The work of Donald Levine (1974, 1965), and Harold Marcus (1994) has come in for 
particular criticism along these lines106. Levine’s later work rejects the ‘erroneous 
view that before the conquests of Menelik II in the late nineteenth century the other 
peoples of Ethiopia had lived independent and self-sufficient lives’ apparently not 
least on the circular grounds that this view ‘fails to provide any leverage for getting 
at the properties of the larger Ethiopian system directly’ (1974:21): by positing 
‘Greater Ethiopia’ as a ‘single societal system’ (1974:69), and documenting pan-
Ethiopian traits common to its groups of citizens, Levine is able to prove it such. The 
work is something of an exemplar of the performativity of categorisation. A core 
problem for Levine and Marcus’ approaches is that they attempt to ‘read off’ a 
‘correct’ classification of the nature of Ethiopia from ‘the facts of the matter’; thus 
for Marcus Ethiopia’s people have ‘natural allegiances’, its peasants uniformly share 
a ‘historical connection to the state’, such that any development which  
 
encourage[s] the break-up of the larger nation […] will give way 
inevitably to renewed national unity as the logic of geography, 
economics, tradition, and political culture once again come to dominate 
politics. (Marcus 1994:xiv) 
                                                 
106 Although much of the ethno-nationalist literature associated with the Eritrean or Oromo causes, is 




Such assessments neglect the problem that any preferred classification of Ethiopia 
will remain under-determined by ‘natural’ facts, and its preference and performance 
a matter of convention rather than correspondence. There is nothing inevitable about 
the evolution of conventions, whatever the weight of ‘logic’ of the circumstances in 
which they evolve. Even those few slices of the history of the population(s) of an 
area as large as modern-day Ethiopia over the period since the Queen of Sheba, 
which have been researched and documented, are rich enough to resource any 
number of interpretations. What is clear is that the interpretations which have 
survived and dominated have done so primarily because they have had influential 
patrons. In the period under question, the newly-established imperial state, evidently 
keen to boost its credentials, was, by a significant margin, the most influential. 
 
Inflaming the nexus: waking after a thousand years107 
 
The imperial state was founded on an explosive conjunction of 
antagonistic class and ethnic divisions that made it inherently unstable. 
To stabilise it, the state administration […] became highly centralised 
and bureaucratised, and Ethiopia built the largest army in black Africa 
(Markakis 2000:7) 
 
‘We remind you finally that all of you are by race, colour, blood and 
custom, members of the great Ethiopian family’. (Speech given by Haile 
Selassie I in the Ogaden in 1956, Ethiopian Observer December 1956, 
cited in Healy (1983:99)) 
 
This section explores the factors and processes which contributed to emergent 
resentment amongst various of Ethiopia’s ethnic populations regarding the 
‘ethnocratic’ rule to which they were subject. These include the experiences of 
different groups during Italian occupation and the Second World War; attempts by 
Haile Selassie I to curb the authority of regional aristocracies; the expansion of the 
education system, and of employment opportunities in the extended government 
bureaucracy; and a series of regional and local rebellions in the middle decades of 
the twentieth century. It suggests again the contingency of the ‘effect of the facts’: 
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although the imperial arrangement which placed southern groups under northern rule 
was forged in the 1880s, it became controversial only when significant relevant 
‘patterns of knowledge’ supported such controversy; it was not the iniquity per se, 
but its shared categorisation as such which provoked a reaction. 
 
New categories, new experiences: Italian occupation and British 
administration 
 
In the period from the 1890s to the early 1930s, then, successive Ethiopian regimes 
under Menelik II (d. 1913), Zewditu (r. 1913-1930) and Haile Selassie II (r. 1930-
1974), had worked to establish the legitimacy and integrity of the situation in which 
the multi-ethnic Empire was ruled and ‘unified’ under an Abyssinian state. The five-
year period of Italian occupation of Ethiopia from 1936-1941, along with British 
involvement and the process of disposal of Italy’s colonial possessions during and 
after the Second World War, introduced either the experience or the possibility of a 
range of alternative administrative and sovereign arrangements. A number of factors 
associated with the Italian occupation had significant effects relevant to the 
subsequent relationships between ethnic groups and the state. 
 
Firstly, the Italian conquest demolished the inevitability, and undermined the ‘divine’ 
Solomonic credentials, of two generations of Abyssinian rule. This was compounded 
by the ignominious circumstances of Emperor Haile Selassie’s flight into exile. 
Secondly the Italian occupation presented many of Ethiopia’s subject peoples with an 
alternative experience of imperial rule, from which a number drew comparisons 
unfavourable to the emperor’s return. A third factor exacerbated the trend: an Italian 
policy of divide and rule, which ‘to facilitate the conquest’ deliberately sought ‘to 
foment internal discord and warfare’ pitting Ethiopia’s subject races against the 
Amhara regime, from the 1936 Maichew campaign onwards actively offering a range 
of inducements (Sbacchi (1985:36), Greenfield (1965:230)). In particular, Italian 
hopes rested on Ethiopia’s non-Amhara and Muslim populations: thus  
                                                                                                                                          
107 Cf. Gibbon (1899). His ‘misleading […] but by no means wholly inept commentary on the 
isolationist tendencies of the times [the Middle Ages]’ (Pankhurst 1961:390) provides the Ethiopian 




Oromo oppression under Amhara domination became the central theme 
of Italian propaganda and of de-Amharization campaigns. Amharic was 
displaced as the legal language; and Arabic, Oromonya and Kaffinya 
were taught in schools. (Sbacchi 1985:160) 
 
Despite the Italians’ best efforts Oromo ‘nobles and ordinary people were perplexed 
and disoriented’ by the conquest, and remained ‘mistrustful’ (ibid.:161). Eminently 
more reliable was the response from Ethiopia’s Muslims who ‘gave the Italians 
unconditional help in return for the Italian government’s support of their religion and 
institutions’ (ibid.:161). Poor relations with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church were a 
function of Italian attempts to curry favour with Ethiopian nationalist sentiment by 
removing it from the orbit of Alexandria (Perham 1969:124). More importantly, 
however, they reflected Italian support for Islam, of which Mussolini sought to 
present himself as a regional champion. The period of occupation saw an intensive 
programme of mosque construction, and a number of schemes for the establishment 
of centres of Islamic study and propaganda (Sbacchi 1985:36,162-4). As a result, 
many of Ethiopia’s Muslim and non-Abyssinian populations recount with nostalgia 
the relatively favourable conditions they or their antecedents enjoyed during the 
Italian period. Italian development of infrastructure, driving roads into previously 
inaccessible areas, and drilling wells amongst pastoralist groups, particularly to the 
benefit of Ogadeni Somalis, impressed many.  
 
A number of communities were, then, unenthusiastic about the return of Abyssinian 
imperial rule, and there were even doubts and new ideas amongst those who resisted 
Italian rule. A republican patriot movement, for instance, 
 
argued for the unity of all patriots. […] It advocated a federalist approach 
to accommodate the diversity of Ethiopia’s constituent regions. (Bahru 
Zewde 1991:175-6) 
 
Encouraging such views was a fourth significant factor: the most important of the 
various administrative arrangements of the period incorporated a strong correlation 
between sovereign or administrative unit, and language area. Thus, for instance, 
when the six territorial governorships of Italian East Africa (Map 4) were established 
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‘ethnic principles were applied in dividing the territory’ (Sbacchi 1985:85)108. 
Sbacchi goes on to observe that  
 
the main Italian concern was the elimination of the Amhara’s claim to 
superiority over other populations. [They] framed the division of 
Ethiopia into Governorships in such a way that [this] hegemony was 
eliminated. Employing Amhara in government offices and using the 
Amharic language in non-Amhara territories was prohibited (ibid.:159) 
 
The establishment of the six governorships of Amhara, Oromo-Sidama, Harar 
(including Arsi), Somali, and Eritrea (including Tigray and ‘Danakil’) sought to take 
into account ‘traditional laws, customs, religion, and language’: 
 
This was difficult to achieve. […] The principle of providing unitary 
ethnic local government […]proved to be unworkable. Administrative 
boundary lines cut across ethnic groups. Next to the ethnic principle, the 
geographical criterion was adopted, followed by economic interests. [… ] 
the principle of political opportunism prevailed, rather than the ethnic 
one, although the latter was followed when possible. (ibid.:86) 
 
The significant parallels between ethnic federalism in the 1990s, and Italian 
administrative arrangements in the 1930s have drawn little or no comment in the 
recent period109, a fact which presumably reflects the considerable continuing 
reticence relating to the period of Italian conquest: parallels with occupying fascism 
could be expected only to exacerbate the resistance of pan-Ethiopian nationalists in 
1991, and were hardly likely to enhance the legitimacy of the incoming transitional 
government. Nevertheless it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Italian period 
provided important and widely known and experienced precedents, which must have 
had a bearing on the politicisation of ethnicity over the subsequent period. 
Centralised Abyssinian rule was no longer the only option, the single ‘prominent 
solution’, but had to be explicitly fostered and bolstered to exclude an alternative 
political solution, which the Italians had not only elaborated but also imposed and 
implemented all too clearly. The fact that the possibility of alternatives to centralised 
                                                 
108 Differentiation of the ‘Amharic parts’ of Ethiopia from the other parts of the empire had already 
formed a basis for Mussolini’s demands to the League of Nations in late 1935 (Sbacchi 1985:17). 
109 Gebru Tareke (1996[1991]:48), who also draw on Sbacchi, is an exception. 
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Amhara rule did not neatly disappear with the defeat of the Italians simultaneously 
proved and exacerbated the impact of these precedents. 
 
A fifth factor, and one which does seem explicitly to have exacerbated nationalist 
investigation of alternatives to the restitution of Shoan imperial rule, is a thread of 
ambivalence in both Italian and British policymaking of the period, alternating so-
called ‘Shoan’ with ‘Tigrayan’ policies. The Italians, in the run up to the invasion, 
had pursued a twin-track policy, attempting to sow disaffection amongst the 
Tigrigna-speaking populations, whilst adopting a conciliatory approach to the 
Ethiopian government. The post-Italian British Military Administration in Eritrea, 
and ambiguously mandated administrative involvement in Ethiopia110, perpetuated 
this ambivalence, continuing to administer Tigray from Asmara rather than Addis 
Ababa111. Divergences between the British Foreign and War Offices meant that 
British policy wavered between the restitution of centralised rule from Addis Ababa, 
and the amalgamation of Tigray with Eritrea, establishing a so-called ‘Greater 
Tigray’112. Meanwhile, intense and fragmented political activity and lobbying in 
support of a multiplicity of potential fates for the various parts of Eritrea 
characterised Eritrean politics in the decade from 1941 up to its federation with 
Ethiopia in 1952 (Trevaskis 1960).  
 
Ripples from these occasionally violent uncertainties also affected Ethiopia, with 
revolts in eastern Tigray; western Oromo leaders forwarding a petition to the League 
of Nations for a separate protectorate pending independence; and the British 
continuing to administer the rich Haud pastureland inside the Ethiopian border, 
exacerbating violent conflict over grazing access between the Ogaden and other 
Somali clans, until as late as 1954. It took what Greenfield has called ‘two decades of 
intrigue’ (1965:ch.15) for Haile Selassie to attain anything like the autonomous, 
                                                 
110 See Greenfield (1965:271) and Bahru Zewde (1991:178-183) on the ‘mutilated’ nature Ethiopian 
independence under Anglo-Ethiopian agreements of 1942 and 1944. 
111 ‘British plans for both Eritrea and the Ogaden […] amounted to a perpetuation of the 
administrative divisions set up during the Italian Occupation’ (Bahru Zewde 1991:181)  
112 The ‘Tigray-Tigrigne’ project (see Trevaskis (1960), Erlich (1986), and Tekeste Negash (1997)). 
Vaughan (2000) discusses its resonance in subsequent Eritrean and Tigrayan nationalism.  
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stable, centralised arrangement he sought, and many of the fault lines exposed during 
the period of the Second World War and its aftermath remain problematic. 
 
The subsequent influence of this disrupted period has perhaps been under-
investigated in relation to ethnic federalism. It was, after all, the first time in which 
the possibility of modern administration of Ethiopia on the basis of ‘the ethnic 
principle’ was not simply mooted but extensively implemented via a local 
administrative system of ‘residencies’ (Sbacchi 1985:ch.11), which directly affected 
the lives of the majority of its subjects. Amongst many of Ethiopia’s Muslim and 
peripheral populations it left a memory of comparatively better treatment at the 
hands of the state which remained well nourished and alive amongst descendant 
communities in 1991. 
 
Curbing the old regional elite: imperial centralisation…  
 
Commentators agree that ‘the basic policy of Haile Selassie [was] a centralising one’ 
(Clapham 1966:90, cited in Schwab 1972), continuing the tradition of ‘the great 
centralising emperors from 1855 onwards’ (Clapham 1988:27).  
 
It was to be the major historical achievement of Hayla-Sellase that he 
finally succeeded in realizing the unitary state of which Tewodros had 
dreamt (Bahru Zewde 1991:140). 
 
During the reign of Zewditu, in his role as regent, Haile Selassie had accumulated a 
range of powers, embarking in the process on a power struggle with the conservative 
forces of the traditional elites. In the period up to 1930 he had met and faced down 
early challenges to his increasing powers from the regional aristocracy. 
 
A year after his coronation negusa negast, in 1931 Emperor Haile Selassie declared a 
new constitution which ‘set up the juridical framework of emergent absolutism’ 
(Bahru Zewde 1991:140). This gave the emperor absolute powers to appoint and 
dismiss the nobility, to administer justice, and grant land and other honours. The 
nobility meanwhile, lost their independent authority also in foreign relations, the 
acquisition of arms, and warfare (ibid.:143). Imperial determination to curb the 
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power of the regional elites continued in the post-war period. A new regional 
administration established after 1941 provided for 14 provinces (teklai gezat), around 
100 counties (awraja), and 600 districts (wereda). Haile Selassie kept a firm rein on 
the power of the regional aristocracy, regularly shuffling them from place to place, 
and gradually bureaucratising the central government. Thus 
 
Haile-Selassie continued where the Italians left off in reducing them to 
dependence on the centre. (Clapham 1969:67) 
 
Whilst using the aristocracy to ‘maintain connections between the central 
government and the more traditional sectors of the state’ (ibid.:71), the emperor 
conferred increasingly few senior titles (ibid.:67), and allocated positions of greatest 
influence to those whom he had himself raised to high office, rather than to members 
of the nobility (ibid.:68). 
 
For the first time in Ethiopia’s history, Haile Selassie had succeeded in curtailing the 
power of Ethiopia’s regional elites, and with it the autonomy of her regions. A 
professionalised national bureaucracy and army performed the functions traditionally 
carried out under shifting alliances of decentralised fiefdoms nominally subservient 
to the ‘king of kings’. In order to fill these structures, in an era of modernisation, 
Emperor Haile Selassie needed educated administrators. His reign, then, saw the 
dramatic expansion of education in Ethiopia, in what was perhaps the single most 
important socio-political transformation of the period. 
 
…and bureaucratisation: educating a new elite. 
 
The Emperor is certainly the hub of the government, but he is far from 
being the whole of it; for to further his policy of centralisation, and to 
carry out the new and complex tasks involved by modernisation and 
administrative expansion, he has had to recruit a ruling class of 
administrators and politicians – aptly termed ‘the new nobility’. 
(Clapham 1969:64) 
 
After the Battle of Adua, Ethiopians had begun to go abroad for education, or benefit 
from mission schools or educational facilities in neighbouring Sudan and Eritrea. In 
1908, towards the end of the reign of Menelik II, the first modern school in Ethiopia 
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was opened in Addis Ababa, followed in 1912 by the Alliance Française schools in 
Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. During the decade after the establishment of the Teferi 
Mekonnen School in Addis Ababa (1925), schools began to be opened in different 
parts of the country. A further increase in the numbers of Ethiopians sent abroad 
during the 1920s produced a class of educated Ethiopians prominent in state 
administration in the post-Italian period. The development of education not only 
trained personnel to staff the growing state apparatus, but also ‘disseminat[ed] ideas 
of change’ (Bahru Zewde 1991:109). It established a class of young people 
sufficiently educated and experienced to begin to understand the iniquitous basis on 
which the imperial state was established. Where these individuals also happened to 
be assimilated members of the ethnic groups most disadvantaged by the arrangement 
(as increasingly), they began not only to understand it, but resent it. 
 
Bahru Zewde’s recent study of the ‘reformist intellectuals of the early twentieth 
century’ gives a flavour of the intellectual ‘exuberance and vibrancy of the 1920s’, 
during which the association – even collaboration - between Haile Selassie and 
various of the intellectual group, constituted ‘a fascinating experiment in social and 
political reform’ (2002:210-211). This was an experiment to which the Italian 
invasion and occupation put a stop. Whilst many of the older generation of 
intellectuals went into exile, a majority of its younger members were executed by the 
Italians, creating ‘a generation gap in the intellectual and political history of the 
country’ and contributing to ‘the drab intellectual climate that marked the post-war 
period’ in which ‘the educated elite saw its mission as one of loyal and dedicated 
service rather than engagement in social and political critique’ (ibid.:211). 
 
As a result, ‘the first fifteen years after the Liberation were dominated by divisions 
between largely traditional forces, notably the nobility, and the personal protégés of 
the Emperor’ (Clapham 1969:87). This situation gradually shifted as educated 
politicians worked their way through the ranks of government, such that ‘since 1961, 
most of the important ministers have been men with advanced education’ (ibid.:88). 
Simultaneously, the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration and the Ministry 
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of Finance, along with the emperor, the major forces representing the centralisation 
of the political system’ (Schwab 1972:138). The educated elite, however, had not  
 
scaled the ‘commanding heights’ of the political system, which are still 
held by a man, who, whatever his claims to be a moderniser, is very far 
from them in outlook; and they have not so far provided that driving 
force which is what the government most obviously lacks. (Clapham 
1969:91) 
 
All appointments and decision-making continued to centre upon the person of the 
emperor, so that with his removal in 1974, the only group with sufficient 
organisational capacity to replace his rule was the army. 
 
The language of instruction 
 
The strength of a country lies in its unity, and unity is born of [common] 
language, customs, and religion. Thus, to safeguard the ancient 
sovereignty of Ethiopia and to reinforce its unity, our language and our 
religion should be proclaimed over the whole of Ethiopia. Otherwise, 
unity will never be attained […] Amharic and Ge’ez should be decreed 
official languages for secular as well as religious affairs and all pagan 
languages should be banned (Sahle Tsedalu, Memorandum, Ministry of 
Pen Archive 29.11.25/1.8.33, quoted by Bahru Zewde 2002:140) 
 
When the first of Ethiopia’s schools opened in 1908, teaching was in French, since 
no materials existed in Ethiopian languages. After the liberation Amharic was made 
the language of instruction in the first two school grades, and a decade later, as 
materials were produced, was used throughout primary education. Competence in 
Amharic and English were compulsory requirements for the school leaving 
certificate, and for entry to Addis Ababa University College, which had been 
established in 1950. This gave Amhara children  
 
a distinct advantage over the rest. Furthermore, the neftegna tended to 
congregate in towns where secondary education was available, and their 
children had an advantage there as well. The result was grossly uneven 
ethnic representation among university students. (Markakis 2000:11).  
 
Meanwhile, missionaries were required by law to learn Amharic and to use it as the 
language of instruction in mission schools. Although they were allowed to translate 
the bible into local languages, they were required to use the Ge’ez alphabet, with 
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contradictory effects: at once ‘spreading familiarity with the alphabet of the 
dominant language’ and, by disseminating local languages in written form, providing 
‘a significant catalyst in raising the consciousness of ethnic identity and solidarity’ 
(ibid.:11). 
 
Rebellion and regionalism 
 
The middle decades of the twentieth century, after the liberation from Italian 
occupation, saw a series of regional or local rebellions in different parts of Ethiopia: 
the weyane rebellion in eastern Tigray in 1943; the eruption of Bale between 1963 
and 1970; the uprising in Gojjam in 1968; disturbances in Yejju in Wello in 1948 and 
1970; and the uprising in Gedeo in 1960. Whilst these disturbances are often 
bracketed together (, in fact they have little in common as to origin, cause, duration, 
form, or participants. Whilst few of these instances drew, at the time, on an explicitly 
or widely-shared ethnic rationale113, the precedents of local, non-Shoan resistance to 
Shoan rule they constitute, have offered potentially resonant resources to subsequent 
generations of ethno-nationalists. 
 
The weyane in Tigray (further discussed in Chapter V below) seems to have arisen 
when administrative corruption and greed ignited a situation of existing instability 
and insecurity, and one awash with weaponry in the wake of the Italian defeat. In the 
case of Bale, the measurement of land, which began in the early 1950s, had reduced 
peasants to a serf-like status; new measurements and taxes in 1963 triggered 
widespread alienation which was fed by Muslim antagonism in the face of the 
venality and arrogance of Christian settlers and overlords. The longevity of this 
uprising was also a result of its entanglement with the cause of Somali irredentism, 
and the involvement of the so-called Western Somali Liberation Front, which had 
been established with cross-border support soon after the independence of Somalia 
from colonial rule in 1960, to fight for that end. 
 
                                                 
113 The Bale case perhaps comes closest. 
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Gojjame resistance was initially triggered when a new Shoan governor tried 
unsuccessfully in 1950 to increase taxation in the province, which had, to that date 
‘successfully resisted pressures from the political centre’ (Bahru Zewde 1991:216). 
When increases were again attempted at the end of the following decade, resistance 
was this time suppressed with force. The Yejju and Gedeo cases similarly seem to 
have their roots in fears of, or actual land alienation, and associated taxation.  
 
Whilst Bale offered ‘ideal grounds and location for effective guerrilla warfare 
[being] peripherally located and inhabited by distinct ethnic groups’ (Gebru Tareke 
1996[1991]:200), few of the other cases offered the potential for sustained and 
threatening opposition to the central government. Two factors seem to have operated 
as triggers for a shift in the nature of opposition to the imperial regime, which 
thereafter could gradually be seen to operate more or less at the national level. These 
were the attempted coup of 1960, and the annexation of federated Eritrea, effectively 
completed with the imposition of Ethiopian law the previous year. Whilst the coup 
attempt of Mengistu and Germame Neway was relatively easily suppressed at the 
time, and Haile Selassie succeeded in having the Asmara parliament vote away its 
own autonomy, seeds of a different level of dissatisfaction had been sown in each 
case. Of the various groups amongst whom these seeds took root, the growing body 
of students at Haile Selassie I, later Addis Ababa, University, was the most 
important.  
 
The Ethiopian student movement and the ‘National Question’ 
 
Teferi, do not teach these children of the poor or else they will sit on your 
head. (advice given Haile Selassie I by Kassa Wolde Mariam, HSIU 
President 1962-1969, cited by Balsvik (1985:244)). 
 
The dynamics of the increasingly active and radical student politics of the last 15 
years of the imperial regime remain deeply contested in Ethiopian political circles; 
few of the students’ preoccupations is more vigorously contested than that referred to 
by its Marxist label as ‘the National Question’. Until recently, almost all of the 
political organisations and movements which had fought over the Ethiopian body 
politic since the 1970s, including many of those which continue to do so, could and 
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often did trace their roots back to the student movement, or could identify its strong 
influence upon them. Political fissures which continue to divide Ethiopians can in 
many cases be traced back to student debates in the final years of the imperial period: 
to divisions between generations, cliques, or diaspora groups of activists; or to 
disputes over ideology, analysis, or the application of either to different aspects of 
the Ethiopian situation, then as now. 
 
The rise of the Ethiopian student movement constitutes a watershed in modern 
Ethiopian political history: it was arguably as transformative of the political culture 
and ideas of Ethiopia’s elite as Menelik II’s expansion had been of its political space. 
Many of the events that followed in its wake proved equally bloody. In the absence 
of political parties and strong associational life, the ‘students emerged as the most 
outspoken and visibly the only consolidated opposition group’, constituting ‘a 
disproportionately large section of what could be called the bearers of public 
opinion’ (Balsvik 1985:xiii). Remarkably ‘the social and political awakening of the 
Ethiopian students [was] a spontaneous self-accomplished process achieved in a 
situation of great isolation’ and ‘an environment hardly conducive for its 
development’ (Markakis 1974:358). 
 
The movement’s critical significance is no doubt responsible for the extraordinary 
levels of popular mythology which have surrounded it ever since. It has been 
credited or damned with responsibility for just about everything that has happened in 
Ethiopia since the early 1970s. On the other hand, neither the students, nor the 
various political organisations descended from them, came to power after 1974. 
Rather, as briefly discussed in Chapter V, the military seized power, establishing a 
regime which rapidly turned on and consumed most of the major successors to the 
Ethiopian student movement, during the Red Terror of the late 1970s.  
 
This fact has perhaps further deepened the romanticism, often uncritical and 
idealised, with which the heady student period (a sort of ‘age of innocence’) has 
often subsequently been viewed, particularly amongst Ethiopian diaspora 
communities. What had always been internecine struggles amongst the more 
 
 129 
committed student factions became, after the rise of the Dergue, literally deadly. The 
deaths of so many have undoubtedly further constrained the ability or willingness of 
survivors to analyse the experiences of their ‘generation’ (Kiflu Tadesse 1993, 1998; 
Babile Tola 1989). Those who had an interest in formulating a critique of the student 
movement in order to learn from its mistakes, and further their struggle in opposition, 
often did not survive to tell their stories114; those who escaped were often silenced by 
the bitterness or guilt of longevity; those who remained in Ethiopia by the ongoing 
imperatives of survival.  
 
With the exception of Balsvik’s remarkable outsider’s work (1985), both political 
and academic analysis of the student movement remained relatively fragmented for 
most of the Dergue period115. The efflorescence of official political enthusiasm for it 
in and since 1991, suggests that its emotional, ideological, and strategic pull had 
remained strong. Not for the first time, the change of government in 1991 provoked a 
new consideration of the student movement’s legacy, not least by a new regime keen 
to lay claim to it. The EPRDF has repeatedly emphasised its debt to those elements 
of the Ethiopian student movement, who first elucidated notions of self-
determination of nationalities within the Ethiopian empire state, and laid the 
ideological basis for political mobilisation on the basis of ‘nationality’. In 1991 other 
members of the Transitional Government joined them in averring that it was only 
then – twenty years later – that the student movement was finally ‘coming to 
power’116.  
 
In this post-1991 reconsideration, Walleligne Mekonen, author of the November 
1969 article ‘On the question of nationalities in Ethiopia’, emerges as a focus for 
singular veneration. A well-established narrative holds that it was in his terse 
analysis that the national question burst onto the scene, fully formed and endorsing 
                                                 
114 The more realistic – albeit not always dispassionate - analyses of the student movement have come 
from survivors in this category. Gebru Mersha’s unsentimental account (1987) is a good example. 
115 Other pre-1991 work includes Alem Asres (1990), Ambaw Ayele (undated MS), Babile Tola 
(1989), Fentahun Tiruneh (1990), Gebru Mersha (1987), Getachew Wolde Meskal (1984), Hagos 
Gebre Yesus (1972) (1977), Legesse Lemma (1979), Melaku Tegegne (undated MS), Beyene Negewo 
(1977), Tesfaye Demellash (1983), Teshome Gebre Wagaw (1982).  
116 Comment made by Tesfaye Habisso, July 1991 Charter comment (English translation of the ETV 
video soundtrack of the proceedings, Assefa Gezahegn for the author, June/July 1994). 
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self-determination up to and including secession, transforming Ethiopian politics 
forever and at a stroke. Like most oft-repeated political mythologies, this one is a 
considerable oversimplification. Although the contribution of Walleligne’s paper 
does indeed seem to have been fundamental, it emerged from a collective 
accumulation of experiences, discussion, and thinking over a period. It is the purpose 
of this section to trace and explain the main dynamics of this development, both 
before and after Walleligne.   
 
I have already noted that the dynamics of the student movement and its application 
of Marxist analysis of the problem of nationalities are deeply contested. An 
alternative account, which has grown up over the intervening decades, can be cited as 
a good exemplar of this. According to this version, also a distorting simplification, 
the application of the National Question to Ethiopia was not the true-bred child of the 
Ethiopian student movement at all, but the illegitimate offspring of Eritrean 
secessionist nationalism of the time. Far from reflecting bitter experiences and 
genuine concerns with the governance of all parts of the Ethiopian state, the 
argument continues, discussion of the self-determination of nationalities within the 
student movement represented nothing more than the success of a subtle campaign of 
manipulation by Eritrean activists, designed to distort and subvert the radical 
movement in the furtherance of their own secessionist objectives. But for a few 
Italian-influenced Eritrean die-hards, this line continues, the issue probably would 
never have arisen, and certainly would not have merited the attention it received. The 
conclusion of this argument is, of course, that without these pernicious alien 
influences of 1960s internationalism, an Ethiopia ‘decapitated’ of Eritrea would not 
now ‘languish’ under ethnic federalism at all.  
 
This is an assessment often put forward since 1991 by the incumbent government’s 
opponents, not least with a view to divesting the ruling party of an important 
domestic component of its ideological pedigree, and undermining the legitimacy of 
its flagship political project. It has been fed by the form of much of the literature on 
Ethiopia written between 1974 and 1991, in which, if index entries for the national 
question appear, they habitually signal discussion only of Eritrean moves for 
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independence from Ethiopia. It is true that Eritrean nationalism played a significant 
role both in raising and shaping discussion of the national question within the student 
movement. It is one which has, however, usually been assumed rather than 
investigated. 
 
The following account considers in turn: the process of overall radicalisation of the 
student movement; the way in which a concern with ‘regionalism’ gradually 
emerged, culminating in explicit discussion of, and disputes over the National 
Question; and various of the factors which may have influenced this process: the 
competing impulses of modernism and traditionalism; ideological influences; and the 
roles of diaspora politics and the Eritrean nationalist struggle.  
 
Radicalisation of the Student Movement 
 
There is no doubt in my mind that some of our students increasingly view 
themselves as political persons […] (Memo from HSIU Dean James Paul 
to HSIU President Kassa Wolde Mariam, 6 October 1966, quoted by 
Balsvik (1985:169)) 
 
Balsvik identifies five phases in the ‘steady radicalisation’ (Bahru Zewde 1991:222) 
of the Ethiopian student movement. These cover what she calls ‘challenges to 
authority’ from 1958 to 1962; ‘demands for participation’ from 1962 to 1966; a 
period of confrontation between 1967 and 1968; the ‘revolution that failed’ in 1969; 
and the prelude to the subsequent change of government from 1970-1973. 
Radicalisation over this period was extremely rapid, as reflected by the evolution of 
student publications: 
 
In 1956 the editorial in the first issue of the student paper invited students 
to write articles on any topic ‘except politics and religion’ [University 
College Calls, 1 (1), 1956]. In 1968 an editorial in Struggle [2 January] 
stated: ‘the basic role of the university students in our country is to make 
the masses conscious of the suffering they are enduring resignedly’. 
(Markakis 1974:358) 
 
Balsvik summarises a set of factors influencing this set of changes. The impact of 
modern western education was clearly key, as was the way student opposition was 
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affected by ‘the anti-colonial, nationalist emancipation process in Africa’ (1994:86), 
influenced by: the proximity in Addis Ababa of the OAU; the presence of several 
hundred scholarship students from other parts of Africa from the end of the 1950s; 
and the revelation at the Addis Ababa UNESCO conference on education in 1961 of 
Ethiopia’s poor record vis-à-vis other African countries. A third factor was the global 
‘flowering of political activism in the student environments of the 1960s’ along lines 
that were ‘anti-imperialist, anti-American, anti-authoritarian, and inspired by Marxist 
theory’ (ibid.:87). Here the influence of left wing publications, radical Peace Corps 
volunteers, and an extremely active diaspora were important. Finally, the repressive 
response of the government ‘did more to gather the students behind the protests than 
any ideological or factual arguing could ever have done’ (ibid.:89). Popularity born 
of repression was compounded by the regime’s tendency to vacillate between beating 
student demonstrators, and ‘encourag[ing] them to petition the Emperor’. The tactic 
of closing the schools ‘invariably backfired, since the government was obliged to 
seek ways to lure the students back [and] accept embarrassing compromises which 
served to embolden its youthful opponents’ (Markakis 1974:360). 
 
Every compromise reinforced the visible fallibility of the ‘divine’ imperial regime. 
The government’s failure to address the students in political terms was exacerbated 
by indecisive university authority. Opinion varies as to the role of the numerous 
foreign members of the university teaching staff. According to Balsvik ‘many were 
authoritarian and paternalistic, and few took student involvement seriously’ 
(1994:91). Andargachew Tiruneh meanwhile claims that  
 
a lot of the school and university instructors from the West were 
sympathetic to and, in the case of the Marxists among them, advocates of 
the trends within the student movement. (1993:135-6) 
 
The situation was presumably, as everywhere, that the instructors, whether Ethiopian 
or foreign, were not a uniform body. 
 
As a result of this constellation of factors, the mid-1960s saw the beginning of the 
‘really militant phase of the student movement’ with ‘the emergence in 1964 of a 




the students’ uncompromising opposition to the regime, as well as the 
beginning of acceptance of Marxist ideas, is traceable to this period. 
(Bahru Zewde 1991:223) 
 
Evolution of concern with ‘regionalism’  
 
Discussion about the national question was slower to emerge onto the students’ 
rapidly radicalising agenda than a range of other less controversial issues. This 
reflects a policy climate in which ‘the nationality issue was a taboo subject, and even 
after years of fighting in Eritrea and elsewhere, was not part of public discourse’ 
(Kiflu Taddesse 1993:52).  
 
The Ethiopian government avoids any reference to ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious diversity, and […] also actively discourages non-official inquiry 
in this field. (Markakis 1974:51n.3) 
 
As a result of imperial dissemination of the Amharic language, the assimilation of 
non-Amhara populations to Amhara culture and religion throughout the twentieth 
century, and university admissions policy, all students were fluent in Amharic. In 
addition to date and place of birth ‘University College of Addis Ababa cards also 
noted race, religion […], but by the time HSIU opened [in 1961] it was illegal to ask 
a person’s ethnic origin’ ( Balsvik 1985:43). Kiflu confirms that most students were 
hostile towards ‘the political assertion of ethnicity’. 
 
Student writing extolled Ethiopian nationalism, a sentiment perceived to 
transcend all other identities and loyalties’. […] The Abyssinian nature of 
Ethiopian nationalism and identity was taken for granted. No mention 
was made, for example, about the neglect of all other languages in favour 
of Amharigna, or the identification of Ethiopia with Christianity. (Kiflu 
Tadesse 1993:52) 
 
In the early 1960s student support for unity could be taken for granted. Students 
wrote in support of reuniting Eritrea with ‘the motherland’, and supported the war 
against Somalia in 1964. Such was the appeal of national unity that it could still 
serve as an effective brake on academic freedom (President Kassa Wolde Mariam 
News and Views 16 November 1962:2, cited in Balsvik (1985:116)). For several 




abundant evidence of enthusiastic pride in and loyalty to Ethiopia, even if 
toward the end of the 1960s there was a clear tendency to turn against the 
government’s one-sided, pretentious propaganda about the country’s past 
and present. (Balsvik 1985:279) 
 
Even at the end of decade, a comparative study found Ethiopian students less likely 
to refer to tribal and regional identities than their African peers (Klineberg & 
Zavalloni 1969:241). 
  
The first indications that the position of nationalities within Ethiopia was beginning 
to be regarded as complex and problematic came with a series of reflections on what 
it meant to be an Ethiopian, of which the best known is Ibsa Gutema’s Ityopyawi 
Man New? (‘Who is an Ethiopian?’), which won a poetry prize in 1966. In the same 
year, the university paper News & Views (30 April) carried an article by Haile 
Mariam Goshu reflecting on ‘Ethiopianism’ as ‘transcend[ing] personal, tribal, and 
regional loyalties’. By the end of 1968, however, Struggle had adopted a more 
controversial – if still tentative - editorial line, stating, in Balsvik’s summary, ‘that 
although there was a feeling of nationalism in Ethiopia, it had not yet in the country 
as a whole or in the student body become stronger than the regional and tribal 
impulses’ (1985:279). 
 
Around 1967, then, it seems that the ‘nationalities issue’ began to be discussed in 
closed study circles of the more theoretically conscious students (Kiflu Tadesse 
1993:53); it was also on the agenda at the 1967 meeting of the National Union of 
Ethiopian University Students (NUEUS). Various reasons are put forward as to why 
the national question became so important around this time. Four interrelated factors 
seem to have been in play: increasing criticism of the neglect of Ethiopian culture in 
the educational curriculum; burgeoning interest in Marxism-Leninism; diaspora 
discussion of the ‘national question’ at home; and the activities of Eritrean 
nationalists after 1960 (Balsvik 1985:278). Each of these is discussed in greater 




Also significant, however, were ‘ethnic sentiments’ and ‘divisions’ within the 
university which students ‘acknowledged and deplored’ (ibid.:279). An influential 
factor seem to have been the closure of the university boarding system after which 
‘students from the same school background and language group tended to find 
accommodations together’, with the result that ‘at the end of the 1960s almost half 
the dormitory rooms were occupied by students on the basis of ethnic connections’. 
(ibid.:279-80). This situation at once reflected and fostered the prominence of ethnic 
affiliation, and Tigrigna, Oromiffa, and Gurage languages began to be spoken on and 
around the campus. 
 
Tension seems to have been developing between the three major student language 
groups: Tigrigna-, Oromiffa- and Amharic-speakers. In one instance it resulted in a 
‘serious fight involving these two groups of students [Tigrayan/Eritrean and Amhara] 
[which] went on for several days, reportedly on a ‘tribal basis’’ at the Laboratory 
School of the Faculty of Education in 1967 (Balsvik 1985:281; see also Kiflu 
Tadesse 1993:52). Oromo consciousness was rising around this time, in the wake of 
the banning of the Metcha-Tulama organisation in 1966, and no doubt fanned in the 
capital by the trial of its leaders in June 1968. On campus, ‘radical Oromo groups 
were forming, led by student activists such as Baro Tumsa, Ababiya Abajobir, 
Zegeye Asfaw, and Yohannes Negewo’ and ‘a Tigray students’ association […] 
existed unofficially in the university’ (Kiflu Tadesse 1993:52)117.  
 
The University Student Union of Addis Ababa (USUAA) presidential elections of 
November 1968 seem to have provided something of a trigger for more concerted, 
public, and bitter discussion of the nationalities issue amongst student leaders in 
Addis Ababa. Many expressed concern that the defeat of Tigrayan ‘radical’ Tilahun 
Gizaw by Amhara ‘moderate’ Mekonnen Bishaw was soured by ‘ethnic politicking’ 
through the hustings period, during which, the radical camp alleged, a whispering 
campaign had linked Tilahun with secessionist Eritrean nationalism (interviews, 
former members of the student movements, Addis Ababa, November 1997, Addis 
                                                 
117 These developments are discussed in Chapter V. 
 
 136 
Ababa and Mekelle, October-November 1998; cf. also Kiflu Tadesse 1993:52)118. 
The stakes were, of course, raised dramatically when, a month after his election as 
USUAA President the following year, and the simultaneous publication of 
Walleligne’s article in Struggle, Tilahun was assassinated. 
 
Explicit discussion of the National Question 
 
Ethiopia is not really one nation. It is made up of a dozen nationalities, 
with their own languages, ways of dressing, history, social organisation 
and territorial entity. And what else is a nation? Is it not made of a people 
with a particular tongue, particular ways of dressing, particular history, 
particular social and economic organisations? Then may I conclude that 
in Ethiopia there is the Oromo Nation, the Tigrai Nation, the Amhara 
Nation, the Gurage Nation, the Sidama Nation, the Wellamo Nation, the 
Adere Nation, and however much you may not like it the Somali Nation. 
(Walleligne Mekonen 1969:4) 
 
Walleligne Mekonen was an Arts undergraduate from Amhara Saiynt in Wello. His 
paper, over thirty years later, reads like a blueprint of the ideological position 
advocated by the TPLF/EPRDF. He proceeds to contrast the ‘true picture’ of 
Ethiopia he describes, with the ‘fake nationalism’ of the ruling class, based on 
Amhara/Amhara-Tigray supremacy which, since ‘culture is nothing more than the 
super-structure of an economic basis’, reflects the economic exploitation of the south 
by the Amhara/Amhara-Tigray neftegna system. Neither the impoverishment of 
Amhara and Tigre peasants, nor, he argues, the elevation of individual assimilated 
southerners to positions of influence does anything to undermine the facts of this 
situation, albeit the result of ‘historical accident’. To change it, he says, ‘we must 
build a genuine national state’ in which  
 
all nationalities participate equally in state affairs, […] where every 
nationality is given equal opportunity to preserve and develop its 
language, its music, its history. [...] a state where no nation dominates 
another nation be it economically or culturally. (ibid.:5) 
 
                                                 
118 Mekonen Bishaw was, with Mesfin Wolde Mariam, one of two representatives of AAU at the 1991 
Charter Conference. He was amongst those academics controversially dismissed by the TGE in 1992. 
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This is to be done not by military coup, and not by movements such as those in Bale 
or Eritrea, since ‘they do not attempt to make a broad-based assault on the 
foundations of the existing regime’. Most controversially of all (and of great 
relevance to the constitutions of the 1990s), Walleligne went on to say, he did ‘not 
oppose these movements just because they are secessionists. There is nothing wrong 
with secessionism as such’: 
 
As long as secession is led by the peasants and workers and believes in 
its internationalist obligation, it is not only to be supported but also 
militarily assisted. […] We should never dwell on the subject of 
secession, but whether it is progressive or reactionary. A Socialist Eritrea 
and Bale would give a great impetus to the revolution in this country and 
could form an egalitarian and democratic basis for reunification. […] In 
the long run, Socialism is internationalism and a socialist movement will 
never remain secessionist for good. (ibid.:6-7) 
 
In putting a distillation of radical student discussion on this issue on paper, 
Walleligne’s article not only shattered taboos on the discussion of nationalities 
within the empire state, it also wrenched a profound shift in the frame of reference of 
the domestic student movement which had, in public, essentially advocated 
Ethiopian unity. In positing an independent Bale the paper undoubtedly sounded 
absurd or naïve to many (interviews, former students, Addis Ababa, November 1997, 
October 1998). Its power lay in forcing its readers to think the unthinkable: the issues 
raised by peripheral nationalists in Eritrea and the Ogaden were now brought straight 
to the heartland of the empire state. Walleligne’s article had challenged the integrity 
and sustainability of the mythology of imperial unity just as effectively as the 1960 
coup, and the nationalists’ challenges, had demonstrated the possibility of shaking its 
physical inviolacy.  
 
Walleligne’s article also played a significant role in the transformation of student 
politics into the seedbed for a series of radical political organisations. The paper 
defined both the purpose such an organisation might fight for, and also a possible 
organising principle: the equality and autonomy of nationalities. The paper is 
couched not so much in theoretical terms as in the practical political terms of ‘what 
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we must do’ and ‘how we must do it’. As such it marked a crucial turning point for 
the domestic student movement from activism to action. 
 
Factors associated with the emergence of the nationality issue 
 
Modernist versus traditionalist dynamics within the Student Movement 
 
A number of authors have commented on the ways education tended to alienate 
Ethiopian students from their background. Donham (1999) suggests a fundamental 
ambivalence in the attitude of Ethiopian students towards modernising processes 
during the Dergue, one which was at once imitative and hostile, proud of Ethiopian 
identity, and embarrassed by Ethiopia’s backwardness.  
 
Modern education imbues [the student] with admiration and longing for 
such secular values as enlightenment, progress, equality, efficiency, and 
prosperity which he finds manifestly lacking in his world.  The 
realization that Ethiopia lags behind most other African countries in the 
drive for development comes as a painful shock. (Markakis 1974:188) 
 
‘Strong dissatisfaction with education in Ethiopia’ began at the Sixth Congress of the 
NUEUS (Balsvik 1985:240), fuelled by high levels of student failure because of 
language deficiency, and the irrelevance of a university curriculum (Markakis 
1974:1988) poorly designed to convince Ethiopians to work in the countryside 
(Ginzberg & Smith 1966:115-6). Students were concerned that 
 
the schools had failed to transmit culture and heritage and to imbue the 
student with an identity. Opposition was voiced to foreign educational 
advisers who were incapable of devising solutions to Ethiopian problems 
and seemed to have created a system designed to destroy Ethiopian 
culture. (Balsvik 1985:240) 
 
The ‘mini-skirt riot’ of March 1968, where (male) students disrupted a campus 
fashion show they claimed exemplified ‘cultural alienation, moral degradation, [and] 
western imperialism’ (Kiflu Tadesse 1993:46), exemplifies these tensions. 
Frustration was regularly directed at the Ethiopian Orthodox church, whether from a 
Marxist rejection of religion, or from those who had joined the Haimanote Abew 
(‘faith of our fathers’) Student Association to denounce neo-colonialist influences, 
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and the failure of the official church to engage with populations in the south. On the 
one hand ‘the fact that many activists felt Ethiopian identity was somehow connected 
to the tradition of the Orthodox Church means that this view had not yet become 
controversial’. Meanwhile, however ‘the clandestine circulation of Oromo proverbs 
and songs shows that there were definite signs of a search for identity on the part of 
Ethiopia’s subject peoples’ (Balsvik 1985:242). 
 
A factor of far-reaching significance was the programme of Ethiopian University 
Service, under which, from 1963 onwards, students spent a compulsory year 
‘work[ing] in the field for the purpose of establishing contact and rendering service 
to essentially rural communities for the purpose of aiding national welfare and 
improving student understanding of local community needs problems and 
developments’ (Balsvik 1985:141, citing EUS handbook). Initial student reluctance 
shifted to enthusiasm after the first year, with student recognition of the need for 
teachers in rural areas, and the establishment through the 1960s of ‘links of solidarity 
and communication’ between the EUS student teachers and their secondary school 
student pupils.  
 
EUS was envisaged by the university establishment as a mechanism for diffusing 
ethnic sentiment, and a deliberate policy of sending students to areas other than their 
home regions was adopted, in an attempt to foster pan-Ethiopianist loyalties in the 
face of emergent regional nationalisms (interview, former University Dean of 
External Affairs, Mekelle, October 1998). In the event two much more significant 
results of the programme were expanded student knowledge of situations in different 
parts of the Ethiopian empire, and the establishment of an effective network of links 
with the high school student body throughout the country. The radicalising impact on 
both groups rapidly became apparent, and from 1969 the service component of EUS 
was reduced and students ‘given increased workloads to discourage outside 
activities’ (Balsvik 1985:145). The widespread disruption of schools in 1969 




In giving members of the student movement firsthand experience of life in different 
parts of the empire, the EUS programme was seminal. Most students’ knowledge of 
the problems confronting Ethiopia’s peasants remained sketchy, however, and many 
have concluded that the movement’s ‘appraisal of the internal Ethiopian situation left 
something to be desired’. Rather, it was ‘swept off the ground […] by European 
ideologies and organizational models’ (Andargachew Tiruneh 1993:29-30), in ‘an 
uncritical, hasty, and impetuous emulation of [ideological] currents then in vogue’ 
(Gebru Mersha 1987:31). 
 
Ideological influences on the emergence of the national question  
 
Marxism was presumed to be an unchallengeable truth […] it generated a 
mass hysterical loyalty. Many did not read it […] they were obsessed by 
it. (Dawit Wolde Giorgis 1989:10-11) 
 
Marxist thought exercised a strong influence on the students, and the large Marxist-
Leninist corpus on the National Question formed an essential component of their 
ideological ‘curriculum’. Two different strands, or ‘applications’, of the National 
Question in the Marxist Leninist tradition are often identified (Blaut 1985, Davis 
1969)119. Stalin’s 1913 treatise on ‘Marxism and the National Question’ provided an 
approach designed to resolve the national question within a multi-ethnic empire such 
as the Soviet Union. Lenin’s writings, meanwhile, provided a broader theoretical 
approach to the questions of self-determination and nationalities in an era of 
imperialism, which found particular resonance in anti-colonial situations. Both 
strands were studied, argued over, and often conflated by the various factions of the 
Ethiopian student movement, and many of the divisions which emerged reflected 
divisions in the perspectives on the nature of the process by which the Ethiopian 
empire state had been established. Central to Marxist-Leninist approaches were the 
commitment to the right of secession for appropriate units in the context of socialist 
emancipation.  
 
The union of states must take place voluntarily, ‘on a truly democratic, 
truly internationalist basis, which is unthinkable without the freedom of 
                                                 
119 Walker Connor’s 1994 account does not distinguish between them, being sympathetic to neither. 
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separation.’ [Zinoviev & Lenin 1930[1915]:373] ‘A socialist of a great 
nation or a nation possessing colonies who does not defend this right is a 
chauvinist’ [Lenin 1930[1915]:235]. (Davis 1967:195) 
 
The question for Ethiopian radicals, then, was whether or not the empire state 
incorporated colonies or fully-fledged nations, and, if so, whether those advocating 
their secession were ‘socialist’ forces deserving of support. Eritrean, Ogadeni, and 
(increasingly) Oromo nationalists favoured the categorisation of their secessionist 
claims as ‘Colonial Questions’, deserving, in Lenin’s terms, rights of self-
determination. Those with a stronger commitment to the authenticity of empire were 
drawn to the Stalinist preference, whilst accepting self-determination, for regional 
autonomy over ‘national cultural autonomy’120:  
 
Stalin found that national-cultural autonomy was undesirable for several 
reasons. First, national-cultural groups are inter-class groups, in which 
proletariat and bourgeoisie are supposed to find more in common with 
each other than with the people of their respective social classes in the 
rest of the population. Nationality, he declares, is a bourgeois principle. 
(Davis 1967:163) 
 
I do not go into the niceties and sophistry of the ideological debates which took place 
in Ethiopia, other than to comment that they did not reduce the ambiguity and range 
of possible interpretations as to the ‘correct’ application of Marxist-Leninist principle 
to particular cases, and particular nationalist movements in practice. They lent ample 
resources to all of the parties to pre-existing divisions amongst activists, and 
spawned new factions. Since a series of separatist ‘national questions’ was being 
fought out in various parts of the empire state, debate focused on whether or not 
these should be supported, and under what circumstances. For all its fire and vigour, 
Walleligne’s seminal paper, for instance, stopped far short of clarity on the 
immediate practical problem of whether or not the Eritrean Liberation Front should 




                                                 
120 Lenin also described Bauer’s national-cultural autonomy as ‘an opportunistic dream picture of 
people who have lost the hope of building consistent democratic institutions’ (from ‘Theses on the 
National Question’ (1913), quoted by Davis (1967:164)). 
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[The student movement] had two distinct components: the external and 
the internal. (Bahru Zewde 1991:222) 
 
Diaspora students were able to operate with greater freedom and better organisation 
outside the constraints imposed by the Imperial regime. More controversial topics 
like the National Question were first discussed outside Ethiopia. Ideological 
influences from the Soviet Union and China reached Ethiopians at North American 
and Western European universities, members of the Ethiopian Students’ Union in 
North America (ESUNA) and the Ethiopian Students’ Union in Europe (ESUE). 
‘Distance, and better access to revolutionary literature, uncensored’, and less 
preoccupation with ‘day-to-day realities’ (ibid.:225) meant that the diaspora groups 
developed more coherent and sophisticated theoretical analyses than those at home; 
and indulged the luxury of acrimonious infighting over them.  
 
Major divisions over the national question took place in the international arena. Two 
months before the publication of Walleligne’s paper, the ESUNA congress in 
September 1969 had debated a series of four presentations on ‘regionalism’ in 
Ethiopia, by leaders who represented a generation of activists slightly older than the 
radicals in Addis Ababa121. As a result of this debate the congress adopted a series of 
resolutions, which  
 
condemn[ed] regionalism as an inseparable part of our opposition to 
feudalism and imperialism [and] oppose[d] all separatist movements 
since their objective is contrary to the Ethiopian people’s emancipation 
from feudalism and imperialism. (ESUNA (1970) Challenge, 10 (1) 58) 
 
Any chance that the differences between those advocating the principled right to 
secession and the ESUNA position could be mediated and reconciled by discussion, 
was abruptly terminated with the publication of a paper by ‘Tilahun Takele’122.  
 
                                                 
121 The papers, by Andreas Esheté, Hagos Gebre Yesus, Alem Habtu, and Melesse Ayalew, were 
published in Challenge 10 (1), February 1970. 
122 The pseudonym was chosen to symbolise ‘two generations of opposition to the Hayla-Sellase 
regime’: the Black Lion Takele Welde-Hawaryat, who opposed the emperor from the moment he went 
into exile in 1936, and the student leader Tilahun Gizaw, who had been murdered in 1969 (see Bahru 
Zewde 1994). The paper is assumed to have been written by the radical student group which set up in 
Algiers after their 1969 hijacking of an Ethiopian Airlines plane, under the leadership of Berhane 
Meskal Redda, who went on to lead the influential EPRP. 
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Venom […] is the hallmark of the style injected into leftist politics by 
Tilahun. His intention was not to enlighten the ESUNA leaders; he was 
out to destroy them, to deny them any quarter in the ranks of the student 
movement. (Bahru Zewde 1994:490) 
 
The paper’s combination of abusive personal vitriol, and exclusive emphasis on the 
‘one true’ understanding of the national question, set the tone for future intransigence 
and bloodshed between the heritors of the various factions of student politics. It 
advocated the recognition of the right of self-determination, including secession, of 
nations and nationalities within Ethiopia, concluding (with Lenin) 
 
if we demand freedom of secession for […] all oppressed and unequal 
nations without exception we do so not because we favor secession, but 
only because we stand for free voluntary association and merging as 
distinct from forcible association. (Tilahun Takele (1970:53), quoting 
Lenin ‘A caricature of Marxism and Imperial Economism’ Collected 
Works XXIII, p.67) 
 
Tilahun Takele split the students, opened the door to support for the Eritrean 
nationalist movements, and ‘chart[ed] an ideological trajectory whose full 
impact is being felt only today (Bahru Zewde 1994:483-4). 
 
Eritrea: a precedent for nationalist struggle 
 
Struggle in Eritrea has given prominence to the manifold nationality 
problem in [Ethiopia] […] eventually, after a long and agonising 
consideration, the radicals came to accept the Eritrean movement on its 
own merits and, consequently, they explicitly upheld the unconditional 
right of self-determination for all nationalities in Ethiopia. (Markakis & 
Nega Ayele 1986:65-7) 
 
Balsvik identifies the influence of the Eritrean liberation movements as the most 
important factor in raising concern with the national question amongst Ethiopian 
students: ‘the mere existence of the conflict in Eritrea forced the[m] to take up the 
topic’ (1985:278). 
 
The relationship between the Ethiopian student movement and the Eritrean 
nationalist movement, particularly in its second incarnation following the 
establishment of the EPLF in 1971, was a recursive one. It is clear that from the 
annexation of Eritrea and annulment of the federal arrangement in 1959, there were 
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close links between the student bodies in Addis Ababa and the diaspora, and 
radicalisation in Eritrea. Thus for instance, the ‘underground conglomerate of radical 
nationalism’, the cultural Mahber Teatre Asmara (MTA) was established in 1961 by 
 
singers, composers, poets and university students returning from the 
Haile Selassie I University in Addis Ababa. MTA served as a recruitment 
centre and fund-raiser. It also provided an outlet for the frustrated 
population.123 (Ruth Iyob 1995:102) 
 
The rise of nationalist sentiment and expression in Eritrea coincided closely with the 
period of radicalisation of the Ethiopian Student Movement. A high point of this 
radicalisation - the massive Addis Ababa student demonstrations in 1965 for ‘land to 
the tiller’ - coincided with a three day strike of secondary school students in Asmara 
demanding a referendum on the future of Eritrea and the return of its jurisdiction 
over social and economic institutions (ibid.:105-6). 
 
Many of those who split from the ELF to form the EPLF in 1971, had been members 
of the student movement in Ethiopia, acquiring much of the radical perspective they 
brought to the younger organisation124. The Eritrean question was an integral part 
and key catalyst of the discussion of the national question, but the emergence of the 
issue was not merely the result of manipulation by Eritrean nationalists. The fact that 
many EPLF nationalists emerged from the Addis Ababa student movement 
demonstrates that the inter-relationship between the two groups was complex.  
 
Nevertheless, the International Union of Students’ resolution of support for the ELF 
in Cairo in 1966 was something which Ethiopian students had to respond to. Most 
were strongly opposed to it, precipitating a resolution at the NUEUS Sixth Congress 
the following year affirming that Eritrea was an indivisible part of Ethiopia (Balsvik 
                                                 
123 Interestingly this form of cultural troupe later emerged as a potent instrument in the hands of 
ethno-nationalists groups in Ethiopia.  
124 Isaias Afewerki, for instance, had left AAU to fight with the nationalists in 1966; other leaders who 
abandoned their studies in Addis Ababa were Haile Mariam Wolde Tensaie, and Muse Tesfa Mikael. 
Amanuel Gebre Yesus attempted in 1969/70 to convince the other members of the Algiers group to 
fight in Eritrea, and his eventual departure to do so forced the others to engage with the issue.  
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1985:282). From then on, Ethiopian student opposition to Eritrean secessionism 
echoed in student politics125. As Balsvik summarises 
 
Strong concern for Ethiopian unity was expressed […] The official stand 
of NUEUS and USUAA seems to have been outright condemnation of 
the ELF up to 1968-69, whilst most Eritrean students favored it, but 
conditional support grew. (ibid.:283) 
 
The fact of an armed struggle in Eritrea had two results. Firstly, it forced the student 
movement to confront the practical implications of principled support for self-
determination, and to consider concrete resolutions for or against support to the 
Eritrean nationalist leadership. The support shifted when nature of leadership shifted, 
from the more conservative Muslim-dominated ELF, to the more radical, better-
educated EPLF. It was, for instance, when the newly formed EPLF sent messages of 
solidarity to the student movement that it split over whether or not to provide 
support. Secondly, active Eritrean nationalism set a precedent for armed struggle 
against the imperial regime, which, when factions of students themselves considered 
the future of their struggle, provided exemplar of the organisation of a liberation 
movement, cradle for practical education of all kinds, including military training, and 
useful conduit to contact and support in the internationalist movement.  
                                                 
125 As for instance, in Tilahun Gizaw’s defeat in the student union presidential elections of 1969, 
mentioned above. ‘Tilahun Gizaw and his supporters […] were accused of being agents for this or that 
secessionist organisation. According to Struggle and Tilahun Gizaw, “tribalism, ethnocentrism and 




Chapter V. The protagonists of ethnic mobilisation 
 
This chapter investigates selected developments relating to the status of Ethiopia’s 
ethnic groups over the 17 years of the Military Marxist Dergue regime, which ousted 
the aging Emperor in September 1974, in the so-called ‘creeping coup’. It 
documents, in particular, the emergence of the protagonists of ethnic mobilisation, 
and architects of ethnic federalism in 1991. It is arranged in three sections. The first 
briefly provides a contextual review of Dergue policymaking in relation to the 
nationalities issue, and the ongoing dynamics of state centralisation. The second 
looks at the origins, emergence, and ideology of the Tigray People’s Liberation 
Front, TPLF, and the process of its reincarnation as the elder member of the EPRDF. 
The third section of the chapter traces the origins of nationalist sentiment amongst 
the Oromo and the origins and development of the Oromo Liberation Front, OLF. By 
1991 the TPLF/EPRDF and the OLF had emerged as the twin political and military 
forces poised to take over the state. In tracing their emergence and development, this 
chapter explores the processes by which ethnicity became one of the principle axes 
of political conflict in Ethiopia.  
 




The Provisional Military Administrative Committee (PMAC) and the Dergue 
constituted a group of 120 relatively young soldiers, ranging in rank from private to 
major126. ‘Innocent of ideology and bereft of political programme’ (Markakis 
2000:15) they looked to the noisy urban influence of the students and intelligentsia, 
and rapidly adopted much of their radical Marxist rhetoric and revolutionary 
terminology. In response, the various political organisations, which had split as they 
emerged from the student movement, became further divided over whether or not to 
co-operate with the Dergue, with Me’isone (the All Ethiopia Socialist Movement) 
                                                 
126 See Clapham (1988), Gilkes (1982); Andargachew Tiruneh (1993), Halliday & Molyneux (1981). 
Keller (1991[1988]), and Ottaway M & D (1978) also cover the period in detail. Also of interest are 
Assefa Endeshaw (1994), Alem Abbay (1991), Giday Degefu Koraro (1987), Thompson (1975). 
 
 147 
agreeing that it would, and the larger Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) 
opting to continue the struggle. The divisions seem to have been exacerbated by 
ethnic categorisations: ‘[I]n the popular perception, MEISON also came to be 
identified as a predominantly Oromo organisation, and EPRP as predominantly 
Amhara – perceptions that became self-fulfilling’. (Africa Watch 1991:102) 
 
The most significant and rapid consequence of the new Marxist colouring of the 
military’s approach was its almost immediate move to nationalise the economy, 
including rural and urban land, a move already proclaimed and pretty much 
implemented by the end of 1975127. Nationalisation of land ‘destroyed the economic 
foundation of the imperial system and ruled out a return to the status quo ante’. 
Cultivators were given usufruct rights over plots divided roughly equally between 
them.  
 
Those who benefited most were the people in yeqign ager [conquered 
land, the south] who were freed from the exactions and services due to 
alien landlords. Most of the latter […] congregated in the towns, or 
returned to the region of their origin. (Markakis 2000:16) 
 
Accompanying and facilitating the implementation of land reform was the Dergue’s 
dramatic innovation in local government, the introduction of the kebele (literally 
‘neighbourhood’) system128. As a result of this system, Ethiopians were organised 
into urban dwellers’ or peasants’ associations ‘each covering a defined territory and 
responsible for all the people in it’, under its own administrative council and officers 
(Clapham 1988:131). Kebeles129 came to assume powers over almost all aspects of 
Ethiopian life during the period of the Dergue, and constituted the tool by which the 
state was able to reach deep into every community. They still do. In rural areas, the 
early powers of peasants’ associations included the distribution of land under the 
reform programme, and the establishment of judicial, trading, and administrative 
systems. These were extended by proclamation at the end of 1975 to include the 
                                                 
127 There is a large literature on the Dergue’s land reform. See, for instance, Dessalegn Rahmato 
(1984), Cohen & Koehn (1980), Ghose (1985), Clapham (1988:ch.7). 
128 Clapham traces its origins in the candidates’ use of recognised iddirs, during the imperial period, to 
organise electoral support (1988:131).  
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establishment of ‘peasant defence squads and agricultural producers’ co-operatives’ 
(ibid.:157). 
 
In urban areas, kebeles were responsible for rent collection, judicial tribunals, and a 
range of social services ‘under government supervision’.  Their powers were also 
soon extended to encompass  
 
registration of houses, residents, births, deaths and marriages, and the 
collection of local taxes, whilst the public safety committee was 
empowered to ‘carry on guarding and security activities in accordance 
with directives issues by the Ministry of Interior’ [Proclamation 9 
October 1976]. (ibid.:132) 
 
The widespread implication of the urban kebeles in the bloodshed of the Red 
Terror130 earned them a feared notoriety, the scars of which are still perceptible in 
local government relations. By the end of the 1970s, and now with Soviet advice131, 
the Dergue had established an elaborate hierarchy of government premised on 
‘democratic centralism’. The government’s extreme intolerance of opposition was 
vigorously defended in terms of the need to ‘safeguard the achievements of the 
revolution’. The kebele system formed the outermost level of this centralised 
hierarchy, by means of which these ‘safeguards’ were bloodily implemented. 
 
The overwhelming commitment to centralisation did not change with the 
introduction of the constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(PDRE) in 1987, which institutionalised the single party system of the Workers’ 
Party of Ethiopia (WPE). The Dergue essentially retained the pre-existing regional 
                                                                                                                                          
129 Although the term was associated only with urban areas during the Dergue period, it applies to 
both rural and urban units, and since 1991 has come to be applied again to both. 
130 Africa Watch estimates that ‘well in excess of 10,000’ were killed during the Red Terror 
(1991:101). ‘The worst atrocities of the period’ started in February 1977 when Mengistu ‘labelled the 
EPRP [assassination] campaign the ‘white terror’, and Atnafu Abate promised ‘for every 
revolutionary killed, a thousand counter-revolutionaries executed’ [Lefort 1983:199]. The promised 
ratio was not to be much of an exaggeration’ (Africa Watch 1991:102). By mid-1977 the EPRP had 
been effectively wiped out in the towns, and the Dergue turned on its erstwhile ally Me’isone, with 
further rounds of slaughter in October and December 1977, and through much of 1978. See Kiflu 
Tadesse (1998), Babile Tola (1989). 
131 The dramatic reversal of superpower alignment in the Horn followed Mohammed Siyad Barre’s 
miscalculated attempt to reincorporate the Ogaden by force, sensing Ethiopian weakness in 1977. 
Moscow unceremoniously relocated its military advisers from Mogadishu to Addis Ababa. 
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administration system based on the awraja and wereda, simply renaming imperial 
teklai gezat as kifle hager, subdividing a number of units, shifting a number of 
boundaries132, and declaring a range of nominally ‘autonomous areas’ (compare 
Maps 6 and 7). Whilst regional first secretaries of the party had some degree of 
autonomy, over, for instance, resettlement, the goal of the regime remained the 
‘centrally commanded and organised state – which it ha[d] inherited and sought to 
extend’ (Clapham 1988:128).  
 
Attitudes to nationalities  
 
The incoming military regime was quick to denounce the Abyssinian chauvinism of 
its predecessors, and proclaim the equality of all nationalities and cultures in 
Ethiopia. The presence of Oromo Teferi Banti as second-in-command of the Dergue 
up to his death in 1977, and of significant numbers of Oromo in the ranks of the 
allied Me’isone and heading the land reform (so popular in Oromo areas), meant that 
‘the regime was often regarded as an Oromo one’ in its early years (Clapham 
1988:215)133. The Dergue promised the abolition of traditional customs which 
‘hamper the unity and progress of Ethiopia’, and removed the official status (and 
much of the property) of the Orthodox Church whilst recognising Islam. It tolerated 
an upsurge in the printing, broadcasting and teaching of languages other than 
Amharic134, and an enthusiasm for cultural diversity. At the political level, however, 
there was little room for manoeuvre.  
 
[In] the soldiers’ perception ‘national contradictions’ [were] limited to 
the realm of culture. The overthrow of the feudal regime, [they] claimed, 
had ended national and class oppression, and guaranteed the equality of 
all peoples and cultures in Ethiopia. Consequently national contradictions 
no longer existed, only the legacy of cultural oppression remained. 
(Markakis 2000:16) 
 
                                                 
132 The areas constituting Simien Omo, for instance, were brought under one region at this time.  See 
chapter VII. 
133 Amongst those commentators to have taken this view are, for instance, the Ottaways (1978:84). 
134 The multi-language literacy campaign, which began in 1979, is discussed below.  
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The commitment of the new regime to the ‘indivisibility of Ethiopian unity’135 was 
never in question. The clearest demonstration that this was the case came with its 
abrupt confrontation of the nationalist campaign in Eritrea. When the ELF and EPLF 
rejected the attempts of the Dergue’s Eritrean Prime Minister, General Aman 
Andom, to persuade them to give up their goal of independence and join the socialist 
revolution, the parties went swiftly back to war136.  
 
Given its socialist credentials, and the long-running ideological debates within the 
Ethiopian Left over the issue of self-determination of nationalities, the Dergue had, 
nevertheless, to be seen to recognise these rights, and respect for them was enshrined 
in its 1976 Programme for the National Democratic Revolution.   
 
The problem of nationalities can be resolved if each nationality is 
accorded the right to self-government. This means that each nationality 
will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal 
affairs. A nationality within its environs has the right to determine the 
contents of its political, economic and social life, to use its own language 
and elect its own leaders and administrators to lead its internal organs. 
(PNDR, 1976: part 2) 
 
Dergue pronouncements were careful to refer only to nationalities, never to nations, 
which, in Marxist terms, might be expected to enjoy potential rights of secession and 
independence: these options were never in view. Even nominal self-government 
failed to emerge during the first decade of the regime. Dergue policy-making and 
propaganda made much of the cultural emancipation of nationalities, determinedly 
ignoring calls for corresponding political autonomy. Whilst in substance there was 
remarkably little change, the form of Dergue policy on nationalities, and the 
mythologies underpinning it, did mark a shift from that of Haile Selassie. An 
instance illustrative of the difference is the Dergue’s appointment of chief 
administrators who originated from the regions in question, in an attempt to assuage 
regional disaffection137. These appointees found themselves simply ‘caught between 
                                                 
135 PMAC, ‘Ten Point Programme’ of late 1974. 
136 General Aman was killed on 22 November 1974, ending all possibility of conciliation in Eritrea. 
137 In contrast with imperial shuffling of regional elites (in all areas except Tigray), in a relatively 
successful attempt to break the regional ties of loyalty which underpinned traditional fiefdoms. 
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the centralisation of the regime, and the intensification of local opposition’ (Clapham 
1988:202).  
 
As the centralising policy came under increasing strain in the late 1980s, and as part 
of the reforms that ushered in the PDRE and new constitution, the Dergue announced 
the establishment of a number of ‘autonomous regions’ in the more recalcitrant parts 
of the country (see Map 7). The arrangement was premised on the work of the 
Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities (ISEN), which had been established 
on Soviet advice in 1983, to investigate the potential for a political structure along 
the lines of the Soviet model. In order to obtain the demographic data required, the 
regime carried out a population census in 1984, which incorporated enquiries about 
mother tongue and religious affiliation.  
 
There were two notable shortcomings in the data. Firstly, it was incomplete, since it 
did not cover ‘insecure areas’ in Tigray, Eritrea, and the Ogaden. Secondly, census-
takers and researchers encountered confusion about the ethnonyms by which various 
groups identified and classified themselves: some used names different from those 
used by outsiders or the government; others used clan or religious descriptions 
instead of ethnonyms. (Interview, ISEN member, Addis Ababa, November 1999). 
Many of these problems (and some of the categories identified at that time) continue 
to cause difficulties (see Chapter VII). Nevertheless, the census provided the major 
source of information for ISEN’s researchers who, taking language as the criterion of 
identity, produced a list of 89 ethnic groups in the country (ISEN undated). ISEN 
members supplemented the census data with a number of visits to study different 
parts of the country at first hand, and considered the available ethnographic and 
socio-linguistic data138.  
 
ISEN’s staff of around 20 people139 worked under the close supervision of the 
political section of the regime, the Commission for Organising the Party of the 
                                                 
138 They also made a number of study tours to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The relationship 
between Soviet ethnos theorists working under Bromley at the Institute of Ethnography of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences, and the work of ISEN would bear closer investigation. 
139 They were civil servants and academics seconded from Addis Ababa University. 
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Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE), as a kind of ‘secretariat’ to the official 
Constitutional Commission (interviews former ISEN members, February 1998, 
November 1998). Although much effort was invested in the elaboration of possible 
constitutional arrangements based on Ethiopia’s ethnic groups, ISEN’s researchers 
were under no illusions that ethnicity or the language criterion would guide the final 
arrangement.  
 
The Institute was expected to help ‘resolve minor contradictions among 
nationalities’, on the principle that ‘chauvinism and narrow nationalism 
must be eliminated’ [ISEN 1984a:9], and as these phrases suggest, the 
latitude open to it was slight. (Clapham 1988:200)  
 
On the contrary, it was Mengistu Haile Mariam’s declared view that ‘what is to be 
done, should be done from the viewpoint of unity’ (ISEN 1984b). Fortunately, the 
results of research demonstrated that only 30 of Ethiopia’s 580 weredas could be 
considered monolingual (interview, ISEN member, Addis Ababa, 9 November 
1999), and language-cum-ethnicity was happily abandoned in favour of more 
acceptable criteria associated with economic development. 
 
In the constitutional blueprint that finally emerged140, none of the larger ethnic 
groups was placed within the borders of a single administrative unit. Although the 
new constitution included provisions guaranteeing rights to cultural and linguistic 
expression (and indeed separate territory), the government was simultaneously 
engaged in resettling and villagising rural populations, processes of  
 
ethnic integration […] which will actively undermine the local enactment 
of rights and principles set out in the Constitution. This is perhaps the 
inevitable contradiction besetting the ‘ethnic policy’, based on the 
tension between declaration of rights and actual economic and policy 
measures. (Abbink 1991:12-13)  
 
Meanwhile, nominal ‘autonomy’, was offered to a number of territories populated by 
those with ‘a distinctive way of life and language’, but also on the basis of a 
modicum of ‘economic unity’. Most of the proposed ‘autonomous areas’ were also 
those where conflict was most intense, and where there was little or no risk of 
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anything being implemented. The proposals, which provided ‘only the most formal 
and symbolic expression of local self-government’ (Clapham 1988:204) were too 
little and too late. They fell far short of stemming what was now considerable 
centrifugal momentum, and, particularly in Eritrea, were greeted with scorn by the 
opposition movements. Of these movements, the TPLF, with its calls for full 
autonomy of nationalities within a democratised Ethiopia, was emerging by this time 
as amongst the most powerful. The following section explores this trajectory. 
 
The politicisation of ethnicity in the north, and the emergence 
of the EPRDF 
 
This section considers the operation of ethnicity as both resource and product of the 
emergence of nationalist sentiment in Tigray in the period to 1991. It is organised in 
six sub-sections. The first briefly recapitulates some of the factors associated with the 
origins of Tigrayan disaffection, a number of which have already been referred to in 
Chapter IV. Secondly, I discuss the so-called weyane rebellion of 1943, later 
‘reinvoked’ to serve as both precedent and call to arms for the TPLF’s nationalist 
struggle in the late 1970s. Thirdly, the section catalogues a number of the events 
which triggered explicit nationalist organisation in the early 1970s. Fourthly the 
discussion briefly considers the construction of the nationalist project under the 
TPLF, and the processes by which the organisation undertook the mobilisation and 
manufacture of ethnic nationalism, with the resources already explored. A fifth 
section details the process by which the TPLF sought to act on a wider stage with the 
establishment of the ‘democratic front’ in 1989. Finally the discussion reviews some 
of the ideological tools the movement brought to its capture of the state, and 
formation of the TGE, in 1991.  
 
Although the account sketches something of the development of the TPLF, and its 
relation with its constituents, it does not purport to offer anything approaching a 
history of what is known to outsiders about the organisation, not least because this 
                                                                                                                                          
140 Nine drafts of the constitutional text are held in the ISEN archive. For details of archive holdings 
see ISEN (1983[1975EC]) (1987[1979EC]), and NEB (1996[1989EC]). 
 
 154 
has already been admirably assembled by John Young (1996)141. The account 
focuses on processes of social construction of a common understanding, not least of 
the nature of the national group itself; of collective responses to, and selection from, 
socio-economic and historical circumstances. As suggested in the introduction and in 
Chapter II, I consider a focus on social construction to be a means of gaining an 
improved sociological understanding of what is in play; I specifically reject the view 
that it serves to undermine the validity of nationalist projects by demonstrating them 
to be ‘constructed’ rather than ‘real’. Before considering the projects of the TPLF 
and the OLF, both of which have been repeatedly subject to precisely this kind of 
‘attack’, it is perhaps appropriate to reiterate the view that it is precisely their 
collective construction which renders both of these projects real, effective – and of 
considerable sociological and political interest.  
 
Tigray’s ‘perennial disaffection’142: origins and resource-base of ethno-
nationalist sentiment 
 
Nostalgia nourishes self-esteem, and compensates for what is no longer 
enjoyed. It suffused the collective memory in Tigray and was easily 
domesticated by the TPLF. […] Treated as history-less by the absolutist 
Amhara state, Tigrayans reacted by summoning the past. (Alemseged 
Abbay 1997:332) 
 
TPLF interlocutors interviewed in the course of this study were adamant that anti-
Amhara feeling in Tigray was widespread during the reign of Haile Selassie I, and 
that this was not restricted to the ruling or educated elite. Many singled out two 
historical factors. 
 
Firstly, Tigray, like other parts of the empire-state, was made part of the 
new Ethiopia by force, and this took place against the background of 
                                                 
141 Published as Young (1997a). A fuller account awaits a Tigrigna-speaking historian with greater 
access to documentation and participant interlocutors than has been available to date. Accounts in 
English with useful material on the TPLF and Tigray under the TPLF in the period up to 1991, many 
written by ‘participant observers’, include the following: Abreha Hailemikhael (1995), Adhana Haile 
Adhana (2000), Bennett (1982), Clapham (1989), Duffield (1995), Duffield & Prendergast (1994), 
Firebrace (1983), Gebre-ab Barnabas (1998), Gidey Zera-Tsion (1991), Hammond (1989) (1999a) 
(1999b), Hendrie (1989) (1991), Kahsay Berhe (1991), Kane (1992), Keleman (1985), Medhane 
Tadesse (1994), Peberdy (1985), Smith (1982) (1983), Solomon Inquai (1985), Taddese Abay Mehari 
(1994), John Young (1998) (2000). 
142 Markakis (1987:63) 
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rivalry between different parts of Abyssinia. The second historical factor 
was the hatred and suspicion which had arisen between Tigrayans and 
Amharas, due to the repeated battles between different centres of power.  
 
Of particular interest in this account is its focus not only on the events of history, but 
also on the fact and manner of their repetition and inculcation so as to form a 
knowledge base shared throughout the collective: to constitute a social institution.  
 
This history had been repeated and inculcated by the ruling class, so that 
it spread hatred and suspicion even amongst the common people, feelings 
were not just restricted to the ruling class. However, these views were 
particularly strongly disseminated amongst the youth, students and 
intellectual classes. [They] cannot be dismissed as a minority issue in 
Tigray: they were widespread. (interview, TPLF founder member, 
Mekelle, October 1998) 
 
Quite how far these beliefs in their political interpretation did, and do, extend 
throughout Tigrayan society is controversial. There is plenty of evidence, however, 
of a range of ideas which, at least from the mid-twentieth century, seem to have 
contributed to a well-established Tigrayan sense of self, and of the Amhara ‘other’. 
 
Crucial to this sense of self seem to have been three interrelated notions of the purity, 
originality, and continuity of Tigrayan culture, particularly in its strong association 
with Orthodox Christianity. Thus, for instance, Markakis observed provocatively at 
the end of the imperial period: 
 
[o]ccupying the area which comprised the core of the Aksumite empire 
and speaking a language that is considered to be a close derivative of 
Geez (the language of the Aksumites), Tigre provincialism thrives on the 
conviction that it represents purity and continuity in Ethiopian culture, in 
contrast to the admixture that has diluted this tradition in the region south 
of the Takkaze; the Tigre are apt to refer to the Amhara contemptuously 
as half-Galla. (Markakis 1974:48) 
 
In the consciously less controversial terms of the 1990s, the Tigrayan historian 
Adhana observes that: 
 
Tigray formed not only a durable component of the Ethiopian nation but 
was also part of the backbone of the Ethiopian state. […] Christian 
Aksum must be said to have comprehensively defined and anchored the 
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Ethiopian state since it came into formal existence. (Adhana Haile 
Adhana 1998:43) 
 
John Young also reports Tigrayan and TPLF focus on the centrality of the church in 
the continuity of the Ethiopian state, reiterating Greenfield’s argument (1969[1965]) 
that it was the Christian Church and its doctrine and institutional apparatus that were 
the key links between ancient Axum and the modern state of Ethiopia, rather than the 
imperial throne; and that the church constituted the crucial institutional link 
supporting Ethiopian interconnection between the frequently warring provinces. This 
applied even within the Tigrigna-speaking bloc. During the Era of Princes (Zemana 
Mesafent) ‘Tigray became ‘virtually independent’, its rulers ‘wielding power 
comparable to that exercised by the emperors of former time’’ (John Young 
(1996:32) quoting Hess (1970:50)). Tigrayan Emperor Mikael Suhul however ‘failed 
to establish a Tigray dynasty’ (Adhana Haile Adhana 1998:44) and his successors 
Welde Selassie (Enderta) and Subagadis (Agame) were less and less able to wield 
authority over the Tigrigna-speaking region as he had.  
 
Continuity, once again, was provided by the Church: and the site of continuity of the 
Ethiopian Church, scene in the fourth century of Ezana’s conversion and Frumentius’ 
ministry, was Axum in the heart of Tigray (Tadesse Tamrat 1972:21ff)143. The 
emergence of competition between Tigray and Amhara was mirrored, and no doubt 
exacerbated, by competition within the church between the two important centres at 
Axum, and the monastry at Debre Libanos in Shoa, established by Tekle Haimanot in 
the thirteenth century, which sprang back into prominence when the area was 
reincorporated with the southward expansion under Menelik II. Christian 
competition was closely bound up with the introduction of the mythology of the 
Solomonic dynasty, which ‘also marked the beginning of a competition for 
dominance between Amhara and Tigrayan elites’ (John Young 1996:31). 
 
[Menelik] was the name which legend gave to the first member of his 
dynasty, the son of Sälomon and Sheba. Hence our king styled himself 
Menilek II. He also emphasized the elements of the legend which […] 
                                                 
143 The circumspect treatment accorded the Tigrayan orthodox church by the Marxist TPLF is 
discussed by John Young (1996) (1998) as prominent amongst the factors behind its success. 
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had strong association with Shäwa […]. Finally, Menilek tried 
metaphorically to move Aksum to Shäwa. He planned a magnificent new 
church, the center of a new capital, at a place he called Addis Alam, ‘new 
world’ [….]. He richly endowed the church, called it [like the church in 
Axum] St Mary of Zion, and gave its head a title, neburä’ed, hitherto the 
monopoly of the head of the Aksum church. (Crummey 2000:221) 
 
These developments came at a time when Tigrayan politics were reasonably 
cohesive, and its elites could be expected to resent and resist them: ‘[Yohannes] 
unified all the local dynastic houses and his reign witnessed an expansion of the 
Tigray political elite. To that extent, it can be said that Yohannes forged Tigray into a 
protonation’ (Adhana Haile Adhana 1998:44-5). However,  
 
this protonation expressed itself in historical-political rather than ethnic 
terms. The focal points were Aksum and Ethiopia rather than the Amhara 
and the Tigray. The linguistic division between these two groups was still 
irrelevant, in contrast to some arcane doctrinal differences between them 
which proved politically contentious. (ibid.:44-5)  
 
This view contrasts with the much quoted observation of Walter Plowden in 1848 
that 
 
Teegray is now almost universally acquainted with the Amharic 
language, and their customs, food and dress have become so assimilated 
to those of the Amharas as not to require separate description, though 
their hatred of that people is undiminished (Plowden (1868:39).  
 
The events which followed Yohannes IV’s death and defeat at Metemma are 
discussed in Chapter IV, above. After the Battle of Adua, the loss of Eritrea, and the 
severe famine of the 1890s, 
 
Tigray found itself politically orphaned, militarily battered, economically 
shattered and psychologically disoriented. […] Tigray manifested its 
political disorientation in various ways: periodic outbursts of fratricidal 
civil war were interspersed with temporary reconciliations […] the 
political behaviour of the Tigray political elite was in constant flux 
(Adhana Haile Adhana 1998:45-6)  
 
It was during this period, between 1889 and 1935 ‘when Tigray was confronted with 
an unfamiliar polity’ that ‘ethnicity appeared on the political scene in Tigray, along 
with dynastic claims and individual political ambitions’ (ibid.:46). This was a period 
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during which there was little change in Tigray, and when the stagnation and under-
development, much resented by later generations of nationalists, took root: 
 
During modern times, socio-political changes were much slower in Tigre 
than in other regions in Ethiopia. Shoa underwent a centralization of 
power under Menelik […] Ethiopia’s southern regions had been annexed 
to the empire […] with inevitable repercussions for their political, social 
and cultural institutions. Tigre, in contrast, was barely affected. (Erlich 
1986:129) 
 
By the time Haile Selassie was well established, only Tigray was ruled by hereditary 
leaders. Tigrayans were more divided than those in other parts of the country, as a 
result of the longer history, better establishment, and greater segmentation of the 
elites in question (Gebru Tareke 1996[1991]:135). This fragmentation provided 
numerous opportunities for collaboration, primarily with the Italians across the 
Mereb, which, Erlich stresses, ‘did not stem from a separatist instinct or a modern 
sense of Tigrean nationalism’. Rather  
 
the ultimate goal of the Tigrean chiefs co-operating with the foreigners 
was to eliminate local rivals in order to be recognized as Tigre’s negus by 
Ethiopia’s emperors. The Shoans for their part, unable to force an 
Ethiopian centralist government on Tigre144, chose to promote local 
jealousies and rivalries, thus helping to preserve the status quo. (Erlich 
1986:131) 
 
A precedent manufactured: the first weyane 
 
The motives for rebellion exemplif[y] the ideological contradiction that 
characterized weyane’s […] ideology of protest, [which] drew upon a 
combination of ideas and symbols: ethnic pride and particularism, 
memories of a ‘golden past’, the symbols of Tigrean royalty and the 
greatness of Yohannes IV, xenophobia, and religious conservatism. 
(Gebru Tareke 1996[1991]:116) 
 
There is no doubt that [the weyane] tapped a deep source of discontent in 
Tigre and among the Raya Oromo. It stemmed from peasant 
dissatisfaction – it was primarily a peasant revolt – coupled with 
overtones of Tigrean desire to be independent of Shoa. (Gilkes 1975:190) 
 
                                                 
144 Hammond cites British Foreign Office evidence that Menelik ‘tried to impose his own governors 
on Tigray, but met massive resistance’ (1989:16). 
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The so-called ‘weyane’ or rebellion, which brought together the ‘divergent interests’ 
of agro-pastoralists of the lowlands, highland cultivators, and a ‘sectarian nobility’ 
against the government in eastern and southern Tigray in 1943 (Gebru Tareke 
1996[1991]:89), has acquired a retrospective status in excess of the events of the 
time. The rebellion developed in three phases, spreading from Raya and Wajirat in 
May, to capture the provincial capital, Mekelle, in September, before defeat and 
collapse in October 1943 (ibid.:106-7). Even at the time, it was the suppression of the 
revolt, rather than the uprising itself, which had a lasting impact, being  
 
a main watershed in Tigre’s history. Following this, the emperor finally 
managed to demilitarise Tigre and thus deprive the leading families of 
the province of their source of independent power. (Erlich 1986:133) 
 
More than thirty five years after the event, however, the revolt itself gained 
prominence when the youthful leaders of the TPLF explicitly reinvented it as the 
popular nationalist precedent, and widely recognisable indigenous advertisement, for 
the movement’s own struggle. At its first congress in 1979 the TPLF’s name in 
Tigrigna was changed from the original tegadelo harnet hezbi Tigrai (‘Tigray 
people’s liberation struggle’, adapted from the ELF’s tegadelo harnet Ertra) to 
hezbawi weyane harnet Tigrai (‘Popular Revolution/Rebellion for the liberation of 
Tigray’): 
 
we wanted to take something from our own history. (Interview, TPLF 
member then researching the organisation’s history, Addis Ababa, 
October 1998) 
 
Gebru Tareke’s comprehensive and detailed account of the original weyane uprising 
of 1943 (1996[1991]) suggests that its re-incarnation as a precedent for revolutionary 
nationalist struggle involved considerable creative thinking. He concludes, firstly, 
that the weyane did not show evidence of a widespread ‘class consciousness’, and 
lacked a coherent set of goals: the ‘diversity of interests compromised ideological 
clarity’, and what resulted was a rebellion rather than a revolution. It was unclear that 
its ‘leaders were committed to the peasant cause [being] primarily interested not in 
destroying or even in reforming the status quo but in finding a comfortable place 




The aggrieved parties united, temporarily, around a sense of 
‘provincialism’. Yet the notion of provincialism cannot be stretched too 
far […] Only Enderta, Kilte Awlaalo, Tembien, and Maichew were fully 
involved. The local chiefs of Agame, Aksum, and Shire remained on the 
fence until the outcome of the conflict was known (ibid.:121)145. 
 
Despite its various historical shortcomings as a prototype for the revolutionary ethno-
nationalist project with which it has come to be associated, nevertheless, in the late 
1970s the original weyane offered precisely the kind of minimal, but broadly 
familiar, framework suited to re-upholstering in TPLF hands. Memories concentrated 
on a number of features useful to later mythologizing. Firstly, even its historian 
agrees that the first weyane did involve a ‘fairly high level of spontaneity and peasant 
initiative’ (ibid.:121); it demonstrated considerable popular participation, and 
reflected widely shared grievances. Secondly the uprising was unequivocally and 
specifically directed against the central Amhara regime of Haile Selassie I, rather 
than the Tigrayan imperial elite. It therefore ‘manipulated traditional symbols of 
identity and ethnic homogeneity’ (ibid.:122). This point seems to have been of 
particular importance. One of those party to its invocation in the early days of the 
TPLF comments as follows. 
 
To be honest, I learned about [the weyane] later in more detail, and it is 
difficult to separate out what I knew then from the study we made about 
it later on. What we understood at the beginning was that it was a popular 
uprising. […] The areas which were actively involved were [not the 
whole of Tigray] and this is perhaps why it is dismissed as not being a 
nationalist issue. However, the movement called for justice, self-
administration, lower taxation and the expulsion of corrupt officials [and] 
blamed the central Amhara government for these problems. […] It was 
national in character because it was specifically aimed at the central 
government and its apparatus in Tigray (interview, TPLF founder 
member, Mekelle, 7 October 1998). 
 
Thirdly, the original weyane was put down with the assistance of British bombers, a 
factor which cemented the popularly perceived alignment of external ‘foreign’ 
                                                 
145 This reveals the significance of the fact that Tigray continued to be ruled by its factional traditional 
elite and points to a key difference with the south of the country: ‘In the south the gentry […] would 
not dare incite the peasantry because they themselves would have become the principal target. In the 




aggressors146. Fourthly the weyane briefly controlled the Tigrayan provincial capital, 
Mekelle, an important precedent as the TPLF sought to emulate it in the 1980s. In a 
fifth parallel, an immediate trigger of the rebellion in 1943, the brutality of imperial 
militia particularly around Quiha, resonated strongly as the Red Terror spread to the 
same area in the late 1970s. Finally, although the weyane had happened within the 
living memory of older members of the community at the time when the TPLF began 
to talk about and draw parallels with it, it had been concentrated in a relatively small 
geographical area, such that many remembered it happening, rather than remembered 
experiencing it. As a result it constituted an appropriately dimensioned, but 
essentially ‘empty’ category, eminently suited to bear whatever conventional 
meaning later interaction and propaganda would invest it with. In the late 1970s, the 
invocation of the weyane of nearly forty years previously 
 
did not contradict the remembered landscape. And herein lies the potency 
of history as political ammunition. (Alemseged Abbay 1997:333) 
 
Triggers for nationalist organisation: well-told tales 
 
During the later period of Haile Selassie I the region faced open 
discrimination in terms of education, allocation of employment 
opportunities, etc., and these measures offended the emerging intellectual 
class. Gradually the sense of discrimination touched every sector of 
society, and was thus becoming a national issue. Once such a 
combination of repression and denial of equal opportunities is 
established, the youth and intellectuals are bound to be unhappy, and 
their feelings of neglect and suspicion will start to grow. Eventually this 
evolved into a coherent movement, and blurred divisions. (Interview, 
TPLF founder member, Mekelle, October 1998) 
 
This section briefly enumerates a series of incidents and events commonly construed 
as both ‘triggers’ and ‘markers’ of emerging nationalist sentiment, in the few years 
before the establishment of the TPLF. It is interesting that the repertoire of events has 
itself become noticeably fixed and formulaic, with very similar accounts emerging 
from a significant number of the interviews carried out in the course of this research, 
                                                 
146 British planes bombed Mekelle on market day, inflicting ‘considerable casualties’ (Gebru Tareke 
1996[1991]:111), a precedent which undoubtedly resonated during the TPLF campaign against the 
Dergue, which saw similar bombings of Tigray’s market centres, and which was remarked upon when 
a British Ambassador visited Mekelle early in the TGE.  
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and to be found in, for instance, Hammond (1998), Alemseged Abbay (1998). The 
uniformity of reference observed is indicative of the subsequent construction and 
reconstruction of the narrative, consistent both with its ‘repetition and inculcation’, 
and with the performative theory of social institutions. This is in itself illustrative of 
the difficulty of establishing the situation before the impact of nationalist telling and 
retelling of histories, a problem of which many interlocutors were conscious.  
 
There are three notable events that are commonly retold, together with a standard set 
of common experiences. Firstly, in 1969 the meteoric career of the Tigrayan football 
team was eclipsed when it was promoted to the premier league, where it was no 
longer victorious. In 1973 it was returned to the second division, but at an October 
tournament the team was disqualified. The ban resulted from a dispute in which team 
members added a ‘y’ to the Amharic name placard they had been issued, altering the 
official ‘Tigre’, commonly considered a veiled slight to national pride, to their 
preferred ‘Tigray’. The anecdote is recounted by many interlocutors, and retold by 
Alemseged Abbay (1998:100-02). A second event, also recounted in detail by 
Alemseged Abbay, is the establishment of the Tigrayan ‘Folk Troupe’, Bahli Tigrai, 
in 1969-70. 
 
Folk poems and music were collected and shown on stages all over 
Tigray […] Many wept. [...] Such cultural revival created fertile ground 
for the upcoming war of liberation. Indeed Bahli Tigrai was designed as 
a vehicle for political ends (ibid.:99-100). 
 
A third powerful anecdote, less widely retold, concerns the organisation of a funeral 
cortège to return to Tigray the body of a Tigrayan teacher, who had died in Harar, 
along with the (Amhara) provincial education officer, apparently after some sort of 
disagreement between the two.  
 
The imperial Ministry of Education arranged for the Amhara’s body to 
come back to be buried with honours, but not the Tigrayan’s, although 
they never established who had killed whom. Suhul organised for [the 
teacher’s] body to be returned to Addis Ababa, and a large convoy of 
Tigrayans assembled in solidarity and brought the body to Mekelle en 
masse. It was a major show of Tigrayan feeling (interview, Tigrayan 




The person of ‘Suhul’, an early member of the TPLF, emerges as a key convenor and 
instigator of nationalist sentiment during this period (cf. Hammond 1998:27-29). 
Although older than those in student circles, as a delegate to the imperial parliament 
from western Tigray, he enjoyed increasing status amongst the radicals, particularly 
as (in another set of common recollections) his exploits began to challenge the more 
conservative nationalist activities of Ras Mengesha Seyoum, and the Tigray 
Development Organisation (interviews, TPLF veterans, Mekelle and Addis Ababa, 
October-November 1998). 
 
A series of radicalising experiences were common to those emerging from high 
school into university over the period, the cohort which went on to form and lead the 
TPLF. The close contact between high school students in all Tigrayan towns, and the 
EUS student teachers who arrived to teach them each year from 1970 was mentioned 
above. By 1973 their collaborative efforts had closed the high schools in Tigray for 
two months; in 1974 they remained shut all year. Meanwhile, Addis Ababa 
University had a Tigrayan student association, dedicated to the study of the problems 
of the people of Tigray, and the need to regenerate its economy, culture, and 
language. Increasingly, the relegation of the Tigrigna language in favour of Amharic 
became a focus of frustration (ibid.:19), with bitterness developing over the common 
student jibe which labelled Tigrigna ye wuf qwanqwa (a language of birds). 
 
The eventual formation of the TPLF in February 1975 was a function of the 
juxtaposition of the aspirations and experiences of educated Tigrayans as high school 
and university students, with their awareness of life in an impoverished, 
underdeveloped, and stagnant Tigray, problems increasingly perceived as the result 
of a deliberate and ethnically-motivated government policy of discrimination against 
the northern region. If these experiences generated a non-specific disgruntlement, 
what marked the boundary of a much more specific ‘us’ and ‘them’ was undoubtedly 
the requirement in Haile Selassie’s modernising centralising empire state to speak 
and write the language of the imperial regime – Amharic. Language had come to 
mark a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to an extent that shaped their decisions as 




There was a discussion about what form of struggle: armed, yes, but 
organised how? If people come from the same nationality, then even 
radicals and non-radicals can talk to each other with confidence, where 
radicals of different nationalities might not. Armed struggle was going to 
be a serious matter. If secrets were to be kept from betrayal, then this 
dynamic would be most important (interview, former academic, Mekelle, 
October 1998). 
 
Mobilising and manufacturing ethnic nationalism and the ethnic nation 
 
Nationality was the primary contradiction in the sense of being in the 
forefront of people’s minds in Tigray, such that they couldn’t get beyond 
it to consider any other basis for mobilisation. It is in people’s minds and 
you have to focus on it because they are not going to be mobilised 
without it being addressed. It occupies them in a fundamental manner; it 
was the primary concern for the majority of the population: it was easily 
felt as a main slogan amongst ordinary people, much more than the class 
issue (interview, TPLF founder member, Mekelle, 8 October 1998). 
 
A wide range of the subjects, motifs, and themes explored above were now woven 
into the fabric of the Tigrayan ‘imagined community’, and a wide range of 
techniques of teaching, and dissemination employed by the TPLF to render this 
imagining a broadly collective one147. This section highlights a few of the most 
important features and vehicles of the ethnic mobilisation, which underpinned the 
successful development and consolidation of the nationalist movement.  
 
The Tigrigna-language poetry and song, and the cadres, cultural troupes, radio 
broadcasts, and cassettes that spread them, were central. The TPLF evolved highly 
sophisticated mobilisation and propaganda mechanisms, based around a core 
network of kifle hezbi or lead cadres (also described as ‘public relations officers’, 
interview, TPLF historian, Addis Ababa, January 1999). These relatively senior 
political cadres were resident over extended periods within particular communities, 
to learn from, mobilise, and teach populations with whom they had lengthy 
interaction and got to know well. In this essentially Maoist approach, the priority 
accorded to continuity of contact with rural populations provided the key means by 
which the Front learned about rural life, and learned when to push for change, and 
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when to compromise (cf. Young 1996). Initiatives couched in the language, proverbs, 
and histories of the people worked better, and long immersion in rural culture 
equipped TPLF propagandists to recognise, use, and even develop this conventional 
knowledge. 
 
“In 1974 I came to realise my national identity through the songs. They 
stirred emotions in me.” (TPLF fighter quoted by Hammond 1998:20). 
 
In addition to its development of a repertoire of songs and poetry, the nationalist 
movement made a significant investment in Tigrigna language and curriculum 
development. Tigrigna had been used as a literary language for the publication of 
newspapers, books, and articles, so this undertaking was one of reclaiming and re-
establishing a heritage widely felt to have been undermined by the imperial and 
Dergue regimes. Since the majority of the population of Tigray was illiterate, these 
initiatives also served the developmental purpose of emancipation from poverty. 
 
The fight against poverty provided another strand of nationalist rhetoric, which 
stressed the responsibility of successive Amhara governments in impoverishing 
Tigray. Towards the end of the Dergue government, its own rhetoric about Tigray 
played helpfully in tune with these arguments, referring to the impoverished province 
contemptuously as a ‘liability’ (Alemseged Abbay 1998:119), having ‘nothing but 
stones’. Nothing deterred, the nationalists celebrated Tigray’s famously stony ground 
commencing massive programmes of stone bunding that transformed the look of 
farming hillsides in an attempt to improve their productivity. In addition to ‘periods 
of hardship [which] tend to be stronger forgers of identity’ (ibid.:333-4), motifs 
which evoked the glories of Tigray’s past were also brought to the fore. Thus a 
competition to design an emblem for the Front, selected one incorporating the 
ancient obelisks at Axum.  
 
As this discussion has outlined, there was no shortage of ‘nation-building’ material at 
the disposal of nationalist propagandists. There were, however, important political 
and ethnic fault lines amongst Tigrayans, which this ‘re-categorisation’ sought to 
                                                                                                                                          
147 see Alemseged Abbay (1998:118ff), Hammond (1998:passim). 
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overcome. The early period of TPLF history was marked by competition with three 
other organisations: the conservative Tigrayan nationalist EDU of Mengesha 
Seyoum, and others of the imperial elite; the Tigray Liberation Front, TLF, a radical 
proponent of ‘greater’ Tigray-Tigrigne nationalism, wiped out early on in a 
reportedly bloody purge; and the EPRP, the Tigrayan-led pan-Ethiopianist movement 
which had established bases in north-eastern Tigray, and suggested the TPLF form 
military units under its political leadership. The competitive challenges of each of 
these three organisations had been effectively quelled, or pushed outside Tigray, by 
the end of the 1970s (see Young 1996, 1998, and Vaughan 1994), leaving the TPLF 
with a strong sense of the urgent practical imperative of uniting its constituents.  
 
One of the early periods of division within the organisation during its first years, the 
hanfishfish, or confusion, is often cited as illustrative of the struggle to establish 
affiliation to a pan-Tigrayan identity, above and to the exclusion of regionalist 
sentiments of awrajawinet. Although this interpretation is controversial, and 
officially denied, disquiet at the existence of an east/west division within TPLF, and 
its domination by cadres from the western Axum-Adua-Shire axis (to the 
disadvantage of Tembien, Enderta, and Kilte Awlaelo) has proved remarkably 
resilient over several decades of official insistence on Tigrayan unity. Whatever its 
other merits, the notion of an undercutting east-west political division in Tigray is 
also one of the less fortunate legacies of the invocation of the first weyane. 
 
Before concluding it is worth stressing the limitations of ‘national consciousness’ in 
Tigray, where  
 
[t]he invention of history and the selective summoning of the past had 
limited impact in remapping popular consciousness. […] Peace was what 
[Tigrayan civilians] yearned for, not political independence, flag, 
national anthem, etc. (Alemseged Abbay 1998:170-1) 
 
Whilst these conclusions should not be exaggerated, they do nevertheless offer a 
useful balance to an account focused on an exploration of ethno-nationalist 
invention, which has not discussed the daily experiences of Tigrayans during the 
Dergue period. Clearly the extraordinary brutality of government campaigns of 
 
 167 
imprisonment and torture, enforced resettlement, manipulation of food aid, and 
military activity including the bombardment of civilian centres and markets, all 
designed to ‘dry up the sea’ within which the front swam like fish, left many 
Tigrayans with no alternative, and no hesitation, in joining or supporting the front 
(Africa Watch (1991:ch.8,11,15,16), Hendrie (1991)).  
 
If the Dergue did plenty of mobilisation work for them, the TPLF, kept a determined 
focus on the ‘mass popular base’ that was to underpin national struggle (Markakis 
1987:254). Central to the securing of that mass popular base was an early Marxist 
understanding that, ‘men do not in general become nationalists through sentiment or 
sentimentality, atavistic or not, well-based or myth founded’ (Gellner 1964:160), and 
that national sentiment alone would not nourish the attempt to remove the Dergue. 
From an early stage, nationalist rhetoric was underpinned by the commitment to 
deliver socio-economic advantage to an overwhelmingly rural peasant population. 
Even the terminology used in songs and poems to describe these benefits had 
collective or nationalist overtones. Terms like shewit, meaning a new green ear of 
grain, was regularly used interchangeably of the vehicles bringing relief grain from 
the Sudan, and of the youthful fighters, the new green shoots of a people.  
 
From narrow nationalism to fraternal ethnicities-in-arms 
 
“Le fondement de l’Ethiopie est le Tigré”, écrit Gebrè-Heywèt qui 
ajoute: “C’est le Tigré qui, entre tous, devrait le plus appeler de ses vœux 
la longévité du royaume d’Ethiopie”. Ces remarques qui caratérisent bien 
le double attachement de l’auteur, à sa région et à son pays, ne 
manqueront pas de faire plaisir à ceux qui craignent aujourd’hui que le 
provincialisme, sinon même la revendication ethnique, ne constituent des 
obstacles à la construction nationale. Ce rappel de la grandeur tigréenne 
est tout de même un fait assez exceptionnel de la part d’un “japonisant” 
se consacrant en général assez peu à l’affirmation des fiertés régionales. 
(Bureau 1993:iii-iv) 
 
This section sets out the events by which, having exploited Tigrayan nationalist 
sentiment in its mobilisation strategy, the organisation then in the late 1980s reversed 
the thrust of its propaganda in a bid to convince the population of Tigray to endorse 
an extension of the armed struggle to other parts of Ethiopia. The domestic 
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difficulties encountered in this process, which reconstituted the TPLF as a founder 
member of the EPRDF, now stressing its dual commitment to Tigrayan and 
Ethiopian nationalism, were considerable. 
 
When EPRDF fighters entered Addis Ababa in May 1991, they did so formally under 
the joint military command of the four organisations which then comprised the front: 
the TPLF, the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM)148, the Oromo 
People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO)149, and the Ethiopian Democratic 
Officers’ Revolutionary Movement (EDORM)150. The EPRDF had been established 
by the TPLF and EPDM in early 1989, in an agreement which formalised the 8-year 
de facto alliance between the two movements. EPRDF sources report that the official 
establishment of the Front had been put off for some years in the hope that it might 
include other parties (interview, EPRDF politburo member, Addis Ababa, July 
1994). 
 
Little is documented about the period when the TPLF tried to convince its fighters 
and their families in the peasantry to move beyond the borders of Tigray, but it is 
known to have been fraught (author’s notes 1988).  
 
A[n] immediate obstacle to the EPRDF’s advance was caused by TPLF 
fighters, and Tigrayans generally, questioning the need to carry the war 
south into Oromo and the Amhara populated lands. Fighters in Gondar 
and Wollo reportedly ‘thought they were at the end of the world’ […] 
some 10,000 fighters virtually spontaneously withdrew and returned to 
Tigray. One TPLF cadre attributed this problem to the Front’s emphasis 
on the national problem and the legacy of feudalism which fostered 
parochialism. (John Young 1996:117-8) 
 
Two factors helped the TPLF leadership overcome popular opposition to an 
Ethiopia-wide campaign, over the course of two years of debates across Tigray. One 
was the continuation of the Dergue’s aerial bombardment of Tigray. Although the 
                                                 
148 On the establishment of the EPDM by the ‘Belessa faction’ of the EPRP, and TPLF facilitation of 
this process, see Vaughan (1994:6) and below.  
149 On the formation of the OPDO from amongst Oromo POWs of the TPLF and EPLF, and Oromo 
members of EPDM see Vaughan (1994:6-7). 
150 This small body of Dergue officers captured by TPLF notably at Shire in February 1989 was 
disbanded soon after the establishment of the TGE. 
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battle for Shire Enda Selassie, concluded in early February 1989, was certainly a 
‘turning point’ (Tekeste Melake 1994), marking the end of Dergue forces on the 
ground in Tigray, it did not prevent aerial attack from bases to the south. Secondly, 
the Tigrayan clergy ‘argued forcefully that Tigrayans were part of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church and they should not be separated from it’ (John Young 1996:117). 
 
The discussions which took place in Tigray during 1988 and 1989 were protracted 
and difficult, and laced with ethnic language and imagery.  
 
‘No, we should free Tigray and think of ourselves, our future, the 
development of our land and lives: isn’t that what you have taught us to 
value, to struggle for? How can we send our children to fight in those 
other areas – let alone for the Amhara: isn’t it their oppression of us we 
have been fighting? No. Remember what our Tigrayan king [Emperor 
Yohannes IV] did when Tekle Giorgis [Waagshum Gobezie] sent him a 
bowl of teff as a peace offering! He burned it and sent it back. And that is 
what we must do now if the Amharas ask us for help!’ (elderly peasant 
farmer, TPLF baito congress, near Sheraro, December 1988, author’s 
note of interpreter’s account of the intervention) 
 
The kind of sentiment, which had been actively encouraged by 1988 for more than a 
decade in most of rural Tigray, now proved difficult to reverse. 
 
EPRDF ideology and the ‘national question’ 
 
This concluding section briefly comments on the objectives, self-perception, and the 
ideological tools at the disposal of the TPLF/EPRDF by 1991. As descendants of the 
Ethiopian Student Movement, the EPRDF’s leaders saw the Ethiopian project of 
ethnic federalism as one in a series of Marxist-Leninist approaches to the National 
Question. 
 
Whether or not premised on radical constructionism, a wide range of social scientific 
approaches to ethnicity, as explored in Chapter II, increasingly focus upon the ‘social 
construction’ of ethnic identity: the importance of the culture and interaction of the 
collective in the production of the norms and ‘social institutions’ associated with 
ethnicity; and the key role of the self-definition and constitution of ethnic groups. 
Since they regard the components of collective identities as the intrinsically shifting 
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products of continuous collective reinvention (in response to changing circumstances 
and perceived interests), these accounts therefore stress the inherent difficulties of 
incorporating them as the fixed basis for the permanent demarcation of 
administrative boundaries. Meanwhile, the Stalinist approach to the national 
question, in which EPRDF thinking is firmly grounded, has a more ambiguous 
attitude to the potential utility of the ‘nation, nationality or people’ as a unit of 
governance.  
 
Marxist-Leninist understanding of the so-called National Question incorporates two 
contradictory elements in thinking about ‘nationalities’ and their ‘self-
determination’. The first is the (laudable, and demonstrably true) idea that you can 
mobilise (indeed even define or create) a community more effectively and get it 
engaged in its own political development if you mobilise it from the inside; that is, 
with its own members, in its own language, using its own cultural traditions and 
knowledge system, etc.. This is clearly in tune with the social-constructivist position. 
The second element of Stalinist thinking is not: this is the view that the criteria for 
the establishment of ‘nations, nationalities, and peoples’ are objectively and 
externally identifiable, and verifiable independently of the views of their members. It 
is this component of Marxist thought which has resulted in the notion that a vanguard 
party may legitimately grant self-determination to a community from the outside, in 
that process identifying and prescribing the ethnic criteria to define the group, and 
demarcating geographical borders around it. Both strands are clearly apparent in 
EPRDF thinking. They can be interpreted as reflecting mutually incompatible 
elements of primordialism (the notion of the intrinsic ‘naturalness’ of certain nations 
and nationalities, and corresponding idea that a ‘correct’ map of their location can be 
drawn up) and of instrumentalism (suggestive of the political mobilisation and 
construction of a malleable ethnic identity). 
 
Shifts in EPRDF policy regarding the implementation of ethnic federalism seem to 
reflect tension between these two competing urges – to prescribe from above, or to 
facilitate from within the groups in question. At various moments throughout the 
1990s, changes of policy can be seen as instances of a (belated but welcome) move 
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from the former to the latter, and are explored in Chapter VII below. Meanwhile, it 
remained a critical core conviction of the EPRDF that Marxist-Leninist advocacy of 
nationality self-determination would in fact neutralise, not foster, ethno-sub-
nationalist sentiment (seen as the result of economic iniquity)151. It could be 
introduced, therefore, as a means eventually to achieve greater national integration 
and cohesion (once economic access is democratised and expanded). Whilst EPRDF 
has given in to a number of demands for separate organisation and administration, 
therefore, it is highly unlikely that this is regarded as a desirable end in itself. The 
underlying urge to voluntary integration and unity remains at the core of party 
ideology. This desired outcome is, of course, understood by Marxist-Leninists to be 
contingent upon levels of expansion, integration, and security of the national 
economy that have yet to materialise in Ethiopia. 
 
EPRDF thinking on democracy, also coloured by Marxism-Leninism, is rooted in  
 
‘the all inclusive participation of the people’ (EPRDF 1995:12), 
 
The ethnic group represents the highest effective level where such collective 
participation is deemed possible. What the Front calls ‘popular democracy’ is based 
on communal collective participation, and representation based on consensus. Its 
perception of democracy is shaped partly by ideological conditioning, and partly by 
historical experience, fusing class theory with ethnicity. The validity of Marxist and 
Maoist precepts of mass political mobilisation were confirmed by the TPLF’s 
success in Tigray, where the peasantry was mobilised on an ethnic basis, which 
became also the mode of political participation and representation: 
 
The only coalition we seek is with the people; and the democratisation 
we seek is the democratisation of society and social relations (interview, 
then-President of the TGE, Addis Ababa, August 1994). 
 
EPRDF has, thus, never appeared as an organisation committed to pluralism for its 
own sake. This has been particularly visible in terms of its attitudes to resource 
                                                 
151 Much has been made of a shortlived preference for Tigrayan independence set out in an early 
TPLF constitution/manifesto, apparently revised after less than a year. It seems clear that the 
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distribution and the delivery of services, views entrenched by experience gained 
during the cross-border period of the 1980s. During this period, the organisation 
consolidated its clear understanding of the value and potential of the coincidence of 
interest between peasant populations benefiting from socio-economic development, 
and the party consolidating its support base as a result of being seen to provide the 
means of such development152. Competitors, be they political or developmental, 
represent a significant problem in this consensual model. The most serious of them 
has been the OLF.  
 
Ethnic organisation in the South: Oromia and the OLF 
 
In 1991 the OLF was the only other organisation with a significant military presence 
in central areas of Ethiopia, and with the TPLF/EPRDF became a key member of the 
TGE. This section briefly reviews the emergence and development of Oromo 
nationalism and the difficulties it has faced in attaining its political objectives. It 
considers relations between the TPLF and OLF during the Dergue, and the 
establishment of the OPDO. 
 
Origins of Oromo nationalism 
 
Oromo nationalist commentators have identified ‘three phases in the Oromo struggle 
against Ethiopian colonialism. During the first phase, various Oromo groups and 
their leaders resisted colonialism locally.’ (Asafa Jalata 1993:151). A series of 
Oromo rebellions153 marked the end of the period of consolidation of ‘settler 
colonialism’, and represented localised, scattered and sporadic resistance, often to 
specific iniquities of the naftagna-gabbar system. The events of the Italian 
                                                                                                                                          
overriding dynamic of TPLF/EPRDF thinking has been integrative rather than secessionist. 
152 de Waal (1998) has given a favourable (if undeveloped) analysis of these dynamics. 
153 In Raya and Azebo in 1928-30 (Asafa Jalata 1993:152-3); in collaboration with Enderta Tigrayans 
during the first Weyane (above); in Harerghe and Wollo between 1943 and 1948 (ibid.:152,154). 
Mohammed Hassan identifies a ‘prototype of Oromo national consciousness in the resistance 
movements of the 1880s and 1890s’ (1998:193). 
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occupation and its aftermath triggered the first formal Oromo proposal for autonomy 
with a view to eventual separation from the Ethiopian empire state154.  
 
In a second phase, from 1960 to the mid-1970s, resistance took on more sustained 
and coherent forms (as in the case of the Bale farmers’ revolt of 1963-68155), and 
better organisation (as with the merger of a number of Oromo welfare organisations 
in 1963 to form the Metcha-Tulama Self-Help Association156). When in 1966 
Metcha-Tulama began to discuss contentious issues such as land, and began to 
‘articulate the dissatisfaction of the Oromo with the government and particularly with 
their position in society’ (Wood (1983) in Asafa Jalata 1993:157), the government 
moved swiftly and violently to curb its activities157, before finally banning and 
repressing it in 1967. This, as most commentators agree, ushered in the third phase of 
Oromo nationalism. 
 
In 1967 by imprisoning its leaders and dissolving the Association, the 
government won a pyrrhic, short-term victory. […] by 1974 its policy 
unwittingly transformed Oromo politics beyond recognition. The 
Association’s demand for equality within Ethiopia was transformed into 
the OLF’s commitment to self-determination in Oromia. The 
Association’s efforts to spread literacy in the Amharic language and 
Sabean script were transformed into literacy in Afaan Oromoo using the 
Latin alphabet: what was unthinkable in 1967 became feasible by 1974. 
(Mohammed Hassan 1998:212) 
 
                                                 
154 A proposal was put before the League of Nations in 1936 that a Western Galla Confederation 
(comprising Wellega, Illubabor, and Jimma) be ruled by Britain under League mandate ‘until we 
achieve self-government’ (Gilkes (1975:211); G1-Pro-ldn Western Galla, British Archive Document, 
1936, quoted by Asafa Jalata (1993:153)). 
155 Bale ‘left in the minds of the Oromos the sense that if they were effectively organized their fight 
against Ethiopian colonialism would one day regain for them their freedom’ (Asafa Jalata 1993:160). 
See Gebru Tareke (1996[1991]:125-158), Asafa Jalata (1993:158-160), and Markakis (1987:191-202). 
156 See Mohammed Hassan (1998:181-221), who draws on Olana Zoga (1993). Whilst Mecha-Tulama 
marked ‘the beginning of co-ordinated Oromo resistance’ (ibid.:183), nevertheless ‘the goal of the 
leaders of the Association was the recognition of Oromo identity, within the larger Ethiopian identity 
itself’. (ibid.:190). The objectives of the Association were multiple: ‘improving the welfare of the 
Oromo nation; [and mobilizing it] toward a common goal by undermining the colonial policy of 
divide and rule on the bases of religion, class, and region’ (Asafa Jalata 1993:155).  
157 Mohammed Hassan (1998:205). As well as army officers, frustrated by an official policy capping 
the promotion of Oromo officers, who had been uniformly loyal during the 1960 coup attempt (:198), 
‘the Association also attracted Oromo students from Addis Ababa including […] Ibssa Gutama, Baro 
Tumsa, Yohannes Lata, Mekonnen Gallan and Taha Ali [who went on to become] founding members 
of the OLF’ (:203). 
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Mecha-Tulama’s activities continued underground, and in 1969 a militant faction 
trained in Aden was arrested in Mogadishu attempting to return to Ethiopia to launch 
armed opposition. Oromo student papers began circulating in 1971 the first 
conference of the Ethiopian People’s Liberation Front (December 1973) was 
followed the next year by armed infiltration in the Hararghe area. This group carried 
out effective mobilisation on the land issue, and maintained effective contact with 
Addis Ababa student circles until in July 1974 the first formal meeting of the OLF 
adopted a secessionist programme. 
 
Following the demise of Haile Selassie I in September 1974, Tadesse Biru was 
released, and the so-called Oromo Cultural Committee petitioned the new 
government to allow publications in Oromiffa using the latin script. Its requests were 
refused158 and Tadesse Biru was executed the following year. Once again the 
nationalist project was driven underground, and when a 30-man committee of the 
OLF revised its programme in 1976, the organisation’s rank and file was reckoned to 
number around two hundred.   
 
Obstacles to the development of Oromo nationalist consciousness 
 
A range of reasons ‘why it [took] so long for Oromo nationalism to develop’ 
(Mohammed Hassan 1996:69) have been suggested. Shortcomings in education, 
communication, transportation, the media, standards of literacy and the growth of 
literature, and, interestingly, the ‘intensive interaction among people’ all impeded the 
‘crucial environment for the spread of a national consciousness’ (ibid.:69, quoting 
Alter (1989:77)). Additionally, Oromo nationalism ‘took shape against economic 
exploitation, military subjugation, and ‘political and cultural domination’’ 
(Mohammed Hassan 1998:186); Ethiopia’s ruling elites ‘did everything possible to 
prevent [it …] by destroying Oromo religious and cultural institutions, by dividing 
the Oromo along religious and regional lines, and most of all by undermining the 
growth of the Oromo language and the flourishing of written literature in that 
language’ (ibid.:187); finally the two governments opposed a force which threatened 
                                                 
158 A clandestine newspaper in Oromiffa, Barissa [Dawn] appeared in 1976. 
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‘the disintegration of Ethiopia’, and also ‘to abort the realization of the dream of 
greater Somalia’ (ibid.:189). Each of these factors, in play before 1974, continued to 
influence events thereafter, inhibiting the ‘flowering of Oromo freedom’159, and 
undermining the nationalist project of the OLF. 
 
The political potential of the overwhelmingly large160 and strategically located161 
Oromo ‘ethnic group’, were it ever to be effectively mobilised, has been a prominent 
theme of the relatively few pages which commentators have devoted to it162. Were 
this group, occupying land which provides the ‘backbone’ of the Ethiopian economy, 
ever to be united, it could ‘tip the political balance decisively’ (Markakis 1987:258): 
‘if Ethiopia were to break apart, or if any serious insurgency was to operate […] 
Oromo opposition would have to be at the base of it’ (Clapham 1988:216)163. 
 
To date, however, Oromos have not been active and united for independence, and 
three related reasons for this can be posited. Whether or not (and it seems unlikely) 
divisions between Oromos were the result of machinations of the Ethiopian elites, as 
the nationalists suggest, the wide geographic dispersal of Oromiffa-speaking 
populations, and the diversification of regional groupings have been factors with 
which those intervening (whether to forge a single nation or not) have had to 
contend. This diversification had socio-political implications as  
 
                                                 
159 ‘Addi bilisumma Oromo Ha’dararuu!’ (‘Let Oromo freedom flower today!’) is the slogan of the 
OLF. 
160 At the end of the imperial period ‘the relative strengths of the major ethnic groups remain[ed] a 
matter of guesswork’ (Markakis 1974:51). The OLF long claimed that the Oromo population 
represented an absolute majority of the population of the Ethiopian Empire (Gadaa Melbaa 1988:96). 
The 1984 government census gave a figure of 29.7%, whilst the 1994 figure was 31.1%.  
161 Territory inhabited by Oromos stretches from near the border with Djibouti to Kenya, from the 
border with Somalia, almost to the border with Sudan in the west.  
162 Studies of the Dergue period by Andargachew Tiruneh (1993), Clapham (1988), Keller (1988), and 
the Ottaways (1978) each devote no more than a couple of pages to these issues. Works on the 
imperial period tend to give even less space to the subject. 
163 Fascination with latent Oromo power goes back to Manoel de Almeida in the 1620s:‘if God had 
not blinded them, and willed that certain families or tribes among them should be at war with one 
another constantly, there would not have been an inch of land in the empire of which they were not the 
masters’ (quoted by Markakis (1974:16)). A deep-seated fear of ‘the Oromo threat; has arisen quickly 
at times of political change or instability – so quickly as to suggest its cultivation as a useful rallying 
mechanism by successive regimes.  
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different Oromo tribal groups evolved quite different political systems, 
which varied from small acephalous clusters of agnatically connected 
neighbours to quite complete kingdoms. (Baxter 1978:284) 
 
During the formation of the Gibe states in the four centuries preceding the advent of 
Menelik’s invading forces, the sedentarisation of Oromo pastoralists brought class 
stratification in its train, and this substantially undermined the traditional gada 
system164, with rich families replacing gada leaders in the hierarchy (Mohammed 
Hassan 1990:95). In these areas of the western region the Abyssinian state 
encountered the familiar (centralisation of power within a defined and defended 
territory (ibid.:93,97)), and this influenced the manner in which local elites were 
retained when it was assimilated. The experience of the relatively well-educated 
protestant west, however, contrasts strongly with that of Arssi and Borana, where 
gada survived longer and marginalisation was more pronounced. Meanwhile in 
Wollo and areas to the north, religious differences are not acute, and that there is 
little separation of Oromo political identity:  
 
northern Oromos have something of the Tigrean ambivalence towards the 
Ethiopian state: not only is secession a much less evidently viable 
proposition form them than for Oromos further south, but they have 
occupied leading positions in the state’ (Clapham 1988:216).  
 
Differently again, in Hararghe, and some areas of Bale and Arssi, where ‘ethnicity, 
religion, and exploitation have coincided, and where the religious factor has not only 
differentiated the indigenous from the settler population within the region, but also 
provided a link with external assistance from across the Somali frontier’, 
nevertheless ‘no common Oromo identity [has] resulted’. (ibid.:217) 
 
A second problem confronting Oromo nationalism has been the economic context 
within which they were operating. The wealth of many Oromo territories was one of 
the primary motives for Menelik’s expansion. Their continuing economic 
significance undoubtedly attuned successive regimes to respond rapidly to any 
                                                 
164 Asmarom Legesse (1973) provides the classic ethnographic account, but see also Bassi (1996:150) 
regarding the political import of gada, which ‘is certainly a very strong symbol of Oromo ethnic 
identity, but, as with most symbols, may have multiple meanings’.   
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serious threat of revolt. A high degree of incorporation of Oromo elites165, and 
relatively high levels of economic development following the ‘displacement of the 
empire’s centre of gravity southwards’ (Markakis 1974:97), both militated against 
such resistance. During the Dergue period, the early redistribution of land removed 
what had become the central focus of economic grievance against the state166, and 
took momentum from incipient Oromo nationalism (Markakis 1986:261, Clapham 
1988:216). After land reform, and despite continuing discrimination, Oromo peasants 
were relatively rarely in the common situation of their Eritrean and Tigrayan 
counterparts who had ‘nothing to lose’ in economic terms by joining the nationalist 
movements. In addition, firm state control of Oromo areas was reinforced during the 
1980s by means of extensive and repressive villagisation, and resettlement167.   
 
Underlying all of these issues is the question of assimilation. Baxter’s notion of 
‘permeable clan structures’ (1978), incorporates the idea that Oromo social systems 
were prone not to unite, and were open to assimilation of groups that they came 
upon, and by the Ethiopian state. Even the relatively centralised Gibe states ‘failed to 
coalesce into one political entity’ (Mohammed Hassan 1990:100). As a result, ‘the 
history of the Oromo people is a story of fusion and interaction by which all tribes 
and groups have altered and been transformed constantly’ (Mohammed Hassan, 
quoted by Baxter 1978:177). Oromo capacity for assimilation perhaps primarily 
accounts for their perception by a succession of Somali governments as ‘pre-ethnic 
raw material’ (Gellner 1983:84) waiting to be moulded into either a Somalised or 
Amharised form. Whilst nationalist accounts claim that an Oromo national identity 
has long been formed168, it remains far from clear precisely what this means in 
political practice.  
 
Suffice it to say, then, that there has been a range of socio-economic, historical, and 
geopolitical obstacles in the path of an effective and co-ordinated Oromo challenge 
                                                 
165 See Markakis (1974:115), Asafa Jalata (1993). 
166 Discontent had emerged in the wake of Haile Selassie’s reforms of 1966, which had lifted a veil of 
confusion surrounding land tenure, and illuminated the degree of expropriation which had taken place 
in southern areas. 
167 See Clay & Holcomb (1986), Africa Watch (1991). 
168 Cf. Keller (1998:115) and other contributors to the volume edited by Asafa Jalata (1998). 
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to the Abyssinian state. As opposition to the Dergue regime developed during the 
1980s, it became the view of the TPLF that these obstacles were compounded by the 
organisational and ideological weaknesses of the OLF and its leadership. 
 
Relations between the OLF and TPLF/EPRDF 
 
The two organisations first came into contact soon after the OLF opened an office in 
Khartoum in 1978169. The OLF reportedly found co-operation with the EPLF easier 
than with the TPLF:  
 
Our claim [that the independence of Oromia was a colonial question] was 
parallel to that of the EPLF in Eritrea. As a result, political issues were 
never such a fundamental problem between us. (interview, OLF former 
deputy-chairman, Toronto, August 1994) 
 
Whilst the TPLF disputed the OLF’s colonial analysis of the Oromo situation, 
 
it was not an issue to prevent co-operation against a common enemy 
between the two organisations. (interview, TGE Foreign Minister, Addis 
Ababa, July 1994) 
 
Unlike the EPLF, the OLF was ‘prepared to leave the door open to the possibility of 
coexistence within Ethiopia’ (interview, OLF former deputy-chairman, Toronto, 
August 1994). 
 
In 1983 a series of meetings were held between the TPLF, OLF, WSLF, and ALF, 
which resulted in a number of joint press releases and statements, amongst which one 
issued by the OLF and TPLF in Khartoum announced their decision to co-operate at 
a tactical level. The first TPLF unit left for the OLF base area in Asosa in 
October/November 1984170. Sources from both organisations report that the military 
training units remained around a year, but that the relationship continued to be 
uneasy. 
                                                 
169 With the deterioration of its relations with Somalia after the creation of the SALF, the OLF turned 
west for support. 
170 ‘The unit was led by Kinfe [Gebre Medhin] from which you can see how much importance we 





According to the TPLF, political differences soon crystallised into disagreements 
over military strategy, hastening the collapse of relations, and the withdrawal of the 
TPLF contingent. The TPLF disapproved of the increasing clashes between the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the OLF, and (they claim) tried to 
convince the latter that helping the Sudanese government maintain a buffer zone 
along the border with Ethiopia was ‘not their war’; that they should move out of the 
lowland border areas around their headquarters at Asosa where the population is 
Benishangul rather than Oromo, and into the highlands of Wellega ‘in order to be in 
touch with their own population’ (Interview, TGE Foreign Minister, Addis Ababa, 
July 1994). The criticisms launched by the TPLF hinged on the Maoist theme of the 
correct relationship between a liberation movement and rural people, and the need to 
be closely integrated with the population.  
 
The problem of the OLF was that it was basically a foreign-based 
leadership: they were totally alienated from the day-to-day realities at 
home. We had been trying to invite them to our base area, to map out 
common strategies, but were continuously frustrated. (Interview, TGE 
Foreign Minister, Addis Ababa, July 1994) 
 
The recriminations continued to focus on the nature of the OLF leadership and 
escalated, culminating in 1986 with the publication of a TPLF paper denouncing it as 
‘incapable of leading the Oromo struggle’ (Interview, former OLF deputy-chairman, 
Toronto, August 1994)171. The withdrawal of the main contingent was now followed 
by the removal of the smaller number of TPLF cadres who had remained with the 
OLF to work in medical, mine laying, and other non-combat roles. 
 
OLF anger was further exacerbated by what they saw as TPLF attempts to recruit 
Oromos from Sudan, Somalia, and the Middle East, and to intrude onto Oromo 
nationalist territory. Here the geopolitical disadvantages of the Oromo nationalist 
claim to represent the whole of the vast Oromo-inhabited area became acutely 
apparent. As noted above, by the time the TPLF extended its activities outside 
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Tigray, the consolidation of its control over the province was complete. The 
establishment of similarly uncontested authority over the rural areas of the vast 
region of Oromia, by contrast, was, during the Dergue, never a possibility for the 
OLF – or any other organisation. The military advantages of strong consolidation in 
a manageably compact geographical area, with relatively easy access, for instance 
through Sudan, had always to be weighed against the political need to be seen to 
operate throughout the whole of the region which the OLF aimed to liberate. The 
bloody nature of the internal split which had created the IFLO in 1978172, and the 
aggressive activities of the latter in the east of the country, left the OLF painfully 
aware of the potential of threats to their claim to represent all Oromos. The 
geographical difficulties of the liberation of Oromia were always profoundly 
exacerbated by the poor relations between the OLF and the Somali government, 
relations which some reports suggest were not enhanced in this period by the 
activities of the TPLF office in Mogadishu. 
 
The OLF report that  
 
from the early 1980s we got a hint that they [the TPLF] were planning a 
fight with the Oromos. From 1979 through the 1980s we were agreed 
with them upon voluntary unity based on self-determination. But they 
were starting to express doubts, and this was obvious when they came up 
with the two options of a tactical ‘United Front’ and a strategic 
‘Democratic Front’, suggesting we join the former. Effectively what they 
were saying was ‘we will use you for now, and then thrash you later 
when it suits us’. (Interview, OLF Foreign Relations Spokesperson, 
London, August 1999) 
 
Meanwhile the TPLF, having abandoned any possibility of working on this strategic 
level with the OLF, was still keen to have a strategic Oromo partner suitable for 
membership of its proposed ‘Democratic Front’. Concrete progress towards the 
establishment of an Oromo organisation from amongst Oromos who included POWs 
held by the TPLF in Tigray, was apparent from 1988. The already bitter divisions 
                                                                                                                                          
171 This happened around the same time as the TPLF similarly fell out with the EPLF after describing 
it as only a tactical not a strategic ally. Observers suggest that both developments were linked to the 
rise of the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) after 1984. 
172 On the departure of Abdul Karim Ibrahim (Sheik Jarra) see Markakis (1987:263); on the alleged 
connection with the assassination of Baro Tumsa and others see Asafa Jalata (1993:169). 
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between the OLF and the TPLF were merely entrenched with the formal 
establishment, in 1990, of the OPDO. It is hard to avoid Gebru Tareke’s conclusion 
that ‘there is absolutely no question [but that] this force has been created under the 
tutelage of the EPRDF in order to counteract the OLF’ (1996[1991]:224). Keller 
goes further, arguing that ‘the strategy of the EPRDF in dealing with its most serious 
ethnically-based opposition is to ‘divide and conquer’. It has created a party, the 
OPDO, that serves as a counterweight to the OLF’ (1998:115)173. 
                                                 
173 At the time it was not only Oromo nationalists who opposed the creation of the OPDO: some of 
TPLF’s staunchest supporters in Europe responded with dismay to what they saw as ‘the end of any 
pretensions to the commitment of TPLF to self-determination’ (personal communication, 1989). 
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Section Three. Mapping power and ethnicity in the Federal 
Democratic Republic 
 
The capacity of the Ethiopian State to implement a blueprint as complex 
as that prescribed by Soviet [nationality] theory, while maintaining the 
Leninist centralised autocratic hegemony which appears to be the core 
value of the [Dergue] regime, is open to doubt. But, if pursued, the 
strategy is likely to have a powerful influence on the development of 
ethnic consciousness, and the categories through which it is expressed. 
(Crawford Young 1986:449) 
 
The political process is good, but its implementation is a disaster. When 
EPRDF came they tried to win people over saying things like ‘no-one is 
forced to pay tax!’, but the farmers replied that ‘tax is what makes us sure 
that the land is ours’. And it is the same with ethnicity. They came along 
and disturbed the social relations; without thinking they disturbed things 
which have taken a long time to settle. (Interview, civil servant, Bonga, 
Kaffa zone, June/July 2002) 
 
The form of ‘revolutionary democracy’ embraced by the EPRDF seeks to exploit the 
performative power of the unified and mobilised participation and will of the 
community - of the ethnic group. The key to achieving that unity is the recognition of 
diverse nationalities, the harnessing of their ‘nationalisms’, and their political 
mobilisation at this highest level where unity is possible and effective. The problem 
for the Ethiopian opposition parties in the early 1990s as now was that this was not 
the playing field upon which they thought they were competing. The problem for the 
EPRDF remains that their strategy has met with varying degrees of success, 
encountering both difficulties apparently inherent in the project, as well as obstacles 
thrown up by the manner of its implementation. As the quotations above indicate, the 
introduction of ethnic federalism has had a profound, varied, and unpredictable 
effects on the great range of conventional beliefs which may be said to underpin 
‘ethnicity’ in Ethiopia. 
 
This third section of the thesis describes the activities of the EPRDF primarily in 
areas where they had not operated prior to 1991, to organise local party and 
administrative structures on the basis of ethnicity. The account attempts to illuminate 
the critical importance of the ethnic federal structure to the viability of the EPRDF’s 
project of political mobilisation, the inextricable connection between the two axes of 
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territory and representation, and the centrality of language in both cases. It also seeks 
to illuminate the extent to which little was left to chance in constructing this 
structure. The strategy of mobilisation and organisation which the EPRDF 
implemented in some rural areas, for instance, remained almost invisible until the 
outbreak of a rash of PDOs (People’s Democratic Organisations) was announced in 
the capital. During the course of the fieldwork conducted, however, the extent of the 
preparation and planning with which the party attempted to put the perceived 
instrumental value of ethnicity into operation was repeatedly and forcefully outlined. 
In other areas, notably Oromia NRS, EPRDF’s ‘intent to compete’ was well known 
before the change of government.  
 
Inherent in the EPRDF's attachment to the idea of nationality-based mobilisation, 
along with the idea that it is morally better than other forms (i.e. that ethnic self-
determination is democratic, emancipatory, non-discriminatory for the first time in 
Ethiopia's history, and therefore a good thing), is the idea that it works better - i.e. 
that people are more responsive to political education and encouragement given to 
them (in the words of a TPLF founder member, interviewed, Mekelle, October 1998) 
'in their own language by their own children'. These two chapters, then, attempt to 
establish whether, and under what circumstances this view may be right. They 
document the translation of political insight and experience generated during the 
anti-government campaign in Tigray and other parts of the north, to the 
establishment (or consolidation) of government and party structures all over the 
country.  
 
The two chapters are set out in terms of the two axes of government – representation 
and territory – briefly elaborated in Chapter I, above. They are also organised to 
distinguish the projects of political mobilisation by which the ruling party sought to 
influence representation (Chapter VI), from the ‘responses’ of the ethnic populations, 
which have often focused on the renegotiation of territorial demarcation (Chapter 
VII). Chapter VI considers some experiences as the party attempted the mobilisation 
of different groups, revealing competing conceptions of ‘legitimacy’ of 
representation and of its ‘indigenousness’, and of the relation between the two. 
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Chapter VII explores the territorial implications of the policy of ethnic federalism, 
exploring how incrementally evolving self-conceptions of group identity have been 
jolted by, and redefined in response to dramatically transformed circumstances vis-à-
vis the salience and opportunity afforded ethnicity.  
 
In 1991, as the Dergue regime was defeated, and ethnic federalism introduced, it was 
already clear that  
 
the political ecology of nationalities is now in a process of far reaching 
change. The various groups can no longer be considered in isolation: the 
political ecological infrastructure has already been decisively affected 
and restructured by the Ethiopian State itself. The interesting aspect to 
follow now would precisely be the evolving pattern of interaction of this 
politically and culturally dominant elite and the designated nationalities. 
(Abbink 1991:12) 
 
The following two chapters attempt to begin to trace precisely this pattern as it 





Chapter VI. Reworking representation: political mobilisation 
at the limits of ‘revolutionary democracy’ 
 
From an initial position of great moral and political strength, President 
Meles Zenawi and the EPRDF have fallen back into the old Ethiopian 
tradition of attempting to rule single-handedly and autocratically, without 
consent of, or input from, the governed. (Herbert Lewis 1994:5) 
 
Yes, we needed to build a coalition, but we needed to build a coalition 
essentially in rural areas. Some of the groups that came out after the 
transitional arrangement felt that, because they were similar in view with 
the EPRDF the EPRDF should ally with them. We don’t ally with 
groups. We ally with people. Eighty-five percent of the population lives 
in rural areas. Any alliance that helped us to mobilise this eighty-five 
percent we made; any that didn’t, we didn’t. And we have succeeded, not 
only because of those who were positively inclined to the EPRDF but 
primarily because of those who were not, because these people are 
reference points. We need these reference points. It is not a question of 
magnanimity: we need these reference points to show the peasants the 
other side of the coin, so they can choose, based on an understanding of 
the facts. Because that is the only type of decision that can sustain 
grassroots participation. (Interview, Chairman of EPRDF and then 
President of the TGE, Addis Ababa, August 1994) 
 
The local authorities treat us as an enemy of EPRDF and therefore of the 
people, rather than as an opposition: they told the people ‘if you support 
that party you are fighting the government in power; that party doesn’t 
even have a police force: no law protects them.’ And even the police said 
‘we don’t know that organisation: if you elect them we won’t give them 
any help’. (Interview, opposition party officers, Karate, Konso special 
wereda, 19 June 2002) 
 
This chapter explores the various strategies with which the EPRDF has attempted to 
mobilise support in different parts of the country – and the different levels of success 
with which they have met. The chapter opens with a brief account of events in the 
Southern Nations’ Nationalities’ and Peoples’ National Regional State (SNNPNRS), 
which presents a complex and contradictory picture, being the region where 
EPRDF’s doctrine of ethnic self-determination has enjoyed its warmest post-1991 
welcome, but also the only area in which the organisation has faced even localised 
electoral defeat174. I suggest that whilst the premise of the advantages of talking to 
                                                 
174 See Tronvoll (2000) on the 2000 elections in Hadiya. 
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groups ‘in their own languages through their own children’ was a good one in so far 
as it represented an attempt to get ‘inside’ the group in question, in practice its 
implementation and the results have been mixed. This has been not least because of 
misconceptions about the means by which ethnic groups are (re)constituted and 
maintained. Meanwhile, in the pastoralist periphery, explored in a second section, 
EPRDF has worked by means of coalitions with traditional elites, not attempting to 
work from within these communities. Section three returns to the narrative of Oromo 
nationalism, begun in Chapter V above. It considers how overt competition between 
alternative constructions of proper representation has inhibited government 
mobilisation in Oromo areas. The chapter concludes with a brief review of events in 
regional urban centres.  
 
‘Un museo di popoli’175: animating the exhibits  
 
Southerners are the genuine Ethiopian federalists, if you like, because 
they don’t want independence, since the groups are too small, but they 
want an Ethiopian framework which can both protect their unity, and 
defend them against the Oromos and Amharas. (Interview, foreign NGO 
consultant, Arba Minch, then Simien Omo zone, 13 October 1999) 
 
The small southern groups accept Ethiopian identity. (Clapham 1994:30) 
 
EPRDF mobilisation in the SNNPNRS 
 
During the training we were taught by Tigrayans who told us “you can 
play your national play, and we ours”. I came back here and we 
continued the discussion process. I went with Shekecho, Majangir, and 
Sheko people to Masha where we had a further meeting. EPRDF gave us 
that freedom to speak together, and to write. (Interview, school teacher, 
Tepi, then Kaffa-Sheka zone, 7 October 1999) 
 
When EPRDF forces took control of Addis Ababa in May 1991, its cadres and 
fighters had barely set foot inside the borders of the area now administered as the 
SNNPNRS. There had, however, been significant prior preparation for the 
organisation’s swift move into this area which is, more than any other, responsible 
                                                 
175 Conti Rossini (1937:169). 
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for Ethiopia’s reputation as a ‘mosaic of distinct peoples’176. Versions of the 
following account of ERPDF’s recruitment, training, and deployment of southern 
cadres, are to be heard with minor variation all over the south, and beyond, and I 
quote it at some length as typical. 
 
I was involved from the beginning [of the establishment of the zone]. I 
was a soldier in the Dergue’s army and was captured by the TPLF in 
[February 1989] at the battle of Shire [in western Tigray]. I stayed in 
Tigray until [October 1989]. We had political education about the nature 
of the Dergue and the ERPDF. Our teachers were a Welleye and a 
Tigrayan. The group of POWs were given the choice whether to stay in 
Tigray or go back to the Dergue (700 chose this option) or go to Sudan 
(100 did this but they found it not conducive so they returned to us). 
There were 23,000 soldiers captured at Enda Selassie177, and 16,800 of us 
were southerners. We had our own caucus organised within EPDM, and 
we were led by Tadesse Gurmuz and Tefera Meskele178. 
 
When EPRDF reached Addis Ababa, I was in Wellega with their forces. 
From Wellega we reached Mizan Teferi around two months later. There 
were two of us cadres – one Bench and me from the Dizi. There were 11 
other fighters with us, but since they were not from this area they stayed 
behind whilst we started to talk to the people. We were looking out for 
educated people who could join the movement, but we were also careful 
not to target people who had any connection with the Dergue. 
 
The Bench People’s Democratic Organisation was organised in [1991-2], 
and elections were held in [1992-3]. The Me’enit separated off in Yekatit 
[February 1993] to form their own party, the Dizi in [May 1993], and the 
Sheko in Hamle [July 1994]. (Interview, zonal official, Mizan Teferi, 
Bench-Maji zone, 9 October 1999) 
 
Four points are interesting here. The first is the existence within the apparently pan-
Ethiopian EPDM of a caucus of several hundred EPRDF fighters from ethnic groups 
in the southern region who were separately organised, educated, and mobilised179. 
                                                 
176 Ironically the metaphor is Levine’s (1974:21), who notoriously rejected the perspective it depicts 
(see Chapters I and IV). Although some 45 ethnic groups are administratively recognised within 
SNNPNRS, the 1994 census indicated that 13 of them account for 93% of its population (then 
reckoned to be just under 10.4 million), with only three of these (Welaiyta groups, Sidama, and 
Gurage groups) each accounting for more than 10% of the population of the region (1994 Census, 
results at Country Level, Volume I, Statistical Report, FDRE/CSA 1998:73-4). 
177 Albeit high the figure is consistent with claims at the time (Africa Watch 1991:266). 
178 Tefera Meskele, a Welaiyta, went on to the leadership of the SNNPNRS and EPRDF 
organisation(s) in Simien Omo, until his removal on corruption charges in 1999. See Chapter VII.  
179 In view of EPDM’s dramatic trajectory from pan-Ethiopian nationalist EPRP to ethnic ANDM, 
official insistence on the immutability of the organisation’s position on the national question draws 
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Interviews established that these cadres had received instruction on how to establish 
new parties well before the fall of the Dergue, in other words well in advance of the 
first outside inkling that EPRDF intended to establish its own ethnic PDOs all over 
the country. 
 
The second point of interest is the careful positioning of southern cadres to move 
quickly into their home areas as the government forces collapsed, and the care they 
took to ‘go on ahead of the other EPRDF fighters’ to talk to elders and opinion-
formers in their own groups. After what is often described as a few days of seeking 
to reassure their communities, these returning sons called in their ‘more experienced 
comrades to discuss in more detail with the people' (interview, zonal official, Mizan 
Teferi, 9 October 1999; a pattern corroborated by interviews across SNNPNRS, 
October/November 1999). It seems likely that there were both long-term and short-
term considerations in play. The EPRDF’s immediate needs were to find a means of 
communicating with rural populations (relatively few of whom spoke Amharic) to 
calm alarm and uncertainty at shifting events, and to counteract the propaganda of 
the previous government (whose cadres were still operational in many places), which 
had portrayed the EPRDF in gruesome terms. Further, the movement wanted to 
distinguish itself from the Dergue, and above all convince the local population that it 
was not just another group of ‘invading Abyssinians’. As already suggested, it 
wanted to present itself from the start as understanding local populations ‘from the 
inside’; as an organisation which they could safely support and trust, since they were 
being encouraged, by their own brothers, to establish their own organisations, and 
join or forge alliances with EPRDF ‘as equal partners’.  
 
Thirdly, it is worth noting that the strategy began a process of elision of party and 
state, simultaneously selecting proto-administrators and establishing the ubiquitous 
interim ‘Peace and Stability Committees’, in the process of promulgating the party’s 
ideology and seeking to recruit members. The same people were targeted for both, 
                                                                                                                                          
scepticism. One can conjecture that EPDM’s enduring pan-Ethiopian veneer formed a convenient 
gloss: a) within the terms of which Ethiopians of all ethnic backgrounds were encouraged and able to 
join EPRDF; b) which deferred the need explicitly to abandon the organisation’s pan-Ethiopianist 
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and the training they received for both purposes (in the interests of stabilising a 
precarious vacuum) was a political and ideological one given by the party. Until such 
time as state structures were in place, the seamless process of consolidation and 
expansion of both party and administration, begun with POW education hidden in the 
mountains of Tigray, continued unconstrained and at breakneck speed throughout the 
south under the banner of ‘peace and stability’. 
 
The final point of note is the strategy of targeting ‘educated people’ best able to help 
establish organisational structures on the ground. The southern cadres who had 
already become members of EPRDF were relatively few in number and (since almost 
all were rank and file POWs) relatively uneducated180: they were valued by the 
organisation more as a key to initial contact with small southern populations than for 
their long-term suitability as community leaders, and most of the original group seem 
subsequently to have been replaced181. Interviewees were ambivalent as to whether 
those put forward to represent their communities were selected by the communities 
or by the initial group of cadres, but it is apparent that the cadres had clear 
instructions as to what sort of people they were looking for.  
 
[Those of us] who were chosen all went to Awassa for training. We 
attended meetings, and stayed there for a month. We studied how 
Ethiopia had been during the Dergue, then about EPRDF and its policies. 
After the month they said to us ‘you four are teachers: you have already 
got the idea, so you should go back to the area and teach the people why 
it is that EPRDF has come to help them’. In particular we had to tell 
people about the need for them not to sell their land. So then the four of 
us who were more experienced returned home, whilst the others who 
                                                                                                                                          
origins; and c) which happily contributed to concealing from outsiders (and competitors) the 
meticulous ongoing preparation for ethnic-based mobilisation in the south post-Dergue.  
180 The leadership of the southern caucus was made up of senior officer POWs, crucially 
supplemented by a number of ‘intellectuals’, including Dr Kassu Yilala and Dr Ahmed Hassan who 
joined the organisation overseas. As Calhoun has observed of China, in Ethiopia also the term 
‘intellectual’ ‘carries a broader reference than in the West. It means more or less all educated people.’ 
(Calhoun 1991:71n5) Thus party members are regarded in two categories as either ‘peasants’ (who 
pay a small fixed subscription), or ‘intellectuals’ meaning all others (who pay a percentage of their 
income on a sliding scale).  
181 Comments such as the following were commonplace: ‘Originally in 1991 there were 7 EPRDF 
soldiers who came here and were from this area. […] All 7 are now out of politics: either because they 
were ill or because they were evaluated to be inadequate’ (interview, private sector officer, Tepi, 
Kaffa-Sheka zone, 8 October 1999). 
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were only 10th and 11th graders182 stayed on for a longer training. 
(Interview, teacher, Tepi, then Kaffa-Sheka zone, October 1999) 
 
Rural schoolteachers were obviously of great interest to EPRDF, as were other junior 
government employees of local origin. Such individuals were targeted to become 
members of the party, and remain in overwhelming numbers the backbone of local 
administration183. They became attractive recruits for EPRDF since they were based 
in rural areas and apparently enjoyed that winning combination of close contact with 
the rural community, and – in view of their relatively higher levels of education – a 
degree of status and respect amongst their rural neighbours. In 1991, existing EPRDF 
members from the south had few if any formal educational qualifications or 
experience. Effecting at least a marginal improvement in the educational level of 
core cadres was therefore a priority for the party. However, an equally significant 
factor in the recruitment of primary teachers was their uniform ambition to escape 
their rural postings and move on to higher things184. 
 
Class distinctions and political affiliation 
 
EPRDF seems to have recognised the potential of existing socio-economic cleavages 
in small towns and rural areas, and by the late 1990s a fairly clear class distinction 
could be observed between supporters of the government and those of the opposition. 
Junior elementary teachers, lower members of the local bureaucracy, and school 
leavers – those, in short, who had everything to gain from joining the ranks of the 
party of government – have often become its enthusiastic members185. Meanwhile, 
those who may already have enjoyed a rather higher status in rural areas (which they 
may have feared risking), and who are frequently less than enthusiastic about the 
                                                 
182 students sit the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate (ESLC) at the end of 12th grade, so 10th and 
11th graders would be relatively senior high school students.  
183 This is a situation also reportedly commonplace during the previous regime. 
184 The disgruntlement of rural schoolteachers at the hardships of their lot has long been documented 
(Wrinkle (1953), Aklilu Habte (1960), Bowden (1976)). Bowden (1976:475) summarises a litany of 
grievances including economic factors, poor working and living conditions, lack of opportunities, 
isolation, and low social prestige. 
185 ‘Most of those who are brought in to administer the zones can be considered a “lumpen 
intelligentsia”. The social resentment of this class which has not gone on to success or to university is 
something which has been exploited by the party and in this sense they have been much cleverer than 
their competitors.’ (Interview, foreign observer, Addis Ababa, September 1999)  
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overnight political rise of their juniors – those, in fact, typified by head-teachers, 
graduates, and professionals, as well as those with some inherited wealth – very often 
filled the ranks of opposition organisations. This pattern has, of course, been 
modified over the course of the decade, as the educational profile of EPRDF 
members and local administrators has been transformed by the impact of the Civil 
Service College degree and diploma programmes, from which so many have 
graduated. The point remains that those who support the party of government have 
usually won both their education, and the other advantages they enjoy, at its hands. 
Those who have led opposition to it, on the other hand, often had ‘independent 
means’ of some kind, whether educational, professional, social, or economic. 
 
The parties which made up Beyene Petros’, Southern Peoples’ Coalition (SEPDC, or 
hibret), for instance, were also often represented by teachers, but usually more senior 
ones than those joining EPRDF. (Those who gained some seniority under the 
previous government, and who became members of its Workers’ Party (WPE), were 
precluded from office and ruling party membership.)  
 
There is more than one interpretation of this situation. Opponents assert that EPRDF 
quickly proved itself an organisation that anyone with any real education, 
independence, or community standing rapidly left, or had nothing to do with it from 
the beginning. Others suggest that EPRDF targeted the ‘lumpen intelligentsia’, 
calculating that the higher educated group were likely to prove ‘class enemies’ of 
their peasant-orientated policies. Others still, that they saw in this strategy a means to 
undermine their competitors: 
 
The problem was that other liberation movements didn’t understand the 
danger and potential of existing social cleavages. EPRDF did, and were 
thus able to portray the nationality based movements that mushroomed in 
1991 as upper class organs, as for instance they did with the Sidama 
Liberation Movement, SLM, suggesting that they had actually opposed 
land reform, and were controlled by feudals and aristocrats. (Interview, 




The SLM’s leaders, who joined the TGE in 1991, were particularly vulnerable to the 
EPRDF populist rhetoric, which soon labelled them ‘class enemies’186. 
Unsurprisingly, SLM left the TGE along with the OLF, announcing likewise a return 
to armed struggle187. Whether the EPRDF acted on the basis of ideological 
conviction or of considerations of power or both, it is worth reiterating a point 
suggested above. The TPLF/EPRDF has always deployed a double-edged sword 
against its enemies, one equally capable of despatching pan-Ethiopian challengers 
with its ethno-nationalist blade, and co-ethnic competitors with its alternate edge, 
that of superior class analysis. After 1991 the ideology of class struggle became the 
more important weapon, given administrative arrangements which themselves 
militated against the operation of multi-ethnic or pan-Ethiopian organisations. It has 
been deployed in almost all cases where ethnic competitors either emerged or 
existed.  
EPRDF’s failure (or determination not) to recruit the ‘ethnic elite’ in each case seems 
to have had negative consequences in terms of local perceptions of party legitimacy 
and ‘ownership’. In many instances the low calibre and lower socio-economic profile 
of those commonly recruited into the party has been, in itself, enough to engender a 
sense of mistrust.  
 
They seem determined to recruit the most worthless and useless people, 
and then of course they kick them out for corruption. Corruption and 
turnover of personnel is an acute problem in this area. It is such a 
constraint that we almost think there is a deliberate policy of 
                                                 
186 Several had been given official positions by the Dergue, later becoming disillusioned and defecting 
initially to the SALF, and in 1982 setting up the militant anti-Dergue SLM with an office in 
Mogadisho (Markakis 1987:294n38). Wolde Amanuel himself, having represented the Sidama at the 
July 1991 Transitional conference, was subsequently added to the SPO list of those wanted in 
connection with alleged Dergue-era crimes, and fled abroad. 
187 Support for the SLM, which seems to have continued to be quite strong in some parts of the area, 
was kept in check amongst the crucial middle class by the selection of a Sidama SNNPNRS President, 
and of Awassa as the regional capital. Development (and enrichment) opportunities were good in the 
cosy environment of Awassa’s exponential mid-1990s expansion. Although control of the process of 
allocation of land leases in a number of SNNPNRS’s urban centres (particularly lucrative in Awassa) 
had attracted inter-ethnic wrangling and controversy for some years, enviable (and envied) flagship 
development projects in Awassa and Yirgalem muted the appeal of SLM complaints about ‘abuses’ of 
Sidama land rights, and the trade in that most valuable Sidama product, coffee. 
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destabilisation. (Interview, private sector professional, Awassa, 15 
October 1999)188 
 
Such suspicions have been greatly exacerbated by the visibility of the local EPRDF 
PDOs’ ‘outside backers’, which has substantially vitiated the organisations’ claims to 
indigenousness and legitimacy189. Opponents object that, whatever its pretensions to 
local credibility, and whatever the benefits and advantages of its enthusiasm for 
indigenous languages and localised administration, EPRDF’s apparent unwillingness 
to recruit those capable of independent pursuit of local interests, call into question its 
real motivation.  
 
Language and class 
 
Before considering how EPRDF interacted with its competitor organisations in the 
south, it is worth noting that the constellation of ethnicity (and language) and class 
has operated subtly differently in the south than was the case in Tigray. This has 
resulted in a clearer correlation between class profile and enthusiasm for ethnic self-
determination, especially as regards the prioritisation of mother-tongue languages, in 
some of the southern cases. Twenty-five years ago  
 
[a]mong university students, the Tigrinya-speakers appeared more loyal 
to Tigrinya than did the [Oromos] and Gurages to their mother tongues. 
(Cooper 1976:299) 
 
Cooper attributed this factor to the relative prestige both of Tigrayan ethnicity and of 
the Tigrigna language190, which helped to counter the influence of ‘educational and 
                                                 
188 Northern cadres at the Second EPRDF Organisational Congress, held in Awassa in early 1993, also 
expressed concern about the ‘poor levels of conscientisation’ of their southern comrades (interviews 
with delegates, Awassa, January 1993). 
189 The presence of Tigrayans in advisory positions within the SNNPNRS was much talked about, and 
particular vitriol focused on the figure of Bitew Belay, the then TPLF Central Committee member 
often referred to as ‘the Viceroy of the South’. 
190 ‘One factor that serves to promote or retard language shift is the relative prestige of the groups 
whose languages are in contact. Groups whose prestige is high are less likely to abandon that symbol 
of group identity, the mother tongue, than groups whose prestige is low […] The cultural kinship 
shared by Amharas and Tigrinya speakers and their participation in a common tradition have given a 
greater prestige to the latter, vis-à-vis the Amharas, than to other groups. While the prestige of a 
language in general is inseparable from the prestige of those who speak it, Tigrinya also has a source 
of prestige which is independent of its group, namely the fact that it is the only Ethiopian language 
besides Amharic in which publication is regularly carried out.  […] Current publication yields prestige 
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occupational mobility’ associated with the adoption of Amharic. In the south, by 
contrast, where indigenous languages were less widely spoken, were often not 
written and standardised191 and certainly not used for publication, and where 
Amharic-speaking settlers were rather more widespread, the incentives for those with 
education to learn, even adopt, Amharic were clearly greater192. When the TPLF had 
advocated the renaissance of Tigrigna in Tigray, the policy had met with a uniformly 
enthusiastic endorsement, driven equally by peasants’ concerns to be able to access 
courts, administration and services without intermediaries, and by the middle class 
desire to reassert Tigrigna’s ‘fine literary tradition’ (which had enough basis to 
sustain the widespread interpretation that it had been falsely slighted and repressed), 
and to gain employment. 
 
In the south, middle class attitudes regarding the adoption of indigenous languages 
for education and administration have been more ambivalent, and the calculations as 
to their relative ‘value’193 vis-à-vis Amharic more complicated. As a result, whilst 
peasants often seem to have been enthused by EPRDF’s ‘empowerment’ of their 
language, in some cases their more educated (and often correspondingly more mobile 
and/or urban) brethren have seen the potential pitfalls associated with the policy, and 
reacted at best with indifference194, at worst suspicion. Many increasingly view the 
use of local languages in education (and the concomitant loss of Amharic, the only 
                                                                                                                                          
to the language and provides an additional incentive for those who speak it natively to retain it.’ 
(1976:298-9)  
191 See Chapters III and VII on the importance of written text in ‘capturing’ a language by establishing 
a norm around which dialects coalesce, as well as the tendency of oral language groups to exaggerate 
dialect difference. 
192 1994 census figures for the SNNPNRS indicate 312,929 claiming Amhara ethnicity, and 438,403 
claiming Amharic as a mother tongue; the two figures for Tigray NRS, and in particular the 
discrepancy between them are all significantly smaller. These figures pale into insignificance however 
when compared with those to be found in Oromia where Amharas number nearly 1.7 million, and 
Amharic mother tongue speakers over 2 million (see below, this chapter). Also significant are figures 
for those with Amharic as a second language: 16.6% of the population in SNNPNRS; 11.2% in 
Oromia NRS; and only 7.1% in Tigray NRS (respective regional analytical census reports (Volume II) 
pp.44-5). 
193 Measured on a range of criteria, all of which seem to incorporate ideas of status and usefulness in 
varying proportion. 
194 Even members of the local government are phlegmatic rather than enthusiastic: ‘Although 
Hadiyigna is our working language, actually we don’t use it all that much. All kinds of languages are 
used in the zone – Amharic, Hadiyigna, Kambatigna, and Silte. There are large number of Silte traders 
in this area, and more than half are Silte in Hosaina’ (interview, zone Bureau head, Hosaina, Hadiya 
zone, October 1999) 
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possible ‘lingua franca’) as potentially isolating, and restrictive of the mobility and 
opportunities of the next generation – effectively as evidence of an abiding 
Abyssinian determination to ‘divide and rule’. In areas such as Hadiya and 
Kambatta, for instance, such suspicion has become something of a marker of 
opposition to EPRDF – even where the ethno-nationalist groups have otherwise 
welcomed the principle of ethnic self-determination. By mid-2002 anecdotal 
evidence was building that in some parts, those with the resources to do so are 
increasingly now sending their children to be educated in towns where schooling is 
available in Amharic. With the decline in the ability of many school-leavers to 
communicate in Amharic visible in many parts of the South by the end of the decade, 
even ambitious peasants began to question the benefits of educating their children in 
indigenous languages which would do nothing to facilitate their upward or outward 
mobility. In a number of areas, Amharic has been retained for education and 
administration. 
 
Despite the different constellation of interest in the south than in Tigray, southern 
responses have not been uniform. The very different manner in which the language 
issue has played out in Simien Omo, which is discussed in Chapter VII, seems to 
support the contention of Chapter II, that collective conclusions and actions reflect 




There are persistent and widespread reports that EPRDF has responded to 
competitors in the south with a systematic strategy to undermine opponents, old and 
new.  
 
In Gedeo, the repression was as strong as in Oromia, because there was a 
strong local movement […] people do not particularly want to talk. 
Gedeo is similar, because the armed resistance in the 1950s and 60s to 
Amhara landlordism made it difficult to get support for the EPRDF 
organisations. Compare also the case of the SLM: they have members 
and followers underground, but they cannot operate openly. (Interview, 




The recent results of this situation in Gedeo are vividly documented by Pausewang, 
who describes ‘an atmosphere of distrust and fear’ (2000:117), and confirms the 
suggestion that ‘the tense relations between the two competing parties may partly be 
explained by recourse to history’ (ibid.:118). 
 
Whilst these accounts are significant because they are of such frequency as to 
suggest a political pattern, their significance is difficult to establish, because of the 
difficulty of ascertaining levels – let alone profiles - of popular support for any of the 
non-EPRDF organisations or individuals involved. More significant, therefore, has 
become the case of the opposition Hadiya National Democratic Organisation 
(HNDO), which in 2000 generated an unprecedented level of support, or at least of 
opposition to EPRDF.  
 
Hadiya, Kambatta, and the campaign against the southern coalition 
 
They cannot let us only have a sniff at democracy: they have to allow us 
to eat it too! (Hadiya elder, quoted in Tronvoll 2000:149) 
 
The Hadiya (and similarly also the Kambatta) case offers a particularly clear 
demonstration of the correlation of class and political divisions amongst the rural and 
small town populations. The parties that made up the SEPDC, including Beyene 
Petros’ own Hadiya National Democratic Organisation (HNDO), count many 
relatively senior and experienced teachers amongst their members, along with local 
businessmen, and social elites. HNDO and EPRDF representatives both acknowledge 
that a major cause of the strong electoral showing of the HNDO in 2000 federal and 
NRS contests, was the very public failing of an EPRDF administration in Hadiya, 
which had been riven by corruption scandals195.  
 
Nevertheless, it is unclear quite how the HNDO managed to present itself as a 
preferable alternative to the ruling party. Observers agree that, from the elections in 
                                                 
195 HNDO won 6 out of 7 of the constituencies where elections were rerun in mid-2000. A number of 
interlocutors also suggest that the vote was also influenced by local anger at the deployment of 
‘mostly Tigrayan’ special forces in the area before and between the initial and repeat election dates. 
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1992 until early 2000, HNDO had little in the way of visible organisational 
infrastructure in Hadiya areas, especially as compared with the EPRDF.  
 
In [1991-2] we had an office in this area, but it was closed down. They 
refused us permission directly, saying ‘you cannot give your political 
idea to the people’. They only wanted the EPRDF candidates to 
participate in the election. […] I actively participated in the election in 
1992. We had so many people and supporters. (Interview, HNDO 
representative, Hosaina, 17 October 1999 
 
Songs and poems seem to have been used to disseminate information about HNDO 
electoral symbols (Tronvoll 2000:164). Such strategies, and the strength of protest 
feeling, may have helped to counteract a relative paucity of resources and 
organisational capacity. It seems, however, that deeper social dynamics may also 
have been in play in this case, and that these may have hinged upon perceptions of 
‘authenticity’ and legitimacy of ethnic representation.  
 
The HNDO chairman and his fellow leaders, for instance, were extremely well 
known amongst the extensive middle-classes in the relatively many small market 
centres and towns of Hadiya, of which Hosaina and Shone are only the most 
important. Dr Beyene’s canvassing in Hosaina in 1992 drew a large crowd. As a 
professor at Addis Ababa University, whose name and voice were from time to time 
heard on the national and international media, he had a status in the eyes of the 
aspirant Hadiya population which EPRDF’s school-leaver cadres could never attain. 
He was thus in a position both to draw on, and to generate Hadiya ethnic pride 
amongst the elite and the wider population in a way which was not open to them. A 
range of examples emerged in the course of fieldwork, where appeals to the authority 
of ‘elders’, or historical family connections, had been used to promote and lend 
credibility to moves against the ruling party or government196.  
 
                                                 
196 Another instance of this would be the role of the leader of the Welaiyta delegations to Addis Ababa 
in 1999, Wana Wageisho. His nomination and claim to speak on behalf of his people drew at least in 
part upon his wife’s status as the niece of King T’ona, the legendary warrior/leader who had 
galvanised local resistance to Menelik (interview, delegation members, Welaiyta Sodo, 13 October 
1999). See Chapter VII below. 
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Ironically, a good parallel could be drawn here with the preference and support given 
in Dergue-era Tigray for the TPLF leadership. Tigrayan peasants and petite 
bourgeoisie in the late 1970s and 1980s supported and followed not other peasants, 
but their university-educated elite, overwhelmingly also the scions of Tigray’s socio-
economic elite. Beyene Petros and his colleagues could be seen to be a much closer 
social equivalent of the group who led the TPLF, than were the raw recruits to the 
ruling party of the 1990s. This may go some way to explaining the large vote which 
the HNDO gained in 2000. Since it suggests a fairly tenuous and speculative decision 
to favour the known names of the HNDO by the peasantry, it perhaps also suggests 
why that vote may have collapsed in 2001, in the face of what seems to have been 
considerable pressure from state and ruling party bodies in the intervening period 
(Pausewang (2001), Pausewang & Aalen (2002). 
 
If here there is a parallel with ‘revolutionary Tigray’, Hadiya contrasts strongly with 
Tigray in respect of popular attitudes to indigenous language, as discussed above, 
and this undoubtedly also played to the advantage of the SEPDC/HNDO. Middle 
class attitudes to the adoption of indigenous language for education and 
administration have been overtly hostile in Hadiya. This ambivalence was seen early 
on amongst HNDO circles when, at a rally in Hosaina during the transitional period, 
the crowd called on speakers to drop Hadiyigna, and just use Amharic (Kjetil 
Tronvoll, personal communication, July 2001). The (EPRDF) explanation that this is 
because HNDO has support only in urban areas seems less tenable after the 2000 
elections, and probably underestimates the strength of feeling building in the 
SNNPNRS on the language issue.  
 
Questions about the scale of political conflict in Hadiya (and other areas), the 
number of deaths and casualties associated with it, and who bears responsibility for 
initiating, perpetrating, and allowing violence, are all highly contentious. ERPDF and 
opposition interlocutors give diametrically opposite analyses. In the wake of what 
little is known of the 2001 electoral experience, however, it seems increasingly 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that government and/or ruling party repression of the 
opposition has been deliberate, systematic, and comprehensive. In mid-2002 the 
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mood amongst those politically involved on either side in Hosaina remained tense 
and cautious, with security officers overtly watchful of outsiders attempting to 
investigate these issues. 
 
Konso: the honeymoon and after  
 
Konso has seen internal political conflict only relatively recently, and then not on as 
wide a scale as Hadiya. Watson describes a ‘honeymoon period’ in Konso in the 
early to mid-1990s, ascribing its subsequent waning to a number of factors, including 
the failure of local administrators to work with and through indigenous social 
institutions in shaping the Konso Special Wereda government (2002:198-218). That 
Konso did indeed enjoy a period of calm, in contrast with the rapid acrimony in other 
parts of the south, may reflect the unusual strategy adopted by the Konso opposition: 
essentially ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’. The Konso group set up at the outset 
of the TGE adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the ruling party, and soon became 
an EPRDF member, the Konso People’s Democratic Organisation (KPDO). The 
older, educated elite, and the newly recruited EPRDF cadres worked together within 
the party for a relatively long time. Whether leading members of the former category 
finally resigned or were ‘sacked following evaluation’ from the KPDO is disputed. 
Crystal clear, meanwhile, is the bitterness and antagonism inherent in their 
experience of setting up the opposition KDP, which was finally registered with the 
NEB in 2000, winning 7 seats in the wereda assembly, and control of three kebeles in 
the 2001 elections197. 
 
The period of 5-6 years during which the individuals who are now antagonists 
worked together in the administration of Konso seems to have had a range of 
observable effects, some more positive than others. Although the KDP and its 
supporters seem to have faced difficulties and intimidation since the 2001 election, 
KDP officers were imprisoned ‘partly because the government officials are slightly 
                                                 
197 The ruling KPDO and/or special wereda government since established a ‘temporary 
administration’ (gizeyawi tsefet bet) in each of the three kebeles, and KDP officials complain these 
have allowed their elected representatives no official recognition or services, but rather called kebele 
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afraid of them, since previously they have been with them in the party, and were 
powerful’ (interviews, Karate, 19 June 2002). Other private interlocutors suggest that 
the situation is not as clear-cut, or indeed as acrimonious and dangerous as 
government and opposition politicians claim, since ‘they all have some kin relation 
one with another’. The advantage of what seems still to be a marginally less 
conflictual situation than many elsewhere, may be that population and politicians 
alike speak with considerable openness (and cynicism) about the administration of 
the special wereda to date. This is almost certainly outweighed, however, by 
persistent and endemic corruption and croneyism amongst all of Konso’s politicians, 
if widespread allegations are to be believed. Watson’s concerns that, despite the 
evident advantages of ethnic federalism in principle, local administration remained in 
practice external (and oblivious) to the social traditions of the majority of the 
population of Konso (2002:209ff) are more than borne out by a series of interviews 
conducted locally in mid-2002. Interlocutors place the blame for an almost total 
dearth of the materials, running costs, and motivation with which good initiatives 
could have translated into socio-economic advantage in Konso, squarely on the 
shoulders of ‘the politicians’, seeing little to distinguish between them198. 
 
One size fits all: limitations on mobilisation ‘from within’ 
 
By no means does […] “objective” measuring of cultural similarities lend 
itself to direct political application. It always leads to etic interpretations, 
not to emic views of identity. If self-determination is to mean anything, 
definition of political identity should be left to the bearers of these 
identities. In view of actual political power games such a position may 
sound idealistic. (Schlee 1994:139) 
 
If the claims to indigenousness and legitimacy of EPRDF organisations in the south 
are vitiated by the relatively lower class profiles of those they have recruited and by 
whom they are led, as well as by their non-indigenous connections, they are perhaps 
                                                                                                                                          
meetings in June 2002, apparently in an attempt to overturn their election (interviews, Karate, 19 June 
2002). 
198 Although not discussed in Chapter VII, Konso is by no means immune to boundary disputes 
associated with ethnicity. The most serious of these concerns Teltele district, claimed since 1992 by 
Borana zone of Oromia NRS (Schröder (1998:24ff)). Another border dispute (Gato and Bayde 
Fuchucha) was under discussion between Konso and Derashe special wereda administrations in mid-
2002, with a further claim for separation (Ale) referred to the NRS parliament for consideration. 
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further damaged by the often relatively superficial, cursory, and formulaic nature of 
the interventions which the fledgling PDOs have made in various localities.  
 
Ethnographic depictions of remote groups have traditionally often been prefaced 
with the researcher’s lamentations as to the ignorance of those who seek to govern 
their research subjects, and the crudity and folly of their attempts to interact with 
them. In the worst cases such accounts have combined a strong normative sense of 
the superiority of the researcher’s knowledge as a basis for policy formulation, with a 
streak of irritation as to the likely ‘sullying’ effect of administrative interference 
upon the pristine culture of those studied.  
 
Fortunately there is a strengthening body of ethnography, and ‘ethnographic history’ 
(Donham 1999) on southern Ethiopia, much of which employs a deconstructive 
analysis in order to consider the ‘two main levels of discourse: that of the state and 
its political elite and administrative bureaucracy, but also that of the various ‘native’ 
groups.’ (Abbink 1991:3) This corpus represents the view  
 
that the conventional approach to areas like the Ethiopian Southwest, 
until recently resulting in a series of classical monographs, should shift to 
a more regional-comparative view, emphasizing the historical links 
between the various ethnic formations and the processes conditioning 
them. (Abbink 1991:3) 
 
Relations between ethnic groups and the state then become less disturbances vitiating 
research, than the focus of its interest. Sensitivity to the view and culture of ethnic 
groups, and their self-determination, is the explicit claim of the ruling party, and 
ethnography which sheds light on its success or failure takes on more than usual 
political interest and salience. This is true of commentary such as that of Abbink 
(1991, 2000), Schlee (1994 1989), Turton (1994, 1989) and (on the Dergue period) 
Donham (1999).  
 
Limited local knowledge in Bench Maji 
 
Abbink’s account of the escalation of conflict, and erosion of conciliation capacity in 
Bench Maji zone (2000) gives a dramatically different picture of the way in which 
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the zone is governed from the account taken down in Mizan Teferi with which this 
section opened. The centrepiece of his article is a review of the meeting called by 
EPRDF cadres in 1991 to discuss the establishment of the zone government and call 
upon participants – particularly the Suri (or Surma)199 - to give up their weapons. The 
meeting was 
 
a first effort at local translation of new (EPRDF) policy. The proceedings 
of the meeting reveal as much about Suri and Dizi attitudes as about 
those of the EPRDF people. (ibid.:540) 
 
His conclusions are salutary and discomfiting, and illuminate the scale of problems 
associated with this act of ‘translation’, problems which in this case he associates 
with two related features of the attitudes of the incoming cadres: ignorance and 
disregard of local norms, and an assumption of superior understanding. 
 
[…] the idea that a ‘final settlement’ of regional problems could be 
reached, on the basis of ‘reasonable agreement’ among the groups, 
proved to be too optimistic. […] the meeting was marked by 
misunderstandings and by underlying indifference among the 
participants. […] The EPRDF people perhaps thought it could work 
along the lines they knew from conciliation efforts in the communities in 
their own (Tigray) area, where there was an underlying linguistic and 
cultural homogeneity lacking among the Maji population […] Hence 
their cultural concepts of mediation and conciliation were shaped by a 
partly traditional northern Ethiopian ethic modified by secular and 
revolutionary-socialist thinking, which declared cultural differences and 
personal grievances (related to theft, loss of dignity, insult, etc.) 
relatively insignificant in view of the collective interest. Another 
underlying idea among the EPRDF people was that whatever the 
problems in the Maji area, one had to deal with the fact that the people 
there were illiterate, uneducated and just ‘ignorant’ of how to deal with 
problems of conflict and reconciliation; one therefore had to ‘teach them’ 
(ibid.:544)200 
                                                 
199 The latter is ‘the name under which they are known to neighbouring groups and state officials; they 
themselves now reject the term, preferring ‘Suri’’ (2000:533n10). This is not the only instance where 
outsiders including the state and ruling party persist in referring to an ethnic group by a name that they 
reject; another is the Daro or Daro Konta of Simien Omo, who object to the commonly used name 
Kulo, or Kulo Konta having learned of its offensive connotations in Italian (interviews, civil servants 
and private sector officers, Ella Konta wereda, and Waka, Mareka Gena wereda, Simien Omo, 12 
October 1999). By far the most notorious case of this kind, of course, was the formerly widespread 
use of the word ‘Galla’, ‘a name applied by outsiders, by which the Oromo were known until recently 
[and] loaded with negative connotations. The Oromo do not call themselves Galla and they resist 
being so called’ Mohammed Hassan (1990:xi).  




Taken out of context201, the failure of EPRDF cadres to ‘sacrifice oxen or carry out 
other ritual acts deemed necessary for a true reconciliation’ (ibid.:545) may seem a 
trivial matter of ethnographic nicety. The virtue of Abbink’s account, however, lies 
in his demonstration of the fact that it was much more than this: the crucial meeting 
failed in its objectives precisely because it ‘ignored or bypassed cultural expectations 
among Dizi, Me’en and especially Suri of what a reconciliation meeting should be 
and how the participants should be treated’ (ibid.:545). Essentially, here, the EPRDF 
cadres had failed to press home the advantages of the instrumental power of 
mobilising on the basis of ethnicity – precisely because they did not understand the 
conventions associated with the ethnicities in play in this instance. Rather they were 
operating on the basis of ‘identikit’ conceptions of ethnic identity, and of the proper 
dynamics of inter-group conciliation, developed and imported from elsewhere. The 
strategy did, of course, have some important benefits202. These (and their 
sustainability) were vastly reduced, however, because of the formulaic manner in 




Part of the explanation for EPRDF’s failures of mobilisation lies in their 
misconception of the nature of ethnicity and ethnic identity, something which is 
borne out by important ethnographic work. The party (in common with many 
theorists of identity) has operated in the positivist (in this case additionally Leninist) 
tradition of an instrumental or materialist understanding of collective identity, 
according to which nations, nationalities, and peoples are the products (for 
primordialists additionally the ‘natural’ if not perennial products) of the operation of 
‘objective criteria’ within ‘the objective situation’. Thus the organisation has tended 
to disregard the continuous internal process of collective construction and 
reconstruction of group identity203. Rather it has been tempted to view the ethnic 
                                                 
201 Or with the reader’s own modernist preconceptions. 
202 For instance, in creating a ‘new local leadership stratum’ (ibid.:545). 
203 Although, of course, given its material/instrumental slant, it is sometimes explicitly conscious of 
the possibilities of external (re)construction of group identity by means of socio-political 
‘engineering’ (see Chapter VII below). 
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groups in question in terms of the ‘objective’ characteristics which it (or rather 
Stalin) has defined in advance, and been able to observe from the outside. In turn it 
has often unwittingly ridden roughshod over ‘what the group knows’ from the inside, 
the emic perspective (cf. Schlee 1994) which, I argue, in fact precisely constitutes its 
collective identity. EPRDF has been successful in its mobilisation efforts primarily 
where it has been seen ‘genuinely’ to have operated from within the relevant group 
and with a knowledge and understanding of its culture and interests. Attaining such a 
perspective has clearly depended upon a lot more than the ability of its cadres to 
speak the local language, and where cadres’ efforts have come to a halt at this 
superficial level, they have met with correspondingly limited success.204 
 
Fortunately for the government, those areas of the country where the local culture 
has been at furthest remove from the shared experience of its cadres have also been 
furthest from important centres of population, economic activity, and government 
control. Whilst some investment in learning about the linguistic and cultural 
concerns of several million Welaiyta or Sidama is likely to yield a valuable return 
even for a federal official, a similar approach to the problems of 3,258 distant 
Mursi205 and their neighbours is less likely to be of interest to Ethiopia’s politicians, 
be they in Addis Ababa, or the SNNPNRS capital Awassa. However, it is interesting 
that the ‘authenticity’ of EPRDF organisations has become a matter of widespread 
and explicit contention in those parts of the country where the organisation has faced 
strongest competition and resistance, and some of these are also large and central 
regions. This issue is explored in further detail with particular reference to Oromia 
NRS below. 
 
                                                 
204 In addition to the detrimental effect upon the party’s own fortunes and capacity for effective 
mobilisation and action, more serious still is Abbink’s suggestion that in Bench Maji ‘the disregard of 
the EPRDF for local notions and symbols of peace-making’ has contributed to the ‘’undoing of 
culture’, i.e. of the ritual codes of mediation’ and thus been implicated in ‘the intensification of 
violence itself’ (2000:547). 
205 One of the many groups living in Debub Omo zone, regarding whom vid. Turton’s work going 
back to 1977. This population figure is from the 1994 census. Ironically the very obscurity of the 
Mursi makes them of disproportionate note at national level, as a result of significant tourist interest in 
their distinctive dress and appearance, notably clay lip and earlobe plates.   
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In concluding this review of EPRDF’s attempts to redraw and dominate 
‘representation’ in the SNNPNRS, however, it is perhaps important to counter what 
may be an overly negative focus upon problems and failures. For much of the 1990s 
it seems clear that the gamble of the EPRDF that the peasantry, and those who most 
closely influence it, would respond with enthusiasm to the chance of 'ethnic self-
determination' seems to have paid a handsome return in the Southern Region. By the 
time of the establishment of the FDRE in 1995, it seems clear that the EPRDF was 
pleased with the rapid progress of the parties making up its Southern Front. 
Interviews conducted suggest that there are perhaps good reasons for this.   
 
Rural informants in the southern region - including those who do not support the 
Front - remain remarkably enthusiastic about federalism and the 'gifts' that it has 
brought: local autonomy of a unit defined around their own group; linguistic 
freedom, and access to educational and judicial systems now administered in their 
own languages; local employment opportunities in the decentralised administration; 
the visibility of representatives from their own group at the federal level, and - 
perhaps more importantly than anything else - the allocation and visible expenditure 
of capital budget resources within each local area by local people, where this had not 
been the case in the past. The next chapter outlines the circumstances in which, 
whereas 'being able to use one's own language' is commonly the visible marker of a 
change of policy which has earned rapid support, it has often been the perception of 
the delivery of (control of) economic advantage which has emerged as the key to 
sustaining it or not. It is here that more visible problems have arisen. 
 
If the consideration of the southern region given this chapter has suggested the 
problems associated with external and politically prescriptive classification of 
collective identity, that set out in the next chapter considers the internal adaptations 
and evolutions of identity, which have constituted collective responses to the new 
circumstances and opportunities that ethnic federalism has been seen to offer. In the 
SNNPNRS these have been significant.  
 




Where we didn’t succeed was in nomadic areas, and we didn’t even try, 
because in these areas, clan realities are the key issue – not political 
issues. We didn’t try to organise in these areas because we knew it 
wouldn’t work. (Interview, then President of the TGE, Addis Ababa, 
August 1994) 
 
We were delighted. The training had gone very well with good 
discussions and active participation, and we felt that they really 
understood and accepted – even somehow ‘owned’ - the criteria for the 
distribution. So we were dismayed to find that as soon as the inputs had 
been dished out and we turned our backs, they completely redistributed 
everything according to what was ‘right’ in clan terms. It was quite a 
lesson. (Interview, international NGO officer, commenting on a 
rehabilitation project in Harerghe, Addis Ababa, September 1995) 
 
This section briefly recounts the very different strategy pursued by EPRDF in 
pastoral areas including the Ogaden, Haud, and Awash, where their standard 
approach of deploying a network of indigenous cadres to mobilise the local 
communities ‘from within’ was modified in the face of a non-sedentary and clan-
based population. In these areas, EPRDF – at least initially – pursued an exceptional 
policy of working through clan leaders as intermediary ‘coalition partners’, rather 
than attempting direct mobilisation. 
 
Pastoralists and the state 
 
Under most circumstances, as set out at the beginning of this chapter, EPRDF was 
reluctant to enter into alliances with ‘elite groups’, preferring to operate directly 
through its cadres to ‘ally with the people’ (interview, TGE President, Addis Ababa, 
August 1994). However in the case of Afar and Somali pastoralists they recognised 
early on that this would not work, and sought an alternative approach: 
 
You can’t go beyond clan realities to the issues of land, language, 
culture, participation, power, and to mobilising the peasants, because 
they are nomads, so here you either have a clan leader or you don’t. And 
in these instances we knew that the type of coalition that we needed to 
build was a coalition [with local leaders]. They are not EPRDF, but they 
are positively inclined towards EPRDF. (Interview, TGE president, 




It seems likely that, in addition to the centrality of the clan, ‘cornerstone of Somali 
[and Afar] pastoralist society’ (Markakis 1995[1993]:ix), EPRDF caution also took 
account of the well-documented hostility existing between nomads and the state206. 
This hostility is the result both of the brutal history of Abyssinian expansion and 
annexation of the neighbouring lowlands207, and persisting Somali irredentism208. 
Additionally, pastoralists 
 
have a shallow commitment to the nationalist goal of founding a state. 
This seemingly fickle attitude reflects this group’s lack of interest in the 
state, an institution for which the traditional pastoralist mode of 




they tend to view government as alien and unrepresentative of their 
interests and concerns [… and] the mutual suspicion and lack of 
understanding between them is re-enforced. (Hogg 1997a:13-4) 
 
Pastoralist alienation in the Horn of Africa fuels violent political conflict 
and is one of the challenges faced by the post-colonial state in this 
region. The marginal position of pastoralists in the Horn ensures this 
challenge is not a serious threat to the state, unless it joins with political 
dissidence on the part of other social groups. (Markakis 1995[1993]:ix)  
 
The widespread perception that ‘loss of autonomy and incorporation […] set most 
pastoralist societies in the Horn of Africa on a path of irreversible decline’ (Markakis 
1993:3) has fed this disaffection209. It seems unlikely that even an ideal of ‘self-
determination’ granted to Ethiopian Somalis and Afars within their own National 
Regional States would have been able to reverse this situation, given an overarching 
regional context of sovereign states whose international borders continue to criss-
cross and interrupt migration routes, cutting off access to water and seasonal pasture. 
What eventuated was short of that ideal. 
 
                                                 
206 Observers draw a distinction between the violence of Somali (and Afar) relations with the state, 
and those of the southern Borana Oromo, paralleling other cultural distinctions (Helland 1997:76).  
207 Greenfield (1982) cites Foreign Office sources (Enclosure 173, Rodd to Salisbury, May 13 1897, 
PRO FO 403/255) and Kasete Gebrehiwet (1974) to suggest the abuses involved.  
208 Touval (1963), Markakis (1987), Laitin & Said Samatar (1987). 
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Candidates for coalition amongst the Somali… 
 
EPRDF’s coalition strategy meant that potential allies amongst Somali and Afar clan 
leaders were particularly valuable to the new regime in 1991, and it focused initially 
on those who had led resistance to the imperial and Dergue regimes. Markakis 
documents the ‘considerable lengths’ to which EPRDF went to ensure the 
participation of veteran Somali leaders in the events that launched the TGE: 
 
they asked for Sudanese help to locate representatives of the long 
moribund Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). The Sudanese 
found them hiding in the midst of war-torn Mogadisho, fearing Hawiye 
revenge for their long association with Siad Barre’s regime and the 
mindless violence sweeping the Somali capital. They were flown to 
Khartoum where they met with EPRDF representatives. […] (Markakis 
1993b:2) 
 
Whilst the WSLF210 participated in the July Charter conference, and was 
subsequently given three seats in the HPR, the other long-standing Somali 
organisation, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)211 hesitated, but was 
given the fourth Somali seat in the HPR when its leadership did gather in Addis 
Ababa towards the end of the year. The two organisations talked about operating 
under a united front, but only the ONLF went on to become active in the Somali 
NRS.  
 
The WSLF and the ONLF represented the two versions of the secessionist agenda in 
the Somali region of the Ethiopian empire-state (Somali unification and Ogadeni 
independence) the influence of which the incoming regime in 1991 hoped to 
dissipate or subvert by granting self-determination within ethnic federalism. Critical 
                                                                                                                                          
209 Some challenge the ‘’pastoralism is in decline’ school of thought with its rather static interpretation 
of pastoralism as an unchanging mode of livelihood’ (Hogg 1997a:2-3), arguing that pastoralist/state 
relations are ‘a good deal more complex’ than this (Hogg 1993:63).  
210 See Markakis (1987:223-234) on the establishment of the WSLF by the Somali regime in the run 
up to the Ethio-Somali war of 1976-8, seizing ‘an historic opportunity to force the longstanding issue 
[of Somali unification]’. 
211 Initiated by WSLF members in August 1984, and made public in 1986 ‘initial ONLF policy 
defined the Ogaden as ‘an oppressed nation colonized by Ethiopia’, and pledged to establish ‘an 
independent Ogaden state with full sovereignty in line with the aspirations of its people’. This was a 
departure from the irredentist aspirations of the WSLF, and for the next few years the ONLF struggled 
to get out of the shadow of the older movement’ (Markakis 1993b:3). 
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impetus to the irredentist project had come, since independence in 1960, from the 
government in Mogadisho, and the implosion of the Republic of Somalia in early 
1991 greatly reduced the obstacles to Ethiopian unity the EPRDF had to overcome: 
the Somali region effectively had ‘nowhere else to go’, and even establishing an 
independent Ogadeni state looked undesirably precarious under the circumstances. 
Once established as an administrative entity in its own right, however, ‘Region 5’ – 
later Somali NRS – was subject to all manner of new divisions and struggles. 
 
As Markakis notes, initially: 
 
the Somali were left to their own political devices. They reacted 
characteristically by forming more than a dozen clan and lineage based 
groups to resist domination by the Ogadeni clan. Thirteen had been 
registered with the Electoral Commission by mid-1992, and some more 
appeared later212. (1993b:6) 
 
Gradually the dynamics of the primary fissure began to emerge, with the larger 
Ogaden clan (represented primarily by the ONLF) on one side, and their smaller 
neighbours arraying themselves on the other in an uneasy alliance against Ogadeni 
dominance. Fear of this dominance, particularly as it would operate in an 
independent state, tended to carry the smaller clan groups closer to the EPRDF and 
the federalism it advocated. By contrast, ‘the ONLF’s commitment to the new order 
in Ethiopia was not solid’ (Markakis 1997:567). The swing of the balance of power 
between the Ogadenis and the rest provided the basic impetus to political 
developments in the region through the 1990s, tempered as always by central 
Ethiopian interference, premised upon dislike and mistrust of centrifugal elements, 
and security concerns about this gaping, porous, and volatile border area. 
 
The Ogaden clan emerged from regional elections in 1992 with a majority in the 
regional assembly and control of the regional government, a situation which ‘united 
                                                 
212 ‘They included the Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front, the Horiyal Democratic Front, the Ethiopian 
Somali Democratic Movement which claims to represent the Ishaq living in the Haud, the Democratic 
United Party which claims to represent the Hawiye of the southern Ogaden, the Democratic Action 
League formed by Issa, a group representing the Rer Barre cultivators in Kelafo, and another 




all the other clans in opposition, and they set about to derail the newly established 
regional administration’ (ibid.:567). A few months after the council’s replacement in 
June 1993, it met under new ONLF leadership in Jigjiga213, where ‘in an outburst 
against the alleged interference of the central government in Somali regional affairs, 
it voted to exercise the right of self-determination’ (ibid.:568). Again the regional 
leadership was replaced, and ‘the opposition clans strove to forge a united front […] 
encouraged by the central government’s growing disenchantment with the ONLF’ 
(ibid.:568). 
 
By early 1994, the central government’s policy of ‘forging coalitions’ had involved 
them in  
 
the removal of three successive Somali regional presidents, none of 
whom stayed in office more than seven months. A number of regional 
officials and ONLF members were also imprisoned. All were charged 
with embezzlement of funds, abuse of authority and sundry other crimes. 
This effectively crippled the regional administration, alienated the 
Ogaden clansmen, and provoked sporadic clashes between government 
forces and members of the ONLF. Itihad, which was threatening 
insurrection, eagerly joined the hostilities (ibid.:568) 
 
Now finally EPRDF set out to sponsor a political affiliate, and the Ethiopian Somali 
Democratic League (ESDL) was established at a meeting in Hurso, under the 
leadership of the two Somali members of the federal cabinet214, and with strong 
pressure publicly applied by both Prime Minister and President215. The success of the 
ESDL during elections in 1995 was conveniently facilitated by a split in the ONLF, 
over whether or not to participate. After the elections, however, ‘came the turn of the 
                                                 
213 When in 1995 the regional capital shifted from the remote Ogaden heartland of Gode to the 
highland periphery of Jigjiga, close to Ishaq territories, the move was initiated by the non-Ogadeni 
clans newly controlling the region, and was also clearly desirable from the Federal government’s 
highland perspective, given the relative accessibility, stability and security of Jigjiga – as well as its 
more temperate climate. Somali regional politicians had been warned early on not to press their 
controversial claim to Dire Dawa.  
214 Abdul Mejid Hussein, an international civil servant and Federal Minister is an Ishaq, a clan long 
feuding with the Ogaden over the Haud; Samsudin Ahmed, a Gadabursi and vice-minister. Neither 
‘had previous connection with Somali nationalist and clan politics’ (ibid.:568)  
215 Meles Zenawi warned Somali elders and politicians that the right to secession was to be exercised 
‘by the people and the nation, not a political party or a clan’ (Ethiopian Herald, 11 February 1994), 
cited by Markakis (ibid.:569). 
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Ogaden to have a try at derailing a regional government controlled by other clans’ 
(ibid.:569). As Markakis concluded in 1997 
 
The new political order in Ethiopia does not seem to have affected the 
categorical imperative of Somali political practice, which is clannishness. 
[…] It was to be expected that having gained the upper hand, the ESDL 
itself would become the arena of clan rivalry. […] With its leadership in 
prison or abroad, the ‘illegal’ ONLF drifted on a collision course with the 
central government. In June 1996, an agreement was announced in 
London between this group and the [by then outlawed] Oromo Liberation 
Front. (ibid.:570) 
 
Events in the Ogaden took a further turn for the worse with the outbreak of the Ethio-
Eritrean war in May 1998, with whatever priority had been accorded internal 
political reconciliation losing out to the imperative of security, in the face of cross-
border destabilisation. Although the ONLF and the ESDL officially signed an 
agreement to merge in June 1998, if left some sections of the ONLF – along, of 
course, with Itihad, and an assorted cast of trans-border characters – outside the 
Ethiopian net. The Byzantine activities of both Ethiopia and Eritrea in mobilising 
allies amongst Somali and Afar clans in both countries, and in neighbouring Somalia, 
Somaliland, and Djibouti, are enumerated in Gilkes (2000). The result has been 
(further) increase in the availability of both small arms and heavy weapons, as well 
as a dramatic escalation of the presence of the Ethiopian Defence Forces throughout 
Somali NRS and, controversially, across the border.  
 
…and amongst the Afar  
 
EPRDF activities in the Afar NRS since the fall of the Dergue have been similar to 
those amongst the Somali, albeit reflecting a stronger tendency to ‘interfere’ from the 
beginning of the transition, given a history of closer proximity and collaboration 
between adjacent Tigrayan and Afar opposition movements during the Dergue 
period216. The ERPDF had, in the Afar Liberation Front (ALF), a pre-existing ally, 
                                                 
216 During the imperial and Dergue periods, the escarpment down to the Danakil, and a part of the 
lowlands, were administered under Eastern Tigray. The TPLF administration of Tigray during the 
Dergue period was organised within three zones, with this area falling into the eastern one, and 
involving significant liaison with Afar groups. 
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which had been consistent in its opposition to the Dergue regime since its 
establishment in 1975 by the son of the Sultan of the Awsa Afar, Hanfare Ali Mirah.  
 
With the nineteenth century expansion, the Awsa sultan, now an Ethiopian ‘vassal’  
 
won recognition of his authority over his subjects, and this contributed to 
the consolidation of Afar ethnic identity’ (Ali Said (1998:109-110).   
 
Shoan pre-eminence and its ‘close historical relationship with the Awsean Sultanate 
in the south made the southern Afar appear the leadership and representative of all 
the Afar.’ (Maknun Gamaledin 1993:45). The sultanate was, however, slow to 
become a focus for Afar resentment towards the central state, despite large scale 
developments along the Awash River under Haile Selassie I in the 1960s, when 
‘large tracts of Afar dry-season grazing land were lost to commercial irrigation 
schemes run by foreign concessions, members of the royal family and Ethiopian 
entrepreneurs’ (Ali Said 1998:110). The main reason for this was the enrichment of 
the Sultan and his entourage in the cotton plantations, and their close and prestigious 
relations with the Emperor217. An alternative outlet for opposition was established 
just before the end of the imperial regime, when a group of educated Afars studying 
overseas set up the Afar National Liberation Movement (ANLM). Following the 
change of government, and the nationalization of land218, however, it was not long, 
before the sultanate also became disillusioned with the Ethiopian state, and the ALF 
was established. ‘The recognition of the sultan as a patriot by the ANLM marked the 
forging of a broader political forum for ethnic opposition’. (ibid.:111) 
 
Whilst in ideological terms the ANLM was closer than the conservative ALF to the 
other liberation fronts, including the TPLF, which had emerged from the radical 
politics of the ESM, most of its members were won over by the Dergue’s 1976 
‘National Democratic Revolution Programme’, in which they saw the potential 
                                                 
217 These additionally ‘helped Haile Selassie to check the early Eritrean rebels, and also influenced 
colonial politics in neighbouring Djibouti, where the Afar constitute a substantial proportion of the 
population’ (ibid.:110) 
218 This ‘not only led to the expropriation of the holdings of Ali Mirah, the Afar sultan, but also 
deprived the pastoralists of their large tracts of dry-season grazing land, which were turned into large 
government irrigation schemes and state farms’ (ibid.:111) 
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‘realization of their demands for an autonomous Afar state’. ANLM’s reportedly 
heavy involvement with the Dergue sowed lasting distrust between it and the 
ERPDF, and this has cast a long shadow (Interviews, Mekelle, October 1998).  
 
Neither, however, was EPRDF enthusiastic about its long time ally the ALF. Apart 
from the ideological chasm which separated the two organisations, particularly 
discomfiting to the ruling party were the ALF’s apparently lavish expenditure of the 
regional budget, its undisguised prioritisation of the economic development of the 
Awsa area, and the disparate, wayward, and opportunistic nature of the relations of 
various members of the Ali Mirah family with regional players219. Despite the 
EPRDF’s keenness to court the Sultan and his family in the early and unpredictable 
days of the transition, it could not long resist the temptation to foster a more 
congenial alternative. 
 
The Afar People’s Democratic Organisation (APDO) came into existence 
shortly after the fall of the military regime. This group is supposedly 
supported by Afar who were formerly part of Tigray province, and is an 
EPRDF affiliate. It claims to represent the interests of the cattle-keeping 
Afar, in contrast to the ALF which is associated with those of nomadic 
ancestry. Considering the close ties between APDO and EPRDF, it seems 
that the former largely represents the interests of the country’s ruling 
party, instead of the interests of the Afar. The APDO is gradually 
breaking ALF’s power monopoly, as is shown in the results of the recent 
elections, when it won a majority of the seats in the Afar Regional 
Council (twenty-three out of forty-eight) and (three out of eight seats) in 




The bulk of the complaints about EPRDF activities which have filtered out from 
Afar, and to some extent also Somali areas during the 1990s, have something in 
common with points discussed in the previous section regarding the SNNPNRS. 
Albeit responding differently to different patterns of social stratification, it seems 
that EPRDF has once again sought to mobilise amongst those who can be regarded 
as marginalized under previous socio-economic arrangements, similarly exploiting 
                                                 
219 At the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict it was reported that one of the sultan’s sons favoured 
the Eritreans, and another the Ethiopians. Rivalry amongst several of the siblings for control of the 
organisation, and its Gulf-sponsored purse strings, has long been rumoured. 
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their potential resentment to pinpoint them as a ‘target group’ for party membership. 
It has been observed of the APDO, for instance, that it has drawn members from 
amongst the young men whose social, political, and economic marginality had been 
further intensified by the impoverishment and breakdown of the pastoral economy. 
Placing these ‘young upstarts’, via APDO, as elected representatives, local 
executives, administrators and bureaucrats, has subverted the traditional authority of 
elder clan members, whose loyalty – whether to the sultanate or not – was woven 
into a conservative social structure over which EPRDF had little evident means of 
gaining control.  
 
In some instances, this younger generation of pastoralists (unlike their counterparts 
in the SNNPNRS) has also represented the more educated stratum in Afar society220. 
However, its co-option into government has triggered similar anger at EPRDF 
‘manipulation of our autonomy’, and ‘disregard of our culture’ (interview, Addis 
Ababa, April 1998), as was evident in the south.  
 
The literature on peace building and conflict resolution in Somalia in the early 1990s 
suggests another area of concern as to EPRDF’s approach in pastoral areas. 
Following the collapse of the Republic of Somalia in the early 1990s, Abdi Ismail 
Samatar criticised the anthropological ‘traditionalist’ literature on the region because 
(amongst other failings) it  
 
conflates kinship and current clanism; it accepts the ideology of clanism 
as a sufficient explanation of the on-going tragedy, without unearthing 
the social and the material basis of its constitution; [and that] it gives 
excessive weight to the causal power of clanism’ (1992:629) 
 
His suggestion is that ‘the mesmerising power of Somali tradition’ in its eloquent 
depiction in such works as Lewis (1961)221, in fact seduced many of those 
intervening in Somalia into ‘creating an equation with a single variable’ – that of 
                                                 
220 It seems that the opposition ANDM has had more purchase amongst the educated elite, another 
apparent parallel with the SNNPNRS. 
221 Cf. also Ahmed Yusuf Farah & Lewis (1993), who fail to examine the mutual influence of 
traditional and modern socio-political structures and forms of activity, and simply present the two as 
alternatives. Abdi Ismail Samatar’s ‘transformationist’ approach (1992), meanwhile, investigates these 
connections, in a manner reminiscent of that advocated by Abbink (1991) discussed above.  
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clan (Samatar 1992:628). Given the comments of the EPRDF leadership with which 
this section opened, it seems likely that this kind of reduction may also have coloured 
and marred the approaches to pastoral populations of the new government in 
Ethiopia in the early 1990s. EPRDF’s perspective may have blinded them to the 
operation and emergence of relationships other than those between clan units. The 
categorisation of Ethiopia’s populations under ethnic federalism may have 
exacerbated existing tendencies to 
 
view pastoralists and pastoralism in isolation. Instead of seeing 
pastoralism as the product of a dialectic between a variety of shaping 
forces – history as well as nature – [explanatory paradigms] seek single 
variable explanations. (Hogg 1997:2) Pastoralism and farming do not 
represent polar opposites but rather ideal types of economic activity 
along a continuum from ‘pure’ pastoralism to farming; most of 
Ethiopia’s ‘pastoral’ societies pursue multi-resource economies in which 
the balance is constantly shifting in response to changing circumstances. 
(:5) New types of relationships begin to replace those based on kinship or 
common livestock interests. […] old relationships become reformulated 
for a modern political arena. (:7) 
 
EPRDF involvement in Somali and Afar NRSs, seems, at best, to have had mixed 
results. Once again this may reflect superficial understanding of social dynamics in 
the regions in question, albeit in this case a lack of knowledge explicitly 
acknowledged, and attemptedly circumvented, by the ‘coalition building’ policy.  In 
the late 1990s, the situation became so volatile that the Federal Government 
despatched technical advisers to shore up the administration in each of these areas222. 
 
[C]orruption among local leaders, widespread embezzlement of public 
funds, inadequate development efforts by both central government and 
private sector, bitter power rivalry among different political groups and 
EPRDF manoeuvres to change the local power balance all tended to 
frustrate the democratisation process. This is a favourable ground for 
increased ethnic antagonism. The prevailing situation in the Afar region 
apparently endangers the peaceful and democratic resolution of the ethnic 
issue. (Ali Said 1998:114) 
 
                                                 
222 Nominally in response to simultaneous requests for such support from Somali, Afar, Gambella, and 
Benishangul Gumuz NRSs, in early 1998. The fact that these advisers are primarily Amharas and 
Tigrayans, and are regarded as EPRDF cadres, has done little to endear them (or the EPRDF) to the 
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Persuading the Somali to remain within the Ethiopian state, and the Afar to give up 
their dreams of a greater Afar nation was ‘a conspicuous initial success’ (Markakis 
1997:567). The relatively small populations, and economic and geographical 
marginality of these pastoralist areas, however, mitigated the national significance of 
the relatively distant approach to political mobilisation adopted by the EPRDF 
government. This situation contrasts strongly with that in the largest, most populated, 
and most centrally located of the Federal Democratic Republic’s regions, Oromia 
NRS. 
 
Competition in Oromia 
 
‘The one who has left us and moves through the borderlands, let God 
make him return. Let the guests who came to our land return to their 
country in peace’ (Tamene Bitima 1993), [part of a blessing] recorded in 
the Walliso area in 1992, during a meeting between representatives of the 
OPDO and the peasantry […] the guest i.e. the EPRDF is wished to 
return in peace to his country, either with the help of God or by an 
additional collective effort of the people. (Zitelmann 1996:104)) 
 
The TPLF leaders lack the legitimacy to design and implement a federal 
system which works only when it is designed by the people and their 
representatives and implemented with their freely expressed consent. 
‘Federal principles grow out of the idea that free people can freely enter 
into lasting yet limited political associations to achieve common ends and 
protect certain rights while preserving their respective integrities’ [Elazar 
(1987)] Today, the Oromo are not free people and therefore they can not 
freely enter into political association to establish a federal system. 
(Mohammed Hassan 1998:185) 
 
The interpretation of events in Oromo areas since 1991 has been bitterly contested 
from the outset. Oromia comprised one of the four regions (plus Addis Ababa) the 
government of which EPRDF sought to win control during the transitional period. 
Between them these areas encompass over 48 million of a total national population 
of just under 53.5 million223, i.e. more than 90% of the population. In Tigray, and 
Amhara EPRDF had established widespread control before the fall of the Dergue; in 
the South and Oromia they were effectively setting out to do so from scratch.  
                                                                                                                                          
people of the regional capitals (interviews, private sector and civil servants, Jigjiga, January 2000), 
and the policy was reportedly modified in 2002. 




In Oromia, as noted in Chapters I and V, EPRDF was confronted with a relatively 
widely known, widely established, and widely supported competitor in the 
longstanding nationalist Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the only other movement to 
control an extensive operational territory before 1991. This section attempts to 
consider the position of the EPRDF affiliate, the OPDO, operating, since the 
withdrawal of the OLF in 1992, in the context of what seems to be a higher degree of 
disaffection amongst opinion-leaders than in any other part of the country. In this 
violently contested terrain, the disputed question of the government’s record in the 
delivery of socio-economic services emerges as a critical barometer of its support. 
Given the well-established and sophisticated history of Oromo nationalism, however, 
questions of convention and collective belief - about the ethnic ‘authenticity’ of the 
ruling party, and its ‘legitimacy’ to represent the Oromo cause and people - have 
again fundamentally shaped developments. 
 
It was, then, after a long period of enmity, and with great misgivings that the EPRDF 
and OLF came together to form the core of the transitional government in 1991224. 
Both sides felt that their reservations had been justified when the competition 
between them, always bitter, rapidly escalated into bloodshed as the 1992 elections 
approached225. Frantic arrangements to attempt to separate and encamp the armed 
forces of the two parties collapsed, and the OLF withdrew four days before elections 
in June, rapidly followed by a majority of the other smaller parties opposed to 
EPRDF. The OLF’s departure from the government, and return to armed struggle, 
and the relatively rapid neutralising of the bulk of its forces during the summer of 
1992, left a situation in the region which interlocutors described as ‘depressingly 
straightforward’: OPDO has consistently swept the electoral board and administered 
                                                 
224 The history of mistrust set out in Chapter V had been exacerbated in 1990/1 by a series of military 
clashes and skirmishes as the EPRDF forces moved on Addis Ababa from the west, through areas of 
Wellega of which the OLF claimed control. The EPRDF campaign, named in Oromiffa ‘Operation 
Peace and Democracy’, was clearly designed to win support amongst the rural Oromo population, and 
infuriated the OLF.  
225 Reports of these events in English come from international election observers. See NIHR (1992), 
African American Institute for Democracy (1993). 
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the region with little or no opposition226 and (in the view of many) equally little or no 
support; the ‘best people’ have refused to have anything to do with the 
government227; many are reported to have been detained; and the impression is that 
peasants and townspeople alike are significantly more fearful of discussing their 
situation than is the case in other parts of the country.  
 
The threat (and implications) of being perceived as an OLF supporter are widely 
feared whatever the sympathies of those in question; in a number of cases this seems 
to have circumscribed initiative along with opposition (interviews, government and 
private sector officers, Jimma, Nekempte and Metu, October/November 1999), such 
that development is often perceived as a casualty as much as democracy. The 
following anecdote about NGO activities in Oromia NRS is not isolated. 
 
During a recent conference held to discuss women’s issues, a problem 
arose when the issue of right of redress for women against their husbands 
was discussed. One participant said ‘if there is a problem, we take it to 
the kebele, after the kebele to the wereda; after the wereda, however, 
there is only god’. We tried to correct this idea by explaining that she 
could also take her case to the zone, and region, the federal government, 
and so on. We were arrested after this on the basis that we had been 
‘giving away government secrets’. (interview, NGO officer, Addis 
Ababa, 24 September 1999) 
 
The effects of what is perceived as government over-sensitivity are often criticised, 
and the following comments are widely echoed: 
 
In Amhara NRS, for instance, you can be committed to community 
development of your area, and disagree politically, and there is no 
problem: you are free to work, and to make your contribution. In Oromia 
NRS, however, you are labelled as a ‘narrow nationalist’, or as a ‘feudal’ 
or ‘pan-Ethiopianist’. These allegations might come, for instance, if you 
were to listen to Oromiffa music. This is only being applied to Oromia 
NRS – you don’t find this problem in other regions. This kind of policy 
is basically killing the nationalist momentum for development, which is 
                                                 
226 So, for instance: ‘There are no political parties in this area now, other than OPDO. I can’t say that 
all the population are with OPDO, but since there are no other organisations operating here now it is 
difficult to tell. There might be many other organisations that the population supports, but without any 
concrete result’ (interview, zone government official Nekempte, Misrak Wellega zone, October 1999). 
227 ‘people in this area tend not to work for the government if they are any good at all’ (interview, 
private sector development officer, Metu, Illubabor zone, October 1999). 
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the positive part of the federal system in other places. (Interview, 
academic, Addis Ababa, November 1999) 
 
The impression that the EPRDF, in attempting to keep control of nationalist feeling 
in Oromia, has in fact throttled it, and driven its impetus outside the legal political 
framework, is widespread. If recruitment of educated and experienced personnel was 
regarded as a problem in SNNPNRS, it has been more of a crisis in Oromia. The 
OPDO has been plagued since its inception with corruption problems (with several 
subsequent ‘cleaning up’ sessions, resulting in massive expulsions), and a series of 
defections to the OLF, even at the highest level228. During 1991 and 1992 both sides 
accused the other of recruiting ‘former Dergue party members and soldiers’, and it 
seems clear that the large pool of demobilised soldiers from the army of the previous 
regime has provided a readily available resource for each. 
 
In common with the situation in SNNPNRS, the upper stratum of the urban and rural 
intelligentsia, whose sympathies are quite clearly not with the government229, have 
stayed well away from its structures and projects. Many have found refuge with non-
governmental structures. In the western parts of Oromia including particularly 
Wellega and Illubabor, the long-established protestant churches offer alternative 
vehicles for resource delivery, conferring status, or establishing a career230.  
 
The views of the peasant majority are, as ever, less clear. There is however, some 
evidence that in certain parts of Oromia resistance to the government is compounded, 
rather than assuaged, by government economic policies and interventions, 
particularly in the agricultural sector. Oromia NRS contains a number of the 
country’s grain surplus-producing areas, and many feel that they are disadvantaged 
by policies designed to promote national food production, and increase the security 
                                                 
228 Perhaps still the most significant defection to the nationalists was that of the head of Security and 
Justice in the region in January 2001, although the decimation of its leadership since the divisions 
within the ERPDF from February/March 2001, is remarkable.  
229 It is worth noting that many educated Oromos were also angered at the OLF’s decision to withdraw 
from government – a disappointment which has left many feeling ‘unrepresented’ and ‘excluded’ 
(personal communication, 1992, 1995) 
230 The churches in the west have the added advantages of strong contacts and credibility amongst the 
international NGO, church, and donor communities. That the government had tended to regard these 
well-resourced organisations with resentment and suspicion is hardly surprising. 
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of food deficit areas in the north (particularly Tigray NRS, and parts of Amhara), to 
the detriment of producer incomes in the more fertile south. Whilst extension 
packages of credit, fertiliser, seeds, and tools, have been the main pillar of 
government development programming which seeks at once to benefit, to woo, and 
to tie farmers into the system231, their formulaic application in some parts of Oromia 
has triggered crises in loan repayment.  
 
At the moment things are pretty much OK because food is flowing to the 
north and to Simien Omo where there is famine. As a result prices are 
pretty stable. But if production in the rest of the country develops, well it 
is clear that this area will have a lot of problems, and there will be a 
backlash against the extension programme232 (interview, senior 
government official, Nekempte, Misrak Wellega zone, 4 October 1999). 
 
Although this problem may affect only certain areas of the region, it further 
contributes to the sense of grievance that Oromia is having to put up with a system 
designed for the benefit of other parts of the country. Allegations of government 
incompetence, corruption, and policy weakness constitute one strand of nationalist 
discourse. Another, as indicated above, relates to legitimacy and questions of 
indigenousness. 
 
A persistent allegation is that, because the party has faced such profound difficulties 
of recruitment 
 
There is a group of people who are moved around all over Oromia, from 
one place to the next, and simply appointed by the party. There is no 
attempt to get really local people or to have any continuity of 
administrative personnel (interview, NGO Officer, Addis Ababa, January 
2000) 
 
Although this allegation did not seem to be borne out by the evidence accumulated 
during fieldwork233, nevertheless it forms part of a discourse which describes OPDO 
                                                 
231 There are persistent allegations that the provision of such inputs, and threat of their withdrawal, 
have been used as a stick with which to keep farmers ’in line’ on political matter – often in relation to 
the election or recall of party candidates. 
232 These fears proved grounded after bumper harvests in 2000. 
233 Respondents in Jimma, Nekempte, Metu, all confirmed that ‘zone executive members have to be 
from the zone, not just from somewhere in Oromia’. The only instance in which local executive and 
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members as ‘outsiders’, even, ‘not real Oromos’ (interviews, Addis Ababa, February 
2000): 
 
The major problem is with the neftegnas. Many came to know the 
language and the culture and are now masquerading as Oromos when 
they are not at all. Most of those who are members of OPDO are 
neftegnas. This is where many of the problems arise with the relationship 
between the political organisation and the population. They don’t fully 
understand how the community works, and what it will respond to. 
(interview, private sector professional, Addis Ababa, September 1999) 
 
As with most complaints, the symmetrical criticism is also made of the nationalist 
movement by party members. When questioned about why educated people were 
hostile to the OPDO, party members often retorted along the lines of the following 
respondent. 
 
Most are the children of landlords, and they want to get back their land. 
They know they will never get back their land whilst OPDO is in power, 
so they don’t support us – they promote negative impressions of the 
government and of course claim that it is for other reasons. (Interview, 
local government officer, Nekempte, Misrak Wellega zone, October 
1999) 
 
The nationalist version of the claim, however, carries an ethnic sting along with the 
class slur. In the SNNPNRS, as outlined above, EPRDF was often praised for 
introducing the benefits of ethnic federalism, but criticised for not really allowing the 
development of structures to support self-determination from within the ethnic 
groups in question. In Oromia NRS, by comparison, the critique of nationalist 
opponents is more fundamental, suggesting that the entire process of the 
establishment of ethnic federalism is fraudulent, implemented in Oromia by a ‘faked’ 
ethnic party, whose errors are based not on misunderstanding of the local cultures 
and conditions but on the wilful prioritisation of non-Oromo interests. In much of the 
                                                                                                                                          
party officials interviewed came from outside the zone where they were assigned was in Kemissie, 
capital of the Oromiffa-speaking Special Zone within Amhara NRS. Here, it was claimed, a history of 
extreme marginalisation precluded local recruitment of suitable people. One could speculate that 
nationalist criticism might have swung the other way, alternatively accusing the government of 
‘dividing Oromos’ by giving emphasis to zone and local differentiation. Interviews suggested strongly 
that such localised affiliation remains important, thus, for instance: ‘People take steps on the basis of 
their sense of their own identity. For instance, I am from Wellega. If you mix me with the Borana, I 
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nationalist literature, the OPDO are equated with external forces, or described as 
their puppets. The comment ‘behind every OPDO member stands a Tigrayan with a 
kalashnikov’ has been commonplace through the early 1990s. Also persistent is the 
theme of the plunder of Oromo resources. 
 
They said they would bring peace to the  
Oromo, but they never did. Instead they 
Settled among us, travelled everywhere 
And surveyed the resources of the 
Oromo 
(Jaarso Waaqo Qoot’o, translated by Abdullahi Shongolo (1996:276)) 
 
In sum then, the nationalist message is that EPRDF, from which OPDO has no 
independence, is designed solely to serve the interests of its home areas in Amhara 
and Tigray. Even, they claim, the form of the Abyssinian occupation of Oromia has 
barely changed under ethnic federalism. So, finally, the nationalist position remains 
clear-cut and simple: a luta continua234. 
 
Regional capitals and the ‘young turks’ 
 
The EPRDF, with its explicit focus on peasant development, paid little attention to 
the middle classes during the 1990s. Its EPRDF amongst educated groups, however, 
has not been entirely negative. The establishment of regional and zone capitals – 
particularly the exponential growth of Mekelle (Tigray), Bahr Dar (Amhara), and 
Awassa (SNNPNRS) – gradually enabled the government to meet some of the 
requirements of a new generation of young civil servants and professionals. This has 
at least allowed EPRDF and the government to recruit some educated capacity to 
facilitate regional and local initiatives. The limited evidence regarding patterns of 
mobilisation and support in these towns is briefly reviewed here. 
 
In some respects, the apparent success story is the development of Bahr Dar (slums 
notwithstanding) and the professionalisation of the regional bureaucracy in Amhara 
                                                                                                                                          
don’t feel anything, even though we share something as important as the language’ (interview, NRS 
Bureau Head, Addis Ababa, September 1999). 
234 Cf. Leencho Lata (1999). 
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NRS. From amongst all of the six non-federal units of government that the ERPDF 
controls directly (the four large regions, Addis Ababa, and the Provisional 
Administration of Dire Dawa), the executive and civil service which run Amhara 
NRS seem over recent years to have emerged as the most efficient and effective235. 
This success is of interest, given the great difficulties of recruitment the regional 
government faced at the beginning of the transitional period.  
 
During 1991 and early 1992 the educated elites of Ethiopia’s ‘oppressed peoples’ 
flocked to join Development Associations and political parties set up for the benefit 
of their ethnic groups. The regional bureaux, NGOs, and offices to be established in 
different parts of the country represented new opportunities for providing service to 
one’s ‘own people’ in one’s own home area. Many educated Amhara, however, saw 
the situation quite differently. An expansion of the regional civil service entailed a 
contraction of the federal civil service based in Addis Ababa, then dominated by 
Amharas and Amharic-speakers. Most were understandably unenthusiastic about the 
prospect of vacating the capital, and leaving the educational and other facilities it 
offered the middle-class. Unlike their peers in other ethnic groups, many educated 
Amharas saw in the changes a threat to the national influence they stood to lose, in 
the context of which whatever regional influence they might gain could never be 
seen as a gain. 
 
Over and above the individual interests of established civil servants and their 
families, at a political level educated Amharas were often not supporters of ethnic 
federalism, tending to be pan-Ethiopian nationalists, even enthusiasts for the 
centralised state of the imperial period, forged ‘in their own image’ on the basis of 
common Orthodox Christianity and the Amharic lingua franca. Dispute raged as to 
whether ‘there was any such thing as an Amhara’236; even elements within the 
EPDM seemed reluctant to see the organisation transformed into the nationalist 
ANDM; and, when the Amhara Development Association was set up, it proved 
                                                 
235 Interestingly the ANDM also survived EPRDF party upheavals in early 2001 relatively unscathed. 
236 ETV debate between Mesfin Wolde Mariam and Meles Zenawi, broadcast August 1991. 
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difficult to recruit members, officers, and supporters. Attracting qualified individuals 
into the regional civil service proved even more problematic.  
 
The establishment of Bahr Dar as the regional capital was itself controversial – both 
because of traditional rivalries between the Amhara provinces of Gojjam, Gondar, 
Shoa, and Wollo, and because of its malaria-prone position on the shores of Lake 
Tana. In 1991 Bahr Dar was little more than a muddy village, as advocates of the 
better-developed towns of Gondar and Dessie were quick to point out. Its 
transformation into a smart capital and lakeside resort, however, has mirrored the rise 
in the willingness of educated Amharas to move, work, and set up businesses there, 
and more general shifts of attitude: 
 
In 1996 students were highly sceptical of the ANDM government, 
frequently considered the party to be an instrument of the TPLF, saw 
little signs of development, were angered at what they considered the 
TPLF giving away Eritrea, and strongly opposed the EPRDF’s ethnic 
division of the country. In 1998 the students were mildly supportive of 
the government, placed less emphasis on TPLF hegemony, considered 
ethnicity a viable basis on which to organize the country, were not 
unduly bothered at Eritrea’s departure from Ethiopia, and pointed to the 
development and stability under the ANDM. A caveat here may be that 
the students were from Bahr Dar, which has seen higher levels of 
development than any of the other major towns of the region. (Foreign 
consultant’s record of two sets of focus groups carried out amongst high 
school students in Bahr Dar in February 1996 and March 1998, personal 
communication, May 1998) 
 
Such findings were supported by fieldwork, and the enthusiasm amongst regional 
civil servants for the regional leadership, and the ‘culture of openness and 
professionalism’ for which they were credited, was notable (interviews, NRS civil 
servants, Bahr Dar, May 1999, January 2000). Whilst tempered by concerns about 
corruption and relative inefficiency, a similar sense of pride can be felt amongst 
some civil servants in Awassa, which has also become a gleaming and impressive 
lakeside regional capital237. 
 
                                                 
237 In Awassa the sense of ‘collective endeavour’ is apparently mitigated by the multi-ethnic nature of 
the administration, and recent controversy over the city’s status (see Chapter VII).  
 
 225 
The trajectory in Mekelle has been different, given that expectations riding on the 
‘liberation’ in 1991 were much higher amongst many educated Tigrayans, and 
consequently much more difficult to fulfil. Young civil servants and graduates 
flocked to apply to work in their home region: to be closer to homes and families, 
from whom many had been separated by the war; to work and live in a Tigrigna-
speaking environment; and to demonstrate their commitment to the development of 
Tigray, alongside their loyalty to the new ruling party and its nationalist project. 
Many were appalled by the physical conditions they encountered in Mekelle and, as 
rents leapt up to reflect the new demand, found it difficult to live on government 
salaries. Almost all of the new influx were young single men, who were soon 
complaining vociferously about the dearth of young single women. By the time this 
imbalance started to shift, a flourishing network of prostitution had re-established 
itself in the former garrison town.  
 
A particular problem experienced in urban ‘post-revolutionary Tigray’ was the 
discrepancy in ‘culture’ between the TPLF and the incoming civil servants, where 
the ‘assumptions of the bureaucracy frequently conflicted with procedures developed 
by the TPLF’ (John Young 1997b:82). 
 
Often at the centre of debate over administrative reform is gem gum238, 
which derives its origins from a number of sources, including Maoism 
and the traditional means of evaluation employed by Tigrayan elders. 
Developed during the revolution as a means to ensure accountability and 
democratic decision-making in the army as well as in the TPLF’s mass 
associations, the introduction of this institution into state bureaucracies 
throughout Tigray […] initially met considerable resistance from 
bureaucrats unwilling to have their performance evaluated by fellow 
employees and the community, and still faces opposition. (ibid.:95) 
 
In the recent period, the sense of disquiet amongst the middle class in Mekelle and 
the other towns of Tigray seems to have re-emerged. It seems likely that this is 
primarily a consequence of the profound impact of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict on the 
region, and, very recently, the upheavals and divisions within the party, some of 
which were fought out quite publicly in Mekelle itself.   
                                                 
238 Essentially a form of performance evaluation based around extended collective discussion, 




Once again, Oromia NRS has proved to be a significantly more difficult case than the 
other core regions. Considerable sensitivity attaches to the identification of a regional 
capital, because of the strength of Oromo nationalist determination (shared within 
OPDO) to lay claim to Finfinne (Addis Ababa) itself. The argument about the 
location of the Oromia NRS capital239 clearly divides OPDO from the other 
component parts of EPRDF, which label it an example of the kind of ‘narrow 
nationalism’, which favours nationalist rhetoric and symbol above the interests of the 
people of the region. Throughout the 1990s Oromia Regional Bureaux remained in 
the capital alongside but separate from their federal counterparts. Whilst a number of 
Oromia’s towns have seen some development, no one centre has emerged as a focus 
of development growth (and nationalist pride). On the contrary, many of Oromia’s 
older towns, of which Jimma is the most obvious240, have faced decline. 
 
A second problem concerns civil service recruitment. At the end of the 1990s, federal 
civil service salary scales had been revised and increased, resulting in a mass exodus 
from the Oromia regional civil service where salary scales remained at the pre-
existing lower rate. In some bureaux this had created staff shortages of dramatic 
proportions, with up to 50% of positions remaining unfilled241. In Ethiopia, the 
haemorrhaging of personnel from the public into the incomparably better-
remunerated private, voluntary, and international sectors is a problem everywhere: in 
Addis Ababa where living costs are above the norm, and the competition 
immeasurably greater, it is a crisis. The current situation effectively places the 
Oromia NRS civil service is at the ‘bottom of the heap’. This can hardly fail to 
perpetuate the problems of capacity and competence discussed above. 
 
                                                 
239 Likely at the time of writing to be resolved in favour of Adama (Nazareth). 
240 Jimma was an important administrative centre under Haile Selassie and the Dergue, and the 
economic hub of coffee trading for the entire area. Now that much of the coffee producing area 
(especially Kaffa Sheka zone) forms part of SNNPNRS, and Jimma’s status has been reduced to that 
of zone capital, its Italianate buildings, wide avenues and markets are redundant and decaying. 




This chapter has attempted to review the varying degrees of success, and different 
strategies, with which the EPRDF has attempted to mobilise amongst different ethnic 
groups, and different socio-economic strata. A recurrent theme of these accounts has 
been the relation between their success in mobilisation and the attention which has 
been paid both to the interests, but also to the collective self-perception, of the group 
in question. The words of a sympathetic voluntary sector professional perhaps 
provide an appropriate conclusion. 
 
There are some things which cannot be reduced to mere practicalities, 
and identity is one of them. This is a very delicate issue. The approach 
adopted by successive Ethiopian governments has always been to 
undermine the social dimension, and to make policy on the basis of very 
limited understanding. There are always far too many things which are 
invisible to us as outside actors. (interview, NGO officer, Addis Ababa, 




Chapter VII. Reworking territory: languages, boundaries and 
budgets 
 
To draw a boundary is a cognitive act that lays down some premises; but 
it does not determine all the social forms that eventuate. The affordances 
of a boundary set the scene for social activities, and in that sense, yes, 
boundaries also connect. But the connections that emerge are the work of 
people who respond selectively and pragmatically to the affordances, 
spinning connections in forms that will be shaped by social and material 
processes, not by cognitive fiat as the drawing of the boundary was. The 
presence of the boundary sets the other processes in motion – with 
emergent results. (Barth 2000:30) 
 
This chapter considers the relation between ethnic community acceptance, rejection, 
or manipulation of ethnically defined boundaries, and their collective perceptions of 
self-interest, expressed particularly clearly with reference to the resources (notably 
capital and recurrent government budgets) seen to be allocated to the administrative 
units constituted by the process of boundary-making.  
 
Whereas the previous chapter concentrated upon the activities of the EPRDF and its 
member and affiliated organisations in approaching a range of different communities 
for the purpose of popular mobilisation, this chapter shifts to bring more clearly into 
focus the responses of actors amongst these different ethnic groups to the changed 
circumstances and opportunities brought about by ethnic federalism. Whilst this 
provides a useful distinction between chapters, it also risks setting up an artificial 
dichotomy: neither of the two interacting categories it posits (‘government/EPRDF’ 
and ‘ethnic group/community’) is either discrete in structure, or unitary in outlook. 
EPRDF members and government officials are also members of ethnic groups, and, 
as discussed in Chapter VI, ethnic federalism has done much to extend the reach of 
the former into the latter. Neither, as noted in the methodological discussion in 
Chapter III, are ethnic groups monolithic units of analysis. This should be kept in 
mind as the actions they or their leaders pursue (not least as members of the local 
structures of the ruling party) are traced in what follows. 
 
The chapter is presented in two sections, each of which elaborates a group of cases. 
Of these, the first considers two instances in which an administrative and political 
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status, apparently disproportionate to the current numbers of the language group 
members in question, seems to have been granted early on by the TGE. In Harar 
NRS and Waag Himra ‘special’ zone, exceptionally, historical factors seem to have 
supplanted language as the primary criterion for political and administrative 
boundary making. The section explores the pro-active influence of group members in 
bringing this about, together with other considerations which may have influenced 
these decisions, including the characteristics and role of the collective identity in 
question in each of the two cases. The second and most extended set of case studies 
returns to the multi-ethnic SNNPNRS, seeking to identify patterns and variations 
amongst the multiple challenges which groups have posed to the boundary, language, 
and administrative arrangements of ethnic federalism during the 1990s.  
 
Harar and Wag Himra: where history brought privilege 
 
Harar and Wag Himra were in 1991-2 awarded the status of National Regional State 
and ‘special’ zone respectively. These two cases are bracketed together because they 
represent two instances where the EPRDF-led TGE relatively early on recognised 
and accommodated the claims of certain groups to special status, permitting the 
incorporation of large numbers of non-language-group members within the 
autonomous areas named for them, on the basis of other – primarily historical - 
factors. The instances are of interest because they are unusual: they should be 
considered in the context of the much wider range of cases where the Ethiopian 
government has been markedly less willing to accommodate appeals to past glory, 
and a historically wide-ranging territorial jurisdiction.  
 
As noted in Chapter I, when ethnic federalism was first mooted, at least some 
members of almost all of Ethiopia’s contemporary language groups expressed 
themselves keen to lay claim to the land – often also the ancestors – of their 
neighbours. In most instances, the TGE was dismissive of historical claims, 
preferring to deal in contemporary demography. The fact, therefore, that the 
instances dealt with in this section represent departures from an otherwise marked 




Harar: the city state  
 
‘O child of Harar, come back to your city!’ song popularised after the 
1940-50s dispersal of Hararis. (Cohen & Waldron 1978) 
 
We are beholden to the EPRDF because they recognised the historicity of 
the Harari claim for self-determination (interview, then Harari National 
League (HNL) MP in the HPR, Addis Ababa, 11 January 1999) 
 
Of all the national regional units established under ethnic federalism, the smallest, 
Harar NRS with its ‘national’ population of 9,374 Hararis242 out of a total regional 
population of 131,139243, is an undoubted constitutional oddity. Whilst the 
arrangements for its representation at federal level are the same as those relating to 
other federated states244, Harar NRS is governed under a highly idiosyncratic internal 
arrangement, which artificially maintains a disproportionate ‘balance of power’ 
between the small Harari community, and the much larger Amhara and Oromo 
populations living outside the walled city but within the boundary of the state245. 
This arrangement, which effectively marks a departure from the principle of equal 
and universal suffrage in which Ethiopia’s constitutional arrangements are otherwise 
embedded, is officially justified with reference to the unique historical and religious 
significance of the holy city of Harar, and, in the view of a Harari historian and 
linguist, the importance of the history, heritage, and ‘cultural rights of minorities’: 
 
                                                 
242 I use ‘Harari’ in preference to ‘Aderi’, which seems increasingly to be rejected by the indigenous 
population of the city. The majority of the Harari population lives outside Harar, and the total 
population in Ethiopia according to the 1994 census was 21,757, of whom 5,788 were in Addis 
Ababa, and 4,222 in Dire Dawa. These figures are further dwarfed by a large diaspora. 
243 Cf. 1994 census (Volume I, Country Level Statistical Report 1998:76). The total figure is made up 
as follows (groups listed in order of size): Oromo 68,564; Amhara 42,781; Harari 9,374; Gurage 
4,140; Tigrayan 2,244; Somali 2,199; all other groups number fewer than 1,000.  
244 Namely, one MP in the HPR roughly per 100,000 constituents, plus an additional one of the twenty 
seats reserved for ‘minorities’; one MP for each nationality group in the HoF, plus an additional 
representative for each million members of the group – thus just one for the Harari community. 
245 The establishment of the boundary of Harar NRS has itself caused considerable controversy, and 
also reflects the influence of history. In the words of a Harari nationalist and ‘elder statesman’: ‘of 
course Harar as a walled city state is not viable – it always used to have an agricultural farming area, 
with the closer area predominantly horticulture and orchards, and the further area rain-fed cereal 
agriculture, and this area was regarded as ‘rural Harar’ or Harar-ghe. Through time, however, Hararis 
were disinherited of their land, and Oromos moved into these areas. As a result when we wanted to 
establish the federal state, we had to convince 17 Oromo peasant associations to join the city in order 
to create a socio-economically viable entity. There was a congress of 170 ‘founding fathers’ of the 
Harari national state – 85 from urban areas and 85 from the rural areas.’ (Interview, then HNL 
member of the HPR, Addis Ababa, February 1998) 
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Large groups can always develop, but small ones need particular 
assistance – otherwise where is the democracy? We Hararis may be few 
in number, but our wishes are much bigger. Historically Harar was 
greater even than Tigray – we were many more in number. But because 
our people taught the Islamic religion, they spread their strength far and 
wide and were lost. There were many wars. Wherever they went they 
settled, and when the Oromo migration began there was a lot of conflict – 
until the wall was built. Those who were outside were swallowed up. The 
TGE recognised the historical sacrifices that this nation had made. Are 
Amhara or Oromia given a regional because they are large? No. 
Language is one factor, but so also are the psychological makeup and 
history of the people. All of the people who are settlers here are 
latecomers – and they have somewhere else to go. The Amharas have 
their own region, and so on. They also have other ways of getting good 
access to the state. For us Hararis, though we are few, this is our only 
place. (Interview, Chairman HNA Cultural Committee, Harar, January 
2000) 
 
The representative arrangements 
 
The arrangement of the legislature in Harar NRS provides disproportionate 
representation of ethnic groups. It is, briefly, as follows. The highest political and 
law-making body of the State is the 36-member Council of the Harari Peoples 
(HPC), which is in turn constituted by the joint meeting of two chambers: the 14-
member Harari National Assembly (HNA); and the 22-member People’s 
Representative Assembly (PRA). The HNA is made up of Hararis resident in Harar, 
and elected only by members of the Harari community resident either in the region, 
in other parts of Ethiopia, or (in a departure from normal democratic and electoral 
practice) in the diaspora. The HNA’s powers cover legislation over matters relating 
to Harari culture, language, and historical sites, and the nomination of the Regional 
State President and three members of the executive from amongst its number. 
Meanwhile the PRA’s 22 members are composed of 4 members elected from the so-
called jogol (the area within the walled city predominantly inhabited by Hararis) and 
18 members from the rest of the region, i.e. the Amhara-dominated kebeles 
surrounding the jogol, and the Oromo-dominated rural Peasant Associations of 
Hunde wereda surrounding that246. Assuming that the Hararis could keep control of 
                                                 
246 A major focus of the 18 months of negotiations, which preceded this arrangement, was the number 
of electoral districts from which representatives to the PRA would be drawn. Since the elections were 
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the election of the 4 members from the jogol, they and the remainder of the 
population would effectively control 18 seats each in the Joint HPC.  Whilst the HPC 
remains the highest body, assuming all powers given by the Federal Constitution to 
NRS legislatures, the more equitably representative PRA retains significant powers 
to legislate on matters of economic and social development, drawing up budgets, 
agricultural taxation arrangements, and so on, for submission to the joint HPC247.  
 
The realpolitikal rationale for ‘positive discrimination’ 
 
There are various explanations for the adoption of unusual arrangements which, 
exceptionally, offer positive discrimination to protect the rights and status of the tiny 
population regarded as ‘indigenous’ to (and concentrated within the walls of) the 
city. Most agree that central to it was some sharp negotiating, and elevated lobbying, 
by the cohesive, articulate, and wealthy Harari community, led by the Harari 
National League, HNL. Equally important, however, has been the weight of 
realpolitik behind various of the issues on the basis of which the HNL has lobbied. 
For instance, marked consideration has clearly (indeed explicitly) been given to the 
search for mechanisms likely to increase stability in an otherwise volatile and 
contested area of eastern Ethiopia. Common to both realpolitik and ethnic 
nationalism have been considerations of the past, and of ways of understanding and 
using it. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
based on a single slate of candidates per district, the Amhara community lobbied hard for three 
concentric districts, so that their separate representation would not be incorporated with that of the 
larger Oromo electorate. This option, which seemed to have been successfully pushed by committee 
chairman Kifle Wodajo (whose appointment was itself widely interpreted as intended to be reassuring 
to the Amhara community), was subsequently overturned in an agreement separately reached between 
Meles Zenawi, Hassan Ali (OPDO), Duri Mohammed, and Mohammed Sherifo (both HNL) 
(interviews, parties to the committee and discussions, Addis Ababa). 
247 Under these arrangements it was important that constitutional change and ratification of the 
nomination (by the HNA) of the NRS President required a two thirds majority of the HPC, thus 
forcing a high degree of consensus – and (as some Harari nationalists have complained) ‘allowing the 
Oromos to veto the presidential nomination’. Mohammed Tewfik Ahmed (1998) notes that relatively 
lax quorum requirements have tended, meanwhile, to undermine the arrangements, allowing the HPC 
to take decisions without any of the HNA members being present – but not vice versa.  
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Harar has long been recognised as ‘the natural strong point for control of all the 
neighbouring [Oromo] and Somali tribes’ (Trimingham 1965:22). It is not surprising 
that HNL nationalist leaders have been forthcoming in their endorsement of this idea: 
 
If you applied ‘one man one vote’ in Harar, then the Oromos would take 
it over248, there would be war with the Somalis, and the EPRDF would 
have to intervene to sort out the mess and keep the peace. (Interview, 
former HNL Harari NRS President, Harar, January 1999)  
 
Harar in the hands of Hararis is critical to the stability of eastern 
Ethiopia, because if you give it to one or another region you destabilise 
the whole because they will compete. This way Harar becomes a 
lynchpin of stability – in fact much as it was historically during the Adal 
Emirate. (Interview, then HNL member of the HPR, interviewed Addis 
Ababa, January 1998) 
 
Evocation of the period of the Emirate serves a variety of powerful purposes in this 
context. For most highland Ethiopians it calls to mind the devastating invasion and 
conquest of Abyssinia by Ahmed ‘Gragn’ between 1526 and his death in 1542 
(Trimingham 1965:84ff), a seminal episode which continues to haunt highland 
anxiety about encircling Islam. In this context, however, these historical references 
are designed not only to raise the spectre of Abyssinia’s greatest fear, but also to be 
suggestive of the most effective safeguard against its resurgence: a strong and 
strongly integrated cosmopolitan centre in Harar. The Harari nationalist discourse 
with which TGE leaders were courted during the early 1990s, stressed (as had the 
historian Trimingham before them) the fact that it was ‘internal weaknesses [in the] 
Adalite policy of equilibrium’ which led to the jihad of Ahmed ‘Gragn’: 
 
[The] older generation living in settlements and towns [Harar foremost 
amongst them], interested in commerce, indifferent to religion, and ready 
to come to terms with Abyssinia, were opposed by newly converted Afar, 
and Somali tribes, moved by motives both religious and migrational, and 
led by warlike fanatical amirs. (Trimingham 1965:81,84) 
 
                                                 
248 The OLF position was that Hararis were ‘urbanised Oromo’, and that Harar formed a natural zone 
capital within Oromia NRS, with no reason to exist as a separate entity. Whilst the OLF formed part 
of the TGE, therefore, no agreement on the status of Harar was possible. Although OPDO have 
proved more amenable to Harari nationalist aspirations, tension remained and controversy focused on 
the unwillingness of the Oromia NRS zone administration of Eastern Harerghe to vacate government 
offices in the outer part of the city. HNL sources argued ‘they must move, because Harar cannot have 
two husbands – wedded both to Hunde wereda and Harerghe zone’ (interview, Harar, January 1999). 
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In parallel with stress on the civilising and pacifying influence of Harar, with its 
long-standing attachment to an urbane culture premised upon commerce, has been a 
strong emphasis in HNL rhetoric on the highly indigenised nature of the Islam 
practiced in Harar249, and its distance from the more dangerous evangelising strains 
of ‘foreign-influenced’ fundamentalism at work in the region250. Rather the moderate 
Muslim leaders of Harar were keen to cast themselves as interlocutors likely to prove 
useful to Ethiopia in approaching the less tractable adherents of their faith251. Harar’s 
efforts to present itself as a convenient and conciliatory bulwark against the incursion 
of radical Islam via Somalia were seized upon by the central government. The 
promise of utility was made concrete when (to the apparent surprise of federal 
EPRDF officials (interviewed, Addis Ababa, 1998)) the HNL proposed an 
Association of Eastern Ethiopian States in 1997, with representatives drawn from the 
body of federal MPs from Somali NRS, Afar NRS, Harar NRS, the eastern zones of 
Oromia NRS, and the Dire Dawa Provisional Administration252.  
 
This structure marked a coincidence of various interests. The HNL was anxious to 
use it as yet another means to minimise the risk of Harar being swallowed up by the 
‘Oromo sea’ that surrounds the city253, and the central government keen to foster the 
emergence of a new and stable regional equilibrium: preferably one institutionalised 
by formal state-level interaction, and accessible to representatives loyal to itself. The 
difficulties EPRDF encountered in working in pastoral regions (explored in Chapter 
VI above), rendered the Ethiopianised Harari intellectual and mercantile elites all the 
more valuable.  
                                                 
249 ‘The process of Islamisation was not accompanied by a parallel process of arabisation […] there 
was no genuine fanatical fervour […]’ (Trimingham 1965:139,97). 
250 Since 1991 Ethiopia has frequently alleged Iranian or Sudanese influence amongst fundamentalist 
groups in the lowland periphery of the Horn. The activities of Al Itihad Al Islaamiya, along with 
radical radio broadcasting reckoned to have Iranian backing, raised concern in the mid-1990s. 
251 Hararis were amongst the first to warn the church-dominated NGO community in Addis Ababa in 
1991 of the dangers of failing to involve Islamic welfare organisations in co-ordination networks 
(Jalal Abdel Latif, presentation to a meeting of the Emergency Relief Desk, Addis Ababa, November 
1991). 
252 Under this structure, co-ordinating committees were established to deal with issues of common 
concern to the regions in question, relating to culture, socio-economic development, and security 
matters. This last became particularly interesting when the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict in 
May 1998 demonstrated anew the vulnerability of Ethiopia’s long border with Somalia.   
253 the composition of the council of the Association is finely balanced such that the Oromo members 




The symbolic value of a prominent Harar 
 
In turn, the EPRDF and the TGE’s willingness to grant a highly visible autonomy 
and prominence at the federal level to the holy Muslim city of Harar was at least 
partly influenced by the desire to be seen to counteract and reverse a history of 
equally visible, and bitterly resented, Christian and military domination of the city, 
which had begun with Menelik II’s occupation of it after the exceptionally bloody 
battle at Chalenqo in early 1887254. The Abyssinian conquest of this area saw a 
dramatic influx of Amhara soldiers and settlers255, and it was at this time that the 
outer city (beyond the jogol) was constructed and settled by the predominantly 
Amhara population still present in significant numbers today. These dramatic 
demographic and economic256 shifts were further compounded when the efforts of 
Franco-Ethiopian engineers to construct the Ethio-Djiboutian railway along the 
mountain spine to Harar were abandoned, and Dire Dawa was built on its revised 
lowland route in 1907. At this point ‘the mercantile activities of the city of Harar 
declined drastically’, and ‘perhaps 25% of the [Harari] population of the city 
emigrated to different areas of the country’ (Cohen and Waldron 1978:50). Like the 
urbanised middle-class Ethiopian Somali community of Dire Dawa, the Harari 
population was further scattered (often overseas) as a result of hardened Ethiopian 
state policies and reprisals in the wake of the Italian occupation in the 1940s, and 
again in the late 1970s after the Somali incursions during the Ethio-Somali War.  
 
Complications posed by Harar’s multi-ethnic profile 
 
Harar’s establishment as a full and federated National Regional State was intended to 
symbolise the reversal of a history of poor relations with the Ethiopian state. Whilst 
                                                 
254 Twin symbols of this were the imposing Medhane Alem church built by Ras Mekonnen, father of 
Haile Selassie, on the site of the principal mosque, and the Harar military academy, which occupied a 
large area just outside the walls of the city. Neither has been removed or replaced. 
255 Caulk cites contemporary estimates that ‘as many as 12,000 newcomers, including 4,000 men with 
firearms had crowded into Harar town’ (1971a:3n14). 
256 As elsewhere, the arrival of the settlers and the church was accompanied by widespread 
appropriation of land in this fertile and temperate area. 
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some of the symbols of highland imperial domination have been relatively easy for 
the EPRDF-led government to undermine, counteract, or eschew, its demographic 
legacy has perhaps presented as many difficulties in this area as anywhere else in 
Ethiopia. The juxtaposition of three language groups was undoubtedly a primary to 
complication of negotiations over the city’s administration and status. Whilst the 
‘ethnic cleansing’ of so-called neftegna populations which threatened to escalate in 
1991 did not develop on any scale257, feelings and grievances continue to run high 
amongst both Harari and Amhara communities. The former frequently complain of 
continued Amhara domination of the regional civil service; the latter, unsurprisingly, 
that constitutional rights are infringed by what they consider to be the inequitable 
arrangements under which the region is now governed. If the pendulum of influence 
and access to the Ethiopian state has swung in favour of the constitutional ‘rights of 
nations, nationalities, and peoples’, it is particularly clear in Harar that it has also 
swung away from the predominantly Amhara settler population living in the outer 
suburbs of the city.  
 
This account has tried to suggest that there are, from the central government’s point 
of view, good geopolitical reasons why it has responded positively to the HNL’s 
proposals to privilege history over census results in planning the administration of 
the area. The enthusiastic endorsement of these arrangements by Harari nationalists, 
as in the following comments, has hardly served to quell the resentment and 
frustration of other communities: 
 
Affirmative action must be recognized [as being] in line with the struggle 
on the elimination of discrimination. Whenever states […] adopt special 
measures aimed at protecting minority rights [they] shall not be 
considered as discriminatory. (Mohamed Tewfik Ahmed 1998:65) 
 
This section has considered the coincidence of interest between the Harari nationalist 
lobby and the ERPDF-led TGE in institutionalising a dramatic and high profile 
degree of autonomy to Harar and its indigenous population, as well as the ongoing 
                                                 
257 Action directed against Amharas in this area in 1991 and 1992 was associated at the time with 
Oromo rather than Harari resentment. Whilst both OLF and OPDO indulged in strong Oromo 
nationalist rhetoric at the time, both officially eschewed responsibility for these attacks, and 
attribution of responsibility remains inflammatory and contested. 
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reservations and resentment the policy have engendered. It concludes with a brief 
consideration of how conventions and markers attaching to ethnicity may have 
influenced the dynamics in play.  
 
The dynamics of ethnicity in Harar 
 
Ethnicity can be argued to have operated differently in Harar than was the case in 
other instances in Ethiopia, and it is tempting to speculate that this not only is the 
result of the geopolitical interests at play in the area, but also has to do with the 
nature of the identity, the ‘groupness’, generated in this case. 
 
The Harari ethnic community is a highly bounded one, in a number of interconnected 
and crucial respects. Firstly, and most literally and visibly, Hararis are bounded by 
the city wall, which they ‘owe to the wisdom of Amir Nur who was awake to the 
seriousness of the [Oromo] migrations’ (Trimingham 1965:205). Whilst those 
Hararis who travelled outside the wall to disseminate Islam, over the years dispersed 
and assimilated in the shifting ethnic tides of the surrounding populations258, the wall 
ensured that the identity of those within remained sharply distinguished from 
neighbouring groups. Features of these distinctions included lineage claims, and 
language (Harari is a member of the Ethio-Semitic language group, although Harar is 
surrounded by cushitic languages), as well as idiosyncratic norms of dress, 
architecture, food, music, and rituals of hospitality. All of these features have been 
bolstered over the centuries by relatively strong persisting sanctions on exogamy. 
Whilst Harar NRS is constructed to include non-Harari populations, there is no 
expectation that these will assimilate. The constitutional arrangements adopted 
reflect this assumption. 
 
It is important to note that the maintenance of these differences is striking and 
unusual, given the high degree of historical interaction experienced by a mercantile 
and (in earlier periods) proselytising community. It seems that the walls of Harar city 
                                                 
258 On the basis of linguistic evidence, ‘there must have been a territorial continuity between Harari 
and East Gurage, later disrupted by wars and population movements’ (Bender 1976:30). 
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have acted as a trigger and marker of a circular pattern of difference exacerbating 
difference, to the point at which endogamy became something of a cult in the Harari 
population, even amongst the large contemporary diaspora. As Harar’s walls marked 
a community relatively wealthier and more educated and urbane than those 
surrounding it, in-group dynamics strengthened.  
 
When ethnic federalism was introduced in 1991, all ethnicities were not equal. Those 
of Harari identity enjoyed certain advantages as compared, for instance, with the 
Majangir population whose case is discussed below. One set of advantages was, of 
course, the relatively good socio-economic circumstances enjoyed by many of this 
small ethnic group. Also of great benefit, however, was the fact that the conventional 
profile of Harari identity coincided closely with the criteria identified by Stalin for  
‘nationhood’, qualifying it as well if not better than any other language group in 
Ethiopia. Members and outsiders agree that Hararis share distinctive and defined 
language, culture, territory, history, and economic life (1973[1913]:57-61): if any 
group in Ethiopia was to qualify as a ‘nation’, rather than just a ‘nationality’ or 
‘people’, it was surely the miniscule population of Harar. Given the ideological 
approach of those constructing the federal project, failure to incorporate into the 
federal design such an unambiguous case would have been unthinkable.  
 
This constellation is highly unusual in Ethiopia, and cannot be said to apply to any of 
its other language groups in quite the same way. The artifice of the wall has, literally, 
marked out a situation far from norms applying in other parts of the country. 
Contemporary Harar NRS is not premised on any drive to further assimilation, but 
institutionalises difference in its constitutional and legislative arrangements. Here the 
appeals to historic importance were designed to counterbalance the small 
contemporary size of the Harari population living in Harar, with many now scattered 
from what is nevertheless their clear place of origin. These appeals were not needed 
as a means of distinguishing what is evidently a separate ethnic group.  
 




There is an element of identity crisis in Waag (interview, private setor 
professional, Addis Ababa, 3 July 1999) 
 
A very different ethnographic situation from that of Harar applies in the case of the 
Agaw/Kamyr ‘national’ population of Waag Himra zone. Where Hararis represented 
a sharply ‘bounded’ urban body, with a large and prosperous diaspora, the 
Agaw/Kamyr number amongst Ethiopia’s most impoverished, food insecure, and 
remote agriculturalists (Holt & Lawrence 1993). There is little in terms of culture, 
dress, history, or economy to differentiate them from their Tigrigna and Amharic-
speaking neighbours, and the three language populations live relatively intermixed.  
 
The construction of both Harari and Agew identity incorporates the notion of high 
levels of past assimilation, of powerful civilisations and great cultures now 
diminished. Harari identity became ‘marked’ by the establishment of the city, which 
has acted as a bulwark against full and final assimilation as discussed above. Agew 
identity by contrast, enjoyed no such artificial boundary, and is thought about in 
terms of past and continuing processes of assimilation. The ethnic ‘special’ zone of 
Waag Himra has been established on the premise of reversing an ongoing process, 
and it incorporates non-Himtanga-speaking populations, with the official intention of 
disseminating the language back through those populations which are thought to 
‘have lost’ this ability. Although there is no explicit expectation that ‘non 
Agew/Kamyr’ populations will learn a language that is not theirs, there is here a 
different sense of the possibilities of assimilation from that at work in Harar, 
precisely because of the permeability of boundaries. Since there is little overt 
difference in culture between the groups, there are, on the face of it, relatively few 
barriers to overcome in order for the population of the zone to think of itself as ‘one 
group’ in due course.  
 
The ‘Special’ Zone 
 
Waag Himra is situated adjacent to Amhara NRS’s northern border with Tigray, 
between North Gondar and North Wello (see maps 9 and 10b). It has a population of 
just over 275,000 (1994 census) and is established as one of three ‘special zones’ in 
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Amhara NRS, designed to preserve the rights to separate administration and 
autonomy of various non-Amhara ethnic enclaves living within the regional state’s 
borders, in this case the Agew/Kamyr259. ‘Special’ zones differ from other zones in 
the region, which – at least formally - function only as an administrative link 
between wereda and region260. By contrast, ‘special’ zones are ‘self-determining 
units’, and incorporate an additional tier of elected legislature and executive which 
reflect and embody the rights of self-determination granted to the populations in 
question, on the basis of their distinct ethnicity261. The zone, which initially formed 
part of Simien Wollo (although it shows up as a separate unit on the early TGE 
Boundary Commission Map 8), was established as an autonomous unit following a 
conference of interested parties, held in Sekota in 1994.  
 
The case of Waag Himra demonstrates the advantages of ‘special’ zone status, and 
thus provides a useful preface to the consideration of cases in the SNNPNRS where 
populations have raised claims for similarly separate and autonomous zones. In 
1998/99 the zone had a capital budget of 7,974,000 EB and recurrent budget of 
18,278,000, in respect of a population projected to be around 316,500 at the time262. 
Resulting per capita budget figures are significantly higher than those applying in 
other areas. In particular, the capital budget, which has funded the extensive 
construction of zone office buildings, a large hospital, and highly visible housing for 
civil servants, has fuelled a dramatic growth in Sekota town during the 1990s. In 
addition to the generous allocation of resources to the ‘special’ zone by the Amhara 
                                                 
259 The other two special zones are Agew Awi (or Agew Midir) Zone, encompassing the other Agew 
population of Agew/Awingi, and Oromiya Zone, the majority of whose population are Oromiffa-
speaking Oromo. This last seems to have been established later than the other two, probably in 
response to pressure from the OLF, which seems to have been active in agitating for autonomy 
amongst Oromiffa-speaking populations during late 1991 and early 1992 (interviews, local 
government officers, Kemissie, Oromiya special zone, May 1999). As noted in Chapter I, the OLF 
claimed large areas of what became Amhara NRS for Oromia, on the basis that in significant areas 
populations were Amharised Oromos. The claim foundered amidst a complexity of counter claims all 
based on such appeals to history. 
260 Throughout the 1990s zones constituted in practice a politically important unit and locus of 
control: zone administrators in Amhara NRS tended to be drawn from amongst the most senior of the 
ANDM leadership. Amidst reforms undertaken in 2001, however, zone offices in most regions other 
than SNNPNRS became mere ‘branch offices’ of the regional government. 
261 In this sense their structure is identical to those of the ethnic-based zones, and special weredas, 
established under the constitution of the SNNPNRS, described below.  
262 1998 projected figure from the 1994 census. 
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NRS government, formerly inaccessible Waag has benefited from a resource 
intensive federal programme of road construction, which has connected Sekota to 
North, South, and East263.  
 
The advantages seen to be enjoyed in this case have been widely accorded a political 
interpretation, as resulting from the well-known links between the Waag area and the 
EPDM, forerunner of the ruling ANDM. When it first embarked upon armed 
opposition to the Dergue regime after reconstituting itself in 1982, the EPDM 
selected the inaccessible mountains around the remote town of Sekota as its 
operational ‘base area’, and recruited large numbers of Agew and Amhara from the 
vicinity, thus forging the close and emotive bonds of kin membership and shared 
history with the populations of the area, many of whom, at the time of research, 
spoke of the ANDM as ‘our children’, or ‘our organisation’ in the same manner that 
rural populations in many parts of Tigray were wont to speak of the TPLF in the late 
1980s and 1990s264. One result of this mutually advantageous symbiosis, is that the 
respective views of the ethnic community and ruling party or government cannot 
often or easily be disaggregated. 
 
Conflicting bases of Waag Himra’s legitimacy 
 
The autonomous status accorded to Waag Himra, and the basis upon which it has 
been justified and constructed as a legitimate separate entity, is also interesting in 
terms of the illumination it offers of the contradictory notions at work in the idea, 
and in the act, of ‘granting ethnic self-determination’. For here, perhaps more visibly 
than anywhere else in Ethiopia in the 1990s, the government has been simultaneously 
engaged in the processes both of recognising a pre-existing language group, and of 
seeking to strengthen, extend, and re-create a distinct ethnic group capable of 
                                                 
263 It is not only its status as an autonomous unit which has provided a basis for drawing resources into 
the Waag area. The TGE also adopted a policy of prioritising the socio-economic development of war-
affected areas in the early period of the 1990s. Waag’s status as ‘special’ zone, however, provided a 
mechanism for pumping in development resources.  
264 The fact that, as a result of the organisation’s long association with this area, a large proportion of 
the ANDM leadership are either themselves members, or are married to members, of the Agew/Kamyr 
group inspired the joke (effective in Amharic as in English) that ‘ANDM really stands for the Agew 
National Democratic Movement’. 
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sustaining a viable self-administration265. In a second departure (like that of Harar) 
from usual practice, here too the borders demarcated to bound the self-determining 
group have been drawn not only to enclose the contemporary members of a 
dwindling language group, but also to include those who can somehow historically 
be associated with it. In this case the special zone also encompasses those others who 
fit a conception of the population of a Waag understood with reference to historical 
factors and features. Whereas in the case of Harar NRS, its non-Harari inhabitants 
are treated as such, in this instance even those who are non-Himtanga-speakers are 
construed as somehow historically ‘of Waag’, and the ‘ethnicising’ or assimilationist 
pressure is quite different. 
 
There are two strands influencing the understanding of identity in the Sekota area, 
which overlap, intersect, and compete with one another to influence current 
events266. One stresses the importance of Waag as an historical entity, advocating the 
establishment of a successor drawn along lines which reflect this glorious (if, 
arguably, ‘feudal’) past. The second stresses the rights of the population to live in 
accordance with their own culture and – most especially – to use their own language; 
it advocates an administrative entity predicated upon the different ethnic profile of 
the population of this area, upon the preservation of the Agew enclave, whose 
language and way of life were threatened with inundation from the two dominant 
surrounding groups. The dual rationale comes together in the name given the zone, 
which fuses the historical geo-political name (Waag) with the ethnonym (Himra). 
 
What is interesting about these two accounts is that each neither is convincing 
without pilfering the resources of the other. Thus for instance the historical account 
needs the vitality of ethnic identity to add life to its otherwise rather colourless 
evocation of a past long disappeared. Given that ethnicity provides the prism through 
                                                 
265 Another instance of the ruling party seeking to mould ethnicity was its attempt to unify the groups 
of Simien Omo zone, discussed in the following section. 
266 In the course of fieldwork I came to associate them respectively with the pole personae of Teferi 
Wossen, son of Waagshum Wossen, and latest generation of the old Waag aristocracy, and – 
representative of its new elite - Tadesse Kassa, politburo member of ANDM, representative for the 
Waag area, chairman of Amhara’s Credit and Savings Institute, and, since the latest government 
reshuffle in October 2001, vice-President of Amhara NRS.  
 
 243 
which separate administration is considered in the current Ethiopian climate, its 
relevance cannot be expunged from any attempt at autonomy. Meanwhile, however, 
the ethnic account, as a rationale for the zone as established, cannot stand upon 
markers of difference alone, since the population within its border incorporates many 
who have greater similarities with their cross-border neighbours. Language is not a 
reliable marker, with only a minority of the population of the zone speaking 
Himtagna, and other populations being incorporated here. It is not clear that there are 
other salient markers of difference, with even ‘nationalist’ respondents confirming 
that there is little to distinguish Agew, Amhara, and Tigrayans living adjacent to one 
another. 
 
Thus historical markers – the significance of both Waag and the Waagshum267 – have 
been invoked to bolster a dubious claim to ethnic identity. This invocation in turn 
itself demonstrates the threadbare nature of these ethnic claims, since it seems likely 
that the historical area (or areas, since it shifted) of Waag – incorporating Ashenge, 
Korem, and Alamata as it often did – was essentially trilingual (interview, private 
sector professional Addis Ababa, 3 July 1999); and that the adjacent area of Lasta, 
where Himtanga is not now spoken, was historically as much associated with Agew 
identity as Waag itself. Although it is clear that the language had been dying out 
rapidly in the period up to 1991, it is less than clear that Waag ever ‘used to be’ a 
separate language unit.  
 
Language and ethnicity in Waag 
 
In Waag Himra itself, it is officially asserted that significant populations which ‘used 
to speak’ the Agew language Himtanga (i.e. whose parents or forebears spoke that 
language) have been incorporated within the zone, on the basis that ‘even the 
population which speaks Amharic is originally Agew’ (interview, Zone Economic 
and Social Sector Head, Sekota, Waag Himra special zone, 15 May 1999). This 
demarcation has been decided upon in the context of a deliberate attempt to reverse 
                                                 
267 The hereditary ruler of the area up to 1974. 
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the disappearance of a language whose mother-tongue speakers now number fewer 
than 150,000268. The policy is one of overt social engineering:  
 
For the time being Amharic is the official language of the zone, but this 
is just a temporary strategy, and we expect to use Himtanga in due 
course. […] We are trying to encourage the use of Himtanga and there 
are evening classes for government workers who do not speak it yet, 
perhaps because they have only one Himtanga-speaking parent, or have 
been away from the area. There is a certificate issued at the end of the 
course in order to emphasise the development of the language, its use and 
dissemination. (Interview, Economic and Social Sector Head, Sekota, 15 
May 1999) 
 
By 1999 educational materials in Himtanga had been developed for school grades 1 
to 4, and the following year it was introduced in grade 5 (interviews, zone officers, 
January 2000)269. Members of the zone administration felt that ‘pupils were keen to 
learn in their own language, and the government has also set this as a policy 
objective so we are following it’ (interview, Head of Zone Education Bureau, Sekota 
16 May 1999). Government and party respondents repeatedly stressed the ‘urgency’ 
of the situation, commenting on the increasingly prevalent situation where young and 
middle-aged adults now only spoke Amharic, where their parents had been fluent in 
Himtanga (interviews, civil servants, Sekota town, and Tsitska, Zuqualla wereda, 
May 1999 and January 2000). Any suggestion that the expense and complexity of 
intervening thus artificially to nurture and re-develop the failing language might be 
avoided by simply allowing it to wither, was, however, greeted with uniform 
incomprehension.  
 
The reaction seems to represent something more than an unthinking adherence to a 
government-sponsored policy direction. It seems that language competence is 
increasingly seen in Waag Himra as a means to bound and protect the autonomy of 
the ‘self’ to which ‘self-determination’ has been granted, as the following comments 
suggest: 
                                                 
268 143,369 for the country as a whole of whom 130,000 are within Amhara NRS (1994 Population 
and Housing Census, Country Level results, Volume I, pp.79, 81.)  
269 The translation and transcription teams which prepared these materials were led by the high-profile 





We have got the right of nationalities but basically we still haven’t really 
used it in practice because we are still using Amharic. Maybe this will 
change when we change the official language because then it won’t be so 
easy for people to come from outside to work in the area. (Interview, 
Zone Bureau Head, Sekota, 16 May 1999) 
 
The set of ideas here seems to be roughly as follows: (i) we have been given the right 
of self-determination, which we are pleased about; but (ii) we have to be sure that it 
is really we ourselves (and not some outside impostors) who are ‘self-determining’ 
(i.e. to determine that it is indeed self-determination and not outside imposition 
which is involved); thus (iii) we have to ‘create’ ourselves as a viable, coherent, and 
identifiably bounded collective ‘self’ in order to be able to make full use of the right 
of self-determination. Acquisition of a notoriously difficult, despised, and otherwise 
unusable language, seems intended to operate here as a passport, regulating and 
restricting access to those with a demonstrable commitment to (and membership of) 
this highly successful collective270. This situation stands in marked contrast with the 
ambivalent or negative attitudes towards the acquisition of minority languages 
observed in the SNNPNRS, which were discussed in Chapter VI, and are further 
explored in the following sections.  
 
The difference seems to lie critically in the collective consciousness of the relative 
advantages of being seen as ethnically different from the surrounding nationalities, 
possibly enhanced in this instance by the high-level political links Agew/Kamyr are 
known to enjoy. Another critical difference is undoubtedly the continuing proximity 
of the national language, Amharic, which will continue to be relatively easy for new 
generations to acquire, even as their initial language of instruction shifts to 
Himtanga.  
 
Another interesting feature of the operation of language and language policy in this 
area, also relevant elsewhere, is that it demonstrates the powerfully performative 
impact of the declaration of ethnic federalism in 1991. Having been categorised as 
 
 246 
Agew, elements of the population have effectively set out to become what they have 
been declared to be, by acquiring missing characteristics and competences of 
membership in an ethnicity. It is true that aspirant members do not typically innovate 
‘from scratch’ (the category Agew/Kamyr is not undetermined): they tend to have 
some claim to Agew parentage or ancestry sufficient to satisfy the (new) conventions 
of the collective. 
 
It is important to note however, that this re-invention of ‘Agew-ness’ does not extend 
to the whole population of the zone, and is primarily associated with the younger 
educated generation of party members wishing to return to their home area as public 
servants. Whatever may have been the case in the past271, it is significant that the 
1994 census records only a marginally larger contemporary population claiming 
Agew/Kamyr ethnicity, than claims mother-tongue in Himtanga272. Just under half of 
the population of the zone (47.18%) describe themselves as Amhara. As far as this 
research was in a position to establish273, they do not seem to regard themselves as 
‘assimilated Agew’ or ‘former Agew’, but as, simply, coming from Amhara ‘stock’ 
(there are even Amharic-speaking kebeles on the North Gondar side of the Tekezze 
river who have successfully petitioned to join Waag Himra zone274). At this point it 
emerges again that the invocation of history in the design of Waag Himra ‘special’ 
zone has more than one referent. The new zone is premised not only on what ‘used to 
be’ Agew/Kamyr populations, but also on what ‘used to be’ the historical 
geopolitical entity, Waag. 
 
Agew history and identity in Waag and Lasta 
 
A serious threat to the Aksumite Empire is believe to have developed 
towards the end of the tenth century when the Agao tribe rebelled. […] It 
                                                                                                                                          
270 This is a passport required by candidates for elected office throughout Ethiopia: it is no longer 
adequate to be a long-term resident or born in a particular area: one has to demonstrate fluency in one 
of the indigenous languages of the constituency. 
271 There is significant evidence that formerly widespread pagan Agew populations, occupying a wide 
area of the highlands, were gradually assimilated amongst their Christian Amhara and Tigrayan 
neighbours. On this see particularly Tadesse Tamrat (1988) 
272 the figures are  158,231 nationally and 143,241 within the region (1994 Census, Vol.II pp.66,69.) 
273 This point was not fully explored, researched, and tested, and the conclusion remains tentative. 
274 Interview, wereda Education Officer, Zuqualla wereda, January 2000 
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is generally agreed that the rebellion was begun by an Agao princess […] 
Gudit or Yodit [whose] husband is supposed to have been the governor 
of the district of Bugna in Lasta. (Richard Pankhurst 1961:59-60) 
 
Yodit’s period is to this day widely recalled with horror by Orthodox Christian 
Tigrayans, and she is reputed to have ‘overthrown the Christian faith’ with a 
destructive ferocity second only to that of Ahmed ‘Gragn’, replacing the Solomonic 
dynasty of Axum with the Zagwe line seated at Roha (later Lalibella) in Lasta. 
Whilst there is little agreement as to whether the Agew dynasty was (initially) pagan 
or Jewish275, it is clear that Agew identity – like that of Harar – is evocative of a 
historical period of significant challenge to the Orthodox Christian Abyssinian polity. 
It seems likely that a conscious desire to emphasise this plural history was again in 
play when the architects of ethnic federalism incorporated Waag Himra ‘special’ 
zone into the design of the ‘new Ethiopia’.  
 
The problem facing these architects is that Waag (and Lasta) have been slippery 
constructs whose location (even existence) has shifted with each political tide (this 
can swiftly be established even for the recent period, by comparing the maps 
appended).  Whilst Waag had been  
 
a region in its own right like Gondar, in 1950 they put it under Wollo 
(there was even talk of putting it under Tigray) and Waagshum Wossen 
became answerable to the Crown Prince. Under Menelik II the 
Waagshum would wash his hands from the same bowl as the king, to 
give the impression that the Zagwe handing back to the Solomonic line 
was a peaceful process, and that the Solomonids respected the 
Waagshum as a king without power. After all that, the reduction to 
wereda status was a terrible blow. (interview, private sector professional, 
Addis Ababa, 3 July 1999) 
 
The town of Sekota itself had long been a significant market centre, straddling an 
important cross-roads, but had seen its importance decline under successive 
governments.  The best-known reference to Sekota’s historical importance is 
Plowden’s (1868:130):  
 
                                                 
275 By the time of Lalibella, who constructed the famous rock-hewn churches in the town named after 
him, it was Christian. 
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Persons with the rank of nagadras were found only in the more important 
commercial centres, Plowden reporting that there were only six such 
officials in the north, viz, at Ayjubay, Derita, Gondar, Sokota, Dabareq, 
and Adowa’ (Richard Pankhurst 1968:520).  
 
During the Italian occupation, over 40,000 troops had been garrisoned in the town, 
and the older generation continue to speak Italian. 
 
In planning the establishment of the autonomous zone, its relatively prestigious 
history was contrasted with a dismal economic present, in an attempt to encourage 
local organisation for development. A slogan of the 1994 conference was that ‘Waag 
without the ERPDF is nothing: we must build something from within which can’t be 
taken away by the central government’. A drive began to bring back educated 
personnel with local origins, and to build up the Development Association which 
had, for forty years, sought to rebuilt the route from Sekota to the main north-south 
road at Korem. Despite all this, reservations regarding the limits of separate 
Agew/Kamyr identity may have remained amongst the political class. The Agew 
(Kamyr and Awingi) are the only ethnic group with their own autonomous 
administrative entity who have not also been organised under a separate political 
party within EPRDF. Agew members of the ANDM have a vested interest in 
remaining an influential core of the larger organisation and continuing to play on that 
larger stage. Waag Himra has flourished under current political and administrative 
arrangements, and has clearly felt no need of separate representation.  
 
If this chapter has so far considered cases where the Federal government or TGE 
seem to have been relatively generous in granting a higher status within the 
federation than the small groups in question might have expected on the basis of 
demography alone, the remainder of it deals with a range of attempts of ethnic 
groups to wrest additional status, resources, or territory from a government (and 
often also from neighbours) reluctant to give more away.  
 
‘Repacking Pandora’s box’ in the Southern Region 
 
Decentralisation is an accomplished project (then President of the 




Fieldwork suggests that between the mid-1990s and the end of that decade, there was 
an observable and orchestrated move by the EPRDF in the Southern Region, 
SNNPNRS, to claw back control over what some have described as the 'ethnic free-
for-all' in political and administrative organisation, which had applied over its first 
few years. During the initial part of the transitional period, groups of all sizes, 
claims, and credibility had been encouraged by the party to organise and mobilise 
their populations for self-determination. After several years, however, the 
government started to argue that, for reasons of budgetary efficiency, it made sense 
to consolidate the myriad zones, regions, and political parties which had emerged in 
response. A precursor to this process was the amalgamation in 1992 of the series of 
smaller, initially federated units clustered in the south, to form the Southern Region 
(or SNNPNRS). Government integrationist rhetoric turned abruptly to concrete 
measures when, in 1997, the 21 EPRDF political parties which had proliferated in the 
Region were ‘consolidated’ into almost half that number (Young 1998a), and a 
number of separate 'non-viable' zones were unceremoniously stuck back together. 
Finally, and most controversially of all, a series of claims for the recognition of 
separate status for ethnic or language groups and sub-groups were either rejected or 
deferred through the late 1990s. There is clear evidence that an integrating impetus 
characterised government policy during the five year period of the first government 
of the Federal Democratic Republic (1995-2000).  
 
Those who always feared that ethnic federalism would inevitably lead to the 
balkanisation of the Ethiopian empire state have felt that the government was, in this 
period, attempting something akin to repacking Pandora's box. Many felt vindicated 
when unremitting popular hostility finally won a number of concessions from the 
government, in the period from 2000, and three zones were sub-divided to create a 
raft of additional zone and special wereda units. The following account documents 
each of these three cases, namely: Simien Omo and the Welaiyta claim for autonomy; 
the controversy regarding Silte status vis-à-vis the Gurage; and ethnic and minority 
relations in Kaffa Sheka. I suggest that the dynamics of resistance to often heavy-
handed government moves illuminate recursive ongoing processes of construction 
and reconstruction of groups and their interests. I argue that they have as much to do 
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with the ongoing logic of localised struggles over resources, and control over their 
allocation – and with the local invention and deployment of ‘ethnicity’ as best suits 
these other purposes, in the perception of the groups in question, and context of the 
day - as with pre-existing perceptions of ethnic or other collective identities.  
 
These cases are not ‘ethnic conflicts’ in the sense that ethnicity explains or furnishes 
the cause of them. Their dynamics have, however, been seminally influenced by 
shifts in the salience of ethnicity under current political arrangements. As suggested 
by the case of Waag Himra, under ethnic federalism, ethnic zones have enjoyed 
relatively high inputs of capital and recurrent government expenditure. The benefits 
of recognition as a separate units, therefore, are not insignificant.  
 
To summarise, informants in those towns which had, for instance, lost their status as 
zone capitals, often wrung their hands not over the disgrace to their ethnic group but 
over the fact that 'the hospitals will all go to our neighbours now'; more surprisingly, 
those who fought to avoid the 'pollution' of their languages with 'degenerate' 
neighbouring dialects simultaneously observed that 'the language issue is just a show 
which gets attention: what we really want is our own zone with our own budgets'. 
Cynical commentators have even suggested that some strands of conflict emerged 
only with the fall from grace of politically prominent individuals, whose presence 
had been seen as somehow securing the interests of their group at a higher level of 
the federation. 
 
Whatever the combination of ‘issues’ and ‘interests’, they have in a number of 
instances generated sufficient popular hostility to force some faltering government 
steps back from its clear-cut integrationist position, in the period since 2000. In 
addition to the creation of new zone and special wereda units, there is evidence that 
the government has recently sat back to reconsider means of removing incentives 
from those seeking separate new units, in a more fundamental attempt to reduce the 
‘disintegrationist’ trend.  
 




The case of Simien Omo is interesting because it represents one of only a few 
instances in which there is evidence that the EPRDF had adopted a political strategy 
premised not primarily on the notion of pre-existing ‘natural’ ethnic units, but on the 
possibility of actively ‘remoulding’ or ‘melding’ an existing set of ethnic identities; it 
is also an instance in which the ruling party was eventually forced to abandon that 
strategy in response to the violent antagonism it generated.  
 
A choice of inherited boundaries 
 
The major boundaries of what was, from 1991 to 2000, Simien (or North) Omo zone 
were established along with the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) 
in 1987 by the Dergue regime276. The unit had been created by taking elements from 
each of the three imperial teklai gezat, Gamo Goffa, Sidamo, and Kaffa, which had 
up to that point been retained by the Dergue, and was subsequently known 
(somewhat confusingly) as Gamo Goffa kifle hager277. The zone population was 
reported in 1994 to comprise the following ethnic groups (in order of size): Welaiyta 
44.17%, Gamo (including Dorze) 26.79%, Goffa (including Oyda) 9.12%, Daro 
(listed as Kulo) 10.15%, Basketo 1.87%, and Konta 1.86%, plus a few smaller 
minorities278. 
 
The series of boundary changes made by the Dergue in 1987, drew on the work of 
the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, and in a number of instances 
reflected its researches into the location, distribution, and inter-relation of ethnic 
groups, often drawing heavily on the views – and maps – of language distribution set 
out in Bender et al. (1976). The establishment of the new Gamo Goffa kifle hager 
was one of these instances, and reflected the authors’ assertion that  
 
[v]arious Ometo languages run from 50 percent to 90 percent [shared 
terms and forms] when compared with each other. […] Within the Ometo 
                                                 
276 The only adjustments made by the TGE to the Simien Omo zone they inherited were the removal of 
Konso, and addition of Basketo. 
277 Compare the maps given in appendix for the periods 1956-1987 and 1987-1991. 
278 1994 Census, SNNPR Results, Vol.2, Table 2.14, p38. 
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cluster, the family-tree model is unclear because each dialect seems to 
merge into the next one in any direction. (1976:51) 
 
Bender et al. posit the category ‘Welamo dialect cluster’, listing its members as 
‘Dorze, Gemu-Gofa, Kulo-Konta [Daro], Malo, Oyda, Welamo [Welaiyta]’ 
(1976:15, Table 1). In so doing, the book’s authors introduced (perhaps even 
‘invented’) what became the legitimating basis for ISEN and the Dergue’s 
delineation of a map ‘correctly’ reflecting the ‘sensible’ administration within a 
single unit of this cluster of groups, now understood to be separated only by variation 
of dialect.279 
 
Although they may have made sense on grounds of linguistic categorisation, the 
1987 boundary changes undermined long-standing administrative demarcations, 
which had resulted in developmental patterns dividing, rather than uniting the Daro, 
Gamo, and Gofa, particularly from the Welaiyta. Most strikingly they reversed 
Welaiyta’s incorporation with the relatively wealthy Sidamo teklai gezat, a 
connection still held by Welaiyta to have brought about the relatively high levels of 
socio-economic development the area enjoyed during the imperial period 
(interviews, elder generation, Sodo, Simien Omo zone, October 1999, Welaiyta zone, 
June 2002)280. The old teklai gezat of Gamo Gofa, meanwhile, had developed 
markedly different connotations, as the favoured imperial destination for those 
punished with internal exile to the peripheries, following political disgrace or 
disloyalty281.  
 
Welaiyta recalcitrance rallies… 
 
                                                 
279 More than one interview on Simien Omo provided evidence of the pervasive authority of Bender et 
al. (1976). The statistics it offers for dialect shared forms are precisely and widely cited. A second 
influential source has been Cotterell (1973), extensively quoted, for instance, in The Reporter 9 
February 2000, ‘Myopic “Centralisation”’, pp.7 & 10 (John W:2000). 
280 That the large Welaiyta population long-settled in Awassa town is further testimony to the strength 
of this connection was stressed by a number of respondents, including the Welaiyta zone 
Administrator, interviewed Welaiyta Sodo, June 2002. 
281 Amongst others, the leader of the first weyane in Tigray, Blatta Haile Mariam Redda, was 
subsequently confined there.   
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In this way the change institutionalised competing criteria of ‘affinity’ – language 
and administrative history - which won differential support amongst the groups now 
lumped together. Whilst the largely under-developed Daro (formerly part of Kaffa 
teklai gezat), Gamo, and Goffa groups seem to have seen some advantage in their 
new links with the seven weredas surrounding the well-developed centre of Welaiyta 
Sodo, and its relatively highly educated population282, educated Welaiyta openly 
declare themselves to have been appalled at their perceived relegation amongst 
‘peripheral and backward populations’ (interviews, civil servants, Welaiyta Sodo, 
October 1999). 
 
Such sentiments, compounded by a fierce pride in the extremes of valour with which 
the Welaiyta King T’ona had withstood the advance of Menelik II’s troops in ‘one of 
the bloodiest campaigns of the whole process of expansion’283, won the Welaiyta a 
reputation for ethnic chauvinism. This, together with the presence of a significant 
number of Welaiyta cadres in the Dergue’s WPE, did little to endear them to the 
EPRDF, who came to power in 1991 entrenched in the view that it was only lack of 
vision, and the arrogance of the Welaiyta, that militated against the unity of Simien 
Omo’s peoples: 
 
If only Simien Omo had benefited from the enlightened political 
leadership we have enjoyed in Tigray, the Welaiyta weredas would by 
now regard themselves as much part of the wider zone and its people, as 
the Welkaiyt area now does part of Tigray. (Interview, then member of 
the TGE Boundary Commission, Addis Ababa, December 1991) 
 
This comment – very much in the Marxist-Leninist tradition – offers an illuminating 
combination of the notion that identity is open to influence, manipulation and 
change, and the idea that there is a ‘correct’ and an ‘incorrect’ allocation of 
                                                 
282 ‘at least the Dergue brought us all together: we must thank them for that’ (interview, civil servant, 
Mareka Gena wereda, Daro area, 12 October 1999) 
283 Bahru Zewdie (1991:64). ‘When Menelik tried to invade this area, we resisted for 7 years. 118,000 
Welaiyta, and 90,000 of Menelik’s troops died in the fighting before we were conquered’ (interview, 
Welaiyta elder, and descendant of the royal family, Welaiyta Sodo, 13 October 1999). Less commonly 
stressed, although perhaps equally significant in this context, is the fact that Welaiyta subsequently 
became Menelik’s auxiliaries in the subjugation of populations further south and west. 
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populations to ethnic groups or nationalities which can be determined by actors other 
than (indeed external to) those populations284. 
 
EPRDF’s determination to preserve the Dergue’s borders faced little initial 
opposition from a Welaiyta elite mollified by the area’s original status as one of the 
14 federated units (commonly referred to simply as ‘Welaiyta’), and by the 
prominence of several of its number in federal and regional government positions. In 
the mid-to-late 1990s this changed, as a number of factors began to unravel Welaiyta 
(and indeed Gamo, Gofa, and Daro) confidence that Simien Omo zone adequately 
served their interests. 
 
A significant trigger of Welaiyta insecurity was the dismissal and imprisonment in 
1998 on corruption charges of Tefera Meskele, the powerful Chairman of both the 
Welaiyta ruling party and the SEPDF, and a former Dergue solider and TPLF POW.  
During Tefera’s prominent reign as SNNPNRS Secretary, Welaiyta had rested secure 
in the knowledge that their interests were more than well represented285. After his 
departure, calls escalated for the establishment of a separate zone, through which 
representatives of the large Welaiyta population286 could be sure to get a slice of the 
National Regional State pie. The ‘parlous’ economic state of once-prosperous Sodo 
town became a focus of grievance. As Awassa prospered and grew exponentially as 
NRS capital, Welaiyta reflected with resentment that Sidama used to come to Sodo’s 
high school for education; as new Simien Omo zone government office blocks sprang 
up in Arba Minch, bitter reminiscence focused on the imperial ‘golden era’ of 
American mission-fostered development in Sodo287, and fed calls for a separate zone. 
 
                                                 
284 It also probably gives an overly rosy picture of levels of Tigrayan integration.  
285 ‘Tefera Meskele even changed the route of a planned road, just because he was in power. There 
was a kind of arrogance.’ (interview, Welaiyta Zone Administrator, Welaiyta Sodo, 22 June 2002) 
286 1,269,216 across the country as a whole, according to the 1994 census (Country Level Results, 
Vol.1, table 2.14, p.66) 
287 The imperial coup-leader, Germame Neway, is thought to have developed an understanding of the 
iniquity of norms of imperial administration, and made attempts to reverse them, during an early 
posting in Welaiyta (Bahru Zewdie 1991:213). His period is remembered locally with enthusiasm 
(interview Welaiyta zone Chairman, Sodo, 22 June 2002), as is that of the ‘developmentally 




These demands fell on unsympathetic government ears. With the establishment of 
the FDRE government in mid-1995, EPRDF rhetoric increasingly turned, as 
mentioned above, from talk of the liberation and self-determination of oppressed 
groups (all were now, after all, emancipated under the federal constitution) to 
emphasise the co-ordination, amalgamation, and unification of the smaller ethnic 
units in the interests of the ‘efficient use of scarce government resources’. Efficiency 
through co-ordination became something of a slogan over the next few years, and in 
concrete terms, the EPRDF leadership engineered and presided over a process of 
amalgamation of its member and satellite parties, now allowing only one EPRDF 
organisation in each self-determining administrative unit, which, in the SNNPNRS, 
meant at zone and special wereda levels. In tandem with similar processes all over 
the country, the series of 3 EPRDF-member parties which had represented Simien 
Omo’s various communities, were rapidly melded into the composite Wegagoda288 
Peoples’ Democratic Organisation.  
 
Centralisation of the ruling political party of the zone was a matter of relatively 
limited popular interest289, with most shrugging it off as a matter for its members290.  
Of much wider concern was the extension of this ‘centralisation’ drive into the 
sphere of zone government policy-making; specifically to the development and 
imposition of a unified language, concocted out of the four major branches of the 
‘Welamo dialect cluster’, and (in a spectacular demonstration of political 
shortsightedness) given the same name as the new EPRDF party – Wegagoda.  The 
hostile reaction to the distribution of Wegagoda textbooks to the zone’s schools in 
1998 was rapid, widespread, and extreme. In failing to secure the support for its 
introduction even of the teachers who were responsible to inculcate the new 
language, the zone government had created a highly effective vehicle for the 
communication of discontent throughout both urban and rural areas of the zone. If 
                                                 
288 Amharic syllabic acronym for Welaiyta, Gamo, Goffa, and Daro. 
289 On the basis of interviews conducted in January 1998, Young (1998a) reports that elders were 
involved in the discussions which prefaced the establishment of the Wegagoda party. 
290 Many of them were already unhappy with events. 
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teachers across the zone were unhappy291, those in Welaiyta Sodo town and its 
environs were furious. A number refused to use the new books, publicly burning 
them instead. Disturbances in the town resulted in the deaths of at least three people, 
apparently shot by security forces, and several hundred protesters, mostly but not 
exclusively Welaiyta, were imprisoned by the zone government. Although pro-
government media attempted to blame agitation by political opponents292, a 
substantial proportion of those detained were civil servants and EPRDF members, 
infuriated by what they regarded as the unilateral actions taken in Arba Minch293.  
 
… with language a catalyst 
 
Given already existing sensibilities, the inflammatory impact of the introduction of 
Wegagoda should have surprised no-one. Since a first meeting of elders and 
language experts in 1992, language and language-policy formulation had been 
matters of increasing sensitivity in Simien Omo. Failure to agree on the common 
language desired by the central government meant that different languages had been 
used as the media of administration and of instruction in school grades 1-5, in 
different parts of the zone: Daro Kontigna, Gamogna, Goffigna, and Welaiytigna, 
according to the group in question. In 1996, still without agreement amongst the 
experts assigned to the issue, and reluctant to inflame it further, the Ministry of 
Education released a budget for the production of two sets of schoolbooks in 
Daro/Gamo/Goffa (Degago) on the one hand, and Welaiytigna on the other. As a 
result, when Wegagoda texts were introduced two years later, no group saw them as 
anything but a retrogressive step away from an established form of their own 
language, which was being diluted with alien variants. Given Welaiyta perceptions of 
                                                 
291 ‘We don’t like this language. It is not easy to teach. It causes problems with the students because it 
is not their language, and it is not what they were using before. Also for teachers it is very difficult.’ 
(Interview, school teacher, Ella Konta wereda, Daro area, 12 October 1999) 
292 Efoiyta for instance, blamed an article by Assefa Chebo widely cited in the private media. The 
article’s author had been one of the original Welaiyta representatives at the 1991 Charter conference 
and in the TGE, before fleeing the country as the SPO threatened to detain him in connection with 
alleged Dergue-era human rights crimes. 
293 Interviews, Welaiyta Sodo, 12-14 October 1999, and 22 June 2002. By the time of my second visit 
to the town, a number of those who had been arrested because of their strong views on this issue, were 
back in their old political and administrative positions, cheerfully showing off the ICRC ID cards with 
which they had been issued during their detention.  
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their neighbours, and the fact that written Welaiytigna had a well-developed history, 
they saw them as inferior alien variants on an established literary standard.  
 
Written Welaiytigna was first developed by the Sudan Interior Mission in the early 
twentieth century, with the production of a bible in the language by the Wycliffe 
Bible Society, and its dissemination amongst growing numbers of Kale Hiwot 
believers294. Its ‘legitimacy’ was further institutionalised, and its use standardised, as 
a result of its early inclusion amongst the Ethiopian languages selected by the 
Dergue for the literacy campaign that ran from 1979 and 1991295. The literature on 
the literacy campaign suggests that the ‘problems of […] different language names 
for extremely similar languages (e.g. the Wollayta-Kullo cluster)’ elicited 
‘complaints’ about literacy in Welaiytigna during the 1980s (Susan Hoben 
(1994:186-7) citing Mammo Kebede (1988)), and that ‘adults whose dialects [were] 
not used as the major medium of literacy instruction, resented the other group to the 
extent that they resisted literacy instruction’ (Tilahun Sinehaw 1994:230). The 
language used by the literacy campaign in Simien Omo seems to have been based 
relatively closely on Welaiytigna, with glossaries indicating variations found in other 
dialect forms. When Wegagoda’s editors attempted in the late 1990s to develop a 
more ‘representative’ version of the language, using Latin script, their propensity for 
indicating ‘alternative’ variants alongside the ‘orthodoxy’ they advocated, only 
heaped insult on injury.  
 
The problem was that when they printed the booklets they put the 
Welaiyta form in brackets, so for instance ‘water’ was printed ‘hasa 
(hata)’. People immediately asked ‘why? Who is lesser than whom? Why 
are we put under the brackets?’ (Interview, private sector officer, wereda 
centre, Welaiyta zone, 22 June 2002) 
 
                                                 
294 SIM and the Baptist Kale Hiwot church started activities in this area in 1925 with few members. 
When SIM returned to Ethiopia after the World War II in 1947 the movement had grown 
exponentially amongst Welaiyta and Kambatta. The Kale Hiwot Church is now reckoned to have up 
to half a million members amongst 1.2 million Welaiyta. 
295 Welaiytigna and Somali were added to Amharic, Oromiffa, and Tigrigna in the first phase of the 
campaign in 1979, whilst other southern languages were added only in 1981 and 1982. The 15 
languages finally used, all in Ethiopic script, were estimated by the campaign’s organisers to cover 
more than 90% of Ethiopia’s population (Tilahun Sinehaw 1994:230). 
 
 258 
The language issue then, had a controversial history in the Simien Omo area. It now 
became a trigger and powerfully exacerbating catalyst of conflict, as well as a 
vehicle for its dissemination, through the network of primary schools, to the rural 
population. It does not seem, however, to have been of itself either cause or object of 
the violent campaign that ensued. At the peak of what even the pro-government 
Efoiyta newspaper called ‘high fever’, shortly after riots had taken place in Welaiyta 
Sodo town, urban respondents interviewed agreed without exception that ‘of course 
the core issue is not the language, but the question of jobs, budgets, and increased 
authority’: ‘what we really want is our own zone’. Research conducted in Simien 
Omo, Awassa, and Addis Ababa in 1999, 2000, and 2002 uncovered a surprisingly 
uniform consensus amongst participants and observers suggesting that whilst the 
language issue may have constituted a marker, or form, of the conflict, it was never 
its substance296. Had the language debate proved separable from the question of the 
benefits of a zone, a plurality of views might have attracted more dispassionate 
discussion297. In the event, what the polemicised language factor (performatively) 
came to represent, effectively widened support for the Welaiyta cause it helped 
‘mark’, of which the primary goal remained the establishment of a zone.  
 
Dominance of urban over rural interests 
 
The desire to swap administration as part of Simien Omo zone, for the establishment 
of a Welaiyta zone centred on Sodo, in practice reflected the interests only of the 
Welaiyta elite, the urban, educated, middle-class who could expect to run the new 
unit, or benefit from the injection of government resources to the new capital that it 
would engender. The demand for a zone was not accompanied by a call for any 
change to the federal system or policies of government, but only for the addition of a 
further unit, and a corresponding adjustment in the division of resources. As such, 
the Welaiyta cause seems to have been of only indirect or marginal interest to the 
majority of its peasant farming population. Indeed one can make the case that, had 
                                                 
296 This is surprising, in view of the popularity of perceptions that the Welaiyta conflict was ‘about’ or 
‘because of’ language (cf. Ayele Gebre Mariam & Getachew Kassa 2001). 
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the cause been designed in the service of the ‘real’ interests of this majority, it might 
in fact have favoured their continued administration as part of a larger unit. 
 
The defining socio-economic constraint in the Welaiyta highlands is land scarcity 
(Helen Pankhurst 1993:27, Dessalegn Rahmato 1992:17), and the area now regularly 
appears as an isolated southern pocket of food insecurity on maps of vulnerability to 
famine. The densely populated Welaiyta weredas have a long history of outward 
migration, as a primary means of easing pressure on land and supplementing incomes 
through remittances. One observer described the Welaiyta population in the mid-
1990s as ‘salivating’ at the prospect of the construction of a bridge over the River 
Omo, ‘because of the potential for migration onto the lowlands on the south-west 
side of the river’ beyond the formerly impassable natural southern boundary 
(interview, Arba Minch, 13 October 1999)298. One would not normally expect a 
population concerned to maximise its opportunities for outward migration to support 
the drawing of administrative boundaries likely to have the effect of confining it 
more closely within its own ‘homeland’.  
 
The fact that they did so, apparently in spite of apparently good reason to the 
contrary, is suggestive of the importance of distinguishing between what outsiders 
may consider to be their ‘real’ interests, and the ‘collectively known’ interests of the 
group, those that are perceived to be such by the collective in question. The fact that 
the emotive language issue seems to have been widely discussed throughout the 
countryside, thanks to the pivotal role in it performed by rural schools and school 
teachers, may have influenced the rural Welaiyta population to support – or at least 
not oppose – a development potentially likely to curtail their room for manoeuvre 
amongst neighbours. If, in the future, constraints on population mobility come to be 
seen a having more of an impact on the rural economy than the socio-economic 
benefits promised by advocates of the new zone, the views of this population may 
                                                                                                                                          
297 A number of those interviewed in October 1999 also privately noted the potentially desirable 
implications of standardising and unifying the ‘Welamo cluster’, including the prospect of TV and 
radio programming in what would become the fourth most widely spoken Ethiopian language. 
298 It is worth also recording the caveat that ‘there appears to be little permanent move away from the 
highlands and down to the lowlands. If anything, the pattern might be in the other direction’. (Helen 
Pankhurst 1993:27),  
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shift. Were this to happen (or indeed in a range of other potential circumstances299), 
there are plenty of factors (cross-cutting clans, mutual intelligibility of language, 
etc.) which could in principle be ‘selected back in’ performatively to re-categorise, 
mark, and unite the wider Simien Omo constituency as a ‘natural’ group.  
 
Finally, then, in 2000 the government allowed the division of Simien Omo into five 
units: three zones (Daro, Gamo-Goffa, and Welaiyta) and two special weredas 
(Basketo, and Konta). After a struggle, which dated back to the initial failure to agree 
on a common language in 1992, the division was swift, straightforward, and effected 
without recourse to referendum. 
 
The political leadership [in Simien Omo] all agreed, so we were united in 
presenting the idea to the party. There was strong opposition, particularly 
from the TPLF, and it was taken as Welaiyta chauvinism. In the end, 
however, the Wegagoda CC presented the case to the government several 
months before the zone was dissolved. The zone council decided on this 
course by extraordinary session. We were also helped by the absence of 
boundary disputes, since we were basically following the previously 
established borders of the imperial period. (interview, Zone chairman, 
Welaiyta Sodo, 22 June 2002)  
 
Research suggests, however, that this may not be the end of the story. A formal 
request from Goffa weredas of the new Gamo-Goffa zone has been presented to the 
Regional Government for their separation and establishment as a separate zone300. 
Within Goffa areas, an Oyda population recorded as numbering 14,075 in the 1994 
census, has forwarded its demand for a special wereda (interviews, NRS cabinet 
member, Awassa 10 June 2002, ruling and opposition party members, Sawla 23 June 
2002). Resolution of the Simien Omo case by lopping off its most prominent hydra 
heads, has had the none-too-mythical multiplying effect in the short term. The 
prolonged period of conflict over the fate of Simien Omo has left a legacy of 
suspicion and competitive tension amongst the zone’s members.   
                                                 
299 any future move to sub-divide the SNNPNRS, for instance, could be expected to generate educated 
Welaiyta enthusiasm for co-opting its neighbours into a unit large enough to be federated, and small 
enough to be dominated. 
300 The inability of successive governments to construct a road linking Arba Minch and Sawla, and the 
resulting drive of several hundred kilometres between the two, via Sodo, seems to have served as a 




Silte: peeling off the Gurage label.  
 
The second important instance in which a group which had been included as part of a 
larger ‘ethnic’ composite in transitional (as earlier) mapmaking finally won separate 
recognition at the end of the decade is that of the Silte301. Here however the 
dynamics of the story are rather different from that just described. Unlike the 
Welaiyta / Simien Omo case, the differences between Silte and Gurage were 
pronounced, particularly in terms of key (and relatively easily visible and verifiable) 
indicators, namely language and religion. Also unlike the Welaiyta, however, Silte 
were a relatively poor, under-developed and uneducated group vis-à-vis their Gurage 
neighbours. And, a final difference, they had for a century unhesitatingly been 
categorised as Gurage by all outsiders, including many others of those so 
categorised. 
 
Identity differences masked under ‘Gurage ethnicity’ 
 
Within the category ‘Gurage’, three distinct formulations of identity coexisted, each 
responding to a different ‘poitical ecology’ of identity: 
 
Among the western Gurage, the clan (bet) provides the main basis of 
identity. Earlier, there were five clans in this area […] to which two more 
were added recently and [they] are now known as sabat bet (seven clans) 
[…] Territoriality is more important for social and political organisation 
among the Soddo in the north, whose region is divided into ager (clusters 
of hamlets) that provide the foundation of local identity formation. […] 
By contrast religion [Islam] is the cornerstone of identity among the 
Silte-speakers in the east. They comprise the third cluster of the Gurage 
linguistic family, representing five dialects, all quite different from the 
Soddo and sabat bet tongues. […] Within Gurageland, no people 
identified themselves as Gurage, because that identity had no meaning in 
that context. (Markakis 1998:131-2) 
 
The account quoted offers a series of reasons why, despite such diversity, Gurage 
came, in the process of Ethiopian imperial subjugation, to seem to fit the ‘familiar 
                                                 
301 Ethnonyms are complicated even in this relatively simple case: Silte is the name of the population 
and the new zone which represents them; Silti is the name of one of the weredas in the area. 
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image of the ethnic group [… with] clear cut boundaries, cultural uniformity and 
political solidarity’. The period of imperial subjugation between 1875 and 1885 
reduced the Gurage to near serfdom, with the heavy expropriation by northern 
landlords both of enset (false banana, the local staple) and of a tithe paid either in a 
range of grains not locally produced (which had to be bought), or in coin. The 
economic need for increased income, and specifically for money, drove many to 
Addis Ababa, the new capital. They went in large numbers both because it was not 
far, and because the occasional nature of the labour required for enset production 
made seasonal migration a viable option (ibid.:132) 
 
On arrival in Addis Ababa, they excelled in fostering economic co-operation and 
social solidarity, new migrants often finding employment with ethnic kinsmen, and 
piloting communal credit and informal co-operative associations. A developing 
reputation for ethnic cohesion was enhanced by the formation of the Gurage Road 
Construction Association in 1961, and compounded with the publication in 1966 of 
Shack’s seminal ethnography The Gurage: People of the Enset Culture, which was 
actually written only about the sabat bet Gurage. Despite its inaccuracies, the various 
Gurage in Addis Ababa had reason to leave the perception of a single Gurage 
identity unchallenged. It was in the migrants’ interest to ‘expand the social circle on 
which they could rely for support in the alien urban context’. Furthermore, the image 
of a large, unified ethnic group was useful to those amongst them dealing with the 
imperial authorities (ibid.:133-4).   
 
The impact of ethnic federalism 
 
This situation remained little changed until, with the TGE, the reform of the state 
administrative structure to represent ethnic divisions ‘had the effect of blurring the 
Gurage ethnic identity’ (ibid.:140). Although a first Gurage organisation, the Gurage 
People’s Democratic Front (GPDF) had sought to incorporate representatives of all 
groups, and the EPRDF member Gurage People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Movement (GPRDM) took the same monolithic approach, splits began to appear 
within months. Under the influence of the Soddo Jida Democratic Action Group, 
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which had the support of the OLF, IFLO and OPDO, a group of kebeles in Soddo 
chose through referendum to unite with Oromia, leading an angry Soddo population 
to set up its own opposition organisation. 
 
The complex proliferation of organisations which announced the call for a Silte 
schism in the early 1990s, and the controversy attached to it, is detailed in Markakis 
(1998:141ff)302. An important marker of difference seems to have originated two 
decades earlier, and it is one familiar from the Simien Omo case. The Silte language 
was introduced in eastern Gurage areas (whilst Amharic was used in the rest of 
Gurageland) under the seventh round of the literacy campaign of the Dergue in 1982 
(Tilahun Sinehaw 1994:230). The introduction of Silte language reflected certain 
already existing differences amongst ‘Gurage’ at that time. Silte people had been the 
last to migrate to Addis Ababa, and remained longer as manual labourers, entering 
only later into trade. As Muslims, they kept their children from state schools, so that 
there were few Silte amongst the prominent Gurage personalities of the time.  
 
Esmonde (1994) documents the increase in isolation as one moves from the Gurage 
highlands into eastern Dalocha in particular: 
 
With rainfull higher in the west, land was under greater population 
pressure. Farms were smaller and people have long tended to migrate – 
not so much permanently but to establish a base in a major town, while 
keeping that in the countryside, and trading between the two. In the east, 
on the other hand, land was relatively plentiful, and there were adequate 
returns on cereals and livestock [and presumably more work locally]. So 
there was little incentive for people to look beyond their own area. 
(Esmonde 1994:151) 
 
Given the Silte area’s relative underdevelopment, inaccessibility, and lack of 
Amharic, the introduction of the Silte language for literacy made good political sense 
in 1981. Twenty years later, in the TGE context of ethnic ferment and political 
expectation, the assertion of Silte as a separate ethnic identity – on all the same 




This was particularly the case since, after 1991, a number of factors conjoined to 
make the relatively better-off Silte of Silti wereda feel that they (and their poorer 
Silte brethren to the east) were benefiting less from ethnic federalism than the 
‘verdant and entrepreneurial former Chebo na Gurage Province to the north west’, 
whose members now dominated the Gurage zone: 
 
After the introduction of the ethnic policy of the present government, the 
eastern Silt[e] have found their position unstable. Their area has been 
facing periods of conflict and displacement since 1991. In the western 
areas […] life has been much less open to disruption than in the Silte area 
directly affected by the major boundary between Oromiya Region and 
the [SNNPNRS]. So business in the west has been free to thrive. The 
further one passes eastwards towards Lanforo, the more the ethnic 
tension becomes apparent. (Esmonde 1994:152)303 
 
The contrast between the situations to the west of them and to the east, must have 
appeared quite stark to those relatively wealthy Silte living and trading along the 




The split was, however, vigorously opposed by the ruling GPRDM, and by many 
representatives of the other Gurage communities. As one Silte respondent 
complained: 
 
Silte were only ever involved in business, not politics. Gurages 
meanwhile tended to get involved with both, since they were Orthodox 
Christians and had access. As a result they were the ones who were able 
to go to Addis Ababa and convince everyone that we were Gurages. 
(Interview, former SPDP member, now Cabinet Member, Dalocha, Silte 
zone, 25 June 2002) 
 
                                                                                                                                          
302 Parties included the Silte Gogot Democratic Party, and Silte People’s Democratic Unity Party, both 
of which favoured Silte independence, and the anti-separatist Silte Gurage People’s Democratic 
Movement.  
303 The eastern areas were particularly affected by looting in mid-1991 by officials of the previous 
regime who ‘had become used to “running the show” for their own interests, and also realised they 
would have no further opportunity “to get their share”. So they wanted both to loot and to create 
events that would cover up their activities’ (ibid.:154). 
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After a brief foray up as far as the House of the Federation, the issue was referred 
back to the SNNPNRS government, and a complex procedure implemented to select 
representatives for a conference in Butajira in August 1997, to debate and make a 
decision on the issue. Following elaborate preparation by the ruling party, the 
‘infamous’ Butajira conference declared that Silte were Gurage, a decision which 
horrified many:  
 
It is not clear if that was the stand of the EPRDF but there was a lot of 
weeping in the rural areas after the decision. After Butajira the Silte party 
reconsidered its tactics and through contacts started to put pressure at the 
international level, in an attempt to get the federal government to 
pressure the region. (Interview zone cabinet member, Dalocha, 25 June 
2002) 
 
The tactics seemed to work, and in April 2000 the Federal House finally agreed to 
reconsider the case. Eventually it was agreed that the issue be resolved by 
referendum of the Silte weredas. The vote, held between 18 and 26 April 2001, was 
overwhelmingly for Silte autonomous administrative status. The zone was set up 
forthwith, and within a year, EPRDF had published in English a lengthy mea culpa, 
for the way in which it had attempted to frustrate the ‘will of the Silte people’, in its 
new magazine Tehadso. 
 
The immediate rationale for the establishment of a separate Silte zone had been the 
allegation that the wider Gurage zonal administration was neglecting the 
development of this already disadvantaged area. As a result, the rhetoric of the new 
zone’s administrators is resolutely, and energetically focused on socio-economic 
development. Many were members of the Silte independence parties, but are now 
members of a Silte EPRDF member organisation alongside those who opposed them.   
 
The Silte cause, like all others in this discussion, has been defined, shaped, and led 
by educated (and in this case also wealthy) elites, in the service primarily of their 
own interests. It is interesting that in this instance, unusually, the upgrading of a 
particular urban centre has not been an important focus of the nationalist campaign. 
Here an explanation may be that the more typical situation is distorted by the 
influence on the Silte autonomy campaign of the large Silte mercantile community in 
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Addis Ababa. This influential constituency has been less interested in the 
establishment of an urban centre in Silte area from which it could operate (since it is 
already effectively established in trading networks in the capital, and throughout the 
country), than in securing a separate allocation of government budgetary resources 
for its own ethnic zone.  
 
Kaffa-Sheka: fragmentation and mixed populations 
 
It would be impossible to count the number of ethnic groups in this area: 
there are so many of them! (Interview, businessman, Tepi, then Kaffa-
Sheka zone, 8 October 1999) 
 
It was originally 4 or 5 Shekecho families who came to this area a long 
time ago. The boundary between Sheko and Shekecho is the Bako River. 
There was traditionally a landowner who became a chieftain or a king. 
After that, the Sheko people came here, because their own land was 
impossible to farm. Therefore they gave six oxen for some land around 
Tepi. The land got its name because it was sold by a man called Tebe, 
which is a Majangir name. (interview, Shekecho school teacher, Tepi, 8 
October 1999) 
 
The areas along the borders of what are currently Kaffa, Sheka, and Bench-Maji 
zones of SNNPNRS, and Gambella and Oromia NRSs - areas administered 
immediately after Menelik’s conquest, by Ras Tesema and Ras Weldegiorgis, and 
commonly known as Illubabor and Kaffa - have seen repeated boundary shifts over 
the last 100 years, with the historical ethnonyms marking a fluctuating series of 
territorial incarnations (see the series of maps in appendix). The area is home to 
amongst the most diverse and inter-mixed of Ethiopia’s ethnic populations, as the 
quotations above suggest. In addition to a mixture of relatively ‘local’ or 
‘indigenous’ ethnic groups, the area has significant populations of more recent 
immigrants. 
 
The 1994 census records an Amhara population in Kaffa/Sheka zone of just under 
50,000 or 6.86% of the population, living in rural and urban areas. Local people 
identify three phases of their in-migration. As elsewhere, initial groups followed 
Menelik’s conquest of the area in 1897. A second influx took place during the Italian 
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occupation, when many of Imperial Regent Ras Imru’s followers (‘swelled to almost 
unmanageable proportions through the addition of the wives and children of Amhara 
officials and retired soldiers long settled in the Jimma region’ (Greenfield 
1969[1965]:233)) seem to have remained in Kaffa after his capture in 1936304. A 
third and more substantial rural Amhara population resulted from Dergue-era 
resettlement schemes, under which Amharas from Wello were given land, most 
visibly in the northwest area of Kaffa, adjacent to the Gojeb River. More 
controversially, there are persistent claims that Welleye numbers have increased 
during the 1990s, as existing settlers seek to bolster their numbers by bringing 
additional family members from the north ‘for security’ in the context of ethnic 
federalism.305 
 
Much of the area produces coffee, a factor which has attracted relatively large 
numbers of traders and investors from outside the region to its multi-ethnic towns, 
particularly the economically important location of Tepi306. Rural areas are populated 
by a range of groups speaking various branch languages of Omotic, Cushitic, and 
Nilo-Saharan language-families (Bender et al. 1976), with markedly different 
historical experiences of, and contemporary attitudes to political, economic, and 
territorial organisation. Some, but not all, elements of this mixture are marked by 
readily apparent differences in dress and hairstyles, physiognomy, and skin colour 
between groups. 
 
This area has, since 1991, thrown up some of the country’s most intractable, if 
relatively small-scale, conflicts, many being (re)constituted in response to the new 
salience of ethnicity, under the federal project of the government. Conflict in the area 
has multiple layers, and it is often difficult to disentangle its various strands. At least 
three seem to relate to attempts to shift the territorial basis of representation and 
                                                 
304 No figures are available for the number who may have stayed in the area. Greenfield indicates that 
Ras Imru’s followers numbered more than 30,000 when he decided to march to Bonga.  
305 It was not possible to ascertain the validity of these reports in the course of fieldwork in October 
1999 and June 2002. The apparently widespread credibility they enjoyed in the region on both 
occasions is sufficient to render them politically significant. 
306 Stauder notes that ‘since the 1950s, with the introduction of coffee as a large-scale cash crop near 
Teppi, some Majangir in this area have been dispossessed of their lands by Amhara, Galla and other 
highland peoples operating behind the authority of the Ethiopian government’ (1971:2). 
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administration better to serve the perceived interests of particular groups in the 
context of federalism. One is the dispute over the ‘appropriate’ relation between 
‘Kaffa’ and ‘Sheka’ areas, and their respective majority Kefficho and Shekecho 
populations, a problem which spawned Shekecho calls for the restoration of their 
separate zone, as well as irredentist claims on neighbouring weredas outside the 
Kaffa/Sheka zone. Secondly, representatives of the minority Majangir and Sheko 
populations have made persistent, and sporadically violent, calls for the 
establishment of a new zone for their people, to be carved out from areas of various 
of the zones and regions around Sheko and Yeki weredas307. Thirdly, the 
occupational minority Manja ‘clan’, living amongst the Kefficho in Kaffa zone, has 
been agitating for most of the last decade for special proportional representation 
within the zone. This section briefly details each of these cases (which by no means 
exhaust the ‘ethnic’ or ‘political’ claims current in the area) before attempting to 
draw some conclusions regarding commonalities and divergence amongst factors at 
work here.   
 
Reinstating Mocha awraja: Shekecho irredentism 
 
The first case is relatively straightforward, and is an instance typical of the way in 
which urban educated ethnic elites all over the SNNPNRS have commonly acted to 
defend their perceived interests under ethnic federal arrangements, by calling for the 
establishment (in this case the re-establishment) of their own zone, the jobs, budget, 
and resources of which they can expect to control.  
 
With the unification of the SNNPNRS in the early period of the TGE, the 10 ethnic 
groups listed under the former Region 11, ‘Kaffa’, were divided amongst four zones: 
                                                 
307 Clarity in this case is not helped by some confusing ethnonyms. Sheka is the name given to the 
current SNNPNRS zone comprising Yeki, Gecha and Masha weredas, which is dominated by the 
majority Shekecho population. Both the Sheka area, and the Shekecho ethnic group are also referred 
to as ‘Mocha’, as in the 1994 census. A minority ethnic group living to the south-west of the area in 
Yeki wereda of Sheka zone, Sheko wereda of Bench Maji zone, and also across the NRS border in 
Dima Special zone of Gambella, is variously referred to as either Sheko or Sheka. Sheko is used here 
throughout, to distinguish the ethnic group from the zone, at risk of confusing it with the wereda. 
Majangir (sing. Majang) (Stauder (1971), Sato (2002)) is also used in preference to the older Masengo 
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Kaffa, Sheka, Bench, and Maji. In 1996-7, as part of the ruling party’s drive to 
amalgamate smaller units in the name of efficiency (described above), they were 
melded back into two zones, Kaffa-Sheka, and Bench-Maji. In each case the zone 
capital moved to the town in the area dominated by the new ‘majority’ group: Mizan 
Teferi amongst the Bench, and Bonga in Kefficho territory. The Shekecho 
population, whose former zone capital, Masha, was now a mere wereda centre like 
any other in the new Kaffa-Sheka zone, reacted with increasing resentment, anxious 
that  
 
all the budget and resources of the two zones are going to Bonga. If you 
go there you can see a teacher-training institute, hospital… many new 
things. Even the road to Masha has not been fixed properly, and yet 
everything goes to Bonga rather than here. (Interview, private 
businessman, Tepi, 8 October 1999)308  
 
Resentment during the late 1990s focused on the abrupt and non-consultative manner 
in which the decision to amalgamate the zones had been forced on representatives of 
the Shekecho, who claimed they had ‘suddenly’ been called to a meeting in 
Awassa309 where they were simply informed of the decision: 
 
 ‘Zeleke the Sheka zone vice-chairman was told that it was to be 
amalgamated with Kaffa. When he refused to accept this, they kept him 
in Awassa in prison for a year. There was a big demonstration here, and 
the known persons from the society and the population collected money 
in order to send an 11-man delegation to Addis Ababa to petition Meles 
Zenawi. They stayed for 2 months, but they were never able to see even 
[PMO Regional Affairs Head] Berhanu Jembere.’ (interview, 
schoolteacher, Tepi 8 October 1999) 
 
The Shekecho claim – not only for separation from the dominant Kaffa, but also for 
expansion of their own ethnic zone - was, as so often, bolstered with the legitimacy 
to be derived from a historical marker, to which many referred at the time: 
 
                                                                                                                                          
(Bender et al. (1976), Evans-Pritchard (1940)) Masongo (Cerulli 1956), and Ujang (Sudan Notes and 
Records 1922). 
308 Interviews with zone officials in Bonga, 28-30 June 2002 of course put the opposite view that ‘the 
budget was allocated fairly, but many people said many things’. 
309 Shekecho perception that Bitew Belay, the TPLF ‘advisor’ to the SNNPNRS government, had been 
pivotally involved in the decision did little to assuage local anger.  
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During the Dergue, the Shekecho people were in one awraja of Illubabor 
province, called Mocha. This is still the name which is often used for the 
Shekecho people, but it is in fact the name of the geographical area. It 
had 6 weredas. Two [Nono and Sele] are now part of Oromia because 
there are Oromos mixed up with the Shekecho living there; one [Meti] is 
now part of Gambella, although 40,000 Shekecho live there; so now our 
numbers are underrepresented because they only count the Shekecho 
from the remaining three weredas [Yeki, Gecha, and Masha] which are 
part of Kaffa/Sheka zone. (interview, Shekecho private businessman, 
Tepi 8 October 1999) 
 
The question of population numbers had become a sensitive one amongst the 
Shekecho at this time, because of the widespread impression that the SNNPNRS 
government was starting to apply a system of numerical thresholds for ethnic 
populations to qualify for consideration for their own zones or special weredas. The 
irredentist elements in the Shekecho claim seem also to have been fed by another 
local feature of contemporary government policy-making, namely the decision in 
1996 to adjust the boundary between SNNPNRS and Gambella NRS, moving parts 
of Sheko wereda into the new Dima special wereda in Gambella. As so often, one 
modification of a contested boundary encouraged local populations to forward other 
petitions, in the hope they might win similar approval. 
 
Liberally mixed into the Shekecho campaign – albeit not its primary ingredient - was 
the issue of language. Language difference provided a slender basis on which to 
separate Shekecho and Kefficho populations, with benchmark sources such as 
Bender et al. (1976) not even differentiating the two language groups, but referring 
to both as ‘Kefa-Mocha’.310 In relation to the return of areas of historical Mocha now 
‘lost’ to Gambella and Oromia, however, language provided a more effective marker. 
Activists insisted that the substantial Shekecho diaspora in each region would be 
disadvantaged by the need to speak and write Anuak or Oromiffa in order to 
participate in the activities and services of ‘alien’ regional governments, and that this 
represented a failure of application of central constitutional principles. Given the 
government’s insistence that this kind of agitation was the work of its political 
                                                 
310 It did not, however, prevent activists from attempting it: ‘they say that the languages of kafecho 
and shekecho are 85% mutually intelligible, but this is an overestimate. In fact they are barely 45% 
mutually intelligible’ (interview, Shekecho private trader, Tepi 8 October 1999). 
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opponents, it is interesting to note that there is evidence as to the core involvement of 
EPRDF cadres, as follows.  
 
We know that this is an issue in Gambella because there are some 
EPRDF cadres from Masha area who are assigned to certain kebeles in 
Meti wereda of Gambella (Kabo, Bumare, Tiliku Meti) and the people 
told them they wanted to join with the rest of Shekecho. Also in Sele and 
Nono the Oromo cadres agreed with the Southern Region, because that 
area is so far from their administrative centre in Metu, that they said it 
should be transferred to us (interview, then Chairman, Yeki wereda, 
Tepi, 8 October 1999).  
 
The claim also won support of the opposition, including diaspora-based groups such 
as the Shekecho People’s Support Group and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Action 
Group (Achame Shana undated:11). It was finally agreed, and the two previously 
existing zones were re-established towards the end of 2000 [Hidar 1993EC], whilst 
the additional weredas Shekecho nationalists had claimed remained in the adjacent 
Regional States. Whilst some shortage of civil servants was reported – even on the 
Kaffa side - after the separation (civil servant, interviewed in Bonga, 29 June 2002), 
it seems to have gone ahead relatively smoothly. Sheka zone uses only Amharic both 
for administration, and as the language of instruction in its schools (interview, zone 
official, Masha, Sheka zone, 1 July 2002). 
 
Whilst resolving one problem, the boundary change once again provided evidence 
that the government was susceptible to carefully applied pressure, and fed other 
claims in the area. Most vigorous of the hydra heads which reared up came from 
Sheko and Majangir groups.  
 
‘keyi ena tikur’: skin colour, immigration, and the Sheko-Majangir claim 
 
Yeki wereda is always going to be at the centre of problems because it is 
so mixed. (interview, wereda official, Tepi, 8 October 1999) 
 
We have quotas for members of Yeki wereda Executive Committee, and 
its zone representatives, balancing Shekecho, Kaffecho, Amhara, 
Majangir, Sheko, Oromo, Bench, and Manja groups. (interview, Sheka 




On 14 March 2002 the pro-government Walta Information Centre reported that, 3 
days previously, 15 people had been killed, and more than 11 wounded when forces 
associated with the Sheko-Majangir Democratic Unity Organisation attacked Tepi 
town311. Those killed initially were mostly police and local government officials, 
apparently targeted by a substantial force, frustrated at the rejection of their demand 
that the Sheko-Majangir party be allowed to run the wereda after a November 2001 
election victory they claimed had been stolen from it by the NEB and local EPRDF 
party. The violence represented only the most recent instance of an ongoing conflict, 
which had already seen a violent Majangir takeover of Tepi, and other towns, in 
1993 (interviews, Tepi 8 October 1999; Sato (2002:185)). The bones of it were 
evident to Ren’ya Sato, an anthropologist who conducted fieldwork in the area in the 
period up to 1999.  
 
The Majangir are regarded as one of the ‘representative ethnic groups’ of 
Gambela Region, where they are the third group in numerical terms next 
to the Anywaa and Nuer. The problem is, however, that their habitat 
actually extends over the boundaries of three Regions: Gambela, 
Southern Region and Oromiya. There have been a series of disputes 
concerning regional boundaries around Tepi and Bebeka, the Majang 
insisting that they be included in Gambella, though they are ultimately 
striving to establish a Majangir Zone. (Sato 2002:192) 
 
Sato goes on to identify three factors which had operated to increase Majang 
suspicion of their neighbours in the area around Tepi: their conviction that Tepi had 
traditionally been Majangirland; secondly, the fact that Shekecho and Majangir had 
long been on bad terms; and thirdly the fact that Majang leaders had been in contact 
with the SPLA. On the basis of research conducted in the area during June and July 
2002, it seems clear that each of these three issues was clearly still in play in the run 
up to the outbreak of violence in March 2002.  
 
The question of territorial rights in the Yeki area is complicated by the coexistence of 
differing norms regarding access and ownership of land amongst the different ethnic 
                                                 
311 Numbers killed remain unclear, and are rumoured to have escalated during subsequent operations 
of the security forces. The Regional President, interviewed in July 2002 reported ‘about 50 deaths’ in 
the initial attack. (WIC, 19 July 2002). This contrasts with the incomparably higher figures for deaths 
and displaced claimed by the SEPDC (interview, SEPDC Chairman, Addis Ababa, April 2002).  
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groups which populate it. Stauder’s seminal ethnography of the Majangir emphasises 
that as land was not (either traditionally or at the time of his study) under pressure 
‘they have never organised to defend their territories’ (1971:2), and ‘[were] not 
united by political organisation’ (:5). Rather their ‘settlement and the neighbourhood 
are transient in location and composition; the community and usually the 
neighbourhood are not defined as discrete blocks’ (:157). The norms regarding land 
rights and access to which the Majangir have traditionally adhered, render its 
‘ownership’ significantly less externally tangible, and robustly defensible, than do 
those of many of the groups around them. Stauder’s commentary on the period of the 
1960s is also repeatedly suggestive of a socio-economic situation beginning to shift 
in response to the influence of state and other outsider actors312. 
 
Change, and the erosion of the ‘ecological niche’ the Majangir occupied in the 
1960s, have been dramatic, and provide a background to contemporary struggles. 
Sato identifies the influence of Protestant missionaries preaching equality before god, 
and the dramatic impact of Dergue-era villagisation on a fluid traditional lifestyle, as 
key factors in this process. Both seem to have increased the cohesion and 
assertiveness with which Majangir entered the ethnic federal period, in contrast to 
what appears to have been their relative equanimity in the face of previous 
encroachment on ‘Majangirland’. The Majangir can perhaps be seen as relatively late 
entrants in the competitive process of territorially defining one’s homelands, initially 
disadvantaged by a traditional culture premised on fluid group relations with land.  
 
The process of categorisation inherent in ethnic federalism seems further to have 
exacerbated Majangir determination to become a ‘nation, nationality or people’ 
suitable to attract the benefits which now accrue to such groups, thus compounding 
the effects of other modernising processes of the last several decades. This highlights 
the extent to which the ethnic federal policy has helped to bring about the ethnic 
entities it posits: groups marked by common history, language, culture, economy, 
and – the missing component here – territory. Whilst Stauder’s account of Majangir 
                                                 




in the 1960s already demonstrates the importance of problematising ‘groupness’ 
when considering an ethnographic ‘unit’ whose interaction was remarkably limited 
and non-cohesive, the considerable changes which have taken place in the area in the 
intervening period confirm the importance of analysing both the levels and nature of 
social cohesion, and their susceptibility to modification.  
 
Majangir may have been late into the ethnic territorial game, but since 1991 they 
have evidently felt the need for some ‘catching up’ with their more successful 
neighbours, and have employed violent means to attempt this. After years of 
explosive but directionless agitation313, in 2000 the campaign to unite three weredas 
in a new Sheko-Majangir ‘ethnic zone’ saw the establishment of the Sheko-Majangir 
Democratic Unity Party, committed to this end314. As ever, the political organisation 
required to pursue such a project has not been initiated or led by mere cultivators. In 
this case it has reportedly been orchestrated by a group of former soldiers, who 
gained invaluable experience of organisation in both the Dergue army, and the 
EPRDF administration315, with the collaboration of a slightly more educated group 
from the intermingled minority Sheko people316.  
 
One can see a number of parallels between Tepi and the Silte case: within 
the Majangir and Sheko nationalist party some had been removed from 
EPRDF and along with disgruntled civil servants took over the cause: 
their claim was that Shekecho and Bench were benefiting off their backs 
(interview, SEPDF CC member, Addis Ababa, April 2002) 
 
                                                 
313 According to opposition sources they first forwarded a claim for their own ethnic unit to the TGE 
Boundary Commission in 1992. 
314 The campaign seeks the politico-administrative unification of Godere wereda from Gambella NRS, 
Sheko wereda from Bench-Maji zone, and Yeki wereda from Sheka zone. 
315 ‘Berhanu Haile Mikhael was arrested in Mizan Teferi after the disturbances this year; Berhanu 
Gebo was killed. The latter was trained as a cadre with EPRDF but later they expelled him, so he took 
a gun from the health centre guard and went to the bush. Berhanu Haile Mikhael followed him after 4-
5 months, and they were a band of 7 or so, stealing from travellers along the road, all of them ex-
soldiers.’ (Interview private businessman, Masha, 1 July 2002)  
316 ‘The Sheko are a bit better off than the Majangir. I think they assume that if they come to power 
they will be the ones to get their hands on the money.’ (Interview, zone official, Masha, 1 July 2002) 
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A number of urban interlocutors from the area expressed surprise at the collaboration 
between what they saw as the ‘primitive, black, shifting’ Majangir and the ‘red317, 
agriculturalist’ Sheko, who are regarded as having entirely different cultures. Whilst 
in fact there seem to be good political reasons for the elites of these two populations 
to collaborate in attempting to secure their own zone, this reaction of observers is in 
line with the widespread urban perception that the problem in the area is caused by 
‘the blacks’, perceived as a ‘vast’ population now threatening to engulf the scattered 
frontier centres of light-skinned ‘civilisation’318. Given the all-too visible phenotypic 
differences between the people of the area, their apparent adoption as markers of 
political conflict can be expected to entrench division, making it intractable by 
rendering it salient. 
 
The Sheko-Majangir Democratic Unity Party was established in response to initial 
encouragement from the ruling party, who sought to contain the call for a new ethnic 
zone within the legal political framework, encouraging its advocates to work 
‘peacefully and democratically’. The newly established party, however, rapidly 
gained a reputation for racialised rhetoric sufficiently incendiary to discourage both 
the EPRDF and the Southern Coalition from association with it319. In elections at the 
end of 2001, the party won control of a majority of kebeles in Sheko wereda in 
Bench Maji, and claimed control also of Yeki wereda in Sheka zone. As they moved 
to disarm kebele militias in those areas where EPRDF and the NEB claimed they had 
not won elections, they met with resistance. After several months of frustration, the 
Majangir moved en masse on Tepi, which, much to the horror of the mixed ethnic 
                                                 
317 Keyi in this context also means ‘bright’ or ‘lighter skinned’, as opposed to tikur, ‘black’ or ‘darker 
skinned’. 
318 A number of interlocutors in Tepi, for instance, claimed that ‘the SPLA was well known to be 
attempting to establish a string of ‘black towns’ within Ethiopia, as a buffer against Ethiopian 
encroachment. The implication that the Ethiopian authorities share this racialised view of events is 
apparent in allegations that in subsequent operations security forces in the area ‘went looking for the 
blacks’ (interviews, Tepi, 30 June 2002).  
319 Interviews in March/April 2002 with senior SEPDF and SEPDC officials indicated that both 
organisations had early on sought to distance themselves from the overtures each had received from 
the new organisation, because of concerns about the inflammatory nature of its political strategy. 
Although each side sought to blame the ‘involvement’ of the other for encouraging or facilitating the 
formation of what both now agree is an undesirable force, there is no evidence that the organisation 
was aligned with either ruling or opposition party. 
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urban population of traders and civil servants, they saw as the natural capital of a 
future ethnic enclave320.  
 
Sheko-Majangir resentment seems to have focused both on the relative dominance by 
other indigenous groups of the two SNNPNRS zones they inhabit (Sheka by 
Shekecho, and Bench-Maji by Bench), and also on the influx – and relative wealth - 
of outsiders in local urban and rural areas. This instance of conflict, like others, 
almost certainly had a copycat element, encouraged by the visible success of 
neighbouring groups in winning territory for themselves. It is, however, the 
perception of many in the area that it also enjoyed more concrete sources of support: 
co-ordinated political assistance from armed opponents of the Ethiopian government. 
Whilst Sato cites SPLA contacts, local interlocutors interviewed in June and July 
2002 were unanimous in their agreement as to the support and influence of the OLF 
and its allies. The fact that further violence broke out in neighbouring Kaffa zone 
only two or three days after the Majangir attack on Tepi, convinced many that both 
groups enjoy support from a common source. 
 
Kafecho-Manja antagonism: ‘minorities’ under ethnic federalism 
 
The Manja have started to do terrible things – everyone knows it. 
Obuaymed, king of the Shoto tribe around Bita Gena wereda, Washaro 
kebele, was known for oppressing the Manja. So a few months ago they 
ambushed and killed him, and then ate him. When the police caught 
them, they still had his flesh in a sack. (interview, Tepi, 30 June 2002) 
 
Several days after the outbreak of violence in Tepi, tension which had been 
simmering between the majority Kafecho, and the despised minority Manja (or 
Manjo) hunter population, erupted into violence, particularly in the northwest parts 
of Kaffa zone, in Tinishu Gesha, Bitu Gena, and Gimbo weredas. Quite what 
happened is difficult to ascertain, and in mid-2002 the area was awash with lurid 
                                                 
320 Although Tepi had under ethnic federalism lost out to Bonga and Masha, it had long been a 
relatively highly developed and prosperous centre of the lucrative coffee trade, enjoying since 
imperial times a direct air link with the capital. In June 2002, it was reported that several storey 
commercial buildings which had exchanged hands for more than 50,000 EB were now ‘unsellable’ at 
only 2,000 EB 
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tales, such as that recorded above, which reflect the deep-seated social taboos and 
discrimination on which Kafecho-Manja relations are premised. Although Manja 
have a clear political claim (for separate or proportional political representation 
which they cannot attain in a first past the post system), their objectives also extend 
to the transformation of discriminatory social relations in the area321, according to 
which they are regarded as ‘fertile polluters’:  
 
The groups in this category are stereotyped by their farmer neighbours as 
being lawless, uncivilised people associated with the wild bush rather 
than the domesticated village. (Freeman 2001:308-10)  
 
Manja is a tribe or clan, culturally and historically different from the rest 
of the Kaffa. In the past they did something which was not accepted – 
perhaps eating dead animals. It is said that they used to be the leaders in 
this area, but now they are marginalized, in fact not really considered as 
human. (Civil Servant, intereviewed in Bonga, 29 June 2002) 
 
Attempts to change the extremes of social, economic, and political discrimination 
which characterise Kafecho/Manja relations have met with little success.  
 
During the Derg period, the Manjo were allowed to join burial 
associations with other Kafecho. Thus, the Kafecho reluctantly started to 
carry and bury corpses of the Manjo […] With the fall of the Derg, 
however, this practice fell into disuse and the Kafecho today do not 
accept Manjo participation in social and cultural activities. The efforts of 
the Derg did not bring about any fundamental change in their social 
status since the initiatives were imposed and directed from above. […] 
Kafecho consider the Manjo to be ‘unclean’ and ‘stinking’. (Gezahegn 
Petros 2001) 
 
EPRDF administrators advocate a much more cautious approach to changing social 
norms than did their predecessors. This approach, in combination with the devolved 
ethnic administration established under federalism, results in a situation where local 
administrators, civil servants, judges, and police officers originate locally, share local 
prejudices, and experience little sanction from either government or ruling party 
                                                 
321 They are widely accused of having initiated a campaign of systematic rape of Kafecho women as 
part of an attempt to change current social relations by force. Whether such events have resulted from 
the profundity of discrimination in the area, or have been invented as part of the means of justifying 




organs of views whose extreme intolerance may conflict with the constitutional 
protection of the constituents they are elected or recruited to serve322. The failure of 
forcible attempts at progressive social change during the previous regime may well 
have increased the frustration of marginalized communities by raising expectations, 
now disappointed by state ambivalence. Such ambivalence seems to have been a 
problematic feature also of the activities of the catholic and protestant evangelists in 
this area. Whilst there are suggestions that such missionaries have (as in the case of 
the Majangir) raised the socio-political self-esteem of some Manja323, there are also 
reports that the discriminatory attitudes of individual missionaries have further 
inflamed the situation324.  
 
In the wake of the disturbances, at the time of research in mid-2002 Kafecho-Manja 
relations throughout Kaffa zone, were extremely tense, with around 150 Manja in 
prison in Bonga. Manja men no longer came into the town to trade, with only a few 
women continuing to bring in charcoal, and Kafecho women reportedly going only 
with armed male escorts to wash at rivers away from settlements. A three-day 
government-convened ‘conference’ at the end of Sene had done little to calm the 
situation, and a number of observers agreed that a more radical approach to the 
causes of the conflict than any so far evinced under ethnic federalism would be 
required to resolve it. 
 
Commentators have argued that occupational minorities325 have become the new 
marginalized communities as the Ethiopian state perspective has swapped the lenses 
of class for those of ethnicity (cf., for instance, Tronvoll 2000). Pankhurst & 
Freeman, for instance, observe: 
 
                                                 
322 Comparable points are made by Tsehai Berhane-Selassie who suggests that ethnic federalism has 
seen an increase in gendered negative traditional practices, such as child marriage and abduction, as 
well as of forms of female genital mutilation (1998:31).  
323 Cf. Pankhurst & Freeman 2001:335 
324 ‘They teach us in their churches, but won’t visit us at home’ (Interview, Bonga area, 29 June 
2002). 
325 Sometimes referred to as ‘castes’, although Freeman and Alula Pankhurst have set out persuasive 




Although both the Federal and the Southern Region Constitutions contain 
provisions against discrimination on the basis of social background, the 
current emphasis on ethnic identity has seemingly led to a cultural 
revivalism in which previous values and hierarchies are being reasserted 
[…] since most of the marginalized minorities are dispersed social 
categories rather than localised ethnic groups, their concerns have hardly 
been considered in the new ‘ethnic’ politics. (2001:336).  
 
Alula Pankhurst (2001), in the introduction to Freeman & Pankhurst’s edited 
collection, sets out objections to each of the major paradigms and perspectives on 
marginalized minorities (including ethnicity along with class and caste, as well as 
culture area and symbolic approaches), in favour of an analysis premised on the self-
perceptions of the groups in question. The collection illuminates quite how far these 
indigenous perspectives remain from being ‘legible’ to the state (Scott 1998), even a 
state committed to self-determination, where such groups do not constitute 
recognised or legitimate self-determining units. 
 
It is relatively clear that such occupational minorities as the Manja have either lost 
out, or at least gained less than other groups which can be defined as ‘ethnicities’, 
under federal arrangements326. Pankhurst & Freeman however, conclude their 
analysis on the relatively optimistic note that ‘by the end of the twentieth century 
social interaction between the dominant minority and most of the marginalized 
minorities has become less constrained’ (2001:336). It seems therefore, important to 
trace the specific factors that have meant that this is not the case in this instance. 
Many of them relate to the relatively militant political organisation in which the 
Manja have engaged, and the sense of threat with which the majority community 
have responded. 
 
Manja political organisation has been more assertive than might have been expected 
of a peripheral and economically vulnerable group, and there is evidence that this 
reflects the complexities of their group profile, in the context of a range of interactive 
experiences in this ethnically mixed area.  
                                                 
326 Government respondents note in their defence that Manja are included amongst those selected for 
education in boarding schools in Awassa established to ‘fast track’ the development of marginal 




Interviews rapidly established that Manja communities in the north-west of Kaffa 
zone, and into Sheka are markedly wealthier and better integrated than in other parts 
of the region327, and that this may well be related to the greater social acceptance, 
and economic freedom they experience when trading and living amongst non-Kaffa. 
In areas such as Washero kebele, which has a Manja vice-chairman of the local 
kebele council, Manja are involved in administration, and enjoy positions of 
influence. Manja are apparently able to trade forest products (honey, cardamon, and 
coffee) relatively freely with the Amharas and others in the mixed population of Tepi 
town, and thus prosper in a way which is not open to them amongst the Kaffa in 
Bonga. The differential treatment they have received in the two towns seems likely 
to have provided a visible marker of discrimination to those Manja in positions of 
relative mobility328.  
 
One group of Manja falling into this category are those who were conscripted into 
the army during the Dergue period, an experience which ‘gave those who returned 
greater confidence and self-assurance, leading them to resist their social exclusion in 
more aggressive and creative ways’ (Pankhurst & Freeman 2001:336)329. As was the 
case amongst the Majangir, the Manja also seem to have been led by ex-soldiers, 
Alemayehu Ambo and Alemayehu Raggo, who campaigned for political 
representation in a context where the Manja did not satisfy ruling ‘criteria’ for such 
separate organisation330. The fact that the Manja struggle was led from areas adjacent 
to the Majangir, was similarly led by former soldiers, and erupted within days of the 
attack mounted by the Majangir on Tepi331, has led many to believe that there was 
                                                 
327 Several Manja traders were reported to be sufficiently wealthy to own vehicles. It should be noted 
that research did not include independent verification of these facts, but relied primarily on the 
testimony of non-Manja and those who work with Manja communities. 
328 It is also possible that the period during which the two zones were amalgamated sharpened 
awareness of the different attitudes towards Manja. 
329 The same source suggests that the sons of occupational minorities were disproportionately 
conscripted by peasant associations ‘instead of farmers’ sons’. 
330 This is terminology used by more than one EPRDF administrator interviewed in June 2002 in 
Bonga, and Mizan Teferi. 
331 Although it is reported to have roots of disgruntlement going back some time: Bonga 
administrators claimed that Manja had not paid taxes for more than two years. This accusation is now 
widely used against any and all elements of whom the EPRDF/government disapproves in the 
SNNPNRS, and it was impossible to assess its veracity in this instance.  
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not only interaction between the two groups, but that they shared ‘support from a 
common source’.  
 
Social issues are clearly intermixed with economic ones in the Manja construction of 
collective interest vis-à-vis the outside world. It is noteworthy that Tinishu Gesha, 
the centre of recent mobilisation and disturbances, is also an area facing serious 
constraints on access to land and resources. Given that Manja (in common with other 
minorities) do not usually in practice seem to enjoy rights to agricultural land332, 
collective attitudes towards the legitimacy or otherwise of their forest-based 
economic activities have an enormous impact on their level of prosperity. Thus, in 
Kaffa where their activities are ‘stereotyped [as] lawless and uncivilised’ (Freeman 
2001:309), Manja are regularly arrested for ‘illegal’ plundering of Kafecho forest 
resources; meanwhile in areas towards Tepi, dominated by trading groups of many 
ethnicities, they have found a prosperous niche as the ‘legitimate’ indigenous 
purveyors of forest products. Ironically, there also seems to be evidence that as they 
prosper, their demands for the right to land may strengthen. A number of observers 
interviewed locally anticipate that conflict with the Amhara settler population, many 
of whom currently enjoy relatively large allocations of land which they have cleared, 
is likely to erupt as this situation intensifies.  
 
This review of relations between Manja, Kafecho and surrounding ethnic groups, 
lends support to the ‘interactive’ approach suggested by Pankhurst and Freeman, 
according to which  
 
the status of the Ethiopian minorities is not a static structural feature, but 
a process contingent on broader political and economic factors. (Freeman 
2001:329) 
 
I suggest that their approach could in fact be sharpened by a closer consideration of 
the different kinds of interaction experienced by the same minority group with a 
range of different ethnic ‘host’ communities. The considerable ethnic mixing of the 
                                                 
332 Pankhurst and Freeman observe that in a number of instances, minorities have since 1991 been 
forced to give back land they were distributed under Dergue land reform in 1975 (2001:336). 
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Kaffa-Sheka area, where the position of a single minority is constructed differently in 





This thesis has described developments in the politicisation of ethnicity in Ethiopia 
before and after the institution of a system of ethnic federalism beginning in 1991. It 
has explored the legacies, resources, precedents and causes provided by historical 
events, and traced experiences of the way constellations of power and ethnicity have 
been remapped under the federal arrangement. Chapter IV considered the historical 
processes and events that led up to and fed the emergence of political ethnicity in the 
mid-1970s. Chapter V traced the evolution of the two ethno-nationalist movements 
against continuing state centralism, the architects of ethnic federalism, the 
TPLF/EPRDF and the OLF. In turning to the events which flowed from 1991, 
Chapter VI explored the means by which the ruling party sought under federalism to 
redraw and dominate political representation along the lines of the country’s ethnic, 
or language, groups. Chapter VII considered some of the responses this elicited, 
charting a number of instances in which language groups and their elites sought to 
renegotiate the ethnic territorial demarcation hastily drawn up in 1991. 
 
Ethiopia’s modern history can be viewed as an ongoing struggle between centralising 
and centrifugal forces. The Abyssinian core had, in the period before the nineteenth 
century accession of a series of centralising emperors, disintegrated into a series of 
fiefdoms, over which no overall ‘king of kings’ was able to hold sway. The power of 
these fiefdoms persisted under the centralising efforts of three Emperors, and their 
elites benefited from expansionary conquest, in the wake of which they moved south. 
Menelik II’s rule established an Abyssinian (or assimilated) elite throughout the 
Ethiopian empire state, as a result of which many regional powers in the newly 
incorporated areas had closer links with the imperial centre than with the populations 
they ruled. They retained substantial control of their own military forces, however, 
and with it a large measure of autonomy. It was left to Haile Selassie I to curb this 
centrifugal capacity, something he had achieved, by skilled balancing and shuffling 
of interest, and selective confrontation, in all areas other than Tigray in the period up 




Italian occupation brought an abrupt hiatus in half a century of Abyssinian imperial 
centralisation, transforming the culture and structure by which Ethiopia was ruled. 
Fascist rule integrated the empire state with the rest of Imperial Italian East Africa, 
bisecting it according to the logic of ethnicity, and carving out large Tigrigna- and 
Somali-speaking areas for amalgamation with adjacent Italian colonies. For many of 
Ethiopia’s subject peoples, particularly in Muslim areas, and in parts of Tigray, the 
restoration of the Shoan monarchy ended a period of relative economic development, 
and of freedom from Christian Amhara rule. The complications of the disposal of 
fascist Italy’s colonial possessions provided opportunities for the elites of a number 
of these areas to formulate and articulate centrifugal demands for protectorate status 
pending independence. These were collective experiences still widely remembered in 
the last decades of the twentieth century: conventional collective knowledge ripe for 
reinvention and reconstruction by new generations of ethno-nationalists. 
 
The restoration of Haile Selassie erased all evidence of Italian administration, except 
the roads built and memories left. It wiped out as well the last vestiges of traditional 
regional autonomy in Tigray. A reinvigorated drive to centralise was now coupled 
with modernising plans to bureaucratise the state, and educate a new class of civil 
servants. Bureaucratisation brought jobs, open to Amharic-speaking graduates of the 
new university. The university brought students together from all over the empire, 
and sent them out to its other corners on programmes of service; these experiences 
were juxtaposed in a radicalising political climate where questioning the enforced 
‘Amharisation’ of the state and of those associated with it became a new student 
convention. 
 
Chapter IV, then, provided an account of the historical resources and recollections 
freely utilised by the protagonists of the subsequent chapters in consciously 
elaborating or unconsciously re-enacting a range of conventional narratives, creating 
shared knowledge about the relationship between ethnicity and power in Ethiopia. 
Imperial Shoan mythmaking had forged Solomonic history, Orthodox religion, 
Amharic language, and Abyssinian culture into an all-encompassing rationale of 
empire; the regime had invented and enforced the resulting synthesis with equal 
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determination, deploying its performative power, as the elements fused to form 
widely known convention, to masterly effect.  
 
During the period of the Dergue regime from 1974 to 1991, new experiences and 
interaction were shared and discussed, new categories learned, and new conventions 
constructed. In response to what Ethiopians learned, new traditions emerged, with 
new orderings of well-known resources. Centrifugal elements which had challenged 
the imperial regime in its final days sought new strategies. Armed with a Marxist 
understanding of the National Question, ethno-nationalists now retreated into rural 
areas, organised their opposition, and set about the elaboration and mobilisation of 
collective histories, collective voices, and collective demands. The same processes 
(based on different individual experiences) of social interaction, and the collective 
construction and categorisation of knowledge, underpinned the interest, motivation, 
and actions of all parties, whether they were consciously or unconsciously, 
deliberately or accidentally contributing to the collective experience and re-
enactment of convention. 
 
Neither Oromo nor Tigrayan nationalists had any shortage of historical materials 
from which to work their counter-narratives of oppression and resistance. The 
processes and events involved in each case were explored in Chapter V, which also 
suggested how the conventions they constructed set the two movements on a 
collision course. Conventionality is a feature not only of the content of narratives of 
identity but also of the markers and boundaries which delimit them, and this fact 
goes a long way to account for the differential levels of success which the two 
movements enjoyed. The TPLF operated amongst people who shared a strongly 
bounded sense of identity, with relatively high levels of resistance to assimilation to 
or from other groups south of the Mereb. In this situation, their highly focused ethnic 
mobilisation, based on a depth of interaction and knowledge shared with their 
constituents, proved almost too successful, generating difficulties and resistance 
when its proponents wanted to harness it for collaboration in other parts of Ethiopia. 
On top of a shared construction of identity, the forging of a collective sense of 
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interest was also relatively straightforward in this relatively compact, homogenous, 
and uniformly marginalised area.  
 
In Oromia, meanwhile, the ethno-nationalists were confronted with a large, disparate, 
and widely scattered population which had intermarried and assimilated widely and 
over a long period with a variety of neighbouring or interspersed religious, cultural, 
and language groups. Influenced by these circumstances, Oromo conventional beliefs 
relating to identity, and the interactive experiences which daily informed them, 
remained loose and multiple, a shared core secured by a common language 
notwithstanding. The nationalists found in this cultural core powerful motifs of unity, 
recognisable, evocative, and resonant amongst most if not all Oromo populations. 
Less clear, however, was the extent to which these ‘national’ materials were able to 
underpin a politically robust sense of ‘us’ amongst groups who interacted on a daily 
basis with ethnic ‘others’.  Most problematic of all, however, was the construction of 
a collective sense of shared interest throughout this enormous territory. Whilst 
educated Oromo undoubtedly shared common experiences of linguistic and cultural 
discrimination at the hands of the imperial state, even these were likely to be 
understood and categorised differently by Muslim and Christian, sedentary and 
pastoral communities.  
 
The discussion of Oromo nationalism in Chapters V and VI, then, remained 
particularly inconclusive, for the simple reason that the views, aspirations, and self-
perceptions of the majority of the collective(s) – the Oromo nation, or Oromiffa-
speaking population(s) - remain more than usually hidden. The problem is well put 
(and with impressive honesty) by the leading Oromo scholar, the historian 
Mohammed Hassan: 
 
what is not easy to express is the strength and extent of the Oromo 
national consciousness. There is a lack of data which reflects the depth of 
Oromo national feeling in different parts of Oromia, and in the absence 
of reliable data, it is difficult to know the depth of Oromo national 
consciousness. (1998:192) 
 
Different patterns of shared knowledge seem, however, to have translated into 
different patterns of solidarity, support, organisation, and political success. Chapter 
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VI also explored the processes by which after 1991 the EPRDF exported the efficacy 
of its mobilisation in the north to ethnic enclaves of the south of Ethiopia. 
Contradictory tendencies were at work in the ideological approach of EPRDF to 
ethnic mobilisation, as the determination of a modernist vanguard to provide a 
prescriptive definition and delimitation of ethnic groups ‘from above’ fought with the 
familiar advantages of ethnic mobilisation ‘from within’. The implications of these 
tensions emerged in Chapter VI, as a top-down approach to the mobilisation of 
groups often failed to take account of their shared conventions beyond a formulaic 
use of local mother tongue. The ruling party frequently failed to problematise and 
investigate the nature of the local (often ethnic) conventions pertaining to a range of 
issues: the nature and boundaries of group solidarity; the legitimacy accorded to 
traditional and modern elites; the status accorded to mother tongue and national 
languages; and the processes of inter-group relations and conflict reduction. As a 
result, it failed to reproduce the successes of a policy of painstaking internal 
mobilisation in the north. Only in Somali and Afar regions did EPRDF policy makers 
recognise the different character of pastoralist beliefs about social structure and 
solidarity, since in these cases the differences impinged directly to preclude the 
viability of mobilisation by a system of political cadres and cells. 
 
The extent of EPRDF’s success throughout much of the south was not so much a 
measure of the organisation’s capacity to operate within the terms of the knowledge 
system (the shared conventions) of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups, but of their skill in 
manipulating existing social cleavages to co-opt a section of the rural intelligentsia of 
the south to share, or at least conform with their own objectives, perspectives, and 
‘system of knowledge’. Chapter VI noted that already during the Dergue regime the 
relationships between the Ethiopian state and its ethnic populations were undergoing 
profound transformations associated with modernisation (Abbink 1991), and the 
position of many of those brought into local government in EPRDF PDOs is a further 
reflection of these processes. With some education, and already harbouring 
aspirations linked to the state (rather than to the status of their co-ethnics in rural 
areas), they proved enthusiastic if not always competent recruits. Their co-option and 
elevation quickly brought a measure of order, and seemed to short-circuit the need to 
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engage in the laborious processes of learning about the mindset of rural populations 
which had been prerequisites of internal mobilisation. 
 
In short, Chapter VI, Reworking Representation, described how EPRDF collected 
members of the lower strata of the rural intelligentsia of each ethnic group to join the 
ruling parties with promises of elevation through party ranks. It explains how these 
processes created an influential sub-class in each ethnic group, with a clearly 
recognised interest vested in EPRDF rule; and how the party – with the consummate 
performativity of experienced propagandists – declared Ethiopia’s ethnic groups to 
be the right and proper constituent units of the state. The ruling party secured support 
for this arrangement by pumping the resources of the state through a budgetary 
system restructured to feed its constituent (ethnic) administrative units. 
 
The emergence of a class of EPRDF cadres in each ethnic group, however, generated 
some unexpected consequences at the interfaces between the state and ruling party, 
the new ethnic elites, and the wider ethnic populations they represented. As they 
became accustomed to the responsibilities and privileges of office, their social status 
as ‘members of ethnic groups’ became intercut with new statuses: loyal party cadre, 
efficient administrator, family patron. Chapter VII traced a range of cases in which 
the ethnic elite were instrumental in the collective reworking of conventions about 
identity – even of the shape of the collective itself – in ways which could be expected 
to benefit them under the new circumstances of ethnic federalism. Some of these 
processes of recategorisation may also have brought benefits to the ethnic 
populations in question. Others, unquestionably, have brought violence and 
bloodshed. 
 
The discussion traced the ways in which well-placed elites sought to utilise the 
dynamics of realpolitik to win unusual or disproportionate advantages for small or 
marginal populations. Thus Harar traded potentially valuable political loyalty to the 
centre for special status for its tiny, but otherwise influential indigenous population. 
Meanwhile in Waag Himra, a politically well-connected, but multi-lingual (even 
perhaps multi-ethnic) population won special status and generous budgets from its 
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NRS government, before setting out to refashion the group as a viable, coherent, and 
identifiably bounded collective ethnic ‘self’ in order to be able to make full use of the 
rights – and evident benefits - of self-determination. Here, the acquisition of an 
obscure language operated as useful passport to this unusually successful collective, 
a situation which stands in marked contrast with the ambivalent or negative attitudes 
towards the acquisition of minority languages observed in the SNNPNRS.  
 
Chapter VII, Reworking Territory, documented the common pattern by which ethnic 
groups in the SNNPNRS, faced with the new carrots offered by ethnic federalism, 
began increasingly to forward demands for self-determination and their own separate 
unit of administration. Although discouraged by the ruling party at the centre, these 
petitions were often sponsored by the new local party elites, and reflected their 
burgeoning interest in securing control over an allocation of the federal budget 
subsidy exclusive to their own ethnic group. Since the recognised interest of this 
stratum lay in monopolising the resources of the state, allocated on the basis of 
ethnicity, it commonly became instrumental in the reformulation and re-presentation 
of its own ethnic category, mustering such indigenous support as would prove 
sufficient to convince the government. Agitated ethnic populations, excited about 
inflammatory and externally intelligible differences such as language and religion, 
were clearly useful to this end. Even here, where one seemed close to a materialist 
reading of interest, and action (driven by circumstance, rather than by shared 
convention), there was evidence to support a constructivist analysis, as rural 
populations lent their support to campaigns evidently likely to disadvantage them. 
 
Chapter VII accumulated a variety of evidence of the contemporary (re)construction 
of ethnic identity formations in response to the experienced constraints and 
opportunities of ethnic federalism. Investigation of the kinds of markers of identity 
employed and deployed by ethnic groups demonstrated that these processes of 
construction utilised the resources of already existing bodies of conventional 
knowledge: groups did not innovate from scratch. Problems emerged, when a shift of 
perceived interest under ethnic federalism prompted a shift of relevant categorisation 
such as to foster that interest. In a context where ethnic categories were rendered 
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salient, it was often ethnic categories that were redrawn. The account suggested the 
underdetermination of the link between interest and categorisation, and the fact that 
both are contingent upon collective convention. Relevant interest was not objective 
but collectively known interest; and markers of ethnicity were restricted to the 
‘known’ emblems of which the group was conscious, rather than the objective 
features potentially evident to the analyst.  
 
* * * 
 
In Section Two of this thesis (Chapters IV and V), ethno-nationalist activity did not 
emerge immediately from local, if widespread resentment at the iniquity of 
nineteenth century imperial expansion. Its emergence was contingent not upon an 
aggregate of individual resentments of objective circumstance, but on the emergence 
of a shared conviction that the situation should be categorised as iniquitous and 
could and should therefore be resisted: such a conviction could emerge only from 
collective interaction in addition to individual experience. Thus, in symmetrical 
fashion, ethnic federalism per se did not trigger new categorisations of ethnicity: 
each group, and indeed sections of each group, responded in different ways and at 
different times on the basis of their knowledge, that is, their conventional 
categorisation of their circumstances and interests.   
 
I suggested in Chapter II that much can be gained from adopting a position of 
cognitive relativism which, far from denying the impact of the ‘real world’, or ‘the 
effect of the facts’, nevertheless refocuses our quest for explanation away from 
reality onto belief/knowledge: specifically onto the attempt to identify all factors 
which may be involved in accounting both for beliefs which we may believe to be 
false and for those which we may believe to be true.   
 
It is important to stress the primacy of group beliefs, whether true or false, (the emic 
perspective) in accounting for group constructions of identity and action based on 
that (construction of) identity, and to prioritise ‘awareness’ above ‘visibility’ in terms 
of what makes ‘cultural similarity or difference useful as an “identity marker”’ 
(Schlee 1994). Given the prevalence of ethnographic studies of the ‘content’ of group 
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identity, ethnicity, or culture, it is perhaps important to stress that emic and etic 
categories are useful only if we insist upon their use ‘relative to’ particular categories 
and perspectives. Making this point is not to contribute to ‘the impossible task of 
sustaining members’ accounts of their own practices as the only acceptable ones’ 
(Barnes 2000:78n7): to put it as a truism members’ beliefs (accessed primarily 
through their accounts) must only be privileged when what we want to get at is what 
members believe. It is simply to reiterate that we should not encourage a hierarchical 
approach to external and internal perspectives – both in the sense of one being better 
than the other (more ‘successful’ in coping with (and corresponding to) ‘reality’), 
and in terms of one being more extensive and encompassing the other.  
 
Donham’s groundbreaking ‘ethnographic history’ (1999) has explored the interface 
between modernity and tradition as embodied and experienced by the cadres of the 
Marxist government of the 1980s, and those they worked amongst and administered 
in remote rural areas of Debub Omo. The problem of differences of understanding, 
outlook, or worldview is clearly apparent as a factor in relation to the operation of 
notions about ethnicity, identity, nations, nationalities, and peoples under ethnic 
federalism. The TPLF has laid great stress on the way in which it ‘learned from the 
peasants’ (i.e. developed an emic perspective) whilst trying to establish itself in 
Tigray. Young’s seminal study of the movement (1996) has documented a number of 
respects in which the organisation may have been successful because it learned – 
with relative sophistication – to approach differences of interest from premises which 
could largely be shared or at least understood by the peasantry. The protracted 
emergence of a relatively emic understanding on the part of the political leadership in 
Tigray vis-à-vis sections of the population of their constituents, and of a somehow 
‘collaborative’ approach to the political objectives of the party and interests of the 
(majority of the) people of Tigray contrasts significantly which what can be 
documented of the establishment of EPRDF-affiliated organisations in other parts of 
the country. It required a long and intensive process of living and working together.  
 
When the TGE devised the new ethnic map of the country, it was essentially draw up 
on the basis of ‘expert’ opinion, rather than the views of the relevant populations. 
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The process did have some redeeming features. In its favour, the TGE did not define 
very clearly what they meant by nations nationalities and peoples; they did try to get 
some self-definition in the early days by encouraging people to mobilise as they 
wished (and for this were roundly criticised for ethnicising politics and stirring up 
hatreds); and the government has - belatedly - been relatively flexible in considering 
demands for changes in the system (and probably thereby effectively encouraged 
other divisions on the ground). 
 
On the other hand, it is relatively clear that the party did have a strong sense of what 
it meant by a nation, nationality, or people, and went a long way to impose its 
understanding in drafting the arrangements. Here it was fortunate (in its own terms) 
in having a number of willing allies – some of whom shared the ideological 
understanding of their generation, and others of whom went along with the idea for 
other reasons. As good Marxists, EPRDF believed that the nationality issue was a 
transient one. They understood that ethnic identity was malleable, open to 
manipulation, and likely to dissolve in the face of economic integration, or because 
of political mobilisation. On the other hand, in order to administer the country on the 
basis of it, they needed a convincingly ‘objective’ marker to determine how to divide 
the country up. Language emerged as the only suitable and desirable criterion (for 
both objectives), and the mixed experiences of the strategy were explored in Section 
Three. 
 
At this point a brief return to the ideas of Scott mentioned in Chapter I, is relevant. 
The introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia might well have presented an 
opportunity for a move away from the high modernism of the recent past, in favour 
of something akin to what Scott calls mtis (1998). Mtis seem to be a product of 
locally rooted conventional knowledge, taking account of local circumstances and 
local experiences and understandings of them. Much of the evidence of Section 
Three of the thesis (Chapters VI and VII) suggests that in implementing ethnic 
federalism, the regime took shortcuts, incorporating and adopting the perspectives of 
elite ethnic interlocutors, and imposing standard ethnic categories on the basis of a 
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checklist of Stalinist criteria, rather than taking on the arduous task of investigating 
patterns of local knowledge.  
 
* * * 
 
At the beginning of Chapter II I set out three sets of poles between which the 
literature on ethnicity has oscilated: between intrumentalism and primordialism; 
between culture and boundary; and between individual and society. In concluding 
this thesis, I propose briefly to revisit them in the light of the theoretical and 
empirical discussions that followed.  
 
I have suggested that one may plausibly reject both ‘true’ primordialism and 
‘extreme’ instrumentalism – both of which give (determinist) accounts in which 
human action is a mere automatic reaction to some aspect of ‘reality’, in the sense of 
‘the physical world’ - either to a set of primordial givens, or to the circumstances 
which determine the material interest of the individual. I have suggested that the 
problem here, perhaps, is not so much the determinism, but the direct causal power 
attributed to ‘reality’ on which both accounts rely. There is a wealth of empirical 
evidence to support the claim that it is not ‘reality’ that straightforwardly ‘causes’ 
action, but what the actors believe about that reality. Reality and actors’ experience 
of reality is of course part of what influences the beliefs that individuals form, but, I 
have argued, it is not the only nor, indeed, the most significant influence: if two 
observers of an identical reality believe two different things about it, the ‘reality’ 
itself ‘drops out of the story’, in the sense that – whatever role it may have in 
prompting both understandings, their differences must be otherwise explained. There 
is obviously something other than ‘the effect of the facts’ involved.  
 
Instrumentalism and primordialism both, then, need revising in the light of this 
discussion. How we perceive our individual and collective interests, and how we 
perceive our individual and collective identities will undoubtedly both condition our 
individual and collective calculations and action. Both are premised on collective 
convention, and are functions of the systems of knowledge and interaction in play. 
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As such they cannot be fully separated out, but should both be explored within the 
terms of each collective. Neither ‘objective’ circumstances nor ‘real’ ethnic ‘nature’ 
accounts for the emergence of specific conventions about interest and identity, but 
the fact that we (and the groups in question) think they do remains relevant to the 
efficacy the conventions share. It is the conflation of status and state, of ‘convention’ 
and ‘real world’, which accounts also for the enduring appeal of instrumental and 
primordial accounts, along with our attachment to the idea of the enduring appeal of 
ethnic formation. Whether or not such formations do endure is always a matter of 
contingent – albeit potentially strongly normative - convention. It may also be a 
feature of the ways in which they are marked. 
 
The literature discussed in Chapter II above often makes a sharp distinction between 
the cultural content, and the boundaries of ethnicity, between the salience and 
persona of the ethnic identity in question. On the approach I have set out, culture 
becomes relevant not so much as the persona of ethnic state, but as the set of markers 
which may label an ethnic status, since it is the status rather than the state, as we 
have seen, that is relevant to action. On this approach it becomes clearer how the 
nature of the markers selected in turn influences the nature of the status marked, 
rendering it, for instance, more or less permeable to outsiders, according to the 
degree to which these markers can be ‘adopted’ rather than ‘inherited’. This is the 
‘effect of ‘the facts’’. Alternatively, in the terms more widely familiar, content 
affects boundaries and vice versa: it matters what the indicia, criteria, and markers 
are, but how it matters (what results from a particular selection) is underdetermined 
by the nature of the selection: it is a matter of convention, based on judgements of 
similarity. The possibility that the next judgement assigning status will be the 
exception which significantly changes the category, is always there. 
 
If we think in terms of distribution of knowledge, and the way in which one system 
of knowledge shades into another, the reification of either ethnic boundaries or ethnic 
contents needs to be avoided. This suggests a (potential) solubility of ethnic and 
other categories, likely to cause all sorts of difficulties for empirical research. It also 
suggests the importance of recognising the conventional nature of the concept of the 
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boundary we apply as analysts. Barth’s conclusions to his recent reconsideration of 
the ‘analytical concept of boundaries’ are relevant here. 
 
The evidence for the fundamental role in human thought of fuzzy 
categories, the preconceptual experiential sources for conceptual 
structures, and the role of analogy, metaphor, metonymy and mental 
imagery, the raises some difficult conundrums. It may hold a promise of 
access to other human conceptual worlds; but it seems to place us in a 
hall of mirrors when trying to represent categories and concepts different 
from our own by means of our own language and concepts. (Barth 
2000:34) 
 
Ethnicity needs to be disaggregated in terms of ethnic state and ethnic status. 
Individual ethnic state does not cause, influence, or affect action. It is only the social 
status of ethnicity that is directly relevant to calculations determining action. 
 
Barnes (1983) gives an account which stresses the significance of the pronounced 
physical features of a landscape in ‘damping the oscillation’ inherent in establishing 
how others may behave. To make the point about the essentially social nature of 
ethnicity, one could consider a case in which an individual is trying to establish 
whether another, whom s/he happens upon but does not know, is a co-member of 
her/his ethnic group (say, a friend) or not (a foe). In the case where there is little to 
distinguish the two groups, neither individual can know until, perhaps, it is too late: 
there is nothing to tell whether the other is a friend or foe until they have spoken. So 
if the two groups to which the individuals belonged looked visibly different, and 
these differences were regarded by both as salient the encounter might be likely to 
be different, as the relevant knowledge of each would relate to observable markers, 
by means of which each might be able to establish to which group the other 
belonged, and very quickly. This is ‘the effect of the facts’ – the significance of the 
markers. One the other hand, this effect is contingent upon the conventions in play. 
The two might look entirely different but, if this fact did not constitute part of what 
marked the statuses in question, it would not influence their attribution. 
 
This example of individuals removed from their collective environment, raises 
questions akin to those involved in the debate about private language. In the same 
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way, for instance, that meaning is meaningless and inaccessible in a private 
language, ethnicity is meaningless and inaccessible to a single individual marooned 
alone on a desert island: it is an inherently social status. One may then wish to 
consider whether, how, and why an individual could remain a member of an ethnic 
group when on her or his own. There is a sense in which ‘s/he is if s/he thinks s/he is’ 
– i.e. if s/he knows that there is a collective of which s/he is a member, and which 
regards her/him as a member. Yet delusion is not enough to make her/him a member 
of an ethnic group: the knowledge about knowledge is not arbitrary in the sense of 
‘fully up to the individual’ (although it always remains partly up to the individual), 
as it must be shared by the collectivity. Ethnicity, then, is not a property of 
individuals qua individual. 
 
Having problematised the three dichotomies in terms of which ethnicity has been 
discussed, in favour of an emphasis on distributions of conventional knowledge, it is 
perhaps appropriate to return to the neglected fourth of Banks’ oscillations, between 
ethnicity as an all inclusive theory, and ethnicity as a limited approach to particular 
problems. Working with a general theory of social order and the conventional social 
basis of knowledge, I have suggested that the elaboration of ethnic statuses such as 
may inform action, are contingent contemporary processes of local, self-referential 
knowledge construction. Ethnicity as a status is a social kind, and as such it (its 
referent) is exhausted by self-reference. It is a product of local patterns of interaction, 
and in consequence it might be more appropriate to talk in terms of ethnicities rather 
than ethnicity. On this basis, pace Horowitz (1985), we should perhaps continue to 
prioritise empirical research, to extend understanding of the knowledge bases and 
variation of specific, local conventions of ethnicity, over further theorising. 
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